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WAR FOR SPREAD OF KULTUR /
10 UNREAD GERMAN ROE1: "Ah, dearHerr Poet, ourungratu nuii not davejread us, but she has gone to war to make the foreigners do so!"







Before 1914 the German university system and German
scholarship occupied a position of special prestige. The outbreak
of the First World War not only severed ties of friendship and
common endeavour between British and German scholars, but also
seriously undermined the reputation of German Wissenschaft* British
academics, hitherto admirers of German achievements, now claimed
to have long harboured doubts as to the tone of German academic
life. Others, like Lord Bryce, who had worked to promote Anglo-
German understanding now joined the propaganda battle against
Germany.
Intellectuals in all belligerent states saw the war as a
great ideological contest. British philosophers provided an ideo¬
logical exegesis for German policy, although the legacy of Hegel
gave considerable difficulties for the neo-Xdealist school then
dominant in British universities. The historian's traditional
explanation of Britain's role in the world was given greater impor¬
tance by the German claim that the war was a contest for world
empire.
The war also posed an intellectual problem for academics.
Before 1914 there had been little discussion of the questions of
war and peace amongst British academics. When war forced liberal
academics to face moral issues, only Bertrand Russell stood out in
total opposition to government policy. Gilbert Murray and Lowes
Dickinson provide more typical examples of the behaviour of liberal
intellectuals under the stress of war.
iii.
In Britain the eulogy of war may have been more muted than
it was in Germany or France, the persecution of academic "dissenters"
less intense than in the United States, but the involvement of
academics as publicists and propagandists of the national cause was
not less marked than in other belligerent states. However, the
theme is not one of "betrayal". The commitment of British academics
to value-free objective enquiry before the war was, in reality, as
illusory as the similar claims of their German colleagues.
iv.
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"The 'intellectual' is terribly sensitive to the
approval and disapproval of rulers ind other
authorities in the outside vorld. His strong per¬
sonal sympathies are engaged in keeping the good
opinion of successful practical men. The knovledge
that he and his fellows and the intellectual life they
conduct are not directly productive of economic values,
and are in this sense 'parasitic' on the practical
life, feeds the sentiment of deference. His feeling
for the dignity and importance of his intellectual
function no doubt stands out more clearly in his
'consciousness', but underneath, in the hidden recesses
of his mind, the sense of weakness and inferiority rankles.
Man is primarily a doer, not a thinker."
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INTRODUCTION
This is a study of the effect of the First World War on one group
of British intellectuals, namely the university men or academics. Intel¬
lectuals in many countries saw the war as a great ideological conflict.
Never before nad so many of them employed tneir talents as publicists
and propagandists for the various national causes; never Defore had
the international exchange of ideas been so disrupted by war. The involve¬
ment of intellectuals in the battle raised questions which are still un¬
resolved and which sure the subject of fierce debate.x Some examination,
therefore, of the impact of the war on British academics would be interest¬
ing for this reason alone. Further justification for the study lies
in the relative neglect of the "higher learning" in Britain by historians.
The role of German professors as "educators of the nation" has received
considerable attention recently and part of the reason for this lies in
the desire to explain the failure of German universities to offer signi-
2
ficant resistance to fascism. In a similar fashion McCarthyism in America
of the 1950s prompted Richard Hofstadter an . Walter Metzger to trace the
American tradition of academic freedom,"5 and a recent study of American
academics ana the First World War seems to have been written with the
example of the "new mandarins" in mind.
1. E.g. see: W.E. Steinkraus, "War and the Philosopher's Duty" in
pie Critique of War, Chicago, 1969, pp. 15-25; C.C. O'Brien,'Politics and the Morality of Scholarship" in The Morality of Scholar¬
ship, Ithaca, Li.Y., 19b7, p. 71.
2. E.g. F.K. Ringer, The Decline of the German Mandarins, Cambridge,
Mass., 1969; C.F. McClelland, The German Historians and England,
Cambridge, ly'fl, K. Schwabe, Wisaensckuft u. -iriegsiaoral, Gottingen,
1969; W. Schenk, Die deutsch-englisch Rivalitat vor deia ersten
Weltkrieg in uer Sicht deutscher iiistoriker, Aarau, 1967.
3. The Development of Academic Freedom in the United States, N.Y., 1955.
h. C.S. Gruber, srs and Minerva, Baton Rouge, 1975. See G.T. Blakey,
Historians on the Homefront, Lexington, Ky., 1973, for a less
imaginative approach.
X .
The present study, therefore, vas horn of an interest in "the
social role of the nan of knowledge"—to use Florian Znaniecki's phrase.x
British academics were part of what has been termed an "intellectual
aristocracy"/' a group bound together by ties of kinship and shared
assumptions. The removal of the requirement of celibacy for college
fellowships at Oxford and Cambridge in 1832 was important in the develop¬
ment of this group. More young men were encouraged to remain at the
two ancient universities to teach, and this, together with the expansion
of university education outside Oxford and Cambridge, fostered the develop¬
ment of a group of full-time academics. Smaller and less distinct as a
group compared to their German counterparts, yet what has been said of
the German "mandarins" night also be said of them: that they considered
themselves "members of a distinct cultured segment of the nation"; that
"their writings testified to the existence of a highly integrated and
relatively homogeneous intellectual community." because the British
academics provided a definable focus for a study of the effect of the war
on opinions and attitudes, the wider community, of intellectuals who diu
. . 4
not work in universities were generally excluded.
In another way, too, the present study is restrictive. From a
variety of possible lines of enquiry, two in particular have been selected.
X, F. Znanieckt, The Social Role of the Man of Knowledge, N.Y., 195*
2. U. Annan, !The Intellectual Aristocracy" in Studies in Social History,
1955, pp. 241-87.
3. Ringer, p. 3.
4. There are stuuies of major figures like Shaw and Wells. See B.
Schultze, .-.G. ..ells u. der Erste Welt^rie Berlin, 1971; S.
Weintraub,Journey to heartbreak: The Crucible Years of Bernar
Shaw 191-- 1973. See also K.£. Roby, A Writer at War Arnold
Benneth --1918. Baton Rouge, 1972; B. Bergonzi, heroes Twilight
A Study o;.~ literature of the Great War, 1965.
The first concerns the impact of the war on the close ties between
British and German scholars. The second concerns the reactions of
British academics to the war itself. The first is thus concerned not
just with the disruption of ••proving international cooperation between
men of learning, but also with the fall of Germany from the unique position
it had formerly occupied in the minds of scholars. The second theme
is of war as an intellectual problem, a social phenomenon, requiring
analysis and explanation. Before 191^ there had been little discussion
of questions of war and peace by British academics—European war had
come to seem unthinkable to all but a few perceptive observers, like
Graham Wallas. Significantly, Wallas was one of the small number of
university men interested in the new field of social psychology, and with
the outbreak of war in 19lk liberal academics like Lowes Dickinson and
Bertrand Russell had to come to terms with the apparently irrational
forces whi h had involved European states in fraticidal conflict. The
war had brought a number of important issues to the attention of intel¬
lectuals—how could war ever be right?; or, how far should the intellectual
maintain a position of critical detachment from official policy?; or,
wherein lay the root cause of war in the modern world?
Many academics (perhaps most) vent on quietly with their work, as f• r
as wartime conditions permitted, relatively untouched by the conflict.
Research could continue even if there were no students to teach. The
belief that one's professional life could be separated from the world
outside was more easily sustained in some disciplines than in others.
For a chemist the demands of total war were immediately felt, and univer¬
sity departments were heavily involved in munitions and gas warfare
research."'" On the other hand, science had traditionally known no frontiers-
1. The Chemical Advisory Committee and Chemical Warfare Committee of
the Ministry of Munitions included university professors (5 and
9 respectively—a majority of members in each case). The universities
xii.
there was as yet no talk of "German physics' . But this study is not
concerned with scientists except insofar as they wrote (as did Sir Oliver
Lodge of Birmingham University) on the issues which intellectuals claimed
were involved in the war."1' most of the peo-le who appear in the following
pages are historians or philosophers. In all countries historians see;:
to have been the most prolific and influential apologists for the war.'
That this was so was due to the status enjoyed by history as an academic
subject and to the status historians enjoy - .s "national pedagogues".
This term has been used to describe the Wilhelmine professors like Sybel
and Treitschne, and their disciples, who were so prominent in the struggle
3
for German unification, and later in Germany's growth as a world power.
But British historians had a similar, though less obvious, role in pre¬
senting justifications for Britain's position as a world power. Their
tone is more judicious and restrained than that of German historians, but
they were equally arguing a case. Those British nistorians, like
Arnold Toynbee, who worked for the official propaganda machine and crossed
of Birmingham, Bristol, Cambridge and Edinburgh were among those
engaged on research on poison gases. At Imperial College similar
work began even before the Germans used gas on the Western Front.
See: M. Sanderson, The Universities anu oritish Industry 1850-1970,
1972, pp. 219-23; "The Universities and the War", Yearbook of the
Universities of the Empire, 1918-20, rp. 420-1, 424, 440. After the
war there was some debate among academics on the ethics of gas war¬
fare research. See nature, CIV, 4 Nov. 1920 (310), II iiov . 1920 (343)
and 18 Nov. 1920 (375).
1. Similarly, "technical" discussion anion economists (e.g. on how to
"pay" for the war) has been ignored, and the writings of academic
economists used only where they were concerned with the general issues
of war and peace.
2. In Britain the obvious exception was Gilbert Murray, Regius Professor
of Greek at Oxford. The writings of academic theologians were fairly
numerous too, but they have been dealt with in at least two recent works:
A. Marrin3 Tne Last Crusade: The Church of England in the First
World War, Durham, H. Carolina, 1975 and S.P. Mews, "Religion and
English Society in the First World War , Ph.D. thesis, Cambridge, 1975.
3. H. Flaig, "The Historian as Pedagogue of the Nation", History, LIX,
195 (Feb. 1974), 18-32.
a dividing line between academic history and official history which was
never very clear, and even less so during wartime. Talk of "treason of
the clerks" suggests a state of freedom from political entanglement
before the war which was never true of the ritish "intellectual
aristocracy".x
British philosophers were called upon not so auch to justify official
policy (although some like Sir Henry Jones proved the equal of historians
in this) but rather to explain what had gone wrong in Germany. This
process was continued, with a brief interruption, after the war in the
ideological exegesis of national socialism. For some philosophers it was
an exercise in self-defence since British philosophy owed much to German
Idealism. For others, like L.T. Hobhouse, the war provided an opportunity
for renewed attacks on neo-Hegelian orthodoxy. For a younger generation
of philosophers led by Russell and G.E. Moore the argument over the
alleged 1;gacy of German Idealism seemed less important than tne task of
criticising the wartime growth in the authority of the state. It is per¬
haps no paradox that the harshest criticism of Germany after 191*+ came
from erstwhile Germanophile academics, generally men who had reached
intellectual maturity well before 191*+. For the younger generation, "it
was French culture and newly-discovered glories of Russian literature,
2
music and ballet that mattered". To Bloomsbury intellectuals all the
talk of a war on behalf of civilization (by those who claimed that Ger¬
mans fought for Kultur) seemed quite irrelevant. But only Russell of
1. "The influence of these families may partly explain a paradox which
has puzzled European and American observers of English life: the
paradox of an intelligensia which appears to conform rather than
rebel against the rest of society." Annan, pp. 285-6.
2. J. Mander, Our German Cousins, 197*+, p. 12.
the younger generation of academics stood out against the idea of the
"holy Y/ar". He had the personal and intellectual qualities required
of the political dissenter at a time when opinion was strongly in favour
of Britain's entry to the war. That he was tile only academic strongly
critical of the government policy says much about the generally acquiescent
attitude of most of his fellow-philosophers, not only in Britain but
in all the belligerent states. Yet the protection of unpopular opinion
(if not the holding of such) should have been one of the first duties of
philosophers, Just as the critical scrutiny of government policy (and
the evidence presented in "white papers") was supposedly the concern of
historians.
The limits of political dissent within universities were seriously
circumscribed by hostile public opinion and by government action (as in
the restrictions on Russell's movements) but academic freedom suffered
most seriously from, assault within the academic community itself. Ger¬
man-born professors whose loyalty to Britain was not seriously in doubt
suffered at the hands of hostile local communities in Leeds, Birmingham
and Aberystwyth. Jut the treatment of Russell and A.C. Pigou, was a
serious reflection on the behaviour of Cambridge dons—at best paying
off old academic scores when the war offered an opportunity, at worst
ignoring the idea that universities could be sanctuaries for men of
independent mind. That there were not other cases at other universities
(there was one at Oxford) was due more to trie political docility (or
enthusiasm for the war) of academics, one suspects, than to any climate
of tolerance. Academic freedom was as precarious where universities
were traditionally autonomous, as it was in countries where universities
were state institutions (Germany) or dependent on local communities
(American state universities). There were more dismissals in America because
there were many more academics. If there was nothing in Britain to compare
XV.
vith the manifesto of "the ninety-three", which virtually every German
professor signed, there was (apart from Russell) as little attempt to
question the war in Britain as in Germany.
After the war this theme of "betrayal' was taken up by J.A. Eobson,
an economist who existed outside the acauemic community. In 1926 he
wrote that the "graver perils to free-thought and scientific progress
in the social sciences" lay not in the forced suDordination of scholars
to the state, but rather in the "timid conservatism" of professors "and
their genuine class sympathies and reverences." The enemy was within.
Professors were "not so much the intellectual mercenaries of the vested
interests as their volunteers".^ A year later Julien Benda expressed the
same idea in the memorable phrase la trahison des clercs. Although an
2
English translation appeared Benda's book "received curiously little
3attention in England". In America errant wartime academics were
scourged by H.L. Mencken's young men in the pages of American Mercury.
The titles of the articles - "The Historians Cut Loose" and "The Higher
1+
Learning Goes to War" - give some indication of the approach. In Britain
the academics closed ranks and there was no inquest on what had gone
wrong with historians and philosophers in 191^. hot until the 1930s was
there discussion of the role of the "secular intellectual" in British
society.*
1. Free Thought in the Social Sciences, 192b, pp. 5^~5. "The definite
fear of losing a teaching post plays but a small part in sterilising
the scientific impulse as compared with the more constant and insid¬
ious breathing of this conservative atmosphere."
2. By Richard Aldington. The Great Betrayal (1928).
3. R.H. Mowat "The Treachery of the Intellectuals", Hibbert J., XXXIII,
3 (1935), 321.
4. The authors respectively, C.H. Grattan & C. Angoff: American Mercury
XI, kh (Aug. 1927), lat-30 & XI, (June 1927), 177-91.
5. Cf. E. Shils, "British Intellectuals in the mid-Twentieth Century"
(April 1955) repr. in The Intellectuals & the Powers, Chicago, 1972,
p. 139.
But the theme of "betrayal" is not the only one which characterises
the wartime behaviour of British academics (and German, French and
American ones for that matter). For betrayal implies something betrayed,
and the commitment of historians in 191^ to value-free history (and for
that matter, of philosophers to "pure" ideas divorced from social context)
arouses a wry smile fifty or so years later.
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I: GERMAN INFLUENCE ON BRITISH ACADEMIC LIFE BEFORE 19lk
"It is said that every educated man is at heart either a
Roman or a Greek, and there are many arguments to he adduced
in support of the theory. In modern times Englishmen seem to
fall into one of two categories, that is to say there is
something they would find it very hard to define which pre¬
disposes them in favour either of France or of Germany".
Sir Charles Fetrie, The Chamberlain Tradition (1938)
The influence of German universities and scholarship in the
world of learning in the second half of the nineteenth century was
as great, if not greater, than that exerted by American institutions
of higher education since the Second World War. The German example
was responsible for what has been called a "knowledge revolution"^"
in Britain, and the same is true of the rest of Europe and North
America in the sixty or so years before the outbreak of the First
World War. While German philosophy and biblical criticism profoundly
influenced individuals in the late 18th and early 19th century, the
second half of the nineteenth century saw an "institutionalization"
of German learning in Britain. As an American historian has put it:
"...the clerics, aesthetes, and amateurs in all things German
gave way increasingly to the professionals. No longer was it
literateurs and biblical students who spread the new learning;
they were replaced by professional philosophers, historians,
philologists, jurists, physicians and scientists. This is the
meaning of the phrase, 'the institutionalization of the German
influence' . Within this phrase are included the professional-
ization of various disciplines, the introduction of new subjects
of study,the creation of schools of thought, as well as changes
made in existing English institutions as the result of the Ger¬
man influence."2
1. The phrase in this context is from S. Rothblatt, Tradition and
Change in English Liberal Education, 1976.
2. G. Haines, Essays on German Influence upon English Education and
Science 1830-1919. Hamden, Conn. 1969, p. k. Cf. W. Schirmer,
' German Literature, Historiography and Theology in 19th-century
England", German Life and Letters, NS. I, 3 (April 19^8), 168.
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Tracing the transfer of culture is never a simple matter, and this
is especially true of German influence on British academic life before
1914. The transformation of intellectual values under the impact of
tnis influence was uneven. What has been said of German observers
of Britain could equally be said of those involved in the observation
of things German—that "travel does not modify people's opinions very
significantly; it merely provides them with words to express what
otherwise might remain not only unsaid, but also unthought."^ Cer¬
tainly, of the British scholars who visited Germany before 191^, some
were repelled by the atmosphere of German universities while others
were greatly attracted by German Wissenschaft. "For German intellec¬
tual achievements to be appreciated in Britain there had to be, to begin
with, a predisposition to accept the fundamental assumptions behind
the idea of the new Knowledge. Simple contact and exposure are not
sufficient; for these, as is well known, are frequently double edged.
They enforce national prejudice and insularity as much as they challenge
2
them.Among those who wished to reform Oxford and Cambridge and
to revive a tradition of research in British universities the German
example was a potent one. But the fact that they were generally more
articulate than their opponents in this matter should not obscure the
fact that there wa3 always a body of more conservatively minded dons
relatively unaffected by, or suspicious of, German scholarship—the
"Chorus of Cloudy Professors" in the verse satire by H.L. Mansel
1. Ralf Dahrendorf cit. C.F. McClelland, German Historians & England,
Cambridge,1971, p. 1^.
2. Rothblatt, Tradition..., p. 165.
3
contained the following much-quoted lines:
"Professors we,
From over the sea,
From tne land where professors in plenty be^
And we thrive and flourish as well we may,
In the land that produced one Kant with a K
And many cants with a C."^
However, the intellectual torpor of Oxford and Cambridge in
the first half of the nineteenth century encouraged reform-minded
dons, like Mark Pattison of Lincoln College, Oxford, to look spprecia-
2
tively at the vigorous university system of Germany. After the mid-
century reform of the ancient universities research facilities were
still slow to develop and many serious-minded students went to Germany
for higher study. Between 1835 and i860 an increasing number of
British students matriculated at German universities. Between 1890 and
3191^ the increase in numbers was slower. Of course, British students
did not flock to Germany in such numbers as did Americans, and after
1850 they were greatly outnumbered by the latter. But the largest
group of foreign students at German universities (apart from the
Austrians and Swiss whose universities, for all practical purposes,
were part of the German system) was Russian. In 1880 they made up
18$ of the student body, as against 15.5$ American and 6$ British.''
1. Scenes from an Unfinished Drama Entitled Phrontisterion, or,
Oxford in tne 19th Century, 1652.
2. See J. Sparrow, Mark Pattison & the Idea of a University, Cambridge,
1967, pp. 110-25.
3. See the table in G. Hollenberg, Lngliscne Interesse Am Kaiserreich,
Wiesbaden, 197^, p. 29*+» There seem to have been temporary drops
in the number of students in the early 1870s, 1880s and 1900s.
*+. Table in J. Conrad, The German Universities for the Last 50 Years,
Glasgow, 1685,p. *+1. The numbers of British students rose from
26 (1835) to k2 (i860) to 71 (i860), but they still remained 5$
to 6% of the total. American students rose sharply in number and
percentage from U (l%) in 1835 to 77 (10.5$) in i860 and 173 (15.5$)
in l880. According to L. Veysey, the number of American students
declined after the mid-l890s. The Lmgergence of the American
University, Chicago, 1965, p. 131.
5. Conrad, p. Ul.
k
In the case of Russian students political reasons were, no doubt,
important in their decision to study in Germany. For the British
and American students there were two great attractions. First,
tiie accessibility of the German university—admission requirements were
often minimal,living costs were low, and once matriculated the student
could wander from university to university in Germany, Austria-
Hungary and Switzerland. Secondly, there was the attraction of studying
under many of the leading scholars in their fields.
In 1911 A.J. Carlyle, the historian of medieval political thought,
told the Albert Committee that, the "position of the great German
nation in philosophy, science and literature was so powerful that
students were bound to study German and go to Germany if they were of
any promise.""*" And the list of British scholars who did study in
Germany is a long and distinguished one. Among historians, Lord Acton,
J.B. Bury, G.G. Coulton, H.W.C. Davis, H.A.L. Fisher, A.G. Little,
Ramsay Muir, Reginald Lane Poole, G.W. Prothero, R.W. Seton-Watson,
and E.L. Woodward. Among economic historians, W.J. Ashley, J.H. Clap-
ham, William Cunningham and George Unwin. Among philosophers, J. Cook,
Wilson, Henry Siagwick, W.R. Sorley, Norman Kemp Smith, James Ward.
Among theologians, J.S. MacKinnon, John Oman, W.P. Paterson. Among
philologists and classicists, E.V. Arnold, J.S. Blackie, Ingram Bywater,
H.M. Chadwick, L.R. Farnell, Henry Nettleship, John Rhys, and Henry
Sweet. And finally, two early figures in the "new" fields of anthro-
2
pology and psychology, R.R. Marett and W.M. McDougall. Lord Bryce,
1. Times Educational Supplm. 10 (6 June 1911), 91. The Albert
Committee sought to promote the study of German in British
schools and universities.
Z. For a fuller list see appendix h•
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who later became one of the strongest supporters of the German idea of
the university, as a newly-electea Fellow of Oriel College, Oxford, had
in 1863 travelled to Heidelberg "resolved to pass a semester studying
law under Von Vangerow and perfecting himself in the knowledge of the
German language". Later with Henry Nettleship at Dresden they met up
with A.V. Dicey and T.H. Green chaperoning a party of Oxford under¬
graduates. "Our society is a little Oxford transplanted to Germany",
Dicey wrote."'" Half a century later, when ne was British Ambassador
to the United States, Bryce remembered his WanderJohre and listed for a
student audience at the University of Wisconsin the attractions of
German universities—"completeness of...teaching organisation,...the
amplitude of the provision of instruction in every branch of knowledge
...» and...the services they render to the prosecution of research".
On the whole, "the level of learning among the teachers" was "perhaps
2
higher than anywhere else."
But, even more than these measureable attractions, it was the
spirit of German scholarship which made German universities so attrac¬
tive. Academic freedom (lehrfreiheit) and scientific method were the
two features which Michael Sadler noted in his preface to Friedrich
Paulsen's classic work The German Universities and University Study:
"The secret of the greatness of all institutions lies not in the form
of their organisation, or in their legal, status, or in their financial
resources, though of course each of these has an important bearing
upon their efficiency and well-being, but in the spirit of their work
1. Bryce cit. H.A.L. Fisher, James Bryce, 1927, I. 53-9. Dicey
eit. R.S. Rait (ed.) Memorials of Albert Venn Dicey, 1925, p. 36.
2. "The Mission of the State Universities" (June 1908), University
and Historical Addresses, 1913, pp. 156-?.
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and in the unwritten tradition of public service. It is the inner
tradition of German university life, the spirit which animates and
controls them, that most deserves study and excites our admiration.
The German universities have become strong and great through un¬
tiring devotion to science, through belief in the power of education,
through resolute defence of intellectual freedom, and through
personal obligation to the claims of the state.""'"
During the First World War Sadler was to have second thoughts about
2
this last feature of German universities, but in 1906 his admiration
was not at all unusual (although as we shall see observers as differ¬
ent as L.T. Hobhouse and A.E. Ilousman were already expressing doubts).
3
The belief of some British scholars in Wissenschaft was almost religious
in intensity. As an American historian has put it, they "zealously
4
devoted their lives to the service of an unchurched and unknown God.1'
That most serious-minded historian Lord Acton wrote admiringly in the
first number of the English Historical Review (1886) of the "familiar
type of German scholar..., ...the man who complained that the public
library allowed him only 13 hours a day to read, the man who spent
1. pp. vi-vii.
2. See below chapter 1+.
3. Literally scholarship, science, learning, but with connotations.
As Walter Metzger notes: "The very notion of Wissenschaft had over¬
tones of meaning utterly missing in its English counterpart,
science. The German term signified a dedicated, sanctified pur¬
suit. It signified not merely the goal of rational understanding,
but the goal of self-fulfilment; not merely the study of the 'exact
sciences' but of everything taught by the university; not the
study of things for their immediate utilities, but the morally
imperative study of things for themselves and for their ultimate
meaning." R. Hofstadter 3s W. Metzger, The Development of Academic
Freedom in the United StateB, U.Y. 1955, p. 373.
L. Haines, Essays.., , p. llL.
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thirty years on one volume, the man who wrote on Homer in IdOo and.
who still wrote on liomer in 1870, the man who discovered the 358 passages
in which I)ichty3 had imitated 5allust.,,J"
In the same article Acton had spoken of Humboldt forcing "the
,2link between science and force by organisiu a university at Berlin.
And although he did not enlarge on this, he seems to have been refer¬
ring to the new conception of the university which arose in Germany—
as symbols of (and contributors towards) national development and
3
progress. This was the image of the German university which observers
like Sadler and Bryce stressed. It was the same image implicit in the
title of an early history of the movement for university reform—Lewis
Campbell's On the nationalisation of the English Universities (1901).4
hot only were German university laboratories seen, increasingly after
1870, as the source of important technological innovation, but the Ger¬
man university generally came to be seen as a symbol of wealth and
power. As German industry forged ahead there seems to have been a
growing fear in Britain of wnat we would now call a "laboratory gap".
Something of this can be seen in the comments of M.E. Grant Duff a
1. "German Schools of history", repr. in historical Essays & Studies,
1907, p. 370. Robert Browning's "Christmas Eve" offered the roman¬
tic vision of a medieval university town:
"The tall old quaint irregular town/It may be...though which,
I can't affirm...any/Of the famous middle-age towns ox" Germany:/
And this flight of stairs where I sit down,/Is it Halle, Weimar,
Cassel, Frankfort,/Or Gottingen, I have to thank for't?/ It
may be Gottingen—most likely.": section XIV (1850).
2. "German Schools...", p. 370.
3. As the intellectual focus of society the university came to be seen
"as the embodiment of the national mind". P. Farmer, "19th century
Ideas of the University: Continental Europe", in M. Clapp (ed.)
The Modern University, Ithaca, 1950, p. '•). In England and Wales
(less so in Scotland) many scholars and scientists had worked outside
universities (because of religious and pecuniary barriers to entry).
This was at once a consequence and a cause of the intellectual torpor
of Oxford and Cambridge.
U. Campbell was Professor of Greek at St. Andrews and a biographer of
Jowett.
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member of the Royal Commission on Oxford University in the 1850s,
Rector of St. Andrews University in the next decade (1866-72) and
close friend of the Oxford reformers Benjamin Jowett and Mark Patti-
son. "At the beginning of the last century", he told Parliament in
1876, "the German universities were far inferior to our own. A little
more than a hundred years later they were far in advance of them; but
there is nothing to prevent their respective positions being entirely
reversed before the year 1900; if we are only wise now."'*" In Germany
state governments had revived the older universities and £>unded new
2
ones. In Britain it was left, characteristically, to local initiative.
Hartley Institution, Southampton, (1862) Owens College, Manchester,
(1851) Firth College, Sheffield, (1879) and Mason College, Birmingham
(1880) owed their foundation (as colleges of science) to the generosity
of rich manufactuers and merchants. The Yorkshire College of Science
in Leeds was started with money raised by ijublic subscriptions (187^)
and the colleges of the University of Wales at Aberystwyth (1S72),
Cardiff (1883) and Bangor (18810 had similar beginnings.
Envious British eyes looked at the relatively ample German state
assistance to higher education. Sadler who had visited Germany to
study its educational system in 1906 wrote that:
"At no earlier period in our educational history has German
experience in organising intellectual activities had so close
a bearing upon our needs. We find that what has long been going
forward in German universities and technical high schools throws
light upon the place of scientific research in industrial enter¬
prise and iiational well-being. We see that German experience
may guide us, by way both of warning and example, as to the right
relationship between the university and the government or other
1. Cit. Haines, Essays..., p. 102. As late as the 1830s German
students went to Paris for further studies.
2. Berlin (l809),Bonn (l8l8), Munich (1826). Older institutions
were re-established at Breslau (1811), Braunsberg (l8l8) and
Strassburg (1072).
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public bodies from which most of the former receive an increas¬
ing proportion of their resources. As soon as we begin to
consider the true cost of developing the intellectual powers
of the nation we realized that in the bold application of public
funds to higher education and to free scientific education it
was Germany which led the way."l
Was Sadler hinting at dangers in this government-university rela¬
tionship? If he was, he did not elaborate, and British observers
appear not to have recognised the less admirable features of the status
of the German professoriate as civil servants—for example, the mani¬
fest discrimination against Jews and Social Democrats in the competition
p
for professorial chairs. Lord Bryce voiced the feelings of many
academics when he pointed to the "tradition of respect" for universities
"strong in the minds of the German bureaucracy" who had generally been
educated within their walls. This, Bryce felt, was "efficient protec¬
tion". To British eyes official control of German universities might
seem "excessive" but in practice it was not "harmful". Public opinion
3
protected "freedom of teacning".
In Britain there seemed to be little of the German recognition of
universities as national institutions. In Germany, Bryce claimed, "the
whole nation cares for the universities, is proud of the universities,
recognises as perhaps no other nation has ever done, the value for the
practical life of full knowledge and exact training, so that everything
is done which money and organising skill can do to maintain the insti¬
ll
tutions of learning and teaching at the highest level of efficiency."
1. "Preface" to Paulsen, p. vii. Sadler had contributed a number of
special reports on German education to a series issued by the
Board of Education. At this time he was Professor of the History
and Administration of Education at Manchester (1903-11).
2. F.K. Ringer, Decline of the German Mandarins, Cambridge, Mass.
1969, pp. 136-7, 11*1-3.
3. "Mission...", pp. 156-7.
k. Loc. cit.
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How different the situation was in Britainl Until the IOQOb provin¬
cial colleges and universities, and the colleges of London, relied on
public subscriptions, private benefactions, and sometimes finance
from municipal authorities.1 Between 1882 and 1881+ grants from cen¬
tral government were given successively to the new Welsh colleges.
From 1889 government money was provided for eleven colleges and univer¬
sities (fourteen by 1904), but never on a generous scale: in 1904
£54,000, in 1905 £100,000, in 1912 £150,000—still far short of the
half million Sidney Webb had felt was necessary for proper financial
2
support. Up until this time the government had always refused finan¬
cial support, now its support was, at best, half-hearted. Oxford and
Cambridge (apart from small grants for specific projects—generally
scientific) remained outside this system of annual grants until after
the war. However,the two ancient universities were the subject of
government scrutiny and legislation from 1850 onwards.
The reform of Oxford and Cambridge between 1850 and 1882—what
John Horley called the "long journey towards the nationalisation of
3
the universities" —was also animated by the example of the vigorous
German university system, as well as by dislike of the privileged pos¬
ition of the Church of England. The University Reform Acts of 1854
(Oxford) and 1856 (Cambridge) which ended tne control of university
administration by the heads of colleges and which removed religious
U
tests for matriculation and bachelor's degrees, were a disappointment
1. Nottingham College was financed by the city council.
2. R.O. £erdahl,British Universities and the State, 1959, pp. 48-57.
3« Git. Berdahl, p. 42.
4. But not for the M.A. (and hence a vote in Convocation) or fellow¬
ships.
11
for reforming dons. Further reforms during the 1870s which they
secured from Parliament have been somewhat overshadowed by tne mia-
century reforms, however, the legislation of the 1870a was in some
ways even more far-reaching mid certainly more obviously influenced
by the German example."1" The reformers looked at German achievements
in science and traced them to "the internal structure and organisa-
2
tion of German univei'sities." And it was no coincidence that German
influence had been more marked in the 1370s, for had not France's
defeat by Prussia been a striking demonstration ox Acton's "link
between science and force"? The cattle of Sedan had been won in the
3
lecture halls of Berlin, the laboratories of Giessen.
However, the Oxford and Cambridge which emerged from the scrutiny
of the Royal Commission of l873~77 and the enacting statutes of 1882
were by no means replicas of contemporary German universities. Even
among the reform party at Oxford, for example, there had not been total
acceptance of the German university model. Jowett, who was Master
of Balliol by 1870, stressed the need to maintain what was best of the
traditional collegiate structure. The prime concern of the don
Jowett saw as undergraduate teaching rather than his own research. Against
this Mark Pattison argued for a university organised for research, on
1. See Minutes of Evidence before the Royal Commission on the University
of Oxford (l88l), Part I, esp. pp. 55 9 (J.C. Wilson & L.R. Phelps),
108-9 (A.H. Sayce), 173 (W. Odling), 228-9 (T.K. Cheyne), 108-17
(Max Muller), 295-6 (E.B. Pusey, now more favourable to German Univer¬
sities), 291-2 (H. Liddon), 301-10 (R.W. Macan), 867 (J. Bryce).
2. J.Ben-David & A.Zloczower, "Universities & Academic Systems in Modern
Societies", European J.of Sociology, III (1962), I18.
3. W.J. Ashley felt that the 30 or so years before 1870 were "marked in
England by an almost complete ignorance of contemporary German thought."
J.S. Mill was typical with his "superficial and second-hand acquain¬
tance" with "Gei-man speculations and investigations." "It was indeed
the time of Germany'3 humiliation and I suppose the victories of 1870
did more to make us learn German than any spontaneous enlargement of
interest." "The Present Position of Political Economy", in Die
Entwicklung der deutschen Volkswirtschaftslehre im 19 Jahrnundert,
Leipzig, 1908, I, 9.
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a faculty rather than a collegiate basis, and concerned to produce
"a professional class of learned and scientific Bien".^ Significantly,
it was Jovett's vision which prevailed. The Royal Commission, faced
with the difficult task of apportioning the respective areas of colle¬
giate and university (i.e. professorial) teaching, and perhaps believing
that the collegiate structure had certain advantages, left the organis¬
ation of teaching in reformed Oxford for adjustment within the univer¬
sity. Jowett's proposals, being less radicau than Pattison's, secured
2
the necessary support of moderate conservatives. The idea that
research was an important (if not more important) function of the univer¬
sity teacher, took at least another fifty yeaxs (and another Royal
Commission in 1923) to develop. For example, one can note that until
1913 history teaching .at Oxford was controlled by an unofficial group
of college tutors and lecturers (the Modern History Association), there
being no university faculty for the subject. C.H. Firth's criticism
of the lack of serious historical research—in his inaugural lecture
as the Regius Professor (190*0— was lost in the vociferous reaffirm¬
ation of traditional teaching goals: the liberal education of under-
3
graduates.
Outside Oxford and Cambridge the German example was at first
more influential. In London the mathematician Karl Pearson established
an Association for the Promotion of a Professorial University (l393)
1. Cit. V.H. Green, The Universities, Harmondsworth, 1969, p. 72.
2. "By 1880 wnen the academic management of the university was first
divided into faculty boards, the victory of the tutors was so
complete that they were to dominate these boards as well." A.H.
Halsey & M. Trow, The British Academics. 1971» p. 1**9.
3. J.C. Masterman, On the Chariot Wheel, Oxford, 1976, pp. 1**8~9.
C.H. Firth, A Plea For the Historical Teaching of History, Oxford
190*+. For the struggles of the supporters of the research/profes¬
sorial ideal, see: O.H. Ball (ed.) Sidney Ball, Oxford, 1923, pp.
189-201 i L.R. Farnell, An Oxonian Looks Back, 193**, pp. 105, 272.
P. Gardner, Oxford at the Crossroads, 1903. passim; F.J. Haverfield,
"Biographical Hote" to Essays by Henry Francis Pelhan, Oxford, 1911,
pp. x-xi. At Cambridge there was a clearer division between Univer-
12a
in the hope of reforming the University of London along the lines of
the University of Berlin.1 Imperial College, London, which was given
a charter in 1907, was established with the College of Applied Science
at Charlottenberg in mind. However, it was not to be the first of a
line of Technische Kochschulen, for it became a constituent college in
a reorganised University of London—a good example of the iaclusive-
ness in the newer British universities which contrasted strongly with
the strict division in Germany between pure and applied knowledge. The
University of Birmingham was ready to admit the kind of technical sub¬
jects, like commerce and brewing (mining in the case of Leeds) which
2
did not find a place in German universities. The provincial colleges
had often been initially established as scientific institutions
(Firth and Mason Colleges, and the Yorkshire College of Science at
Leeas). But as time went on (and especially after the passing of tne
190** Education Act), they added arts faculties and sought university
3
status. The result was tnat the provincial universities were neither
like the German colleges of applied science or German universities.
In fact they began to look more like the two ancient universities
(allowing for the fact that they did not have colleges), since the
British university system, unlike the German, centred around a
U
'pyramid of prestige". Sir Eric Ashby has explained this by the
1. "When one thinks of the enormous power brought to a focus in the
University of Berlin—with its Ranke, Gneist, De Bois-Reymond,
Kirchoff, Wattenback, Moinmsen, Curtius, Mullenhoff, Helmholtz,
Zupitza, Oldenburgh, Weierstrass, Kiepert, and a dozen or two
more European names—one is inclined to be inpatient with Londoners
that they have slumbered so long." Pearson, "The Proposed Uni¬
versity for London", Academy, 26, 660 (27 Dec. 188*0, 1*30.
2. On the strict demarcation between "pure" and "applied" subjects
in Germany, see Ben-David & Zloczower, *+9_50.
3. Birmingham (1900), Liverpool (1903), Leeds (190*0, Sheffield
(1905), Bristol (1909), Southampton (1902) and Nottingham (1903)
became university colleges.
**. A.H. iialsey, "British Universities", European J. of Sociology,
III (1962), 97. ~ ° " "
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analogy of genetic mutation. This was what happened to German concepts
of a university "as tney crossed the Channel":
"Confronted with a different academic tradition in a different
society, the German concepts were assimilated but transformed.
One important reason was that there was no effective competition
among British universities, such as existed among the universities
in the German states. In Germany rivalry between universities
stimulated them to adopt new ideas. In England higher education
was dominated by the influence of Oxford and Cambridge: prestige
was concentrated in these two centres in a way it has never been
among the universities of Germany. And although the new institu¬
tions of higher education which were established in England were
in part a protest against the exclusiveness of Oxford and Cambridge,
nevertheless they had to live under the hegemony of these ancient
universities. They acquired, by a process of social mimicry, some
of the prevailing assumptions about higher education."^-
Perhaps more than the structure of the German university the German
approach to scholarship had obvious impact in Britain. Many of the
leading learned journals were established after ldfO on the model of
<• 2
the scores of Zeitschriften, Jahrbucher and Beitrage. The London School
of Economics, Victoria University of Manchester and (belatedly) Oxford
3
began to publish series of monographs by young scholars. More generally,
the historical and comparative approach to philology, pioneered by Ger¬
mans, became a model for scholars working in other fields—biblical
k
criticism, classical archaeology, ethnology, law, history. This was
well expressed by W.J. Ashley, a pioneering economic historian who had
1. "The Future of the 19th Century Idea of a University", Minerva,
VI, I (Autumn 1967), ^~5.
2. Including the British J. of Psychology (190L), Classical Qly. (1907),
Classical Rev. (1887), Economic J. (1891), Economic Rev. (1891),
English Historical Rev. (1586), Folk-Lore (1878), Hibbert J. (1902),
J. of Hellenic Studies (1880), J. of Philology (1868), J. of Roman
Studies (1911), J. of~Theological Studies (lS99), Law Qly.Rev.
(1885), Mind (1876) , Proc. of the Aristotlean Soc. (.1.888), Politi¬
cal. kjxy. (*191^), Sociological Rev. (1908).
3. L.S.E. Studies in Economic & Political Science (1896), Victoria
Univ. Publ. (190U), & Oxford Historical & Literary Studies (1913).
4. In political economy members of the "historicist school" felt that
German influence (in this case Roscher's Grundrias) had encountered
resistance. See W. Cunningham, "Why Had Roscher so Little Influence
in England", Annals of American Assoc. of Political & Social Science,
V. 5. German influence on theology was most apparent after i860
(except for E.B. Pusey), on classical studies, before this date.
L.E. Elliot-Binns, English Thought 1660-1900, 1956, p. 26.
Ik
studied in Germany. In nis inaugural lecture as the first holder of a
separate chair in economic history (at Harvard) Ashley ended by pointing
to the common motivating force of the biological, physical and histori¬
cal sciences—the desire to "arrive at a more satisfying and intelligible
conception of the evolution of human society.Ashley, visiting
Gottingen twelve years earlier, just before talcing his degree at Oxford,
had been struck by "the German ardour for the extension of the bounds
of knowledge", a quality he felt his own university lacked. On his first
day there a "young German professor to whom Stubbs had written met him
at the station and began immediately to a3k eager questions on points
of historical scholarship... This seemed to him characteristic of the
German conception, according to which he thought it might be said with
little exaggeration that a University had a responsibility in the first
2
instance to knowledge rather than to students."
Later during the war Ashley was to criticise some of the assump¬
tions and achievements of German research, but in his contribution to
the festschrift for his intellectual mentor Gustav Schmoller in 1908
3
he was still properly deferential. However, at about this time there
were a few voices critical, not just of attempts to introduce German
methods and organisation to British universities, but of the whole
1. "On the Study of Economic History" (Jan. 1893) repr. in N.B.
Harte (ed.) The Study of Economic History, 1971» p. 16. "Just
as in biological and physical science the investigator is buoyed up
by the conviction that every isolated fact, could he learn but
how, has its own place in a sequence, its own significance and
appropriateness, so in the history of man we can never be content
until we have found it a connected and consecutive whole, or
until we know of a surety that it is but a chaos of meaningless
fragments."
2. A. Ashley, William James Ashley, 1932, pp. 20-1. Ashley visited
Germany again in 1883-^.
3. See his "Present Position...".
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thrust of German scholarship. For example, a large part of A.E. Rous-
man's inaugural lecture as Kennedy Professor of Latin at Cambridge
(May 1910) was devoted to criticism of German classical scholarship
for its emphasis on completeness and organisation at the expense of
intellectual reasoning:
"On the battlefield of Sedan you may set up the gravestone not
of one empire but of two, for where tne military predominance of
France fell down and perished, there also the intellectual pre¬
dominance of Germany received awjund of which it bled slowly to
death.... Germany, throughout the circle of the sciences, is
losing or has lost her place, because her best brains are no
longer employed upon the pursuit of knowledge. The Germany
which led the thought of Europe was Germany disunited and poor:
her union and power and wealth now provide great careers in
politics, arms and commerce, and German capabilities—these
are not my words but the words of a Chancellor of the Ekapire—
'German capabilities,' said Prince Bulow four years ago 'have
taken refuge in our industry and army.' The superiority which
Germany now retains in classical scholarship, is not one of
quality but of quantity."^-
The language of wartime criticism of German scholarship is very
much the same, suggesting that it was, at least in part, a return to
the traditional mistrust expressed half a century earlier in Mansell's
Phrontisterion. There was, however, nowreason to suspect that even
the renowned objectivety of German scholars, the doctrine of the
Wertfreiheit research, was merely being paid lip-service. Writing
during the Second World War, H.A.L. Fisher remembered the "eloquent
diatribes against Great Britain" which had formed the substance of
Treitschke's history lectures at the University of Berlin, and how
"a fellow-member of the Ilistorische Verein explained...with the utmost
friendliness that Germany regarded Britain as her eternal enemy and
1. "Housman's Cambridge Inaugural", TLS, 67 (9 May 1968), U76 (its
first publication).Cf. L.T. Hobhouse, Democracy & Reaction,
190U, p. 83. There were signs of a more critical attitude in
France, too. See T.H. Clark, Prophets & Patrons, Cambridge,
Mass., 1973, p. 215.
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predestined victim"."*" This may have been a memory coloured by two
world wars, but it certainly was not an untypical experience as
recent study of Wilnelmine historians has shown. A similar experi¬
ence befell E.L. Woodward twenty or so years later at university
3
in Darmstadt in 1912. And in T.F. Tout's wartime memoir of his
former pupil Mark Hovell (killed on the Western Front in August 1916)
one reads of Roveli's disillusionment with some members of the Institute
fur Kultur una Universalsgeschichte in the University of Leipzig.
Apparently the Professor of English (Max Forster) "exhorted the
student8 to play football that they might be better able to fight
England when the time arrived".
Later chapters will chart the way in which British academics
came to terms with this Anglophobia apparently 30 widespread amongst
their German colleagues. However, first we shall turn to examine
the British "academic community" as it had developed before 191^.
1. An Unfinished Autobiography, 19^0, p. 82. Cf. his The War: Its
Causes & Issues, 191^7 P. 11.
2. McClelland, pp. 168-90, 201-13.
3. "I was startled to find that most of the students I met would talk
to me in a friendly way about the coming war in which the British
navy would be sunk, the British 'colonies' would revolt, and Germany
would become the greatest power in the world." Short Journey, 19^2,
p. 70. Cf. his Great Britain & the War of 191^-1918. 1967, p. xv.
k. Tout also claims that Hovell "saw that Lamprecht studied English
History in the hope of appropriating for his own land the secret
of British prosperity". "Mark Hovell (1888-1916)',', in Hovell,
The Chartist Movement. Manchester, 191b. Lamprecht was also a
member of the German peace movement, however.
17
II: THE BRITISH ACADEMIC WORLD BEFORE 191*+
"...on the basis of present sociological literature the
future historian would, have less difficulty in ascertaining the
social behaviour of the railroader, the taxi-dancer, or the
professional thief than he would that of the contemporary-
university professor."
Logan Wilson, The Academic Man (l9*+2)
What Harold Perkin has called "this most public and yet least
studied of professions"^" —university teaching—had begun to develop
its modern appearance in the years before the outbreak of the First
World War. It is true that one cannot talk of an academic class in
Britain before 191** in the sense that the term can be applied in Ger-
2
many in the same period. British academics were fewer in number, and,
more importantly, less conscious of themselves as a distinct social
group. This lack of professional self-consciousness was partly the
result of the social status of the British academic. Professors in the
Germany of William II were very definitely members of the upper middle
class and were often very well-to-do. In Britain the demarcation
between secondary and tertiary education was still unclear, and there
was a certain amount of movement by teachers back and forth between
1. The Key Profession, 1969, P» !•
2. In 1900 there were approximately 800 Fellows of Oxford and Cam¬
bridge colleges; 500 professors and lecturers in English and
Welsh universities and colleges, about the same number in Scottish
universities (including the college at Dundee), and under 250
in the various institutions associated with the University of
London. Halsey and Trow, pp. 139, l*+5. This was less than half
the number of professors alone, in German universities (*+,000 or
almost all,signed the manifesto of "the 93" in 191*+—see below
p. 7?.
3. Income often depended more on student fees than state salary—
popular professors could be very rich. See Ringer, pp. 3*+-8.
lo
public schools and the colleges of Oxford and Cambridge." In Germany
recruitment to the ranks of the professoriate from assistants in an
Institut or from amongst the Privatdozenten was well-establisned by the
l870s. In Britain the career pattern differed widely between the
older universities and the newer one3. Achievement in research ana
publication was not the only criterion for academic recruitment and
advancement. "Essayists, writers, brilliant public speakers and adminis¬
trators ... found their way to universities to a greater extent than in
Germany"^ The other reason for the slow development of professional
self-consciousness in Britain lay in the ''pyramid of prestige" we have
already noted amongst the various universities and colleges.
Before 191^ the typical figure in Britisn academic life remained
the Fellow of an Oxford or Cambridge college whose loyalty was first
to the body of which be was a member (and in whose affairs he had a
voice) and second to the University. This, its official historian
suggests, was one reason for the slow development of the Association
of University Teachers. The largest and most prestigious universities,
because of their collegiate structure, did not encourage the growth
1. The Cambridge historian G.G. Coulton was elected to fellowship at
St. John's College after schoolmastering in Britain and France.
At another level, the headmastership of a public school like
Rugby was "not inferior...to the headship of an Oxford college".
T.W. Bamford, "Public school masters: a 19th century profession ,
in Education and the Professions. 1973, p. 40, In terms
of salary university lecturers received "little more tnan...
secondary schoolmasters of three years standing, and less than
most'". H. Perkin, The Key Profession, 1969. p. 39.
2. Ben-David and Zloczower, 69.
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of professional self-consciousness of the kind which the A.U.T.
attempted to foster."*" Although there was a "pecking order" among
German universities which put Breslau below Bonn or Berlin, the
German university system has been well-described as "competitive"
—at least in relation to the more obvious hierarchical structure
of British universities. Oxford and Cambridge, V.H.H. Green has
noted, had "few competitors, even among the newly-founded univer¬
sities, so that a professorial chair at Oxford or Cambridge repre¬
sented, as it long continued to do, the crown of academic achievement".
Even a college fellowship had the rewards that a chair outside Oxford
and Cambridge could not always offer—"a comfortable and civilised
environment in which a serious scholar could work without too many
calls on his time or too great an intrusion of outside anxieties or
administrative demr- Who then was th» more typical Oxford figure:
the philosopher F.H. Bradley who remained a Fellow of Merton College,
or the philosopher and social scientist L.T. Hobhouse who moved from
fellowships at Merton (l887~90) and Corpus Christi (l89^_7)^ to the
editorial office of the Manchester Guardian, and ultimately to the
London School of Economics where he became the first Professor of
Sociology in 1907?
A recent study of the development of the "academic profession"
at Oxford suggests that Bradley (despite his reputation as a recluse)
1. Perkin, Key Profession, pp. 26-7. This was reinforced by the
poverty, isolation and small size of most provincial univer¬
sities and colleges.
2. Universities, p. 73.
3. Hobhouse had been an undergraduate (1883-7) and Assistant Tutor
(1890-3) before becoming a Fellow of Corpus Christi College.
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was probably more typical of tne period before 1900 at least. By 1030
a college fellowship represented a commitment to teaching (and that
largely within Oxford) which had not been present earlier in the
century. "The outward structure of a fellowship had changed little,
but its function had been drastically altered". Most Fellows, "and
virtually all the younger ones", were engaged in teaching as a career,
not as an interlude before finding a college living. But if the
career link with the Church of nngland was becoming the exception,
fellowships were still filled by recruitment from within the university
—at Oxford by any member of any college in the University, at Cam¬
bridge usually from members of the college offering the fellowship.
In neither case was publication or scientific discovery important for
success, and the dissertation required by Cambridge colleges was nearest
. . 2
equivalent to the practice of German universities. Outside Oxford and
Cambridge the "pyramid of prestige" encouraged the continuation of the
practice of filling professorships with candidates from the two ancient
universities. When provincial colleges and universities had first
been established this had been a necessity, but as time went on chairs
continued to go to ambitious college Fellows. A young scholar from
Scotland, Wales or the English provincial universities could expect
to have spent some time at Oxford or Cambridge before successfully
securing a chair elsewhere.
1. A. Engel, "emerging Concepts of the Academic Profession at
Oxford I0OO-I85V, The University in Bociety, Princeton, 1975, I,
308. Although 89/« of Fellows 1881-1900 were still in holy orders,
only took college livings and 57> remained to teach at Oxford.
Of the rest, most went on to teach outside Oxford. Fifty years
earlier 92$ were in orders, 53$ took livings and 13$ stayed to
teach in Oxford (p. 352).
2. At Oxford candidates were examined in the subject of some school.
E. Barker, Age and Youth, 1953, pp. lU-lo. The Ph.D. was only
introduced after the First World War (to attract American students).
21
There were, therefore, the beginnings of a university "system"
however pyramidical—and of an academic class or community before
191^. The increase in the 3ize and number of universities and colleges
from the l880s meant that the number of university teachers grew also.1
This was important because the period 1880-191^ was one of financial
difficulty for the two ancient English universities and for most of
their colleges. Agricultural depression had decreased the rental
which could be expected from college and university estates, especially
the former which were generally larger, hot only did this mean that
2
very few new chairs could be endowed, but also that the "dividend
3
attached to college fellowships actually dropped in value. But as
time went on competition even for chairs outside Oxford and Cambridge
became more fierce, and young men embarking on an academic career were
often forced to choose between a long apprenticeship as a badly-paid
lecturer or assistant to a iu a. ucuuu&a university or in
one of the never universities or colleges of England and Wales (a
position not unlike that of the Privatdozen ), or the hope of a
university chair overseas. The colleges and universities of the white
dominions, of India, and of the United States (especially the eastern
seaboard) provided the opportunity (it was hoped) to make one's reputation
and for eventual return to a chair in a British university. The careers
of two former pupils of A.L. Smith, Fellow of Balliol and mentor of
1. Student numbers grew from 1,128 (l800) to 5»500 (1885) and then
jumped to 16,735 (I&89) and 20,000 (1900). Perkin, Key Profession,
p. 23. In London (and the same was probably true elsewhere) the
190L Education Act, by encouraging teachers to seek university
degrees, caused expansion of Arts faculties. See S. Webb's
comments,cit. W.H.G. Armytage, Civic Universities, 1955» p. 255.
2. tingel, 351. Besides, the creation of new chairs might have been
unwelcome to academic conservatives (i.e. a threat to tutorial
teaching).
3. Depending on the college, they dropped to between £80 and £250
p.a. Green, Universities, p. 180.
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many later eminent historians, illustrate the two career patterns.
James Tait left Owens College, Manchester for Balliol in 1883. After
taking his degree at Oxford he was appointed Assistant Lecturer in
.oiglish Literature aria History at Manchester (loo7) and gradually
workea his way up to a lectureship in Ancient dstor.. (1396) and finally
the chair of Ancient and Medieval History (1902).
Tait'b friend and contemporary at Balliol G.A. Wood, after
unsuccessful attempts to find suitable academic employment in Britain,
secured the new Challis professorship of History at the University of
Sydney. He held this for thirty-seven years until his death in 1928.
While Wood remained a grossly-overworked teacher with little opportun¬
ity for research or publication Tait gradually made his mark as the
historian of the medieval borough .ad the other half of that formidable
Mancnester duo Tout and Tait."*" But a post overseas did not necessarily
mean consignment to academic limbo. The young R.M. Maclver left a
lectureship in political science and sociology at Aberdeen and moved
to the University of Toronto (1915-27) and later to Columbia University
in Lew York (1929-50) achieving distinction as a sociologist. Borman
Kemp Smith, the -Cantian scholar, moved from a lectureship at Glasgow
(1897-1906) to the chair of Psychology (190L-1L) and then of Philosophy
(191*0 at Princeton,before returning to the cnair of Logic and Metaphysics
at Edinburgh in 1919. J.n. Todd, Professor of Modern History at
1. lie retired fro:., nis chair in 1919 to devote himself exclusively
to research. On wood, see R.M. Crawford "A Bit of A Rebel".
Syauey, 1975, pp. 108-10.
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Belfast from 1920 had taught previously at McGill (Lecturer in
History 1912), Dalhousie (Professor of History and Economics 1913) and
Queen's (Professor of History 1919) universities in Canada, and at
the University of Edinburgh (Lecturer in Economic History 1910-12)."*"
The links between Scottish and Canadian universities were strong
ones, and the chances of return to an academic post in Britain were
quite good. But after 1912 all the universities and colleges of the
2
British Empire were linked m an imperial Universities Bureau,
forerunner of the present Association of Commonwealth Universities.
This further facilitated career opportunities overseas. In Britain
itself the links between the various universities and colleges were
not much closer (except in terms of distance). There wa3 no national
system of grading academic posts (or salaries) because the growth
of the newer universities and colleges had not been initiated by
central, government. Professors were the employees of their university
of college,a situation which, as we shall see, led to difficulties
just as did the fact that German professors were civil servants.
Lecturers and Assistant Lecturers, however, were the employees of
the professors, paid by them and generally given ad hoc contracts.
At Manchester, one of the earliest provincial universities, only
seven of the forty-three non-professorial staff had tenure. In pro¬
vincial and Scottish universities their salaries were generally one
third that of the professors. In other words there was a growing up,
outside Oxford and Cambridge, a university system with proportionally
1. Todd had some bad luck and some bad advice. See his "Apprentice¬
ship of a Piofessor of History 1903-1919", History, XLIV (1959),
12H-33. '
2. See E. Ashby, Community of Universities, 1963, pp. 1-26.
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fewer professors and. more junior staff with no control over the
subjects they taught.x In Britain, as in Germany, the growing
dissatisfaction with this situation led to the formation of Professional
2
associations, in which lecturers took a lead.
Professors had control of teaching in their departments, good
salaries and security of tenure, although this varied from University
to university. At Birmingham E.A. Sonnenschein, the Professor of
Classics, led his colleagues in opposition to the draft university
charter which gave all effective power to the largely "lay" Council.
The result of their successful campaign can best be described in
Sonnenschein's words:
"We have a City University which realizes for the first time on
English soil the form of organization familiar on the Continent,
in Scotland and America. It combines Imperium et Libertas—
ultimate control by the Council (on which, however, Principal,
Vice-Principal and all the Deans have a seat) with liberty of the
academic body. Among the primary constituents of this liberty
are (a) Pull Faculty organization—fuller than in Scotland or
America. The faculties are what they are in Germany—constituent
bodies of the University with large powers of self-government
under their elected Deans, (b) Research is recognized by Regu¬
lations as part of the duty of each Professor, (c) Lehrfreiheit
is recognized...as the right of each Professor subject only to
the requirements of his Faculty in regard to Time-table and
1. Halsey & Trow, p. 14-9. Perkin,, Key Profession, pp. 23, 39.
Perkin, "Manchester and the Origins of the A.U.T.", British
University Annual, 1964, 88. Professors received on average
£300 p.a. plus 2/3 student fees in the 1890s, £600 without fees
by 1910. But (as at Leeds) professors could get £1,000 or over
—not far short of the most remunerative Oxford and Cambridge
chairs (in Theology, Divinity or related subjects). Lecturers
and Assistant Lecturers got £70-£150 without fees in the 1890s
and an average of £200 by 1918 (although some got as little as
£30). See: Halsey & Trow, p. 173 i P.H.J.H. Gosden and A.J.
Taylor,Studies in the History of a University 1874-1974, Leeds
1975, p. 8, Perkin, "Manchester...", 88-91. Royal Commission
...On Oxford and Cambridge, Report, 1874, I, 46, 136.
2. In Germany the "Corporation of Junior Faculty". Ringer, p. 55.
The lecturer's position is illustrated in the case of R.M. Mac-
Iver at Aberdeen. He was assistant to the Professor of Moral
Philosophy (J.B. Baillie) who broke off all relations with Mac-
Iver after the latter had published criticism of Bosanquet's
Idealism which Baillie took for an attack on himself. The
circumstances were petty but Maclver wa3 left with little hope
of advancement. See his As a Tale That Is Told, Chicago, 1968,
pp. 74-5.
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Degree Courses. (d)...Security of tenure for all Professors,^
subject only to the opinion of their peers, i.e. the Senate."
At Liverpool the "New Testament" group led by John Macdonald
Mackay, Professor of History, achieved very much the same results
after a struggle with the Council comprised largely of hard-headed
2
local businessmen and civic leaders. At Manchester professors
remained liable to dismissal by the Council, although this power
3
was not used. At Leeds and Sheffield there was little opportunity
for professors to exercise any degree of control and they had
effective representation on the University Councils only after
charters were obtained in 1901* and 1905. Thereafter there was
occasional tension between professors and Council, as there was too
at Bristol after the University College there received its charter
1*
as an independent university in 1909. It is quite apparent, there¬
fore, that the growing power of the professors at Birmingham and
Liverpool wa3 the result of a hard-fought campaign. Evidence of
internal disagreements does not usually find its way into the official
histories, which tend to bask in self-congratulation. No doubt the
special circumstances of the University College in Nottingham""' had
1. Cit. E.J. Somei-set, The Birth of a University, Oxford, 193**,
pp. 23-1*.
2. A Miscellany Presented to John Macdonald Mackay, Liverpool, 191^»
PP« 77~9t 5-6,363-75. C.H. Reilly, Scaffolding in the Sky,
1938, pp. 162-90. The statutes gave professors security of tenure
after 5 years service.
3. E. Fiddes, Chapters in the History of Owens College and of Man¬
chester University 1851-191**, Manchester, 1937."PP. 199 n.I, 65-6.
Before 1870 the college had been administered by trustees with
similar powers.
4. A.N. Shimmin, The University of Leeds the First Half Century,
Cambridge, 195^, p. 13. A.W. Chapman, The Story of a Modern
University, 1955, pp. 193-5, 198. On Bristol see Nation, XI, 13
(29 June 1912), V76; XII, 26 (29 Mar. 1913), 1064; XIII, I, 2,1*,
7, 10, 13 (5, 12, 26 April, 17 May, 7 and 28 June 1913), 17,
59, ll*7, 273, 389, 1*97.
5. Until it received charter as a university college in 1903, it was
under municipal control. But even after incorporation Nottingham
professors exercised little control. See A.C. Wood, A History of
the University College Hottintrhara I881-IQL8. Ox-fcrrd_ lbs"}
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something to do with the tension there between the committee of
management and some professors. But one suspects that the belief
that academics were no different from any other kind of employee
(i.e. that they should be liable to dismissal completely at the dis¬
cretion of the governing body) was widespread among the local notables
who sat on University Councils. At Nottingham the difficulties of
one of the professors was compounded by his public support for the
ideas ofiHenry George,"'" and the most obvious examples of tension
between academic staff and government bodies concerned the right of
professors to hold unpopular views outside the university.
While Henry George and Single Tax had been the subject of dis-
2
cussion by University Councils in the l880s, twenty years later it
was growing labour unrest which led to a certain amount of friction
between politically-minded professors and their employers. In Octo¬
ber 1910 a letter appeared in the Radical weekly The Nation alleging
that in "at least two northern Universities" pressure was being
brought to bear on lecturers if they associated themselves "at all
openly with any political party". There was, it seemed, no attempt
to conceal the fact that these restrictions were made "lest offence
should be given to local magnates who have contributed or who may
1. See A.W. Coats, "John Elliotson Symes, Henry George and Academic
Freedom in Nottingham during the l880s", Renaissance and Modern
Studies, VII (1963), 113-37. " "" ~ ' ~ —~
2. In 1383 the Council of Bristol College (later University College)
instructed Alfred Marshall, the Cambridge economist who was
lecturing on George's ideas, to avoid becoming involved in
"public discussion"after lectures delivered under the auspices
of the Council. They need not have worried since Marshall was
strongly critical of Single Tax. See G.J. Stigler, "Alfred
Marshall1s lectures on Progress and Poverty", J. of Law and
Economics, XII, I (April 1969), 217-26 and J. Whitaker, "Alfred
Marshall, the Years 1877 to 1885", History of Political Economy,
IV (1972),,' 25. "" "
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contribute to the funds of the University". This, the writer noted,
was in marked contrast to the "opportunities of free political dis¬
cussion... in Oxford and Cambridge". In the same month the infant
London School of Economics faced a similar, but this time more
explicit, threat from some of its "local magnates". The railway
companies which contributed £1,000 a year to the "Railway Depart¬
ment" in the School threatened to withdraw this unless Sidney Webb
retired fro the chairmanship of the Board of Governors—a course
which he chose to save financial difficulties. Apparently his public
2
statements on the Osborn Judgement had caused offence. Such incidents
were more usual in America where business endowment and a corporate
3
role on boards of trustees of universities were more pronounced.
In a situation where professors espoused the cauoe of urganised
labour much could depend on the university administrators. Someone
like Michael Sadler, Vice-Chancellor of the University of Leeds was
able to protect the right of some of his academic staff to support
municipal workers on strike in the city in 1913. One of them was
D.H. MacGregor, Professor of Economics and a former Tallow of Trinity
College, Cambridge. His academic position made him especially vul¬
nerable to criticism that, in defending the strikers, he was in danger
1. "Trinity" in VIII, 5 (29 Oct. 1910), 196-7.
2. J. Beverictge, An Epic of Clare Market, I960, p. 66. Two former
Principals (both now MPs) publicly supported Webb. See letters of
W.A.S. Hewins and E.J. Mackinder to Times, 22 Oct. 1910 (p.10b) and
2k Oct. 1910 (p.lltc).
3. See Hofstadter and Metzger, chptr. IX. J.A. Hobson, who like Veblen
had apparently suffered loss of academic employment because of his
unorthodox views (see his Confessions of an Economic Heretic, 193S,
pp. 30-1) echoed the American economist's criticism of university
acceptance of benefactions: "The governors and the teaching faculty
will meet them ^the donorqj more than half-way in their demand for
safe teaching in all subjects where unsafe teaching Blight cause
offence in rich and influential quarters." Free Thought in the
Social Sciences, 1926, p. 5k. At least two university colleges
(Nottingham & Bristol) were virtually kept afloat for many years
by injections of money from local businessmen (J. Boot and H.0.
Wills).
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of carrying over his political opinions into his teaching of economics.
However, Sadler was able to assure local businessmen that such dissent
was valuable: "A muzzled University staff is a poor afair. Eut the
forces in favour of silencing unpopular views as 'dangerous' or
'untimely', or 'likely to give offence to powerful friends' are always
pressing and must be resisted", Sadler concluded.'*' Sadler's
knowledge of the German code of lehrfreiheit no doubt had something
to do with his defence of his professors, but this protection of extra¬
mural freedom of speech by academics went beyond the original defini¬
tion of lehrfreiheit: the freedom of the teacher to investigate and
discuss his subject without interference. It was the wider definition
of academic ireedom which was to come under a certain amount of
pressure during the First World War. The fact that there was no
attempt to formulate a code of lehrfreiheit as in Germany (and later
in America) was a sign of the slow growth of professional, self-
consciousness as much as the fact that "academic independence" was less
likely to be threatened in Britain (the reason usually given).
1. Shimmin, p. ^0. Gosden and Taylor, pp. 239~^0. In the 3ame year
students at Trinity College, Dublin, were prevented from attending
meetings in support of the strike led by Jim Larkin. See hation,
XIV, 10 (6 Dec. 1913), U3U.
2. E.G. Coats,"John Elliotson Syrnes...", 112. Ihere was no statutory
definition of academic freedom in the charters of British univer¬
sities and colleges. See R.S.T. Chorley, "Academic Freedom in the
United Kingdom", Law and Contemporary Problems, XXVIII (Summer
1963), 663.
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III: BRITISH ACADEMICS AND THE DISCUSSION OF FOREIGN POLICY
"...in the happy, innocent golden age before 191*+ intelligent
people did not worry themselves about international relations
and the problems of preventing war—they left all that to the
professional politicians and diplomatists. There were, of
course,wars, but they were either colonial wars, in which white
men slaughtered yellow men, or brown men, or black men, or
wars betweeii second-rate white men's states in the Balkans and
South America. In 191*+, although Colonial warfare, like the
sun never set on the British Empire, and we had a nasty time,
beating the Boers, it was sixty years since we had fought a
European nation and one hundred years since we had been involved
in a world war."
Leonard Woolf, Beginning Again (196*0
The involvement of British academics in matters of political
controversy could be traced back at least to the days of the English
Civil War. As Thomas Fuller wrote in his History of the Worthies of
England (1662):
"Mark the Chronicles aright,
When Oxford scholars fall to fight,
Before many months expir'd
England will with war be fir'd."
But in the fifty or so years before the outbreak of the First
World War British university men were involved in three great contro¬
versies over foreign policy. In the way that each issue split academics,
as much as the public in general, they were domestic political contro¬
versies in contrast to the almost universal approval of university men
for British foreign policy in 191*+. Still, because they arose either
out of colonial affairs or out of the perennial problem of the Balkan
nationalities,these public debates did not lead to discussion about
the prevention of war, especially European or world war which seemed
unthinkable.
1. Ernest Barker remembers how, as a candidate for a Fellowship at an
Oxford college in 1696, he wrote an examination essay "which dealt
with the problem of war, and developed the theme that the horrors
of military and naval invention" (he had not thought of the aerial)
"would outrun the endurance of man, producing an apotheosis of
war which would also be its extinction". Age and Youth, p. 33*+.
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The attempt to put Governor Eyre on trial in 1868 for the
brutal suppression of a slave rebellion in Jamaica set friends and
academic colleagues against each other. At the Royal Institution
(later part of Imperial College, London) John Tyndall, Professor of
natural Philosophy,joined the "Eyre Defence Committee" which also
boasted the names of John Ruskin and Thomas Carlyle. His colleagues
at the Royal Institution T.H. Huxley (Professor of Hatural History)
and Edward Frankland (Professor of Chemistry) both joined the vigorously
anti-Lyre "Jamaica Committee". Goldwin Smith, then Regius Professor
of History at Oxford, joined the same group, but the Regius Professor
of History at Cambridge (Charles Kingsley) sided with the "Lyre
Defence Committee".^ Ten year3 later the controversy over Turkish
atrocities in Bulgaria and the failure of the British government to
act against them again divided the country, and with it the academic
community. It was, as Richard Shannon points out, Britain's equivalent
2
of the Dreyfus Affair, with leading intellectuals of the day divided
for and against the "Bulgarian Agitation". Mark Pattisou supported
the "Eastern Question Conference", but that other Oxford reformer Ben¬
jamin Jowett did not. The Regius Professor of History at Cambridge J.R.
Seeley was critical of the agitation , but Goldwin Smith and E.A. Free¬
man, past and future holders of the Regius chair of History at Oxford,
1. See B. Semmel, The Governor Eyre Controversy, 1962, panBim.
At least one member of the "Jamaica Committee" (A.V. Dicey) was
still alive to support government policy in 191**.
2. Gladstone and the Bulgarian Agitation 1676, 1963, p. 202.
Hot merely because of "the brilliance of patronage and the opposi¬
tion which it evoked among the greatest names in literature, art,
science and philosophy", but also because the critics of the
agitation were "men of the emerging era of idealism, imperialism,
power, of challenge to the assumptions of mid-century Liberalism".
There ,/ere certain similarities between British apologists for
Liberal Imperialism and the new generation of radical French
nationalists.
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were leaders of the anti-Turkish campaign.
It is significant, in view of the reputation of Cambridge (and
especially one college, Trinity) as a hot-bed of opposition to the
First World War, that in 1876 members of that university were more
heavily involved in the campaign against government policy than were
the dons of Oxford. Shannon counted twenty Fellows of Oxford colleges
on the list of conveners of the "Eastern Question Conference" and
twenty-two Fellows of Cambridge colleges, including thirteen from
2
Trinity. However, when one allows for the strongly High Church
flavour of the Oxford group (led by £.B. Pusey and Ii.P. Liddon),
C?"bridge's lead in intellectual dissent becomes more obvious.
This is the impression one also forms when the controversy in the
universities over the Boer War is examined. In 1899 as in 1876
the critics of official policy were a small but vociferous minority
at both universities, with intellectual dissent seeming to encounter
more fertile ground for growth at Cambridge. Still, the public opposi¬
tion of university men to the war in South Africa seems to lack some of
the confident vigour of the "Bulgarian Agitation", due no doubt to the
reluctance of many to criticise the government once it had gone to war.
1. Apart from Seeley and the Positivist Professor Beesly, British
historians were firmly in the anti-Turkish camp: Acton, Bryce,
Froude, Green,Stubbs as well as Freeman and Smith.
2. Shannon, p. 220, there were also 19 professors from Scottish,
Welsh and English universities and colleges.
3. T.ii. .. jn and Bryce were the leading Oxford liberals.
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The difficulty of the intellectual in wartime is well illustrated
in the case of Henry Sidgwick, Professor of Moral Philosophy at Cam¬
bridge. As the legatee of Millite liberal philosophy Sidgwick had
opposed government policy in 1676 as immoral. But South Africa was
a question directly affecting British national and imperial interests,
and Sidgwick found the role of critic less appropriate. But not only
was he perplexed by the difficulty of "reconciling adequate security
for England with effective independence for the Boers", there was
alno what he discreetly termed his "personal connection with the
Government". His wife was the sister of the Tory leader in the
Commons (Arthur Balfour), and so Sidgwick declined to lend his name
to a protest petition circulated by Professor Sully of University
College, London."'" Ten years earlier Sidgwick had written of the definite
limits to political dissent by "the thoughtful and moral part of every
community", and now events had proved the truth of his philosophical
reflections. Once war broke out it was "doubtless right for most, if
not all men to side with their country unreservedly". For not even
the most critical intellectual "should keep coldly aloof from patriotic
sentiment". Only before war had broken out could such people be
expected "to make an earnest and systematic effort at an impartial
view of the points at issue".
1. Letter to Sully, 29 Mar. 1900. cit. A and E.M. Sidgwick,
Henry Sidgwick,1906, pp. 5&L-2 (see also pp. 576-7). J. Sully,
My Life and Friends, 1918, pp. 286-7. F.W. Maitland, Letters,
j,-j,. 2U9, 258-9. Hie Master of Trinity College (E.M. Butler)
had his doubts about the morality of British policy, despite
his Liberal Imperialist views. In 1876 (as Headmaster of Harrow)
he had been one of the conveners of the "Eastern (Question Con¬
ference". See J.R.M. Butler, Henry Montagu Butler, 1925,
p. 99. Shannon, p. 132 n.3.
2. "The iorality of Strife", IJE. I, 1 (Oct. 1890), ik. In reprint¬
ing this in his Practical Ethics (1898), Sidgwick omits the
phrase beginning "doubtless right..." (p. 106).
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Where Sidgwick attempte . to give due consideration both to
ethical ideuis and the prima facie duty of the citizen in wartime
(attempting to neglect neither), his Cambridge colleague John West-
lake, Wheveli Professor of International Law, attempted to provide
an ethical basis for British policy in South Africa. Writing one
month after the outbreak of war, he freely admitted that British
demands in the Transvaal were "not founded on any legal right".
They were, ne claimed, based on Britain's right to alleviate the
"intolerable" position of her nationals in the Boer republics.
National ideals were "always propagandist" (that is, expansionist) and
hence admitted of "no compromise". But, judging between the ideals
of the Briton and the Boer, Westlake had no doubt that the "racial"
ideal of the latter was far inferior to "the English ideal of a fair
field for every race and every language accompanied by a humane treat¬
ment of the native races".* This was exactly the kind of conclusion
to which a later generation of academic liberals were led when they
supported British entry to the First World War. However, in 191^ they
had the incalculable benefit of apparent legal as vela a;, moral
rectitude which Westlake could not claim in 1899.
In Cambridge two Fellows of ling's College argued against the
war in the Union. A.C. Pigou, who was to suffer for his opposition
to the First World War, and Oscar Browning, who had joined the
"Bulgarian Agitation", displayed considerable courage by doing so.
Browning, . was also Treasurer of the Union Society, was particularly
2
outspoken, comparing the issue of the Transvaal to the Dreyfus case.
1. The Transvaal War, 1899, pp. ^~7. But see the critical notice
in Cambridge Rev.. XXI, (23 Nov. 1399), 102-3.
2. Cambridge flev., XXI (19 and 26 Oct. 1899; 22 Feb. 1900i 1 and 3
Mar. 1900i 3, 17 and 31 May 1900), 27-3, 1+3-U, 227-8, 2kk> 292,353-
324-U. 0. Browning, Memories of Later fears, 1923, p. 60
(characteristically self-important).
3^
At Oxford academic liberals ha rallied to oppose tiie granting of
an honorary DC.L. to Cecil Rhodes, widely believed to have been
benind the Jameson Raid. However, Rhodes got hia degree at Encaenia,
tne threat of proctorial veto not being carried out because of the
presence of the Prince of Wales at the ceremony. The death of
Rhodes in 1902 helped, as Oxford's official historian diplomatically
put it, "to dim and allay resentments" within the University. The
publication of his will with its scheme for scholarships disarmed
his former critics. One of them (li.A.L. Fisher) even became a Trustee.^-
Edward Caird, Master of Balliol College, was perhaps the most vocal
critic of the war and he made himself very unpopular within tne Univer¬
sity wnen ne chaired meetings called to protest at the British policy
2
of interning Boers in concentration camps, Arthur S?"iywick„ brother
of Henry Sidgwick and Fellow of Corpus Christi (another college with
a "liberal" reputation) joined the "League Against Agression and
3Militarism ' , but he and Caird ;ere untypical figures in Oxford.
1. C. Mallet, History of the University of Qxfora, 1927» III, kTo.
J.G. Lockhart and C.M. Woodhouse, Rhodes, 1963, p. ^OU. Fisher's
letters to the Gilbert Hurrays (Box 7 Fisher Mss.). Signatories
of the protest letter in Tne Times were Caird, A.V. Dicey (Profes¬
sor of xinglistx Law), W. Markoy (Reader in Indian Law), E. Abbott
and J. Conroy (Balliol), V.S.S. Coles (Principal of Pusey House),
S.R. Driver (Professor of Hebrew), G. Moberly (Professor of
Pastoral Theology), W. Sanday (Professor of Exegesis), F.W.
Bright (Professor of Ecclesiastical History), A.M. Fairburn
(Principal of Mansfield College), J. Drunmond (Principal of Man¬
chester College), W.W. Fowler (Lincoln), II. Rashdall (New),
K.M. Burge (University), F.C. Conybeare (University), F.W.B.
Nicholson (Bodleian Librarian), J.B. Moyle (Hew). Times, 20
June 1699 > 10c. The Vice-Chancellor had refused to publish
the letter in the official gazette. See Oxford Mag. XX (21
June 1099),6-7.
2. H. Jones and J.lim Muirhead, The Life and Philosophy of Edward
Caird, Glasgow, 1921, pp. 153-k. Caird was a supporter of good radical
cau es like the Russian Strikers' Relief Fund of 1905. See B. Holling-
sworth, "The Society of Friends of Russian Freedom: English Liberals
and Russian Socialists", Oxford Slavonic Papers, NS. Ill (1970), 61.
3 F.W. Hirst, In the Golden Days, 19^7, p. 199.
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The attitude of most Oxford dona to the war was summed up
by on editorial in the Oxford Magazine. Under the heading "Oxford's
duty to the Army" the editor claimed that the "slouching gait of the
average undergraduate, the 3lipshod dress of the many, the unconscious
ignorance of anything approaching discipline of almost all" would be
vastly improved by "six month's residence in barracks". Tile perennial
complaints about the younger generation were no new thing, but the
suggestion tnat another "group" should be added to the Schools, or
some existing subject modified "to suit the requirements" of the Army
for officers, was new.^ Hie war was 3een as a kind of sporting activity,
a means of building healthy bodies and forming healthy mindc, - kind
of super-athleticism from which even candidates for holy orders should
not be exempt. A battle was "not a wild tumult in which 3eli'ish fury,
hatred and malice, and all the wor3t human passions" were "given free
reign". On the contrary, it demanded only "the loftiest qualities"
of which man was capable, and uhis was "the sanction of the whole
2
thing". Oxford dons were soon hard at work drilling under the
direction of L.R. Farnell, Rector of Exeter College, or on manoeuvres
3
in the "cycle corps" organised by John Cook Wil3on, Professor of Logic.
In other colleges and universities the Boer War led to a revival of
E
more volunteer corps and a general outburst of patriotic fervour.
In Jesus College Cambridge a special meeting addressed by the Master
(H.A. Morgan) and "the first Boat Captain" ended with twenty-one men
tZ
(including the Bursar) offering themselves as recruits. Doubtless there
were many other similar instances.
1' Oxford Mag. XIX, 16 (13 Mar. 1901), 269-70.
2. Ibid. . XX, 11-11+ (5-26 Feb. 1902), 186-7, 208, 22U-5, 227, 21+1+, 153.
3. Farnell, pp. 11+8-57, 327. Bee also below p. 163.
1+. E.g. at Bangor and Aberystwyth. See J.E. Lloyd (ed.) Sir Harry
Reichel 1856-1931. Cardiff, 1931+, p. 37 and E.L. Ellis, The Univer¬
sity College of Wales Aberystwyth 1872-1972, Cardiff, 1972, p. 17**.
5. Cambridge Rev., XXI, 527 (25 Jan. 1900), loO.
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But one can note some more disturbing features of this patriotic
revival. For example, when the German press began to criticise British
policy in South Africa,there were suggestions among British professors
of German origin that some expression of support for their adopted
country might be required.^" In the event public expressions of loyalty
were not called for, but it calls to mind the persecution of German-
2
born professors in British universities during the First World War.
There were aigas too that intellectual critics of government policy,
once war had been declared could expect a rough time from the patriotic
dons. Walter Raleigh, who was one of the noisiest patriots among
British academics during the First World War, devoted much of an article
in the Rational Review to criticising the "dainty and self-indulgent
moralists" who opposed the war. Such people, he claimed, had "lived
too long in the abstract and imaginary world...of discussion and theory"
3
to have a "ready sense of the rudiments of politics" —the perennial
jibe against critics of official policy.
The damage done by the war to Anglo-German relations, was obvious
enough and it was this to which Geraanophil academics directed their
1. See letter of E.A. Sonnenschein (Professor of Classics, Birmingham)
to E.G. Fiedler (Professor of German, Oxford), 21 Jan. 1902, Fiedler-
Harding Mss., F.H. 33. Also letter to The Times, 21 June 1902, p.
11c.
2. See below
3. "The Anatomy of the Pro-Boer", Rational Rev. XXXVIII (Sept. 1901),
55-7. "In a war like this where neither party is faultless and
both are in the right, a man is bound by his nationality, by his
allegiance to the land that gave him birth, and the civilisation
that made him what he is." Raleigh's interpretation of the war as
a "struggle for existence" was very far indeed from the ethical
scrupulosity of Iienry Sidgwick.
k. There were anti-British demonstrations at most German universities
in 1901 and at Jena students had hanged Chamberlain in effigy:
"at the foot of the gallows sat King Edward drinking from a cham¬
pagne bottle". O.J. Hale, Publicity and Diplomacy, H.Y., 19^0,
pp. 2^2-3 and n.
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attention in the first years of the new century. An Anglo-German
Friendship Committee (later the Anglo-German Friendship Society) was
established in 1905 and it boasted many of the leading names in
British academic life amongst its membership."1" Manifestos of
friendship were exchanged between British and German academics—
the one side denying allegations of "sinister designs entertained
by the German people against England", the other assuring the Germans
that the occasional, diatribes of "certain journalists'! merely
demonstrated "their profound ignorance of the real sentiments" of
British people. "For us, as between England and Germany", the British
scholars wrote, "there is no frontier to be defended.... A war between
the two Powers would be a world-calamity for which no victory could
compensate either nation". However, one of the German-bom members
of the Eriti3h society, Karl Breul, did warn his colleagues that all
was not well in Germany. On a visit to that country he had noted a
growing anti-British sentiment amongst "the younger generation".
Treitschke's ideas of a future Anglo-German conflict as an "inevitable
war of extermination between modern Rome and Carthage" were apparently
3"much in vogue" with German students. But it was more common to find
1. See appendix.3.
2. Anglo-German Courier, I, 2 (13 Jan. 1906), 15-17. This answered
a manifesto from hi German intellectuals.
3. Ibid., I, 23 (8 June 1906), 2U0-1. L. Stein (ed.) England and
Germany, 1912, pp. 28-3^. Breul had been born in Hanover (i860)
but had come to Cambridge as a young man as a Lecturer (l88^-99),
Reader (l899-1910) and finally Professor of German.
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academic Germanophiles passing over the chauvinism of the German
Professoriate in silence. Really only with the war did the writings
of Treitschke and Bernhardi become well-known in Britain.
Much of the ignorance about Germany was due to the general lack
of knowledge of central and eastern European affairs in British
universities.^" At Oxford a few exotic undergraduates like Levis Bern¬
stein (later Kamier) and his cousin Ludwig Ehrxich, or the occasional
don like Alfred zioaern, were the exception to what Arnold Toynbee
2
described as the "invincible ignorance" of university men. The
Modern History School—the one school which might have been expected
to provide some stimulus to interest in foreign affairs—only taught
European history down to the Treaty of Berlin in 1878. And "woe
betide the unhappy undergraduate who let his imagination wander beyond
that date", Sir Charles Petrie wrote in his reminiscence of Oxford.
Once,aching J.A.R. Marriott about the osf.sion of Thessaly to Greece
in 1881, he drew the "horrified and indignant" reply that he (Marriott)
"was there to teach history, and not to talk politics". But generally
"no one bothered much about anything which happened after the battle
k
of Waterloo". E.L. Woodward, who was an undergraduate at Oxford
1. Liverpool University established a School of Russian Studies in
1907. Leeds followed in 1916, a year after the establishment
(at King's College, London) of lectureships which were to form the
basis of the School of Slavonic and East European Studies. Most
colleges and universities had German chairs or lectureships (most
begun after 1900).
2. J. Pander, Lewis fiamier, 1971» p. 83. A. Toynbee, Acquaintances,
19b7» pp. 50, 64-5, Jk. Zimmern was the son of a German merchant
settled in Britain. Bernstein and Ehrlich were from Galicia, wnere
in 191^ the Austrian army was mobilized on the family estate, with
the Russian army encamped just 20 minutes walk away over the frontier.
But Bernstein's talk of imminent European wax merely evoked laughter
in the B&llio.l front quad.
3. A Historian Looks at His World, 1972, p. 80.
k. Woodward, Short Journey? p. E0. After the Second World Wax the
cut-off date was moved to 191 At Cambridge the situation was
the same: increased emphasis on European history after changes
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between 1908 ana 1913 describee the intellectual atmosphere of the
University in the following way:
"In these years...the chief interests of those who would now b
described as 'intellectuals' were either in social questions or
in religion. There was not much interest in foreign affairs.
Many of the dons were hardly less ignorant than the undergraduates
about the public affairs of Europe, although they knew the moun¬
tains of Switzerland, the cathedrals of France and the ancient
monuments of Greece and Italy.... I do not believe that there
were half a dozen men in Oxford who realized the European signi¬
ficance of the Balkan wars. The Agadir incident aappeaed in the
Long Vacation; in the following Michaelmas term, there was a good
aeal of vague talk about a narrow escape from war. There was also
a good deal of talk, equally ill-informed, about Germany and the
bellicosity of biiliam II. This talk rarely went beyond repro¬
ducing current newspaper articles. I do not think that anyone
in my year was worried about the possibility of a general European
war."l
Much the same impression was gained by R.M. Maclver during his
three years at Oxford (1901-3) which he attended after graduating from
the University of Edinburgh. Immured "within the walls of a dead
age" most people in the University seemed unaware of the great changes
going on outside". "Industrial and technological developments were
causing social transformations and disturbances. There were troubles
in the Balkans and nutterings between the power alliances of Europe."
But, apart from the occasional debate in the Union, "the living
present" did not intrude. Reminiscences over sixty years after the
events described must be treated with caution, but the same note enters
many memories of Oxford life. Young Cambridge was perhaps marginally
more concerned with the outside world although Leonard Woolf noted
in the Tripos in 1897 still (even with a paper on International
Law) focused attention on the period before 1870. See G. Kitson
Clark, "A Hundred Years of Teaching History at Cambridge 1873-
!973", Historical J. XVI, 3 (1973), 5^8-50; Students' Handbook
to...Cambridge, 191^-15, pp. U07-18.
Short Journey, p. 38. "Our youth, our ignorance, our sheltered
and easy lives, our vague impression that an Anglo-French combination,
with Russia as an additional weight, would certainly maintain the
peace of the world, kept our interests within the bounds of problems
of an industrial society." (p.39).
2. As A Tale..♦.pp. 61-2.
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that it generally did not go beyond a "vague idea...that the preven¬
tion of war was to all intents and purposes a question of arbitration"."1"
Still, Cambridge did have the largest number of "Norman Angellites"
2
of any university in the country.
The "International Polity Movement", started by Norman Angell
(Ralph Lane) with money provided from a business foundation, had
branches in most British universities and colleges, and attracted
liberal academics as well as serious-minded undergraduates: at Birming¬
ham W.J. Ashley, the economic historian, in London, L.T. Hobhouse, at
Glasgow, Robert Latta, the Professor of Logic, at Oxford, Sidney
Ball, Fabian Fellow of St. John's College, Gilbert Murray, Regius
3
Professor of Greek, and W.M. Geldart, Professor of English Law. Angell
preached the gospel of economic liberalism. "Angellism", as A.J.P.
Taylor put it, "supposed that international banking and the gold
standard, respect for private property and the sentiment of the Stock
Exchange, would survive all upheavals."^ Even more than this Angell
believed that the growing interdependence of developed economies meant
that the forceful settlement of international disputes was rapidly
becoming obsolete. T.H. Green had also taught earlier generations of
Oxford undergraduates that the way to peace lay through Free Trade,''
but now Angell laid new stress on the economic unprofitability of war
1. Beginning Again, 1964, p. 185.
2. With 180 members. H. Weinroth, "Norman Angell and 'The Great
Illusion": An Episode in pre-19l4 Pacifism", Historical J., XVII,
3 (1974),560.
3. J.C. Masterman, p. 96. Membership lists in War & Peace.
4. The Troublemakers, 1969, p. 94.
5. See his Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation, new ed.
1941, p. 173.
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(and imperialism) for the victor. "Winning a war brought no advan¬
tages; therefore by implication losing a war brought no burdens."1
E.M.W. Tillyard, later famous a3 an English scholar, as a
young fellow of Jesus College, Cambridge, attempted to prove Angell's
thesis by examining ancient history. His Athenian Empire and The
Great Illusion (1914) published a few months before the outbreak
of war was a novel tribute to Angell's best-selling book The Great
Illusion (1910). Tiliyard claimed that "the fall of Athens was her
economic salvation, and for her it was lucky that it came when it
did". Athenian trading strength was well-established before the
city possessed "strong armaments". "The beginning of her so-called
greatness" was really the "begining of her economic decline",
Tillyard concluded. "By living on plunder she damaged her trade".
For a time Pericles managed to arrest this decline—"to reconcile
Empire and Industrialism"—but after his death "a vigorous and
aggressive foreign policy brought a swift decline which was arrested
just in time by the fall of Athens and her political ruin. The fourth
century saw Athens in a minor position politically, but economically
supreme." Contrary to what one might expect, the economic and
political successes of Athens varied "in most cases inversely". The
economic interdependence of Greek city states in the sixth century was
thus "a state of things where Mr. Angell's arguments on the futility
2
of armed aggression may be said fittingly to apply", Tillyard ended.
1. Taylor, Troublemakers, p. 93.
2. pp. 17, 29-33. Tillyard was the brother of the Greek scholar
H.J.W. Tillyard and had himself taken a first class in both parts
of the Classical Tripos and won a Craven Scholarship (1911). On
his liberalism see B. Willey, "Eustace Mandeville Wetenhall
Tillyard", PBA,XLIX (1963), 387.
h2
Despite Angell's rather simplistic economic analysis (or so it
seems now), at least two young Economics dons at Cambridge (both later
well-known professors at Oxford and Cambridge^ were members of the
university Norman Angeli Society. The Cambridge Union carried an
Angellite resolution "declaring the futility of armed aggression", and
at Manchester University Angellites called for the Government to pursue
the path of peaceful settlement of disputes. " And despite the outburst
of destructive nationalism in the Balkans, which should have given
3
Angellites pause for thought, The Great Illusion remained an enormously
popular book right up until the outbreak of the First World War. Take
for example R.M. Maclver's famous book Community, whose preface is dated
September 191^. The following passage shows Maclver's use of
Angellite ideas:
"The development of common interests is making the institution
of war between nations irrational and vain. War is a relation
of hostility between peoples organised as States. Its method
of mere destruction implies that there is complete antagonism
of interest between the warring peoples. But the interests of
civilised nations are no longer isolable, one civilised people
carro' hurt the interests of another without hurting its own
as well. It is only when communities are essentially isolated,
or when the relation between them is that of dominant to subject
peoples, that the hurt of one can be the good of the other.
Therefore, as intercommunity extends, war becomes more and more
irrational. This is most obvious in the economic sphere, owing
especially to the internationalisation of capital, so that one
civilised community in destroying the commerce and capital of
another, is destroying or injuring the investments of its own
members. Again, as international trade grows, more and more
members of each community live by the commercial prosperity
1. D.H. (Later Sir Dennis) Robertson (Trinity), later Professor of
Political Economy at Cambridge (19^-57) and D.H. (later Sir
Hubert) Henderson (Clare from 1919) later Professor of Political
Economy at Oxford (19^5-51).
2. See. C.E. Fayle (ed.) Harold Wright, Cambridge, 193^, pp. ^1-2 ana
War and Peace. I, 6 (Mar. 191*0, np.
3. Angell claimed Turkey was a militarist state not yet fully assimi¬
lated into the world economy. However, the Cambridge economic
historian W. Cunningham argued that such "economic cosmopolitanism"
underestimated the very real strength of nationalism. See his
"The Economic Basis of Universal Peace—Cosmopolitan or International",
Economic Rev.. XXIII, I (Jan. 1913), 7-13.
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of other communities and are necessarily ruined when that
suffers."1
War between "civilised peoples" was nothing less than "civil
war" since people were just not "as independent" of each other now
(and probably never had been) as states were of other states, nor was
"community" "co-extensive" with the state. If man could see the
irrationality of "war instituted by non-political associations, the
fatuity of the religious wars in which churches involved communities"
and the danger of "resort to war by groups or classes within a
community", why then could man not similarly "condemn warfare between
nationalities"? All that was needed was a conscious act of will:
"...the cessation of war does not depend on federations or
treaties arbitrarily entered upon by independent self-sufficient
states, not on the mere fiat of high contracting parties, not
simply on the convenience of governments or the intrigues of
diplomacy or the relations of monarchs, but on the silent widen¬
ing social will that ultimately all governments must obey. The
mass of society, the great working mass of every people, have
an interest in peace and not in war. Their interests are one
in every State, they form a single common interest. Common
interest when recognised begets common will."2
Maclver was expressing the liberal view of the obsolescence of war
in the modern world. The "social conditions out of which war arose"
had been transformed, and if man could understand this he could be
"rid ...of the body of this dead thing" war. International law was
developing, as civil law had developed within states, towards its
final "legislative" stage.
1. pp. 275-6. The Great Illusion is cited on p. 425.
2. Ibid. , pp. 276, 422. The educated Englishman had "more in common
with the educated Frenchman or German than...with his uneducated
fellovcountrynen" (pp. 427-8). This interpretation also appears
in Maclver's Tne Modern State (1926) where the "political prizes"
or war are seen as "quite precarious and insubstantial" compared
with the social and economic costs (pp. 246-8).
3. Community, pp. 423-4. Maclver repeated much of this in Towards
An Abiding Peace (1944).
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But Maclver was more aware than some peace advocates of the
need to recognise the role of conflict in human society, to channel
destructive impulses into "ever less wasteful forms". If stimulus
to social solidarity were needed, man could perhaps "enter into the
endless and fruitful struggle involved in the mastery of the environment
and the conquest of essential evils'1."'" Much the same point was also
made by J. Estlin Carpenter, Principal of Manchester College, Oxford
(a body founded by the Unitarians). Speaking at the Eighth National
Peace Conference in London two years before the outbreak of war,
Carpenter pleaded with delegates to give attention to "the heroic
side of war", to recognise the "fighting instinct" which was present
"more or less" in all people. If only this could be directed towards
"its proper object", then war could be avoided. Carpenter accordingly
suggested "the great enemies of the body politic, ignorance, want,
disease, and crime" as possible objects for human energy and ingenuity,
and the establishment of university chairs in "industrial, and commercial
development and the history of peace". And why not, since there were
already chairs of military history and lectureships in military science?'
Community, p. 337. This was a better stimulus than war since
the destructive nature of the latter could "spur a people only
to occasional endeavour". In the intervals of peace it was the
"warrior" who became "luxurious and degenerate", the "war-
sustained people" who fell into "decadence", simply because the
more sustained effort required in constructive effort did not
appeal to them.
2. Promotion..., p. 4. A similar plea for the recognition of the
heroic virtues of peace had been made earlier by the Rev. T.J.
Lawrence, an international lawyer: "Courage and devotion,
organization and discipline, are not the sole prerogatives of the
soldier, though the world rings with his deeds of daring and
feats of obedience and endurance, while civilians do not find
special correspondents at their elbow and the daily press filled
with descriptions of their exploits. The management of a great
industrial concern requires as much talent for organization as
the planning of a campaign. The thousands of workmen who obey
one head and combine their separate efforts to attain a common
end are disciplined differently but as thoroughly as the long
lines of marching infantry who delight the eye at a great
1+5
Such ideas were very like those contained in William James1s
celebrated essay on "The Moral Equivalent of War", first published
in 1910.This was also the year that Angell published The Great
Illusion but the Harvard philosopher's ideas on peace went beyond
the conventional truths of economic liberalism. James had posited
an innate aggressiveness in man in order to explain the continued
existence of war in the civilised world. Whether or not war was
irrational or economically ruinous was thus beside the point.
"Our ancestors have bred pugnacity into our bone and marrow", James
claimed, "and thousands of years of peace won!t breed it out of us."
review. If peace necessarily meant ignoble ease there would be
much to say for the theory of Von Moltke and other great
generals, that war was necessary to preserve the virility of the
race and keep alive the manly virtues. But who can visit the
bust hives of industry without being convinced of its fallacy?
The arts of peace require as much active cultivation as the
arts of war. While there are seas to be traversed, mines to be
dug, explorations to be carried out, engineering feats to be
accomplished, and scientific discoveries to be made, no one need
fear that patience, courage, perseverance, and skill will die
out among mankind for lack of exercise. The dangers of fire and
flood would call forth heroism and devotion even if war were but
a dim memory of a past evil. Honest toil and manly exercise
would develop the human frame to the height of its strength and
beauty even if military drill were as obsolete as the formation
of the Macedonian phalanx." "The Tsar's Rescript", IJB, IX,
2 (Jan. 1899), lk5. For a contrasting reaction to Nicholas II's
proposal for a peace conference at The Hague, see W. Cunningham,
"Prospects of Universal Peace", Atlantic Mthly., LXXXIV (Aug.
1899), 236-i+l. Lawrence, together with H. Rashdall and A.J. Dun¬
can Jones (Caius College, Cambridge), was a member of the Church
of England Peace League. See A. Marriu, The Last Crusade,
Durham, N. Carolina, 1975, p. 65.
1. But owing something too to T.H. Green who had written: "Till
all the methods have been exhausted by which nature can be brought
into the service of man, till society is so organised that every¬
one's capacities have free scope for their development, there is
no need to resort to war for a field in which patriotism may
display itself". Lectures.,♦, p. 176.
1*6
But he had gone on to sketch the outlines of a "moral equivalent" to
replace war. Instead of conscription for military purposes, James
proposed "a conscription of the whole youthful population to form for
a certain number of years a part of an army enlisted against Nature."
Not only might this improve the quality of life for others, but, more
importantly, "military ideals of hardihood and discipline" would be
inculcated into the nation's youth. This would help preserve "in
the midst of a pacific civilisation" those "manly virtues" which the
"military party" had feared might disappear if peace broke out. Essen¬
tially an optimist, James believed that "patriotic pride and ambition
in their military form" could be turned to more constructive purposes,
since they were "only specifications for a more general competitive
• .. 1
passion .
James's search for a more acceptable replacement for the excite¬
ment (and even nobility) of war was noted by Bertrand Russell in his
2
review of Memories and Studies (1911) where the essay was reprinted.
Later during the First World War Russell again acknowledged his debt
to James in his own search for "a peaceful outlet for men's energies"
*3
in Principles of Social Reconstruction (1916). However, James's
insight does not appear to have had as much influence with academic
philosophers as one might have expected. Partly this wa3 due to the
unpopularity of Pragmatism (the school of philosophy which James
1. "The Moral Equivalent of War" (April 1910), repr. in War, N.Y.,
1968, p. 29. The essay had originally been given as a lecture
at Stanford University in Oct. 1909, and had been widely pub¬
lished in American periodicals.
2. Russell wrote that "men's energies" needed "an enemy to fight",
but that "all progress" demanded that the enemy should not be
human. Cambridge Rev., XXXIII, 317 (l6 Nov. 1911), 118.
3. p. 95. Russell wrongly attributed James's address to the time
of the Spanish-American 'War (which James had opposed).
U7
expounded) in British universities,"'" partly it was the result of
the late development of psychology as an academic discipline in
2
Britain. Two early practitioners of "social psychology", Graham
Wallas and William McDougall, did tackle the same problem James had.
But more typical of the small group of liberal academics writing on
the problem of war was Goiaswortny Lowes Dickinson, Fellow of King's
College, Cambridge.
It was Dickinson who James had singled out as exhibiting in nis
writings the characteristic weaknesses of the "socialistic peace
advocates"—namely, a failure "to realize the full inwardness of
the situation", a failure to provide a "substitute for war's disciplin¬
ary function"or to provide a "moral equivalent for war". "The duties
penalties and sanctions pictured in the Utopias they paint are all
3
too week and tame to touch the military-minded", James concluded.
And it is true that, despite an undergraduate enthusiasm for drilling
. . . h . . .
with the volunteer militia, Dickinson showed throughout his life a
marked distaste for the martial virtues which James saw as the "enduring
cement" of world peace. In October 1903 Dickinson had joined with C.
F.G. Masterman, F.W. Hirst and G.M. Trevelyan to establish the
Independent Review. In the best traditions of radical Liberalism it
advocated social reform at home and the pursuit of world peace. E.M.
1. According to D. Bell, it was "a matter of scandal" to most
British philosophers. "Philosophy", in C.B. Cox and A.E. Dyson
(eds.) The 20th Century Mind, 1972, I, 179-
2. See L.S. Hearnshaw, A Short History of British Psychology l8H0-
19^0, 196h, pp. l68-8h.
3. James, p. 27. He cited Justice and Liberty (1909), one of
Dickinson's tnen much-admired political dialogues.
h. An "innate ineptitude in the use of lethal weapons led to his early
resignation from the force". li. Wedd, "Goldie Dickinson: The
Latest Cambridge Platonist", Criterion, XII, hj (Jan. 1933), 178.
k
Forster as a Cambridge undergraduate came under the spell of
Dickinson and the Review which he described as offering its readers
a picture of ropress to the future "a passing through not insurmou it-
able dangers to a possible Utopia"."'" To it and its successor the
Albany Review,Dickinson contributed articles on the problem of war
in which he laid great stress on the role of reason in the fight against
militarism and imperialism. Men might not simply be "reasoning animals",
ha wrote ii> July 1906, but "it would be absurd to conclude that they
cannot be influenced by reason. Slowly but surely, argument works
upon us all, partly by confronting one passion with another and com¬
pelling a choice between them, partly by insisting on the consequences
of actions, rjartl^ by pointing out incoherences and contradictions
2
in the arguments by which we are accustomed to buttress our instincts.
This belief animated all Dickinson's writing and especially his
work, after 1915, for post-war international organisation. As he
wrote two years before the outbreak of the First World War , "reason
and imagination" were the only weapons available to the peace
advocate. The role of the intellectual and the academic was thus to
"destroy illusions and reveal naked -'acts"." It was an "illusion",
for example, that war was needed to cure defects in the nation's moral
fibre. "The disease of war is...invoked to cure the disease of peace.
Eut peace ought not to be a disease", Dickinson wrote in 1907- "If
1. Goldswortliy Lowes Dickinson, new ed., 1973, pp. 95~6.
2. ' ar and Peace", Independent Rev., X, 3^ (July 1906), 115. This
was a review of F.W. hirst's anonymous book Arbiter in Council (1906).
3. "The Illusion of War", Ration, XI, 19 (10 Aug. 1912), 702. This
was a review of the Quaker J.W. Graham's Evolution and Empire
(1912).
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our peace is cankered, that is not because it is peace, but because
it is peace based on injustice and egotism".1 As for the supposed
ideals of race,nation, empire and national honour, these arose
from the ideology of the possessing class—from the "monotony of life
2
among well-fed people". In other words Dickinson was echoing T.H.
Green's judgement over thirty years earlier that the "privileged class
involuntarily believes and spreads the belief that the interest of
the state lies in some extension without, not in an improvement of
organisation within."
However, Green was writing in 1879 oei'ore the flood tide of
imperialist fervour in the la3t two decades of the nineteenth century.
But working class jingoism and indeed the new interest in crowd
psychology was something which Dickinson could not avoid twenty or
so years later. Working-class jingoism Dickinson tended to excuse as
"a more pardonable kind of feeling" produced by the monotony of
"chronic overwork" and curable by social amelioration. For the peace
advocate, a3 for the social reformer, "the masses" were "the last
U
hope" for progress. In Dickinson's Utopia there was no room at all
for conflict: what was "base in the life of the average man of busi¬
ness, or clerk or artisan, compared with that of the best soldier",
1. "Peace or War?", Albany Rev., II, 8 (i\lov. 1907), 138. ')!gar and
Peace",119. Dickinson had spent some time demolishing Social
Darwinist theories (see "Peace or War?", 133-*0.
2. "Is War Inevitable?", War and Peace. I, 8 (May 191*0, 221-3 and
9 (June 191*+) ,252-3.
3. Lectures..., p. 171. Although first published in 1882 (after
Green's death) the book had been finished in 1879.
k. "Is War Inevitable?", 252-3. "War and Peace", 113, 115.
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was not "the peaceableness of his occupation, but its lack of direct
and conscious subordination to a common end". "In a community well
organised and well moralised, sucn as the one the socialists con¬
ceive", Dickinson claimed, "every occupation would be regarded as a
public function, and performed in the spirit of public duty.""'"
2
Dic&inson's colleague at the London Scnool of Economics Graham
Wallas was much less sanguine about hopes for world peace in the
period before 191^. Dickinson had seen the Hague Conferences as a
sure sign that mankind was becoming more peaceable and civilised^
that history was now being seen as "something to be transcended, not
repeated". Wallas, however, wrote in his Human Hrture in Politics
(1908) of the dangers of European war,^ ana began to concern himself
with tne role of instinct in human behaviour, lie had been greatly
influenced by William James's Principles of Psychology (1890) which
had stressed tne importance, not only of conscious actions (a3 in neo-
iaealist theory), but also of instinct—a bundle of atavistic impulses.
As Wallas's biographer notes: "His disillusionment witn the unrealis¬
tic assumptions of liberal-democratic thought had found a resolution
1. "Peace or War?", 13T~8.
2. Dickinson lectured 0x1 political theory (as well as teaching
history and economics at King's College, Cambridge), Wallas
lectured on public administration.
3. "Peace or War?", 130-1.
h. "May the Germans and ourselves he now marching towards the
horrors of a world-war merely because 'nation' and 'empire'...
are the best that we can do in making entities of the mind to
stand between us and an unintelligible universe, and because
having made such entities our sympathies are shut up with
them? (Uth ed. 19^+3, p. 285).
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in a new approach to politics based on 'Darwinism' and 'the
new psychology'"."1 The titles of Wallas's early books give some
indication of his approach—Human Nature in Politics and The Great
Society: A Psychological Analysis (191*0. What Dickinson called
2
Wallas's "bio-psychological realism" was thus far-removed from Dick¬
inson's political dialogues which made "the claim of reason seem
3
more worthy of reverence".
Wallas seemed even less confident than James about the likelihood
of finding a "moral equivalent" for war. Like other liberals he
could easily refute the arguments that war was necessary to i: rove
"the breeding stock",** or that it could not be prevented by any
5
system of international law. But what of the argument "that peace,
even if it could be secured, would leave the warlike dispositions
permanently unstimulated, and would therefore produce the nervous
condition...called baulked disposition"? Would it not be impossible
for "man in such a condition" to "live a life which anyone would call
good"? This argument, Wallas felt, had "more stuff in it". And
1. M.J. Wiener, Between Two Worlds, Oxford, 19715 p. 89.
2- Cit. ibid., p. 12b.
3. "The basis of his outlook...was an ethical sensitiveness...
placed at the service of a reason he did not know how to
betray". II.J. Laski, "Lowes Dickinson and Graham Wallas",
Political fly. , III, b (Oct./Dec. 1932), H6l, *+o3.
b. Great Society, pp. 173~9. Wallas pointed to the "clear biological
disadvantage" in the slaughter of the flower of youth, the danger
of the spreau of disease and "the waste of that capital which might
have produced healthier conditions".
5. Loc.cit., As . aclver had done, Wallas pointed to the analogy of
the development of law within.states based on "custom arising
from thousands of free decisions" (rather than compulsion).
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instead of James's vision of a civilian peace corps, Wallas could
only offer the tentative suggestion that "it would not only be
more effective but more economical" if the heroism, excitement and
discipline of war and military life could be achieved by more
direct means—rather than "trusting that we may find them amongst
the accidents and uncertainties, the fatigue and monotony of modern
warfare."We have now made our national houses 30 vast and com¬
plex' , Wallas concluded, "that the custom of firing them in order
to warm our souls is yearly becoming more dangerous and expensive,
2
and the necessity of inventing some other nervous tonic more urgent."
In Wallas's book The Great Society, published only two months before
the outbreak of war, are the following prophetic words: "An inter-
nicene European war is the one enormous disaster which over-hangs
our time...". Gone was the old optimism of nineteenth-century
liberalism—-what Wallas called the "old delight in the 'manifest
finger of destiny' and 'the tide of progress'"—and even "the newer
belief in the effortless 'evolution' of social institutions" looked
far less certain. "We are afraid of the blind forces to which we
used so willingly to surrender ourselves", Wallas concluded rather
1. Ibid., pp. 171-2, 179, 123. Modern warfare could only "provide
a very insufficient satisfaction of the fighting instincts.
Battle-fury ana blood-lust were evolved among our ancestors
under conditions where you felt and sav the wounds you inflicted."
(p. 181)
2* Ibid., . lo3. Wallas briefly mentions James's "Moral Equi¬
valent" p. 66 n. 1. He saw the need for an improvement in the
quality of life for the mass of the population which would per¬
haps include (quoting the conservative journalist St. Loe
Strachey) "some wholesome discipline" and temporary "renunciation
of ease and comfort" (p. 183). But generally he looked increas¬
ingly to "world consciousness" to replace an outdated nationalism.
See Wieneri pp. 157~9.
3. p. U6.
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pessimistically.^ Yet ne remained a confirmed liberal who believed
that human beiiaviour as distinct from human nature could respond to
environmental cnanges. This was "the master-task of civilised man¬
kind" , to produce "a harmony between themselves and their environ¬
ment far deeper and wider'1 than anything that could ue found in
2
existing sociev• In this he differed from the other Ldwardian
pioneer of British social psychology William i-cDougall who, Wallas
felt, tended to see rational thought as "a merely subordinate mechan¬
ism acting only in obedience to the previous stimulation of one
.3
of the simpler instincts."
Yet the difference was a fine one, for McDougail's Introduction
to Social Psychology (1908) was no more pessimistic about the possi¬
bility of Luropean war than Wallas had been in Human Mature in Politics.
The "instinct of pugnacity", McDougali wrote, operated "more power¬
fully" in the present age 'than in any other in producing demonstrations
of collective emotion and action on a large scale." And echoing
Wallas's fears for the outbreak of international conflict, he
continued.
"In our own age the same instinct makes of Burope an armed camp
occupied by twelve million soldiers, the support of which is a
heavy burden on all the peoples; ana we see how, more instantly
than ever before, a whole nation may be moved by the combative
instinct—a slight to tne British flag, or an insulting remark
in some foreign newspaper, sends a wave of angry emotion sweep¬
ing across the country, accompanied by all the characteristics
1. —bid.., . 13.
2. Ibid., p. 68. Wallas "never confused his reformist ideals with
actual conditions, his faith was as great as the other social
scientists, except that it began in greater scepticism". R.M.
Soffer,"The Revolution in English Social Thought 1880-191V,
AHR, LXXXV, 7 (Dec. 1970)» 1962. This general judgement on
Wallas'r. thought certainly applies to his writing on the prob¬
lem of war.
3. Great Society, p. 176. See also pp. 39-^0. Nevertheless Wallas
leaned heavily on McDougall's work.
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of crude collective mentation ana two nations are ready to
rush into a war that cannot fail to he disastrous to both of
them. The most serious task of modern statesmanship is, per¬
haps,to discount and control these outbursts of collective
pugnacity. At the present time custom is only just beginning
to exert some control over this international pugnacity, and we
are still very far from the time when international law, follow¬
ing in the wake of custom, will render the pugnacity of nations
as needless as that of individuals of nighly civilised states
and physical combats between them as relatively infrequent."^
Like Wallas, McDougall seemed to look forward to the time when war¬
fare would be "'replaced by industrial and intellectual rivalry".
Indeed, there were already "unmistakable signs" of this change. Wars
between "civilised nations" were "tending to become mere incidents
of their commercial and industrial rivalry, being undertaken to secure
markets or sources of supply of raw material which shall bring indus-
2
trial or commercial advantage to their possessor." Trade warfare,
which McDougall regarded which 3uch equanimity as an alternative to
military conflict, was not likely to appeal to Wall as who had broken
3
with the Fabians over the question of imperialism and tariff reform.
And there was too an echo of Social Darwinist assumptions in McDougall's
writing not present in Wallas's work. At one point McDougall, consider¬
ing the possibility that military warfare would be sublimated into
less overtly violent forms noted that this would "end what has been
an important, probably the most important, factor of progressive
evolution, namely the selection of the fit and the extermination of the
less fit (among both individuals and societies) resulting from their
1. pp. 279, 231. McDougall cited James's Principles of
Psychology at various points in his book.
2. Introduction..., p. 295.
3. Wiener, pp. 56-7
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conflicts with one another."''" More thorough-going Social Darwinist
arguments against attempts to abolish war w. re of course common at
this time. Looking at his colleagues in the scnolarly world, Wallas
claimed that perhaps "more than half of the professed historians and
psychologists in Europe" believed in the Tightness or inevitability
of war, basing "their arguments upon imposing biological and psycholo-
.2
gical generalisation.''
Apart from the exponents of Social Darwinism like Karl Pearson,
Professor of Applied Mathematics and then (after 1911) of Eugenics
3
at University College, London, Wallas was no doubt referring to the
1. Introduction..., p. 295. This passage remained in the many
subsequent editions of the book during McDougall's lifetime.
In Janus: The Conquest of War a Psychological Inquiry (1927)
McDougall continued (despite the great carnage of 191L-18) to claim
"that war was the great instrument of natural selection among
states and Nations" and that was "the great antiseptic of national
life", the need for self-defence "a bracing tonic influence with¬
out which nations must become relaxed in moral tone" (p. 13).
However, in the foreword he had listed horrible cases of war
madness from his experience as a wartime Major in the R.A.M.C.
and he admitted that "even before the Great War the argument
against war was already strong, the need for its restriction
or abolition already urgent." (pp. 7_12, 15). McDougall repudi¬
ated crude Social Darwinism as represented by Karl Pearson but
he went far beyond Wallas in his criticism of democratic society.
See R.H. Coffer, "Rev Elitism: Social Psychology in Prewar
England", J, of British Studies, VIII, 2 (May 1969), III-UO,
which seems to overestimate the influence of McDougall in Oxford
(pp. 115-6 n. 10) Cf. L.S. Hearnshav, p. 135 and McDougall's
contribution to A History of Psychology in Autobiography, Wor¬
cester, Mass., 1930, p. 207.
2. Great Society, p. 171.
3. E.G. his lecture to the Newcastle Literary and Philosophical
Society, Nov. 1900, where Pearson claimed that "a time when
the sword shall be turned into the ploughshare" would mean that
" mankind will no longer progress". National Life From the
Standpoint of Science, 1905, pp. 26-7.
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academic apologists of imperialism—among British historians people
like J.R. Seeley ana his followers." However, in view of his long-
2
standing rejection of Idealism he could well have added the writings
of the philosophers F.H. Bradley and Bernard Bosanquet to his indictment.
Among British intellectuals before 191^ the influence of Ilegelianism
was every bit as important in arguments for the ri. tness of war as was
the use (or rather misuse) of Darwinian ideas. In this connection F.
h. Bradley's article on "The Limits of Individual and Rational Self-
Sacrifice" in the International Journal of Ethics for October l89^+ is
3
one of the best statements of the Idealist position on war. Here
Bradley, who, unlike Bosanquet, tended to express himself in unequi¬
vocal terms, launched an attack on the "insincere professions" and
"sickening cant" of the "Humanitarian" school. Against its claim for
the equality and "absolute value of individuals" Bradley pointed out
that the real world was quite different—"force n s the world, and
... self-assertion...is a condition of welfare", he wrote. And if "the
end" were "the full development of human nature", then the end was
"superior to the individual" and it was "right to act for this end to
the best of one's judgement."^
1. See P. Burroughs, "John Robert Seeley and British Imperial
History", J. of Imperial and Commonwealth History, I, 2
(Jan. 1973), 191-211.
2. Wallas rejected Idealism (and orthodox religion) after his first
year at Corpus Cnristi College, Oxford, in 1877. Bee Wiener,
pp. 5-9, 7-3. Over 30 years later Oxford rejected Wallas for
the newly-established Gladstone Chair of Political Theory and
Institutions, and chose instead the much less distinguished
W.G.S. Adams.
3. It was originally written in 1878 or 1679.
4. Repr. in Bradley's Collected hssays, Oxfo. , 1935, I, 168, 176.
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What then of the argument used by Wallas and Maclver that
international law would develop (and was developing) as law within
states had developeu? Bradley had two objections. First, one simply
could "not argue in general form from civic to international morality",
from what citizens could or could not do, to what nations could or
could not do. Secondly, "analogy from civil lif. Lid not reveal a
picture of unlimited self-sacrifice. It showed, on the contrary, that
"within limits self-assertion.../was7 valid". Bradley then reinforced
these points (especially the first) in the following striking passage:
"A nation must aim at the good of mankind and at peace in the
end; but, as things are, this principle will in some cases
justify violence, and even extermination. For, beside the
principle which establishes the end, there can be no absolute
law, and the means to this end cannot be fixed beforehand.
And such means certainly need not always consist in abstinence
from aggression. Our first hope at the present is an inter¬
national executive enforcing the morality of the best; but,
if that is to exist, then the best must agree, and must be
the strongest. And strength means war in reserve. We may loon
beyond this possibility to a better state ox things, but the
first seems the only road to the second. The meek will not
inherit the earth, and a nation which claims morality must be
ready to use force in defence of right."1
1» Ibid., I, 170-173, 175-0. Bradley doubted therefore whether
international law could "be said really xo exist" (p. 170)•
This point had been taken up by another Idealist W. R. Sorley,
then a Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge. Sorley, who seems
to have been less "Hegelian" than Bradley, did agree that there
was such a thing as "international morality" although it was
quite different from individual morality, being of less import¬
ance and later growth, national life preceded international
relations and nations possessed "an independence and self-
sufficiency. ..not shared by the individual.' A nation's duty
was 'to itself" —a recognition of the patriotism (i.e. altru¬
ism) of its members rather than their selfishness. Morality
(international or individual) did not depend upon sanctions,
but law did. Without a "superior power'" to enforce international
morality, international law was "a dream of the distant future".
"The Morality of Nations", IJR. I, h (July IO91), kh2-6. \
5o
Although Bradley rejected Social Darwinist arguments for war,"*"
there was some attempt, notably by D.G. Bite, ie , Professor of Logic
and Metaphysics at St. Andrews, to assimilate Darwinian ideas to Ideal¬
ism. In an article in the International Journal of Lthics for January
1901 Ritchie described war as "a harsh form of dialectic, a rough
means of solving hard problems'', but nevertheless var or "the genuine
threat of war1 was often the only way" to secure the desired end.
This Ritchie defined as "constitutional government and...social pro¬
gress", and he proposed to judge the Tightness of war by weighing
which of "the conflicting forces' would be most linely to achieve
2
this end. However,the rticle was published and part of it written
during the Boer War,-1 Some of it reads like a subtle justification
of British policy. For example, perhaps with the Boer republics in
mind, Ritchie concluded that the nation-state, so x^ecious to radical
liberals,^ was not "necessarily the highest and final type of society".
May not a few great '.empires', in which self-governing federated communi¬
ties control the less advanced races, represent a higher stage—more
likely to be stable, less exposed to war and preparing the way for a
federation of the world"?, Ritchie asked his readers. And later in an
if
1. "...how can we consistently set up tribal morality and a mere
struggle between states as ultimate, when within tribal morality
the principle of selfishness is not paramount." nradley, I,
174.
2. "'Jar and Peace", IJE, XI, 2 (Jan. 1901), 149. Ritchie also had
his doubts about "crude applications of biological conceptions
to social evolution." The nation was obviously not an organism
in the biological sense- the sane human being could belong to
many social organisms and extinction of the less successful did
not necessarily mean the destruction of individuals belonging to
it. "In other words human evolution does not take place only be
death an^ by war", Ritchie concluded. Ibid., 154.
3. Ritchie, "The Moral Problems of War - In Reply to Mr. J.M.
Robertson", ibid., 4 (July 1901), 493. The passage quoted above
was written during the "nr. The body of the article had been
written in 1099.
4. On the grounds humanitarian sentiment rather than reasoned
analysis. See H. Weinroth, "Radicalism and Nationalism: An
Increasingly Unstable Equation", A.J.A. Morris, Edwardian Radical¬
ism 1900-1914, 1974, p. 219.
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apparent reference to the pro-Boers he noted: "The sympathy so often
expressed for the weaker or smaller state, simply because weaker
or smaller, is aesthetic rather than ethical: it is really a survival
of that barbaric feeling about warfare which regards it as a noble
sport."'''
No doubt the peace advocates were thoroughly annoyed by this
table-turning—usually they accused their opponents of harbouring an
outdated nostalgia for war. But Ritchie's definition of the just
war must have seemed even more shocking. "If we do not exactly 3ay
that all successful wars are just wars," he wrote, "we admit that no
nation is justified in e»gaging in war unless with a reasonable pros-
pect of success." This was perilously close to the maxim that might
was right, and during the First World War philosophers unsympathetic
to Idealism would point to the similarity, in some of Bosanquet's
writing especially, to the apparent acceptance of justification by
3
force by Treitschke. However, one must admit that when they were not
taking their arguments to extremes Bradley and Ritchie did show a
grasp of real life in the international world. It certainly simpli¬
fied "the internal problems of political society to isolate the state;
but such simplification means abstraction from the actual truth of
facts", Ritchie wrote. And with a wealth of historical detail he
1. "War and Peace", 150-1, lU8. The passage defending Bmpires was
written in 1898 but fit3 so well conventional political justi¬
fications of the British iiapire that it is difficult to believe
that Ritchie did not have it in mind.
2* Ibid., 1^7-8. On the same grounds "that a revolution is never
justified except by success" (lkO).
3. See below p. U6 .
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attempted to show that war had "ever been the raaker of nations".
Yet, it was true, as their critics alleged, that there was a
kind of fatalistic acceptance of war in the Idealist position. While
criticising the favourite radical explanation for the survival of war
in civilised societies—the machinations of ruling elites; what came
to be known as "secret diplomacy"—as over personalised and "not
very scientific", Ritchie left himself open to the charge of ignoring
the possibilities for reform of the international system. Ritchie's
"scientific" explanation was that there was "everywhere an inevitable con¬
flict between inconsistent types of civilization", and human nature
and existing governments being what they were, this conflict could
2
not "always be kept in peaceful channels". This fatalism was even
more apparent in the writings of Bosanquet. For example, in a paper
before the Aristotelian Society in December 1916 Bosanquet denied
the charge that war arose from the state itself:
"And what about war? It is certain to my mind, that evil and
suffering must be permanent in the world, because man is a
self-contradictory being, in an environment to which he can
never be adapted, seeing that at least his own activity is always
transforming it. And in principle there can be no reason for
treating war as an exceptional case, as if presided over by a
special devil apart from every other form of wrong. Neither
the possibility of eradicating war, nor the incidental good
that come3 of it, can reasonably be discussed, as they commonly
are, apart from the general problem of evil in the world. While
roan has a conscience, and things he values above life, and yet
his conscience is liable to err, the root of war exists. Issues
1. "War and Peace", 137> 136. "Nations exist for mankind and not
mankind for nations; and when any nation, small or large, fails
to serve the purpose for which nations exist, it has no moral
right to block the onward movement of human progress, even
while it may still have a certain quasi-legal status under the
convenient fictions of International Law, until that status is
altered by stern facts." "Moral Problems...", h"9k.
2. "War and Peace", 1^9. Maclver, for example, wrote of "a small
ruling class, possessed of power and obsessed with its ideal"
which could "make commitments which bind the whole state in the
perilous game of external policies". Modern State, p. 236.
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may arise between group ana group which cannot be compromised.
Within the state itself which is cited as the convincing ana¬
logy for a universal reign of law, both civil war and individual
rebellion remain possible."1
Although Wallas never condemned the Idealist philosophy of the
2
state as roundly as did Bertrand Russell or L.T. Hobhouse, he did join
them in attempts to stave off international conflict before 191*+. In
the Wallas papers at the London School of Economics there are letters
from Hobhouse, Lowes Dickinson and J. Estlin Carpenter, concerned
with the efforts of British liberals to maintain British neutrality
3
during the July crisis. Together with the economist J.A. Hobson,
1;
Wallas established the British Neutrality Committee at the end of July
1. "The Function of the State in Promoting the Unity of Mankind",
repr. in Bosanquet, Social and International Ideals, 1917> pp. 300-1.
And though he admitted the incidence of war could be "immensely
diminished by the reform of states, and their reconstruction in
certain cases", Bosanquet was sceptical of the possibility of
international restraints unless they were based on "an organised
moral world".
2. "I, who have never been an idealist, find myself realizing how
thankful we ought to be for a certain moderation and good temper
which has always characterised Oxford idealism. Oxford is, indeed,
apt to be conservative, and to be, perhaps, unduly conscious of
itself as a school of a governing class; but one never meets in
the more influential Oxford thinkers of our own time that hard
assertion of the state and official absolutism whose effects in
Prussia are now part of the history of the world." Apart from the
undoubted influence, for the good, of T.H. Green, Wallas saw this
resulting from the dominance of Aristotle "in nineteenth and twen¬
tieth century Oxford". This made "Oxford students see Plato
rather as a revolutionary idealist than a practical absolutist."
Wallas, "Oxford and English Political Thought", Nation, XVII, 7
(15 May 1915), 227. No doubt this was in part a reflection of a
wartime desire to close ranks (as Wallas hinted), but it was also
an indication that his reaction against Idealism had not been as
thorough-going as, say, Russell's.
3. A Letter from Carpenter (13 Sept. 191*0, for example, suggests a
national conference of peace organisations in Nov.-Dec. 191*+•
See also letters from Hobhouse (8 Aug. 191*+) and Dickinson (n.d.),
Wallas Mss. Box 5- Carpenter was a member of the National Peace
Congress. For other members see appendix.
i+. See Wallas's notes and minutes, Wallas Mss., Box 39. Other mem¬
bers were F.W. Hirst, J.L. Hammond, Gilbert Murray, Professor
Rendel Harris, G.M. Treve3yen.
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At about the same time Horman Angell was setting up the British neutral¬
ity League with C.P. Scott, editor of the Manchester Guardian and
J.J. Thomson, Cavendish Professor of Experimental Physics at Cambridge.^"
As the crisis deepened letters began to appear in the newspapers warn¬
ing of the danger of British involvement in a war against Germany.
On the first of August 191^» the day Germany declared war on Russia,
The Times carried a "Scholars' Protest Against War With Germany",
followed by the signatures of nine people, most connected with the
University of Cambridge. These well-known scholars announced that:
"We regard Germany as a nation leading the way in Arts and Sciences,
and we have all learnt and axe learning from German scholars.
Wax upon her in the interests of Servia and Russia will be
a sin against civilization. If by reason of honourable oblig¬
ations we be unhappily involved in war, patriotism might still
our mouths, but at this juncture we consider ourselves justified
in protesting against being drawn into the struggle with a nation
so near akin to our own, and with whom we have so much in
common."2
This manifesto (especially with its admission of the limits of
dissent if war broke out) was a good deal more cautious in tone than
the spate of letters which appeared at this time in the Manchester
1. See M. Swartz, "A Study in Futility: the British Radicals at the
Outbreak of the First World War", in Morris, Edwardian Radicalism,,
pp. 2k6~6l.
2. E.G. Browne (Professor of Arabic), F.C. Burkitt (Professor of
Divinity), J.E. Carpenter, F.J. Foakes-Jackson (Jesus College),
K. Lake (Professor of Theology at Leiden University), W.M.
Ramsay (Professor of Humanity Aberdeen), J.J. Thomson, W.B. Selbie
(Principal of Mansfield College, Oxford), Taylor mentions 81
Cambridge signatories of a letter to The Times. Troublemakers, p.
117. Carpenter and Selbie, as Principals of nonconformist colleges
at Oxford (Manchester and Mansfield) were hardly representative
of Oxford opinion. Times, 1 Aug, 191^, p. 6d. For the reaction
of a Cambridge don who refused to sign, see W.E. Heitland,
After Many Years, Cambridge, 1926, p. 209.
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Guardian. First, Graham Wallas voiced his fears of the certain dis¬
astrous effects of a European war on the British working class. There
could, he claimed,be a return "to the general intellectual and moral
stagnation of 1793 to 1015 during which the British working population,
both in agriculture and manufacture, were brought down to a lower
point of misery and hopelessness than at any other period of history.""*"
Two days later the British Neutrality Committee reiterated the belief
that Britain was under no obligation to assist France in the event of a
Russo-German conflict. For Russia was "only partly civilized" and was
"governed by a military autocracy largely hostile to Western ideas of
political and religious freedom". Germauy, by contrast, was "wedged
in between hostile States, highly civilised" with a culture that had
"contributed enormously in the past to Western civilization", and was
in addition "racially allied" to the British, with "moral ideas" very
2
like theirs. Ironically, at least one of the signatories—Gilbert
Murray—was to spend much of the war denying the truth of the last
O
two (if not the first) propositions. However, for the moment we can
note that the Committee combined on idealistic appeal to the British
Government to see that justice was done (especially to 3elgium) "and
to act as arbiter in the general interest", with arguments of economic
self-interest. Britain, the signatories wrote, could only remain "the
1. 1 Aug. 191^. Cutting in Wallas Mss. Box 39-
2. Cutting loc.cit. Apart from Murray signatories included Hob-
house, Hirst, Hammond, Hobson, Wallas, G.M. Trevelyan, A.G.
Gardiner, Ramsay MacDonald.
3. See below chapter £x.
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financial centre of the world" in peacetime. If war broke out London's
function as a centre of international finance "would be temporarily
and perhaps permanently transferred to the other side of the Atlantic."
Perhaps this piece of Angellism was designed to appeal to the hard-
headed businessmen of Manchester. Against these good economic and
moral reasons for neutrality, the Committee had placed the "question¬
able" considerations of power politics."*"
Further protests from British scholars laid greater stress on
the threat posed by war to "civilisation"—although soon they would be
talking of a war for civilisation. C.H. Herford, Professor of English
at Manchester (who incidentally had a German wife) spoke of the
possibility of a "horrible crime against civilisation". And he con¬
tinued: "let us clear away this figment of 'honour' which binds us to
intervene, not to save France from being crushed, but to enable her
to make an unprovoked attack upon her neighbour with a better chance of
2
impunity." Ouch obvious francophobia was uncommon and more liberal
1. "If we go to war, it will not be to defend any British right
from violation: we do not even allege that even Germany or
Austria has wronged or affronted us in any way; we cannot even
pretend to a sense of wrong. We shall attack them because, in
a quarrel of a very complex issue in which we have no qualifi¬
cations to act as judge, we presume to decide them...or because
on the Dasis of some cold calculations of high politics—which
all the facts show to be of very questionable correctness—
our security and interests render it opportune to do so...".
Cutting in Wallas Mas.
2. Guardian, 1 Aug., 191k, p. 10b. See also letters from S.
Alexander (Professor of Philosophy), A.S. Peake (Professor of
Biblical Exegesis), R.S. Conway (Professor of Early and Classi¬
cal Latin), all of Manchester University and W.M. Geldart (Viner-
ian Professor o1* 5av; Oxford) in the same issue. Also later
letters from T.H. Toller (Emeritus Professor), G. Unwin (Professor
of Economic History), A.E. Boycott (Professor of Pathology), all
of Manchester University, E. de Seliucourt (Professor of English,
Birmingham), C.H. Reilly (Professor of Architecture, Liverpool),
L.T. liobhouse (Professor of Sociology, London), Guardian, 3 Aug.
19lk (p. 9a), k Aug. 1911* (p. lkc), 5 Aug. 19lk (p. 3c). See
also C.H. Reilly, Scaffolding in the Sky, 1938, p. 182.
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academics would have agreed with G.M. Trevelyan's talk of the Russian
peril to civilisation.A There was too the unspoken fear (hinted at by
Wallas) of the threat to civilisation from within—internal disorder
resulting from the dislocations and deprivations of wartime. Only this
explains the widely-held liberal belief that British involvement in
2
war would be "criminal". Yet even before the German invasion of Bel¬
gium some academics had brushed aside these moral objections. J.A.R.
Marriott, history tutor of Worcester College, Oxford, and later a Con-
3servative M.P., called for a closing of ranks at "an hour so solemn".
Three days later, on the day Britain declared war on Germany, The Times
printed "A Scholar's Protest" which effectively answered all the pre¬
vious talk of German Kultur. H. Stuart Jones, Fellow of Trinity
Collage, Oxford, and,as he was careful to point out, member of the
German Imperial Archaeological Institute, pointed to the other Germany,
the Germany of Treitschke and Bernhardi—naiaes which were soon to appear
in virtually every pamphlet and article. Did the signatories of
"the Cambridge manifesto" realise tnat Germany was "not governed by
scholars, but by statesmen, who solemnly believe that might confers
not only right but the duty of attacking the weaker /states/", Jones
Guardian, 3 Aug. 191*+, p. 6d. This fear persisted after the
British declaration of war: "Even so sensible a man as Dicey
can't get the old fashioned notion that the Russians are mere
barbarians out of his head", Sir Frederick Pollock wrote to Lord
Bryce, 26 Dec. 191*+ (Bryce Mss. UB57). The aged Positivist E.S.
Beesly (Professor of History at King's College, London) in one of
the last articles he wrote before he died spoke of the "crime"
of Germany, but was unable to view with any pleasure the prospect
"of Cossacks harrying the land between the Oder and the Elbe as
they did after Kunersdorf in the time of the great Frederick."
"The Russian Alliance", Positivist Rev., 22, cclxi (l Sept. 191*0,
±'/d~9. A younger generation of liberal intellectuals nutured on
Tolstoy found it easier to slide into Russophilia.
2. Trevelyan, for example, warned of social and economic degradation,
contrasting this with tne peace and plenty of the l860s. Gilbert
Murray voiced similar fears. Guardian, 3 Aug. 191*+, p. 6d & e.
8* Times, 1 Aug. 191*+, p. 6d. Cf. A. Quiller-Couch (Prof, of English
at Cambridge), Morning Post, *+ Aug. 191*+, p. *+g.
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asked. Germany threatened France, which incidentally had also rendered
services to scholarship, in language that no liberal should tolerate."1"
With this rebuke events overtook the academic wrangling, and
by the tenth of August letters began to appear from the signatories
of the Cambridge manifesto. 'The invasion of Belgium had caused an
almost total change of mind. The first letter was from J. Holland
Rose, Reader in Modern History at Cambridge, who became one of the most
prolific apologists for the British cause during the war. The invasion
had convinced Rose "as to the imperative need of repelling that aggression
2
and securing an honourable peace." Professor Ramsay, the classical
archaeologist, seemed to be under some misapprehension as to the pre¬
cise reason for Britain's declaration of war (he mentioned the "inva¬
sion of Holland"). But he went on to explain his reasons for recanting:
"The admiration which I feel for Germany as a civilising Power
in her own fashion (different from ours) is changed to dislike
when 3he misuses her deservea influence in the world of thought
to trample on law and right and to force the horrors of war on a
neutral state. The same reasona which made me sign make me now
recognize that the cause of Germany is turned into an attempt to
enslave Europe, which must be resisted at all costs...I do not
regret signing; it was right for us to seek justification before
the world at large and in the memory of history by showing that
we as a people desired by all honest means to avoid this war.
My own private conviction that the war would be forced _
soon made me all the more resolute to show loathing for it."
A dignified enough recantation. How different was Bertrand
Russell's memory of the collapse of the British Neutrality Committee:
"a loud clap of thunder, which all the older members of the committee
1. k Aug. 191U, p. 5d.
2. Times, 5 Aug. 191^, p. 9b.
3. Times, 15 Aug. 191^, p. Td. Cf. Ramsay, "Confessions of a
Peacemaker", 19th Century, LXXXIII (Mar. 1918), 637.
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took to be a German bomb...dissipated their last lingering feeling
in favour of neutrality."x One might expect Russell not to have too
much sympathy with fellow-liberals who failed what he saw as the litmus
test of ideals in 19ll+. There is a sense in which the wartime activi¬
ties of, say, Gilbert Murray represent la trahi3on des clercs, but
with limited knowledge of the often cynical considerations which
decided policy, there was the tendency in a crisis to believe Sir
Edward Grey and to close ranks. Besides, as Howard Weinroth has
remarked, it involved "no great intellectual feat" to move from
support for small nationalities in the Balkans to support gallant little
Belgium against German aggression. In South Africa fifteen years
earlier many liberal intellectuals had opposed British policy because
it had offended against this cardinal liberal principle, but Belgium
altered everytning in 191^. As L.T. Hobhouse wrote to his sister Emily,
there was "no analogy between tnis and the Boer 'war. There we were
doing a wrong—deliberately destroying two small peoples. Here we are
fighting for France and Belgium which is beaten will be dismembered or
1. Auto iography of Bertrand Russell, 1968, U, 16.
2. "fiorman Angell...", 570. A good example of this is E.G. Browne,
the Persian scholar, a supporter of Home Rule, the Welsh language,
Beer independence and most notably Persian independence. On the
latter Browne was extremely critical of Grey. See his "Persia"
Peace Yearbook 1913, pp. 21-1+; "The Persian Oil Concession",
War and Peace.I. 11 (Aug. 191*0, 315-6; Letters to Ration, V, 13
(25 June 1910), 1*56 and XI, 25 (21 Sept. 1912), 90Q11; as well
as his better-known pamphlets on the constitutional movement
(1909-12). On his change of heart over Belgium, see E.D. Ross,
"Edward Glanville Browne: A Memoir" in E.G. Browne, A.Year Among
the Persians, 3rd. ed. 1950, p. xv.
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annexed.""^ Not that Grey's foreign policy had been without fault.
"I still think that our adhesion to one side in the European alliance
increased the tension and weighted the chances in favour of war",
2
Hobhouse wrote in 1915.~ The Government had been wrong, too, in declar¬
ing war "without exhausting every possibility of avoiding it", but once
in, national existence was at stake as it had never been in South
j£
k
3Africa. "Now we are in it it seeia3.. .useless to recriminate. Later
on we can have it out with Grey", Hobhouse assured Graham Wallas.
This collapse of liberal internationalism was not confined to
Britain. Leading academics in the German peace movement, like the
historian Karl Lamprecht and the scientist Wilhelm Ostwald, became
defenders of the German cause.^ In France the sociologist Emile
Durkheim was prominent in the Conite de Rapprochement Franco-Allemand,
which held conferences at Geneva and Ghent (1912-13), ' but he like
1. 8 Aug. 191*+ cit. H.Smith, "World War I and British Left Wing
Intellectuals: The Case of Leonard Hobhouse", Albion, V. iv
(Winter 1973), 265. See also his letter to the Nation, XVlI, 5
(31 Oxt. 191*+), l*+2-3 calling for a manifesto from "anti- \
militarists of long standing".
2* World in Conflict, p. 17. The Triple Entente emphasised the
geographical vulnerability of Germany and translated it into
"positive political fact". This, together with the vagueness of
its terms, gave it "an appearance of hostility, and barely con¬
cealed. . .menace" in German eyes." German statesmen rapidly made
up their minds that we should fight whatever they did, so that
it was not worth while to forfeit any immediate advantage in the
hope of securing our neutrality."(p. 6l).
3. Letter to mmily hobnouse, op.cit.
*+. 8 Aug. 191*+, Wallas Mss. V.
5. See R. Chickering, Imperial Germany and a World Without War#
Princeton, 1975, pp. 135~*+8 for "Pacifism and the Academic Discip¬
line" before 191*+.
6. W.f. Starr, Romain Holland and a World at War, Evanston, III,
1956, p.63. See also G. Siebura, Die Deutsche Frage in der Qffeny-
lichungen Meinung Frankreichs Von 1911-191*+, Berlin-Dahlin, 1955. ~
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many other French savants wrote wartime propaganda.^ Clearly, British
liberal academics accepted war as a fait accompli. With Hobhouse
it was "sorrowful acceptance" of the realities of international power
2
politics. With others, like Gilbert Murray, or the liberal journalist
and historian J.L. Hammond, there was less perplexity over why the war
had come about—one senses even a feeling of relief once Belgium had
provided a clear moral issue for liberals. The assumption no doubt
was that liberal ideals would survive the test of war, and might even
exert some influence on official policy during wartime. In reality
the intellectuals appeared to provide no more than an idealistic gloss
which covered the more cynical (or realistic) considerations of war
U
and diplomacy. Yet the wartime writings of British academics are
of interest, since the First World War has all the trappings of a
modern ideological conflict.
1. See B. Lukes, Emile Durkheim, 1973, pp. 5*+9~5*+.
2. The description is that of J.A. Hobson (even more reluctant than
Hobhouse to accept official explanations in 191*0 in Hobson
and M. Ginsburg, L.T. Hobhouse, 1931, p. 50.
3. On Hammond see H.R. Winkler, "J.L. Hammond" in H.A. Schmitt (ed.)
Historians of Modern Europe, Baton Rouge, 1971, p. 98.
k. LYen Hobhouse, sceptical as he was about British policy, could
write in the following vein: "The alliance of Great Britain,
France, Russia, Belgium, and Serbia has now been cemented with
blood. It is going to be a part of the most moving historical
traditions of these peoples. So far as the three Western States
are concerned it is reinforced by a similarity of political
development and by geographical considerations, and all these
forces together have engendered a sense of true solidarity...",
World in Conflict, pp. 90-1.
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IV: "THE BROKEN FELLOWSHIP"
"It is the natural logic of the multitude that because we
Englishmen feel it our duty at this moment to combat the German
state to our last breath therefore Germany has never done any¬
thing of value for scholarship or letters. But that is just
the kind of logic to which scholars should give no countenance.
We surely need not be any weaker in our resolution to hold
out till we have righted a great wrong and removed a great dan¬
ger to our nation because we recognise the world's debt in
science and letters to the researchers and writers of Germany."
"The Broken Fellowship" (editorial).
Time:.; Literary Supplement, k Nov. 1915
For British scholars with ties of friendship and common intel¬
lectual endeavour to German colleagues the break in relations in August
191^ was especially painful. Some nad German wives, and the war for
them was, as G.W. Protnero put it, "a sort of civil war".^ Perhaps
this feeling was best sunned up by the Birmingnam economic historian
W.J. Ashley. He had studied in Berlin under two great German economists
Adolf Wagner and Gustav Schmoller, and was especially close to the
2
latter. Early in the war Ashley contributed a pamphlet to the Oxford
series. Although it purported to analyse The War and Its Economic
Aspect, Ashley spent the first part unburdening himself of his grief
at the outbreak of nostilities between Germany and Britain. First he
described tne Germany of his student days:
1. Letter to W.H. Dawson, 2k liar. 1915, Dawson Mas. 269. Dawson
married twice into German families. Other men with German wives
included C.H. Herford (Professor of English at Manchester) who
lost his son Siegried in the war, J. Mackinnon (Professor of
Ecclesiastical History at Edinburgh), G.P. Gooch, Sir Eyre
Crowe (of the Foreign Office) and J.W. Readlam (Historical
Advisor to tne Foreign Office), J.C. Wilson (Professor of Logic
at Oxford), whose German wife had recently died, tried to
obtain permission for his wife's family to live in Oxford but
the war made this impossible.
2. He contributed to the festschrift in his honour: Die Entwick-
lung der deutschen Volkswirtschaftslehre im19 Jahrhundert,
Leipzig, 1908.
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"For many years—from the time when I first went a3 a 3tudent
to Germany—I have had a warm place in my heart for the German
people. Like many other young Englishmen, it was in Germany
that I first caught the infection of the scientific spirit,
the spirit that cares as much for widening the bounds of know¬
ledge as for handing on knowledge already acquired; and what I
saw of social intercourse in Gottingen and Dresden made me
appx-eciate tne Gemutlichkeit, the cheerful simple kindliness,
which characterises so large a part of the people. I have
believed that our two nations possessed many traits in common,
and have had some common interests and duties; and I nave done
what I could t.o promote good understanding between them. And
when the University of Berlin, in conferring an honorary degree,
took occasion to describe me as a true friend of our nation',
the epithet was not, I think, altogether undeserved.1
But now the war, "a special and personal grief" for Ashley, hau
broken the ties of scholarship and friendsnip:
"It means the end, for many years to come, probably for my life¬
time, of the hopes I have cherished of amicable co-operation
between the two countries; the cessation—though that, in com¬
parison, is but a small matter—of friendly inter change of
thought with men wnoae work for economic science and for social
reform I have long admired. And although I am convinced that
the German Government and the German nation supporting it are
profoundly in the wrong; though I am sure that it made a fatally
unwise decision in determining at all risks, to back up—nay,
to prompt—Austria; though I feel that it has quite misunderstood
both the purposes and the temper of tngland, though I have not
the slightest doubt that it is the boimden duty of every English¬
man to do all that in him lies to bring about Germany's complete
defeat; I am not going to deny to Germany the qualities which
first called forth my respect, and I an not going, if I can help
it, to pay any German the poor compliment of returning his
'hatred'...."2
Although Asnley had first-hand knowledge of German society and
3 U
politics, he never involved himself in wartime polemics. 'iiiis was also
1. pp. 3-k.
2. Loc.cit.
3. Shown in his Progress of the German Working Classes (120*0
which followed many of the ideas of Kathedersozialisten like
Schmoller.
h. Ashley confined himself to straight economic analysis as in
Germany ana Cotton", Atlantic Monthly, CXVII, 1 (Jan. 1916),
110-22 and "Germany's Resources Under the Blockage", Atlantic
Monthly, CXV, 6 (June 1915), 817-29.
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true of A.W. Ward, Master of Peterhou3e, Cambridge, and perhaps the
most knowledgeable of British historians on modern Germany. Ward, who
had been brought up in Germany until the age of sixteen, spoke German
like a native and was deeply-read in German literature. ''All through
his life", said one of his eolleagues, he "was anxious to do all that
was in hi3 power to emphasise friendly relations between the land of his
birth and that of his early education. His constant social and literary
relations with German scholars were not simply for the sake of scholar¬
ship but were conspicuously directed to this end."*' As well known in
Germany as in Britain as an historian of the first-rank, Ward was
uniquely equipped to be an intermediary between the scholars of the two
countries. Just two years before the outbreak of war he spoke to the
English Goethe Society of the close ties between British and German
scholars:
"The service which German research and German sympathy have
rendered to the study of Shakespeare during something like a
century and a half can never be equalled, but they may, in
some measure, be returned by the loving devotion of generations
of Englishmen and Englishwomen to the study of-Goethe. In these
spneres of work and thought at least—in the payment of this
mutual tribute to genius, and in this common acknowledgement of
an indebtedness for which there is no sinking fund—the cooper¬
ation and competition between Germans and Englishmen is, we
trust, destined to endure as it is our heart's desire that
the friendsnip they alike betoken may continue and increase
in all tne relations between the two peoples of kinsmen."2
But war in 191*+ put an end to all Ward's hopes—and to the
Society which was not revived until 1923. Although Ward publicly stated
1. T.F. Tout, "Memoir", in A.T. Bartholomew, A. Bibliography of
Sir Adolphus William Ward l837~192*+, Cambridge, 1926, p. xxvii.
Ward was the son of the British Consul-General at Leipzig and
Hamburg, Minister-Resident to the Hanse towns. Ward had a
Prussian knighthood (1911) and an honorary degree from the
University of Leipzig.
2. "Goethe and the French Revolution" (Presidential Address),
Publ. of the English Goethe Soc. XIV (1912), 2.
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his belief that Britain's war against Germany was a "righteous war"^"
he never used his considerably knowledge of Germany to join in the
attacks on her. Instead, he put together a long half-historical paper
on Securities for Peace" and "retired into German history before the
fall of Bismarck." His Germany l8l5~189Q which was published in three
volumes between 1916 and 1918 showed no signs of the very real grief
which the war hau brought for Ward. Its tone, a reviewer noted, was
3
one of "serene detachment" and "absolute impartiality". It was left
to others to argue over the "problem of German Kultur".
How could German policy be explained? Or as C.H. Herford, Prof¬
essor of English Literature at Manchester, put it: "How does it come
...that a nation standing, in very many respects, in the foremost
ranks of civilized peoples, can openly resort in its warefare not only
to practices, but also to principles which suggest a methodical and
intellectualised barbarism?" For Herford this was a personal dilemna—
his wife was German and his own ties to German scholars were very close.
But his answer was a rare example of clear thinking among academic German-
ophiles. As he noted, the usual explanation was to divide "the German
people into two alien hosts." On one side were "the thinkers, the
idealists, the science-workers, the musicians, and the millions of
kindly men and women" whose Geinutliehkeit so readily disarmed "English
reserve". On the other side was the "brutally aggressive military
caste". Usually this view took the "form of postulating a fundamental
1. Founders' Day in War Time, Manchester, 1917, p. 2. This was at
a memorial service for members of Manchester University killed
in the war. Cf. the reaction of a Cambridge contemporary, the
Master of Trinity College, in J.R.M. Butler, p. 197.
2. Letter to C.P. Scott, 2.6 Mar. 1915, cit. J.L. Hammond, C.P.Scott,
1931*, p. l8k. Iiis pamphletsSecurities of Peace appeared in 1919-
3« EHR., XXXIII, 2 (April 1918), 2dk.
7*»
contrast between Prussia and the rest of the German nation."^- This
convenient division into "good" and "bad" Germans did not satisfy
Herford, but it was commonly held by men who knew and loved the old
Germany. "Of the two Germanys", Sir Michael Sadler wrote to a friend,
"the one which you and we love is not responsible for this wickedness,
except so far as it has not had the moral or physical courage enough
2
to stab its Junkers in the face long ago."
Perhaps the foremost exponent of the "two Germanys" view
was Lord Bryce who identified German "frightfulness" firmly with
Prussia. "There was nothing of the kind in Southern Germany when I
3
knew it fifty years ago", he wrote in 1916. He just could not
believe that "the German learned class, or the commercial class—
or the people in any sense" had been "persuaded by Treitschke,
Bernhardi's system of doctrines, or had adopted the principle that
State necessity justifies everything." Soldiers might believe any¬
thing they wished, nor were "most politicians much better." But could
the theologians ana professors have really forsaken ethics or religion?
1. "The Problem of German Kultur", Positivist Rev., 23 (Sept.
1915), 193.
2 To J. Harvey, 9 Aug. 191^ cit. M.Sadleir, Michael Ernest Sadler,
19^9, p. 270. Sadler had visited Germany in 1897 to gather
material for his sympathetic report on German secondary education
(1902).
3. "Preface" to A. Toynbee, The Belgian Deportations, 1916, p. 8.
Letter to H.A.L. Fisher, 15 Oct. 191^, Fisher Mas. Box 3/1. Cf.
Bryce's Neutral Hations and the War, 1915, pp. 7_8. Bernard
Bosanquet made the same point: "The professors, it is said,
have been mobilized in the service of Germany. And on the
general merits of the dispute this is so. But I am not aware of
evidence that philosophers of repute have adopted, say, Bernhardi's
or Treitschke's views of justification by force." "Patriotism
in the Perfect State", The International Crisis in its Ethical
and Psychological Aspects, 1915, pp. 1^0-1 n. 1.
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H.A.L. Fisher, whose lectures on The War Its Causes and Issues
Bryce had been criticising for this indictment of German universities,
was like Herford no "good hater" of Germany. Indeed, he had told his
audience at the University of Sheffield, "I am the last man to draw
up an indictment against a whole people of whose contributions to
the great causes of humanity I am keenly sensible, wnose poetry I
read and love, of whose great masters of historical learning I count
myself to be in some measure the humble disciple." He found "no
pleasure in contemplating the ruin of any civilised country under the
processes of war", especially this "struggle between the two great
members of the Teutonic family" which was "fratricidal and therefore
peculiarly terrible.""^ And yet something was wrong with the German
professors. "I am reminded", Fisher wrote to Bryce, "that cultivated
people can very soon sink to the lowest levels of barbarism by the
example of Gorres who writing in the Rhenische Mercur in 1813 urged
the destruction of Rheims Cathedral, of the Louvre and of the liotre
Dame.
This could not fail to strike home with Bryce who was (like
Fisher) involved in an official investigation of alleged German atro¬
cities in Belgium, including the destruction of the university and
3historic buildings in Louvain. There was, too, considerable evidence
that in their public utterances the "organised masters of German
science" endorsed German military policy; that they like "the
1. The War Its Causes and Issues, 191^, p. 8.
2. 19 Oct. 1914, Bryce Mss. UB. 23. Joseph von Gorres was Profes¬
sor of History at Munich.
3. See below p.3/o.
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enormous majority of the German people" not only passionately supported
the war, hut also justified "at (the most with a regret for the loss
of life) the sinking of the Lusitania and all the other expedients...
called into play for its successful prosecution."^" The manifestos
of German scholars were specifically designed to show the solid support
of professors for German policy and to reject the idea of "two
Germanys". "The German Army and the German people are one", ninety-
three leading academics proclaimed in October 191*+, "and to-day this
consciousness fraternises 70,000,000 of Germans, all ranks, positions
2
and parties being one."
What one might call the battle of manifestos in 191*+ vas begun
by the Address to Evangelical Christians Abroad by thirty German
theologians, including some of the names best known to the British
3
public. Their rejection of the allegation of German atrocities and
their protest against "unnameable horrors" committed against Germans
living abroad, was answered by the address To the Christian Scholars of
*+
Europe from theologians associated with the University of Oxford.
As one might have hoped this latter was couched in tones of Christian
charity—no doubt the Germans would have called it British cant—the
1. Ilerford, "Problem of German Kultur", 19*+.
2. "Manifesto of the Intellectuals of Germany", in W.W. Coole
and M.F. Potter (eds.) Thus Spake Germany, 19*+1, p. *+5.
3. Adolf Diessmann, Adolf v. Harnack, Julius Richter (all of the
University of Berlin), Rudolf Eucken (Jena), William Wundt (Leip¬
zig).
U. H.S. Holland,W. Sanday (the professors of divinity), W. Lock
(Professor of Biblical Exegesis), R.L. Ottley (Professor of
Pastoral Theology), E.W. Watson (Professor of Ecclesiastical
History), G.A. Cooke (Professor of Hewbrew), T.B. Strong (Dean
of Christ Church), J.E. Carpenter (Principal of Manchester
College), R.W. Macan (Master of University College), W.B.
Selbie (Principal of Mansfield College), W.A. Spooner (Warden
of Hew College), C.C.J. Webb (Magdalen), B.H. Streeter (Queen's),
Hastings Rashdall (Hew), T.K. Cheyne (Oriel), E. Bevan (Hew),
F.E. Brightman (Magdalen), P. Gardiner (Professor of Classical
Archaeology) being the most eminent names on the list.
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Oxford theologians claiming that German accusations arose from ignorance
rather than from intellectual dishonesty:
"Some of us are specially bound to individuals on the list
by personal ties of deep regard and admiration. Therefore
we do our best to examine, with the self-restraint and effort
of impartiality which befits those whose business it is to
sift the evidence and to look below the facts for their causes,
the points emphasized or indicated by their signatories....
We hasten to express our belief in the sincerity and good
faith of these protestations and disclaimers so far as they
relate to the motives of those by whom the document has been
signed.... Uaturally we do not charge the signatories with
stating the facts other than as they saw them. But they
wrote, we are quite sure, without having studied at first hand
any adequate collection of the evidence."!
However, this assumption of superior British wisdom did not impress
the German theologians who fought back with Another Word to the
Protestant Christians Abroad—a manifesto, one of the Oxford divines
sadly reflected, which was "a most unworthy piece of special plead-
..2
ing.
Reading the reply of the Oxford theologians one is immediately
reminded of the critical evaluation of Wilhelmine academic life in
the wake of the Fischer controversy of the 1960s. The intrinsic short¬
comings of German universities were clearly revealed in 191^, for those
with eyes to see. The Oxford theologians noted the increasingly homo¬
geneous (and imperialistic) ideology of the German professoriate—for
example, that "no Social Democrat" could "aspire to a professorial
chair". And they concluded: "Of the existence and influence of this
tendency the /German/ signatories cannot be ignorant; and we do not
know whether to be more grateful for their own implicit repudiation of
1.
2.
Oxford, 191*+,pp. 3-^, 8.
W.B. Selbie, The War and Theology, 1915, p. 8.
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sympathy with it, or more astonished at their ostrich-like attitude
towards a state of things so notorious." Normally, they would not have
held their German colleagues "responsible for the theories of mili¬
tary writers like General von Bernhardi" any more than they would have
expected them to assume that Oxford theologians neeessarily agreed
with "the views of Lord Roberts". But the German theologians had
even denied the existence of aggressive imperialistic sentiments
within Germany. Germany, they had claimed, had "not dreamed of
depriving others of light and air"."*"
The German claim, often to be repeated, that this was a war
Kultur against "Asiatic barbarism" put some of the Oxford theologians
in a rather difficult position. At least two of them (W.B. Selbie and
J.E. Carpenter) had signed the manifesto, published in The Times
after the Russian mobilization of July 191^ (but before the German
invasion of Belgium), protesting against British involvement in
war on the side of Tsarism against Germany. Even now the Oxford men
thought it "reasonable, in estimating German policy, to allow for the deep-
seated nervousness in German minds", which was "the outcome of the
neighbourhood on tneir further border of the great mysterious northern
Power with its huge population and the illimitable possibilities of its
future." Such language perhaps suggested similar nervousness in
British minds. Certainly, it was claimed that the Anglo-Russian Entente
1. To The Christian Scholars..., pp. 6-7.
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in no way committed Britain to "sympathy with some features of
Russian internal administration."''"
However, the publication of the most famous of the German
academic manifestos—that of "the ninety-three" in October 191*+ pushed
the battle of words between theologians into the background. The
"Manifesto of the Intellectuals of Germany" became a by-word among
the academics of Britain and France for the subordination of German
scholarship to the dictates of state policy. It had been drawn up
by Ulrich von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, doyen of German classical
philology and a man in frequent contact with British colleagues.
The original signatories included most of the leading German scholars,
and after energetic propaganda by the historian Dietrich Schafer
there were finally about **,000 signatures attached to the manifesto—
2
as Fritz Fischer points out, virtually the whole German professoriate.
"As representatives of Science and Art", the signatories protested
"to the civilised world against the lies and calumnies" with which
the Allies had been "endeavouring to stain the honour of Germany in
her hard struggle for existence—a struggle which has been forced upon
her." The "lies" included the idea of German responsibility for the
war, the "criminal" violation of Belgian neutrality and of international
law, allegations of atrocities against the Belgians (except under "direst
necessity"), and finally the claim of the Allies that in fighting German
1. Ibid., pp. 9-10. They also denied the German charge that the
war was one of Protestant Germany against Catholic (even Pagan)
France and Orthodox Russia. As for Russia's alleged "barbarism",
they pointed out that one of Oxford's "ablest and most distin¬
guished professors" (Paul Vinogradoff) was Russian. "Russian
intellectual development" had "not yet reached the pitch of
German" but there were signs of "a very brilliant and splendid
noonday."
2. Germany's Aim3 in the First World War, 1967, p. 156. n. I.
Of the original signatories the best-known names were: Wilhelm
Forster (Berlin), Johannes Conrad (lialle), Paul Ehrlich (Frank¬
fort), Adolf v. liamack (Berlin), Lujo Brentano (Munich),
Rudolf Eucken (Jena), Ernst Kaeckl (Jena), Max Lenz (Hamburg),
Karl Lamprecht (Leipzig), Max Liebermaun (Berlin), Eduard Meyer
(Berlin), Wilhelm Hermann (Marburg), Friedrich haumann (Berlin),
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militarism they were not seeking to destroy German civilisation. "Have
faith in us", the signatories asked the people of neutral countries.
"Believe that we shall carry on this war to the end as a civilised
nation to whom the legacy of a Goethe, a Beethoven, and a Kant is just
as sacred as its own hearths and homes.
There is little doubt that this manifesto did immense damage to the
reputation of German scholarship, in neutral as well as Allied states.
"To many of us in this country," .rote one of the Oxford theologians,
"it has been the most painful experience of their lives to find men,
whose names they have been long accustomed to revere, showing themselves
so blindly and bitterly .partisan in their judgements regarding the causes
2
of the war." " Another of the Oxford signatories noted that if one took
German "pamj)hlet literature as a whole" and looked in it "for anything
like the sense of px*oportion, the objectivity and balanced judgement of
true science", it was "conspicuously wanting." "Kow is it", he asked,
"that in regard to this present war, its causes and significance, there
are so few traces of German science?" In America J.W. Burgess, a
1. "Manifesto of tho Intellectuals.,.cit. Coole and Potter, pp.
kk-5. Also printed in G.F. Hicolai, The Biology of War, 1919, pp.
2-5. For a less emotional response from some of the signatories
(Max Planck and, according to him, Adolf v. Harnack, v. Willamowitz-
Moellendorff and two others), see the letter sent to Sir Oliver
Lodge via Professor H.A. Lorentz (University of Leiden), Times.
5 June 1916, p. 6&.
2. Selbie, War and Theology, p. 8, Cf. W.F. Moulton, James Hope
Moulton, 1919. pp. 123-32.
3. W. Sanday, The Meaning of the War, 1915, pp. 66-9.
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political scientist at Columbia University and one of the few defenders
of Germany among leading American academics, had by 1915 condemned the
conduct of German savants.x Even before American entry to the war in
1917 its university community had turned against German propaganda—
the manifesto of "the ninety-three" had been the final blow to any hopes
of critical voices being raised in German universities.
The explanation of this sad falling-off from the ideal of Wiaaen-
schaft depended greatly on the extent of one's sympathy with things
German. The simplest interpretation was that German professors had on
2
the spur of the moment been "swept away by a national impulse". The
aged A.V. Dicey felt that the explanation lay in the "false political"
and "religious creed" of modern Germany. This diminished "the moral
O
guilt of good men infected by its errors". For an Oxford theologian
Germany was "a noble nation for a time gone wrong." The qualities of
greatness remained but they were "unhappily blended."^ But for those
less kindly disposed towards Germany, the manifesto of "tne ninety-
three" had a different explanation: The German scholar was "a singularly
guileless and credulous person, entirely without political or constitutional
1. Herbst, p. 169. International protest at the destruction of Louvain
University is collected in Resolutions of Protest, Official Corres¬
pondence and other Data Relating to the Destruction of Historic
Monuments rev. ed. Westerham, 1915-
2. Gardner, Autobiographies. p. IjR.
3* How We Ought to Feel About the War, Oxford, 191**, pp. 7-8.
U. Sanday, Meaning.»., p. 109. One of his Oxford friends wrote that
Sunday would 'not think ill of anybody.... For the worse the Prussian
case is, the more he finds himself constrained to apologise for it:
and his apologetic attitude corresponds remarkably with the German
one, for whatever lie the Germans tell he is bound to have an equi¬
valent excuse, and these become as involved as the original lies that
provoke then. However, he is honest at heart and admits the truth
piecemeal." Robert Bridges to H. Bradley, 3 Dec. 1915, in
Correspondence of Robert Bridges and Henry Bradley, Oxford, 19**0, pp.
145-6>. Bridges (the Poet Laureate) wrote anti-German poems during
the war although he led attempts to resume contacts with German
scholars after the war.
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training, and ready, as a believer in 'divine right and passive obedi¬
ence* , obediently to sign any statement submitted to him by his superiors.""''
This explanation offered by an Edinburgh historian was echoed by many
others who pointed to the obviously important consideration that German
professors were civil servants, and proud of this status.
Whatever the exact reason for their fierce support of official
policy, German scholars had effectively destroyed any credibility that
remained in the image of "two Germanys" in August 191**. As C.H. lierford
noted sadly, the "relation between the things we honour and the things
we abhor in the Germany of to-day, is to intimate to permit either of
them exclusively to dominate any one region or class. They often
appear to co-exist as different aspects of the same mind. And whatever
demarcation could be discerned...before the war, the war itself has all
but completely effaced." Herford had come a3 close as was perhaps
possible, for a British scholar steeped in German culture, to a critical
assessment of the German professoriate's role in creating the prevail¬
ing ideology the Wilhelaine ruling elite. The "glaring" defects of
modern Germany were "rooted in a Kind of fundamental Tightness and nobility"
—one could discern "the root of idealism from which even that which
proudly called itself 'Realpolitik' drew not a little of its vital
.,2
sap.
Eerford had also noticed an "incapacity to value, and even to
1. J. Kirkpatrick, Origins of the Great War, p. 25.
2. "Problem of German Kultur", 19**~7. A recent observer has written
that Wilhelmine foreign and domestic policy is "only intelligible
against the Weltanacnauung constructed by German philosophers and
historians during the earlier nineteenth century which had been
adapted and applied by their spiritual descendants at the end of
the century." J.A. Moses, -Eio Politics of Illusion, 197**» p. 10.
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understand, the mentality of other nations" aud this grave "defect"
in German scholarship soon drew the attention of other sympathetic
observers. W.J. Ashley, for example, had found certain "disquieting
features" in the "mental attitude" even of scholars he greatly res¬
pected:
"In academic circles the legitimate pride in German science seemed
sometimes to have become almost an obsession and to have had the
effect of shutting out of sight what was being done in other lands.
It seemed hardly to be realized that what Germany had to teach the
western world in the way of thoroughness and method had already
been pretty well learnt, and that there were intellectual qualities
of almost equal value, qualities of lucidity and discrimination and
balance, which could perhaps be better learnt elsewhere—even in
despised France. There was a curious national self-satisfaction
which failed to perceive that the great new ideas, the waves of
intellectual inspiration within and without the realm of scholar¬
ship and research, which were affecting the minds of this generation
all over the world, were now almost all of theia coming from other
directions than Germany."2
With such doubts being expressed by academic Geraanophiles it was
not surprising that British scholars less sympathetic to Germany should
now turn and attack German scholarship itself. A notable example of
this occurred at the annual conference of the Classical Association in
1915. Its President W.F. Ridgeway, Professor of Archaeology at
Cambridge, earned great applause with his claim that German contempt
for Britain was, "in no small degree", due to the attitude "of British
scholars, theologians, and some scientists, with some few exceptions,
towards everything German." The fact was "that for the last two
1. Herford loc. cit.
2. The War..., pp. b~5.
8U
generations British scholars, British theologians and British men
of science" had "aimed chiefly at being the first to introduce into
this country the last thing said in Germany, even though that might be
only the worthless thesis produced by some young candidate for his
doctorate. But what was worse, no one dreamed of inquiring whether
the statements of the savant were correct or his arguments valid.
There were, one suspects, academic sour grapes mixed in with
traditional Britisn mistrust of research on the German scale, for
Ridgevay spent some time listing his difficulties on getting published
his criticism of Mommsen's work. But at the Classical Association
conference no one could be in any doubt that most delegates agreed
with criticism of what one of them called "that mass of Teutonic learn¬
ing" which had "encumbered and almost crusned classical study" since the
2 . .
ld'70s. Even the classicist E.A. Sonnenschein, a man by no means
unsympathetic to German scholarship, wrote of it as "one of the
idols before which too many people in this country—including the writer
•>
of this paper—have bowed down.""' The Professor of Colonial History
at Aberystwyth claimed that British historians, rather than classicists,
had "been subjugated by the Germans", but it was clear that anyone
who had doubts about the influence of German learning on his own field
now felt free to make a declaration of independence."I'm glad to be
rid of the German incubus", Walter Raleigh wrote to a French friend,
1. "Presidential Address", Proc. of the Classical Assoc. XII (1915),
19-20. '
2. T.E. Page, ibid., 31 (discussion following Ridgeway's address).
3. Idols of Peace and War, Oxford, 1915, p. 17. Sonnenachein had been
born in London (1651)of an Austrian father.
U. T. Stanley Roberts, Times baucational Suppla. ^9 (l Sept. 191M
150c. Much of his ire was directed at the late Bishop Stubbs.
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"It has done no good, for many years, to scholarship; —indeed, it
has produced a kind of slave-scholarship, though there are still soaae
happy exceptions."^"
Mixed with this reaction there was a certain streak of anti-intellectu&lism.
Usually this was confined to the more lurid wartime pamphlets with titles
like Kaiser, Krupp and Kultur, but occasionally it showed through in more
serious discussions. A good example of this is the article by L.P. Jacks,
Principal of Manchester College, Oxford, and a nonconformist theologian,
in the Atlantic Monthly for April 1915 where he wrote of, "something...
now moving in the philosophical and theological heart of Britain which,
if pressed into utterance, would say, 'Mo more Kant, no more Hegel, no
more Strauss, no more Nietzsche, no more Harnack, no more Eucken—for mel"'
There was in this, Jacks admitted, "soiae insularity", but there was "also
a great deal of human nature." Faced with "the hideous crime committed
.2
on Belgium", things German "stood discredited inthe British mind".
And in another article at this time Jack3 rejoiced that, "The age of
3
German footnotes is on the wane."
Of course such blanket condemnations were not typical and British
theologians usually rallied to the defence of German scholarship. As
John Oman wrote, "Only ignorance can afford to mock at German culture.
1. Letter to Eaile Legouis, 19 Aug. 191^, Raleigh, The Letters of
Sir Walter Baleigh, (187.9-1922), rev. ed., 1926, II, UoU.
2. "The Changing Mind of a Nation at War", Atlantic Monthly,CXV, k
(Paril 1915), 3^U. Jacks felt that the British had "overestimated
the German head" and "underestimated the Russian heart".
3. "A Theological Holiday—And After", Hibbert J. XTV (1915), 6.
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The man who has no debt to it to-day has no great intellectual debt
to anybody, The contribution of no other nation is so great, and that
let us ever gratefully acknowledge.And a University of Manchester
theologian wrote that ''science and her votaries" would suffer if
research "ceased to be cosmopolitan" and "seekers after truth" duplicated
research "through refusal to read work already published in a foreign
2
ana hated tongue." But the question of the relationship of British
and German theology aroused sufficient controversy for the Oxford Univer¬
sity Press to commission a pamphlet in their series on wartime issues.
Its author W.B. Golbie, Congregationalist theologian and Principal of
Mansfield College, Oxford, was in no way anti-German, as his signature to
one of the neutrality manifestos before the outbreak of war had shown.
Selbie was not one to deny British theology's "indebtedness to Germany".
Almost every book on a theological subject" written in Britain showed
this to be true. German theologians has "worked so assiduously and
thoroughly in all the various fields", their scholarship was "so exact
and their speculation so bold and far-reaching" that their writings inevit¬
ably dominated the field. British students came back from Germany
"imbued with something of the German spirit and method; and full of
admiration for teachers like Karnack and Hermann, Troeltseh and Julicher,
3
Johannes Weiss, Seeberg and Loofs."
1. line war and Its Issues, Cambridge, 1915, p. 91.
2. J.H. Moulton, British and German Scholarship, 1915, p. 6. Moulton
died two years later after the ship on which he was travelling was
torpedoeu in the Mediterranean.
3- War and Theology, pp. 3, 7.
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But even so sympathetic an observer as Selbie felt that there was
"some ground for the qpprehension" that British theology was "coming to
depend too exclusively on work done in Germany", and that native
scholars were not always being given credit "for the excellent and original
work" they did. The appearance of the manifesto of the German professors
had only served to remind Selbie of the shortcomings already apparent
in German scholarship—and here he quoted from L.T. Hobhouse's Democracy
and Reaction (1904)—"It is learning divorced from its social purpose,
destitute of large and generous ideas, worse than useless as a guide
in the problems of national life, smothering the humanities in cartloads
of detail, unavoidable, but fatal to the intellect."^ This characteris¬
ation of German scholarship was amplified by Hobhouse in a lecture in
1915 to one of the summer schools organised by F.S. Marvin. There was,
he claimed, "a want of proportion" in some of the "vast Teutonic
■ 2treatises" which took "the heart out of the English student."
Those who had always doubted the value of the massive structure of
the German research industry now felt that, with the war, the time
had come to reassert the older British traditions of scholarship. Gilbert
Murray felt the difference between the British and German approach to
classical literature was that the Germans aimed "more at knowing;
we at feeling and understanding. They are professionals, we are the
amateurs.... We are always aiming at culture in Arnold's sense, not
1. Ibid., pp. 7, 9. As an example of this divorce Selbie noted the
division in Germany between theology as a science and its social
and religious context and purpose. Cf. Elliott-Binns, p 339.
2. "Science and Philosophy as Unifying Forces", The Unity of Western
Civilization, 1915, pp. 171-2.
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Bernnarai1s , they are aiming at research or achievement."i And the
historian J.W. Allen wrote of a "German Blind" tn&t was "at once powerful
and dull". The "German intellect" was "remarkably comprehensive". It
had "a great power of grasping complicated detail and a great faculty
for the wide generalisation". But, at the same time it was "extra¬
ordinarily lacking in fineness of perception, in intellectual subtlety"
and in humour". These deficiencies are so great as to render German
comprehensiveness almost futile. They account for the odd stupidity
ii 2
which marks almost all German work , Allen concluded. Clearly, German
pedantry was yet one more manifestation of Shreckliehkeit.
The heights to which anti-German sentiment among British scholars
could go is illustrated in a letter to The Times in December 191^
from the eminent ancient historian A.H. Sayce, Professor of Assyriology
at Oxford. Whereas Hobhouse had been willing to concede "the element
of disinterested drudgery" as tne German contribution to science, Sayce
denied even this "faithful, unrepaying service of the hard dry fact",
as Eobhouse had called it. In science "none of the great names" vas
German. Apart from Goethe, there were no great names in German literature.
1. "German •Kultur'—III German Scholarship", Quarterly Rev. 223
(April 1915), 333, 336. "
2. Germany and Europe, 191*+, pp. *+5-6.
3. Hobhous® ban claimed that "the cooperation of both types of mind",
German and British, was necessary. A "patient endeavour in the
elaboration of detail", a "certain encyclopeadic minuteness" was
the German contribution to the "international division of labour".
Each element had its place: "English common sense, French lucidity,
German idealism; English liberty, French equality, German organiza¬
tion ; English breadth, French exactitude, German detail". "Science
and Philosophy...", 170, 172-3.
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Kant was "More than half Scottish in origin", and Schiller "a milk-
and-water Longfellow". The German scholar could "laboriously count
syllables and words, and pile up volumes of indices", he could
"appropriate other men's discoveries in the interests of 'culture'",
but beyond this he produced "only theories which take no regard of facts",
which, because they came from Germany "must be regarded as infallible."
Wot content to condemn German researchers to be "intellectual 'hewers
of wood and drawers of water'" for their colleagues overseas, Sayce
finished by damning the Germans for being "still what they were fifteen
centuries ago, the barbarians who raided our ancestors and destroyed
the civilization of the Roman Empire."
This was as bad as the worst anti-English pronouncements of German
professors.^ Significantly there was little criticism of Sayce's letter
from his academic colleagues. Percy Gardner, wno held the chair of
Classical Archaeology at Oxford, described it as an outburst full of
"wild theories and inconsistencies", but he also stressed his "acutest
pain" at the "detestable ends" to which German scholarship was now being
put. Perhaps the best answer came from the Savilian Professor of Astro¬
nomy, who was later to be one of the first to call for the resumption
1. 22 Dec. 191**, p. 6c. Sayce quoted Porson's well-known lines: "The
Germans in Greek are sadly to seek: Wot five in five score, but
ninety-five more: All save only Herman, and Herman's a German".
For the correspondence following his letter, see Times, 2k Dec.
191*+ (p.9d), 28 Dec. 191*+ (p. 7d), 30 Dec. 191*+ (p. 9d), 2 Jan. 1915
(p. 9e)» Sayce also attempted to deny the "Teutonic element" of
the British people (ibid., 20 Aug. 191** p. 7e).
2. See examples in T.F.A. Smith, l/hat Germany Thinks, 1915.
3. Times, 28 Dec. 191**, p. Id.
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of scholarly relations with Germany after the war. "It ought to be
impossible to think of Newton without also thinking of Kepler; or of
Pasteur without thinking of Koch", he wrote.^ In its way a reply in
the fine tradition of those British astronomers one hundred years earlier who
had refused to allow war to interrupt the exchange of information with
French colleagues." But this was 191^ not l6l3 and Professor Ray Lankester,
who strongly supported Sayce's charges against German science, had the last
word—the "delusion" of German superiority in scientific research was due
3
to "the irresponsible gush of young men" lately back from German universities.
Can one say much more about this controversy than to voice a sus¬
picion that academic knives were being sharpened; that the rights and wrongs
of Wissenschaft were convenient ammunition in controversies of longer standing?
There does seem to have been a general sense of doubt about the state of Ger¬
man universities and their professoriate, induced by the shock of war even
in the formerly most sympathetic British minds. What greater contrast could
there be between Michael Sadler's preface to Friedrich Paulsen's great work
on German universities (first published in English in 1906) and his wartime
reflections on German education? In the first Sadler, while not uncritical
of certain aspects of the German system, obviously believed that "in educ-
1;
ation the truth lies somewhere between the German system and the English.
1. li.H. Turner, ibid., 23 Dec. 191^» P- 9c.
2. See Sir G. de Beer, The Sciences Were Never at War, I960,
3. Times, 26 Dec. 191^, p. 7 d. Like Sayce, Lankester claimed German
falsification of the "history of science in the voluminous treatises
written by them deliberately ignoring the claims of others to discover¬
ies and fruitful conceptions upon which tneir own work has been based."
4. "Preface", p. vii. Sadler was even less critical of German methods
in 1912. See his "The History of Education", in Germany in the 19th
Century. Manchester, 1912,
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Nine years later in a contribution to a symposium on German Culture: The
Contribution of the Germans to Knowledge, Art and Life (1915), Sadler now
strongly criticised the "one-sided excellence" of German education
"Its elaborate organisation, triumphantly enforced by the State,
has weakened its moral independence... German education has paid the
penalty for going to excess in the use of methods which, if
employed in moderation, are salutary and wise. Its long tradition
of mental discipline has exposed it to influences which have preyed
on its fairness of mind and have perverted intellectual passion into
partisanship. Its conception of the claims of the State had led
it to neglect the duty of disinterested reflection by means of which,
in the past, German scholars have done signal service to the cause of
truth and to the scientific progress of the world.
The much-vaunted Lehrfreiheit of German scholars had been revealed for what
it really was—something which masked the very real subordination of the
professor to the German state.
Of course this raised the question of whether German scholars could
still be considered worthy of membership of learned societies in Allied
countries. In May 1915 King George had deprived the Kaiser, the Emperor
Franz Josef, the King of Wurttemburg, the Grown Prince of Prussia and other
German prices of their garter knighthoods. Might this not be a precedent
for depriving enemy scholars of their similar, if more lowly, privileges?
This was the conclusion of the academies of Paris and Brussells. To their
. .2
credit the British Academy and the Royal Society declined to do this.
1. "The Strength and Weakness of German Education", p. 301. The whole
book was an attempt (in the words of the editor W.P. PaterBon) to
steer a course between emotional rejection of "the hollowness of
Teutonic pretensions" and German claims "in her worst excesses of
megalomania." (p. vi).
2. F. Kenyon, The British Academy the First 50 Years, 1952, pp. 21-22.
Corresponding members of the Academy included Professors Brugmann,
Sievers (Leipzig); H. Diels, v. Gierke, v. Harnack, Eduard Meyer,
Sachau, v. Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, Windisch, and F. Liebermann
(Berlin); Godhizer (Budapest). The wartime publications of the
Aristotlean Society, British Association for the Advancement of
Science, Royal Asiatic Society, Royal Anthropological Institute,
Royal Historical Society, Royal economic Society, Royal Society of
Edinburgh all still list German and Austrian names among their
"corresponding fellows".
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This was true also of Geiman academies and learned societies—"with
inconsiderable exceptions", British names remained on their membership
roles.^ As we shall see later, universities, in the northern cities of
England especially, were not able to withstand pressure to dismiss pro¬
fessors of German origin but of British nationality (let alone those of
German nationality). Even in Oxford, the Warden of New College was
forced to defend his inclusion of German names among those on the college
3memorial to war dead. However, perhaps the most celebrated case involved
the German Celtic scholar Kuno Meyer.
Meyer was a professor at the University of Berlin on the outbreak of
the world war, but up until 1911 he had been Professor of Celtic,
at the University of Liverpool and after that time honorary Professor of
Celtic. For most of the war period Meyer was a "travelling professor" in
the United States, a position which gave him opportunity for subtle pro¬
paganda on behalf of his country. It was Meyer who published a letter from
an Oxford scholar (F.C. Conybeare) which was extremely critical of British
policy in 191H,** and it was this which first brought him to the attention
of British colleagues. In a letter to the Viee-Chancellor of Liverpool
University, Sir Alfred Dale, Meyer made disparaging remarks about Britain's
ability to withstand an invasion. This, together with his remarks on the
future loyalty of the Irish, was enough for the Council of the University
1. TLB, XV, 7Hd (18 May 1916), 237 and 75H (29 June 1916), 309. U. von
Wilamowita-Moellendorff, My Recollections, 1930, pp. 382-3.-
2. See below pp. 2.86- 3k.
3. See Morning Post, 21 June 191b, p.If and 19 June 1916, p. He. Also
A.G. Ileath to H.W.B. Joseph in L. Housoan (ed.) War Letters of Fallen
Englishmen, 1930, p. 128, Russell, Autobiography, II, 52.
H. See below pp.
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to deprive Meyer of his honorary professorship and condemn him for
"acting as an agent of sedition in imputing treason to loyal Irish
soldiers now prisoners in Germany".''" 'when it became known that Casement
was working among Irish prisoners of war in Germany it was ziot surprising
that Meyer was accused of using his time in Britain to secretly prepare
the ground for Irish rebellion. His trips to the Aran Islands to study
their dialect became especially suspect now in retrospect. A
Cambridge Celtic scholar called for Meyer to be deprived of the freedom
of Dublin and Cork previously given to him for his services to Irish
2
studies. And the University of Wales was only prevented from depriving
Meyer of the honorary D.Litt. they had granted him before the wax by the
discovery that their charter did not empower them to withdraw a degree
once granted.
Of course the war raised not only problems of maintaining contact
with scholars in enemy countries, but even the involvement of scholars
themselves in the hostilities. Although he himself became heavily involved
in wartime propaganda for the Allies, Lord Bryce was at pains to stress
the need for bodies like the British Academy to chart a course of strict
neutrality. In his Presidential Address to the Academy in 1916 he suggested
that its wartime policy should be not to let the war "disturb the even
tenor" of its activities. Meetings and public lectures carried on as before,
1. Letter of Mr. A. Allan (Liverpool University Archives) to the writer,
2k May 1973. Times, 2 Jan. 1915, p. 9e. See also letters from H.O.
Forbes (Reader in Ethnography at Liverpool) and J. Sampson (University
Librarian), Times, 8 Mar. 1915 (p. 9e) and 9 Mar. 1915 (p. 9e). Meyer
wrote a rather bemused reply (7 Jan. 1915, p. 9e).
2. E.G. Quiggin (Gonville and Caius College), Times, 28 Dec. 191*+, p. 3e.
3. The Registrar (J.M. Angus) on his own authority, however, removed Meyer's
name from the calendar, although it was later replaced after passions
had cooled. Letter of Mr. £.G. Thomas (Registrar of the University of
Wales) to the writer, 8 June 1976. Wilhelm Ostwald and Eduard Meyer,
both of whom indulged in wartime polemics against Britain, were listed
as honorary graduates of Liverpool University in all the wartime calendars
9h
the only change being suspension of the election of "foreign men of
learning" as "Corresponding Fellows"—as Bryce put it, "lest the judgement
of their merits might be, or might be possibly seem to be, influenced by
the political relations in which the country stands." The more learned
bodies were "kept outside the passions of war the better for them and the
nations", Bryce concluded.*' The difficult course which the Academy had
to steer in wartime is suggested by an incident involving the French anti¬
war writer Romain Rolland. Originally invited to speak before the
Academy during the celebrations for the tercentenary of Shakespeare's
2
death in 1916, Rolland was asked later not to come presumably because of
his growing notoreity after the publication of his Above the Battle in
an Englisn translation in 191®+.
However, not all British scholars shared Bryce's desire to keep
learned bodies "outside the passions of war". In his presidential address
to the Classical Association in 1915 Professor Ridgeway eschewed an
"address of the conventional order" on the grounds that it would be
"singularly out of place" during wartime. Instead he launched into an
impassioned plea for conscription, citing the evidence of Athenian demo¬
cracy to lend weight to his argument. Where Bryce had decided to say
nothing in his address which might cause pain to a member reading it "ten
or twenty years henceRidgeway considered that normal scholarly activities
1. PBA, 1915-16, pp. 3-6.
2. Starr, p. 118. Rolianu's contribution was printed in the Academy's
publication Book of Homage to Shakespeare(1916), which had no Austrian
or German contributors (the latter especailly who had done so much for
Shakespearean studies,) although it had Japanese, Chinese, Armenian,
Indian, Burmese and even Persian contributors.
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should be suspended for the course of the war. To "hold annual meetings
of societies as if the conditions were in no wise abnormal", he noted,
"would...be highly immoral, for such a course would tend to the continued
opiation of a nation so long drugged with every drowsy syrup of the world
and which is even yet not fully awake." Such unworldliness among British
scholars had led "the leading minds of Germany, not merely soldiers and
politicians, but tne professorial and intellectual classes, to the conclu¬
sion that England was so besotted by cowardice, luxury and sloth, that she
would fall an easy prey to any vigorous martial race.""1"
Allowing for the special bees in Ridgeway's bonnet—conscription,
2
eugenics, the "alien" menace —his idea of mobilizing the scholars in the
nation's cause was widely held. One of Ridgeway's successors in the pre¬
sidency of the Classical Association called upon the members to do "a
piece of war work" for which there was a "definite call"—namely the
creation of "well-informed public opinion on the Greek situation". By
this Professor (Jre meant support for the pro-Allied Greek Prime Minister
3
Eleutherios Venizelos and against the pro-German King Constantine.
1. Ridgeway, p. 19.
2. See his article "The Problem of our Racial and National Safety",
Eugenics Rev. VII (1915)» 123-30. Britain, Ridgeway believed, "had
been brought into the present life and death struggle by a combin¬
ation between Biillionaires (frequently aliens in origin), and their
dupes, the masses (p. 123). He was also very critical of Quakers
and Nonconformists, presumably for their role in the peace movement.
See also his letter to The Times on "Does Democracy Mean Peace",
23 April 1915, p. 9d.
3. P.N. Ere, Venizelos' and His Pellow-Countryiaen, 1917, p. 2.
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The dividing line between creating informed public opinion and dissemina¬
ting propaganda was clearly a fine one. However classical scholarship
continued through the war years, despite Ridgeway's call for its suspension,
and the Classical Quarterly (on whose Board of Management Ridgeway sat)
continued to publish summaries of important German research.^ This is
perhaps a convenient point to turn to two disciplines—philosophy and
history—which were both affected by the war, though in different ways.
1. Reviews of German work fell off in other British classical journals
more, one suspects, from the difficulty of obtaining such books than
for any other reason.
V: BRITISH PHILOSOPHERS AND THE WAR
"The War provided the moat delicious opportunities for the
philosophers. They are all agreed that the wickedness or virtue
of a nation depends upon the metaphysical creed of its professors
of philosophy, and that Germany is an awful example of the effect
of the wrong creed. If they are opponents of Kant and Hegel,
they find in these two the precursors of Bismarck, Treitschke,
Luaendorff and Co If, like the bulk of our most patriotic
instructors in mental and moral science, they have been in the
habit of praising Kant and Hegel, they have a more delicate task
to perform. They have to explain that these great and good men
belonged to the old Germany which we all regret, and that the
abandonment of them in favour of Nietzsche was what caused the
invasion of Belgium."
Bertrand Russell, "Philosophy and Virtue",
The Athenaeum, 2 May 1919
What was the effect of the war on British philosophers? In some
respects it was minimal. As one of them put it; "Those whose business
it is to read philosophical serials even in time of war must have been
struck by the spirit of calm detachment witn which the great problems
of thought are uiscusoed as though there were no 3uch thing as war and
politics. This is magnificent and is as it should be.""'" This spirit
of "calm detachment" could be found in Mind; A Quarterly Review of
Psychology, edited by G.F. Stout a supporter of the war and G.E. Moore a
critic of official policy. Abstracts of articles in German periodicals
continued to appear in its pages throughout tne war and any falling-off
was due, one suspects, more to difficulty in obtaining publications from
1. J.H. Muirhead, "God and the World", in J.E. Carpenter (ed.)
Ethical ana Religious Problems of the War. 1916, p. 98.
2. Moore was an early member of the branch of the U.D.C. at Trinity
College, Cambridge, on which see below p.
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enemy countries than to any intellectual embargo. In each volume of
the Proceedings of the Aristotlean Society the name of the eminent German
philosopher and psychologist Wilhelm Wundt continued to appear on the
list of "Corresponding Members", even though he was a leading apolo¬
gist for the German cause.^
Some philosophers like Bernard Bosanquet, the leading British
representative of Idealism, eschewed public debate on the war, altnough
2
he was privately in no doubt as to the rightnes3 of the Allied cause.
When J.ii. Muirhead, another Idealist who was Professor of Philosophy
at Birmingham, proposed a joint statement on the war by British philoso¬
phers "who on the whole adhered to the tradition of great German idealists",
Bos&nquet showed himself "more desirous of shunning controversy". He
preferred to concentrate his remaining years (he was 66 in 191*0 in study
and in making up his "own mind on the new aspects of things, e.g. in
3
logic". He had, according to Muirhead, "made up his mind that the
supreme duty of the non-combatant was to use his talents and opportunities
given him to the best advantage in his own field as far as the general
distraction allowed."11
Of course this reaction was a means of relief from the emotional
strain of war. But it was also an indication of the dilemma of the
1. His Die Hationen u. ihre Philosophic (1915) castigated the shallow¬
ness of British philosophy.
2. H. Bosanquet, Bernard Boaanquet, 192**, p. 131.
3. Bosanquet to Muirhead, 25 April 1915, cit. Bernard Bosanquet and
Hi a Friends, 1935, pp. 167-8.
U. Ibid., pp. 171-2.
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philosopher in wartime. After science ana mathematics, philosophy is
one of the most cosmopolitan disciplines. The tension between patriotism
and the ideal of international scholarship was less marked than in the
case of, say, historians. Yet British philosophers were second only to
historians in their busy activity as publicists for the Allied cause.
While Bosanquet and the Oxford Idealist F.H. Bradley corresponded learnedly
on "the nature of play1' through tue war years," their colleague Sir
Henry Jones (Professor of Moral Philosophy at Glasgow) wore himself out
giving rousing speeches on recruiting drives up and down the country'. And
in an article for the Hibbert Journal with the title "Why We Are Fight¬
ing" , he gave this estimate of the Britisn case: "Our country can clothe
itself in tne splendid strength of the rectitude of its cause, and it
will put the stern might of conscience into its strokes.... This war
nas come upon us as a Duty, and duty leaves no loose options either to
2
a good man or to an honourable nation."
But there were some philosophers whose consciences were not so
easily satisfied. The unusually acute self-critical faculty of the
3
Cambridge philosopher C.D. broad has been remarked on by others. And
in a remarkable piece of autobiographical reminiscence he has described
his state of mind at the outbreaks, of war. He was neither a "conscientious
objector" nor a fervent supporter of tne war in 191**:
"...even if 1 had been convinced that it was my uuty to enlist, I
have little uoubt that ay physical cowardice would have led me to
1. Bernard Bosuaquet and His Friends, p. 171.
2. XIII, I (Oct. 191*0, 52. As a philosopher in peacetime Sir Henry
had been "less concerned with demonstration than with eloquent
pleading arid living conviction, all philosophy being for him an
attitude to life and a spiritual dynamic rather than a system of
theoretical doctrine." R. Metz, A Hundred Years of British Philoso¬
phy, 1938, p. 302.
3. Metz, A Hundred Years..., pp. 663-**.
xoo
try to evaxe it. and even if I had been convinced that it was
my duty to refuse to take part in the war, I have little doubt
that my moral cowardice, in face of popular obloquy and the dis¬
approved. of friends and relatives would have led me to conceal my
conviction. I suppose that if no other way out of the dilemma
had presented itself, I should have finally enlisted under the
pressure of puulic opinion in the circles which immediately sur¬
rounded me."
But an alternative did present itself "by which appearances were saved
and 'honour', though 'rooted in dishonour', was satisfied." Broad
found work at the university where he was then teaching (St. Andrews)
in the laboratory of the Chemistry Professor who was engaged in munitions
research.^"
At a less personal level, searchings of conscience are suggested
in a lecture by the Professor of Logic and Metaphysics to whom Broad
had been assistant at St. Andrews, G.F. Stout, whose Manual of
Psychology (1399) was a standard work, was giving a lecture at Bedford
College, London, early in 1915 on "War and Hatred". At this time an
official commission under Lord Bryce was investigating alleged German
atrocities against Belgian civilians. Btout admitted to his audience
that he tended to "skip such passages in the newspapers as those which
describe German atrocities in Belgium. I refuse to read even official
reports. I put myself off by noping that in the main they are not true,
or that they are greatly exaggerated, or that they can be explained a3
to case another light on them. Yet I have been gradually forced to believe
in thc-ir reality by evidence which I cannot reasonably resist."
1. "Autobiogragay" in The Philosophy of C.D. Broad, H.Y., 1959, P. 53.
Cf. his "The Prevention of War , IJK, XXVI, 2 (Jan. 1916), 2kX.
2. The International Crisis in its ht'nical and Psychological Aspects,
1915, p. 123.
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This reluctance Stout marked down to 'circumstances and education'1,
for the scnolor, ne felt, was singularly unfitted to comment on politi¬
cal affairs: "Persons of this type do very well so long as they live
a sheltered life, spent, for instance, in study. But they are unfit
to grapple effectively with certain forms of evil or really to appreci¬
ate their nature, or fully to recognize their existence." Although this
seemed to be an admission of his own unworldliness, it soon became clear
that Stout was more concerned with those people—and clearly he was not
one of then—"who, though they are by nature fully susceptible of angry
sentiments, suppress then on principle, because they regard them as wrong
and especially because they are afraid of giving way to hatred." On
the contrary, "some developed forms of tne primitive emotion of anger"
were "necessary ena right." This meant "resentment or righteous indig¬
nation" rather than "hatred or malevolence". In other words, "enlightened
anger...inasmuch as it is free from the various forms of blindness which
p
characterize hatred."
This injunction uo set aside the precept to love one's enemy—it
could, after all,never be "a practical guide amid the stress and
strain of daily life'—was u favourite argument of the more philosopliic-
2
ally-minded academic apologists for the Allied cause. To argue, as
Stout did, that it might "sometimes be better to run the risk of being
1. Ibid., pp. 123-5. As long as anger was not blind, there was "no
general limit to its strength, persistence, or intensity."
2. B.g. A.V. Dicey, liow We Ought to Feel About the War, Oxford, 191^,
pp. 0-9. J.P. Mahaffy, "The Bthics of Retaliation^, in Ad Clerum,
Dublin, 1918, pp. 180-2. Dicey opx^osed retaliation for German
"crimes", Mahaffy' argued strongly for them (see below, p. ).
See also the remarks of R.R. Harett in "Presidential Address: War
and Savagery", 26-7, where "righteous indignation" is defined as
"that stern and disciplined mood in which the best of civilized
men may be expected to fight against injustice and oppression"—
a kind of "cold" anger "controlled by the higher system".
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actuated by hatred than to run the alternative risk of not feeling due
resentment" seemed nicely attuned to the priorities of total var. For
one thing it justified the official injunction to "Love your friends and
hate your enemies", as Stout put it. It also provided one with ammunition
against critics of official policy—the honest doubters. For these
people in "opposing the natural tendency to regard the faults all on one
side, that of the enemy", tended "to run to the opposite extreme" and to
nane out that it was "their own side" which was "wholly or mainly or at
least equally to blame in cases where an impartial consideration of the
evidence would show the contrary."1
Ihis was the very charge which Bertrand Russell, who had studied
under Stout (then a Fellow of St. John's) in his fourth year at Cam¬
bridge, set out to refute in his earliest writings on the war. In his
pamphlet criticising British foreign policy in the ten years before the
outbreak of war he explained that if he seemed to his readers to "emphasise
the faults on our own side", it was because they were "ignored by our
compatriots". If little was said "about the faults on the other side",
that was "because every newspaper and every professor throughout the
country" was "making them known." Moreover, it was "more profitable" to
be conscious of one's own faults "than of the faults of our enemies:
we can amend our own faults if we become aware of them, whereas we can
only increase hatred on both sides by proclaiming the faults of the
enemy", Russell concluded.
1. Stout, pp. 123-i+.
2. The Policy of the kntente, 190^-lk, Manchester, £i.91b7, p. 3.
Also pp. v—vi.
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What then of the darker side of human nature? Russell, appearances
to the contrary, vas no stranger to this.^" And he was well aware that
his pleas for balanced assessment and rationality in wartime might seem
mere logic-chopping to some. "I am willing to admit that disinterested¬
ness itself may become a passion", he wrote in answer to an American
critic. "When a German is accused of having murdered a baby, and it turns
out that he murdered a boy of twelve, I almost forget his crime in the
desire to prevent injustice. I am conscious that if I belonged to a
neutral nation I should reprobate the spirit of Germany wholeheartedly;
but I am restrained by disgust at the orgy of self-righteousness that has
2
swept over the British nation."
Russell returned to this theme in "Justice in War-Time An Appeal
to the Intellectuals of Europe", an article published in neutral Switzer¬
land. The philosopher Leibniz had spoken of a "'war, in which philoso¬
phy tai.es no interest'", but now, Russell claimed, "philosophers,
professors and intellectuals generally" undertook "willingly to provide
their respective governments with tno3e ingenious distortions and those
subtle untruths" by which it was xaade to appear that "all good" was on one
side and "all wickedness" on the other. How could one talk of "moral
reprobation"? It was "nothing but an embodiment of hatred", and hatred
1. "The non-resistance people I know...are so Sunday-schooly—one feels
they don't know the volcanic side of human nature." Russell to
Lady Ottoline Morrell, H June 1915» cit. Russell, Autobiography,
XI, 52.
2. "The War anu i.on-Resistance a Rejoinder to Professor Ferry' , IJL,
XXVI, 1 (October 1915), 2U-5. Perry had written: "It is doubtless
the principal task of the philosopher to offset the bias of the
multitude and resist the current that sweeps by him. But it some¬
times happens that the common opinion is correct, and that even such
blind passions as patriotism and righteous indignation will be
found working for the general good." "Hon-Resistance and the
Present War: A Reply to Mr. Russell", IJL, XXV, 3 (April 1915), 316.
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was "a mechanical product of biological instinct." Righteous indignation
merely prevented one having "humane feelings towards the enemy", "any
nascent sympathy for his sufferings." And how could one talk of the war
as a contest of Right over Might? The war, whatever philosophers might
say, was "not being fought for any rational end". It was "being fought
because, at first, the nations wished to fight", and now because they
were "angry and determined to win victory." "Everything else" was
"idle talk, artificial rationalizing of instinctive actions and passions."
Russell's description of the belligerent states as two dogs fight-
2
ing in the street could not fail to infuriate every patriotic professor
of philosophy. But they could at least console themselves that the
weight of numbers was on their side. His scepticism as to "reputed
influence of pure thought on human action" was echoed only by Britain's
lone academic practitioner of Pragmatist philosophy F.C.S. Schiller, who,
although critical of British policy, never campaigned openly against
3
the war like Russell.' And one is forced to admit that the belief that
wars are ideological has proved durable for all Russell's scepticism.
Thus one can find another British philosopher writing twenty or so years
later of another World War that it was 'as perhaps never before in the
whole course of history, one between philosophies which differ fundamentally
1. Repr. in his Justice in War-Time, Chicago, 1916, pp. 1, **, II, 1**-15.
2. "When two dogs fight in the street, no one supposes that anything
but instinct prompts them, or that they are inspired hy high and
noble ends.... Ana what is true of dogs in the street is equally
true of nations in the- present war." Ibid., pp. 13-1**.
3. The words were Schiller's and he went on (in the course of a review
of John Dewey's German Philosophy and Politics) to demonstrate that
"philosophic ideas" had "as little to do" with this as with previous
wars. Self-defence, property and national existence were "the
primary motives that send men to the battlefields, though at various
times governments have eked them out by app>eals to honour, glory,
loyalty, religion, plunder and (now) 'nationality'. All this was as
true of the Germans as of the other combatants." Mind, US. XXV,
98 (April 1916), 25**.
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as to what man is and what he is here for."^
Philosophy and philosophers were in the front-line of battle in
1914 as in 1939. Articles began to appear with titles like "German
Philosophy and the Present Crisis", "The War and the Theory of the State",
"'Shall We Serve God for Nought?' Treitachke and Hegel", "German
Thought: The Real Conflict". This last, by a lecturer in philosophy
at King's College, London, put succinctly what others struggled to express:
"The fact that there is a struggle of idea3 underlying the great war is
2
now a matter of common realization." While German professors raged
against Manehestartun—that perfidious individualism of the British—
British philosophers discovered "behind the attack on the British Empire
...a deeper design, which was nothing less than the overthrow of the
3
moral foundation on which Western civilization has been built up."
This was one of the main themes in the wartime writings of L.T. Hobhouse,
first Professor of Sociology in the University of London.
For Gladstonian Liberals like Hobhouse the most disturbing
feature of the world of thought in 1914 was that during his lifetime
there had "been a profound change of intellectual", even "of moral out¬
look. The Victorian age believed in lew and reason", he wrote in
The World in Conflict (1915). How its sons had "come in large measure
to believe in violence, and in impulse, emotion or instinct." Biolo¬
gical theory had been "interpreted as a justification for force and self-
assertion." This grew into "a theory of revolt against law and morals",
against "intellectual" and "moral restraint". Who was to blame for this
1. Editorial, "L; We Are at War", Pnilosophy, XIV, 56 (Oct. 1936).
2. H.D. Oakeley in Church Quarterly Rev., LXXIX, 3 (Oct. 191*0» 97.
3. L.P. Jacks, "An Interim Religion", Iiibbert J., April 1916, repr.
in "Fight for the Right Movement", For the Right, 1916, p. 64.
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regrettable development? The Pragxaatists, Bergson and especially Hietzache,
"a Pragmatist in everything but name". These were the thinkerB who
stressed "the feebleness of reason, the arbitrary and unreal character of
scientific law, the primariness of impulse, the superiority of instinct
to rational purpose, the glorification of movement without vision." They
had pushed man "back from reason to will" and in so doing had encouraged
hixa to go back "one step further on the line of retrogression from will
to instincts, emotions and impulses which man shares with brute
creation."1
Although Hobhouse supported official policy in August 191^ his
acute pessimism was matched only by that of Bertrand Russell, who stood
2
on the opposite side of the fence on the issue of war and peace. Mo
doubt Hobhouse was also concerned to settle old philosophical scores
(the reference to Bergson and the Pragmatists suggests as much). But his
indictment of Nietzsche for destroying "the moral restraints against which
power chafed",-' was echoed by other British philosophers. J.H. Muirhead,
who was no friend of the Realist school to which Kobhouse owed allegiance,
admitted that Nietzsche (and Schopenhauer) had contributed to "the naked
assertion of the right ox self-affirmation in the line that instinct
and interest"prompted. But his condemnation was less enthusiastic. So
much of British Idealism had derived from German philosophy that one had
h
to be careful in placing blames
1. pp. 29, 38-Uo, 51. The erosion of values had been unwittingly
begun by Victorian science which had destroyed both "the ethical
edifice" and "the ideological substructure" of Christianity,
though intending to preserve the first. Mow science had been eroded
from within so that it no longer provided a basis for "a mechanical
view of the world." (pp. 33-^, ^2).
2. "All one's hopes for social and political progress are shattered
once and for all.... We may write Finis to our work, and hope that
civilization may rise again elsewhere." Hobhouse to kmily Hobhouse,
8 Aug. 191^, cit. S. Collini, "Hobhouse, Bosanquet and the State",
Past and Present, 72 (Aug. 1976), 89 n. 13.
3. World in Conflitt, p. 56.
German Philosopny in Relation to the War, 1915, p. ^6.
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But for armchair philosophers Nietzsche was a godsend: "Down
with Nietzsche! Ah, that was fun, drubbing the nasty blackguard, the
man who presumed to sneer at liberals without admiring liberal-unionists.
He was an epileptic, it seemed, a scrofulous fellow, and no gentleman."
And in case Clive Bell's description^" should seem irreverent invention
of the 1920s, here is what one Oxford historian offered in 191^ in
The Germans: What they Covet:
"This Superman was the special invention of a philosopher called
Nietzsche, who spent his life railing against the 'superstition',
as he called it, of Christianity, and against the virtues of pity,
mercy and love, which are, he said, the most distinctive doctrines
of that superstition. You need not remember anything else about
Nietzsche except that he went stark staring mad before he died.
But while he was going mad (and it would only be charitable to
suppose that he was never very sane), he contrived to bite a great
many of his countrymen, and to instil a good deal of his poisonous
doctrine into those he bit."2
Small wonder that an enterprising bookseller in the Strand (no
doubt with many unsold copies oi Oscar Levy's translation still on his
hands) put a sign in his window proclaiming the conflict to be "the
3'^uro-Nietzschean' war". But Nietzsche was to figure far more prominently
in the ideological exegesis of Nazism in the 1930s. In 191^ Hegel's
state rather tnan Nietzsche's "blond beast" was the real centre of
1. Civilization, 1928, p. k.
2. C.R.L. Fletcher, p. 5. The pamphlet (one in a series published
by the University of Oxford) was designed as a popular account in
"homely language".
3. A. Wolf, The Philosophy of Nietzsche, 1915, p. 10. Wolf defended
Nietzsche on the grounds that it was unreasonable "to hold anyone
responsible, not only for his real views, but also for other
people's distortions of them". Although Wolf could see dangers in
a"system of ethics...characterized by naturalism and evolutionism",
he concluded that Nietzsche's political views were more reminiscent
"of the peace societies and of the Society of Friends rather than
Bernhardi and Treitschke." (pp. 17-18, 22-3). These were brave
words in 1915 from the Reader in Logic and Ethics at University
College, London. For the conventional coupling of Neitzsche with
Treitschke and Bernhardi, see E. Barker, Nietzsche and Treitschke,
Oxford, 191k, pp. ^-5•
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attention."" It was widely believed that, "more than anything else", it
was "the German theory of the State" which lay "at the bottom of German
aggression"—the words of Lord Bryce opening a series of lectures on that
very subject in London early in 1916." The main features of this German
theory—repeated so often that they came to Lave an incantatory quality—
were, according to L.T. Hobhouse: "The deification of the State and the
belief that it is tne supreme type of human organisation, the contempt
for democracy, the unreal identification of liberty with law which simply
puts every personal right at the mercy of the legislator, the upholding of
war as a necessity, the disregard of humanity, the denial of the sanctity
3
of treaties and of international law". Kobhouse's indictment was animated
not only by a deeply-felt political liberalism, but also by long-standing
antipathy to the philosophy of Hegel. The kernel of the German theory of
the state, he wrote, could all be found in Hegel's Rechtspnilosophie.
Hobhouse had found that by immersing himself in the writings of Hegel,
Nietzsche and Treitschke, "reading their theories day by day to the refrain
of the war news", he had become far "less sceptical about the relations
between the academic and the practical,And later after a Zeppelin raid
he wrote: "In the bombing of London I had just witnessed tne visible and
tangible outcome of a false and wicked doctrine, the foundations of which
lay...in the book before me...In the Hegelian theory of the god-state,
5
all that I had witnessed lay implicit." How else could one explain why
1. See the different treatment accorded to each in a typical survey of
"German Philosophy" by A.D. Lindsay in W.P. Paterson (ea.), German
Culture, 1915» pp. 59» 62-3. However, during the Second World War,
Kegel was still under fire as the debate between E.F. Carritt and T.
M. Knox in Philosophy for 19^0 shows. (XV, nos. 57-9; 51-63, 190-6,
313-7).
2. "Opening Address", The International Crisis: The Theory of the State,
1916, p. 2.
3. Questions of War u Peace, 1916, p. 19.
k. Ibid., p. 2b.
5. The Metaphysical Theory of tne State, 1913, p. 6 (part of a prefa¬
tory dedication to Lt. R.O. Hobhouse, R.A.F.).
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the ideology of the German ruling class was so different from that of
Western Europe. Only in Germany had the twentieth-century revolt gainst
reason created a state of mind which made for war. For, "while elsewhere
the disruption of moral bonds produced political, literary or artistic
eccentricities which in the end were bound to correct themselves, in
Germany it removed the feeble barriers which stood between an avalanche
and a peaceful world.
Hobhouse's analysis of just where Germany had gone wrong foreshadowed
many of the explanations offered later for the rise of Hatism. Germany
had reacted against the ideas of the eighteenth-century enlightenment which
"sprang up in France, En ,land, America and countries in sympathy with
them. She did not return to barbarism. She developed a new variant in
civilization—in point of fact a new religion." This Hegelianism was "the
first completely reasoned answer to the democratic and humanitarian
ideal." A line of descent could be traced from the "humanitarianism"
of Kant through "the medium" of Fichte's "idealistic nationalism" to
2
Hegel's state philosophy. Where Hobhouse led others followed and soon
not even Goethe was spared the attentions of seekers after the genealogy
3
of German wickedness. In later times the answer of conservatives has
been to point to Rousseau rather than Hegel as the source of troubles
1. World In Conflict, p. 56.
2. Questions of War and Peace, p. loO, Ibid., p. 99.
3. E.g. G.W. Prothero, German Policy Before tae War, 191b, pp. 5~1^.
Goethe's idea of "self-cultivation" and "self-elevation" grew, in
the hands of kietzsche and Schopenhauer into the Will for "self-
annihilation' and then the Will "to Power". From Kant came "the
transcendant duty of submission to the moral law". To this Fichte
added "the idea of civic duty and self-sacrifice" for the nation.
Hegel deified the state and the army, and Treitschke made force the
sanction of the State. Thus the ideas of Kant and Goethe "metamor¬
phosed almost out of recognition, and taking in many extraneous
elements by the way,...became capable of fusion in the political
theory that now holds the field.'
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in the modern world.But during the First World War the reaction of
British Idealist philosophy was almost wholly defensive. This was to be
expected in a school of thought described more recently as "Eegelianism
2
modified by Anglo-Saxon caution".
The task of the British Idealist was thus to rescue what was worth¬
while (anything up to the time of Hegel, and perhaps Fichte) in the
German philosophical tradition. "How comes it, they needs must ask, that
a people whose thinkers a century ago were pre-eminent in their disin¬
terested passion for truth have been led to prostitute their spiritual
energy to the gospel of national self-aggrandizement", wrote the Professor
3
of Philosophy at Reading University College. The best answer came from
b
Muirhead, the most Hegelian of English Idealists, in his German Philoso¬
phy in Relation to the War (1915). Here he set out to prove that Hegelian-
ism had been superceded by other less noble ideals in the Germany of 191^
and that anyway Hegel was innocent of the charges laid against him; in
fact to argue, as another Idealist put it, that there was "indeed no
true philosopher whose teaching can without violence be made to serve as
5
a basis to the superstructure raised by Pan-German theorists."
1. A.E. Taylor claimed this in his review of The Metaphysical Theory
of the State. See Ilind, MS. XXIX, 113 (Jan. 1920), 92-3.
2. H.J. Paton, cit. G.J. Warnock, English Philosophy Since 1900. 1958,
p. 3.
3. W.G. de Burgh, "Tne Peril of Hubris", Edinburgh Rev., 225, ^60 (April
1917), 288.
U. That is, compared to Bosanquet whose Idealism was more eclectic.
5. Oaxeley, 113. This Bosanquet sought to do for Fichte, by showing
that his reputation as the philosopher of racist imperialism was
the result of "a perversion" of his teachings on "a primary life-
force". Fichte's claim "that a civilized state in contact with un¬
civilized ones cannot help extending its borders", Bosanquet felt,
was "a partial truth, though not at all a negligible one". Social
and International Ideals, 1917, pp. 318-9. For a more critical
assessment by another Idealist, see W.R. Sorley, "The State and
Morality", International Crisis The Theory of the State, pp. 36-^2.
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Instead, of the "continuous development" of German philosophy from
Hegel's "great constructive effort of thought" to the present, Muiraead
pointed to "a reaction—a great rebellion and apostacy" after 1831. A
reaction had set in when, "going along with material expansion and the
devotion to the special sciences it evoked", there arose "a philosophy
which sought to invert tae old order and to read body and matter where
it had read mind and spirit." This new materialist school—here Muirhead
cited Feuerbach,Moleschott and Euchner—at first "was content to rest
its ethics on the humanistic tradition it had inherited from Idealism.
But it was not surprising that this element in its teaching, which had
shrunk to little more than a hesitating note, should fall into the back¬
ground in the popular mind.!|i When Social Darwinist thought came to Ger¬
many the "seed fell on ground prepared by a quarter century of materialist
thought", of which Ernst Haeckel's Riddle of the Universe was but the best
known. Instead of being created "as only one among other agencies in
development", the "struggle for existence" had been "exalted into the
2
position of the supreme law of life."
Clearly tiien British Idealists blamed not the Gorman Idealist tradi¬
tion and its conjunction with modern anti-Materialist thought, but
rather Materialism itself, especially when tainted with Social Darwinism.
But did this explain wny Germany was so different? "Good philosophic
idealists among us", Hobhouse wrote in 1916, "go about trying to prove
tnat the reaction in Germany is modern and represents a sad falling-off
from the idealism of Hegel. But the truth is that Hegel is the father and
1. German Philosophy in Relation to the War, pp. vi, 51, 57. Muirhead
cited Ranke's complaint—"Everything is falling. No one thinks of
anything but commerce and money"—as contemporary evidence of this trend.
Ibid., pp. 60-1.
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by long odds the serious champion of everything reactionary in the nine¬
teenth century.""*" To this Muirhead could only reply by drawing a ttention
to the "good" Hegel, who—like Burke—had merely reacted against the
anarchic individualism of the French Revolution. Hegel, had "felt that
the time had come to vindicate the reality of the State as the "sub¬
stance" of the individual, family and national life." And he had been
"further convinced that justice could only be done to the unity of the
State by a personal head as in a modern constitutional monarchy." As
for the claim that Hegel was the philosopher of Prussian militarism, there
was textual evidence to show that he placed great emphasis on "art,
science, religion—all that goes to make...the good life—for the full
development of which the State" was the "essential condition."
The anti-Hegelians, although fewer in number (among professional
pnilosophera at least), seem in retrospect to have had the better of
the argument—not the least, one suspects, because the Idealist defence
was just that, a defence, It was easier to accept that a German victory
"would be a world-wide advertisement for the State-philosophy of Hegel and
its offshoots", than to read Hegel. Besides the bright young men of
philosophy (mostly from Cambridge) were rejecting Idealism itself as
old-fashioned. Bradley, Bosonquet and Muirhead were of a generation that
k
had been brought up with Victorian certainties —a belief in progress and
5
western civilization if not in orthodox Christianity. Russell and G.E.
1. Questions of War and Peace, pp. 19-20.
2. German Philosophy in Relation..., pp. 35~7« As for Kant, he had written
Perpetual Peace.
3. L.P. Jacks, contribution to "Symposium: Ethical Principles of Social
Reconstruction", PAS, NS. XVI (1916-17), 253.
U. Bradley had been born in I'dhG, Bosanquet in 10H8, Muirhead in 1355 and
liobhouse, another Victorian, in 186H.
5. William James claimed that Idealism gave a "quasi-metaphysical back¬
bone which theology has always been in need of." Cit. D. Bell,
"Philosophy" in Cox & Byson, I, 210.
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Moore, who started the Cambridge attack on Idealism in the ld90s, had
both been born a generation behind the old men of Idealism"1"—a sufficient
time for them to have reacted (especially in rationalist and scientific
Cambridge) against many of the values of the Victorian age. C.D. Broad,
a younger nan who attended Russell's lectures at Trinity College, Cam¬
bridge, has caught the mood of this generation gap in British philosophy.
Writing in 1967 he noted:
"The reactions of the clever young men following able and inspiring
leaders, in an exciting attack on the orthodoxy of their immediate
predecessors, are inevitably accompanied by a pleasant glow of
intellectual contempt and quasi-moral indignation. We felt this
strongly about such old fogie3 as Bradley and Bosanquet, to whom
we must have appeared insufferably uppish and superficial; and we
were no doubt often highly deficient in understanding and apprecia¬
tion of what they had taught and of their reasons for it."2
The reaction against Idealism was also in some ways a reaction of
Cambridge Realism against Oxford neo-ilegelianism. Idealism was very much
a product of Oxford. Edward Caird, T.H. Green and R.L. hettleship had
made Balliol a centre of the newly-imported German doctrine in the middle
of the nineteenth century. Later leading Britisn Idealists—Bradley,
Bosanquet, Muirheaa, H.H. Joachim, D.G. Ritchie, William Wallace, J.A.
Smith—were educated at Oxford, where some of them also taught. Except
for J.S. Mackenzie, and perhaps W.R. Sorley, the Cambridge Idealists—
3
relatively fewer—had moved far from Hegelian orthodoxy. As Broad noted,
"Cambridge...had always been rather aloof from the current orthodoxy of
1. Russell was born in 1872, Ifoore in 1873.
2. "Some Personal Impressions of Russell as a Philosopher", Bertrand
Russell Philosopher of the Century, 1967, pp. 101-2. A good example
of this is provided by Broad's exchanges with Bosanquet in Mind, WS.
XXVII, 107 (July 1918), 366-70, XXVIII, 109 (Jan. 1919), 75-77; 112
(Oct. 1919), 502-U; XXIX, 113 (Jan. 1920), 77~8l. See also Bosan-
quet's review of Russell's Principles of Social Reconstruction, ibid.,
XXVI (1917), 233-1*. — - -
3. James Ward and especially J. McE. McTaggart. Henry Sidgwick, who
died in 1900 provided a link between Utilitarianism and new Cambridge
Realism.
Ill*
Oxford and the Scottish universities."1 There were obviously good practical
reasons for thi3, . science and mathematics-based under¬
graduate tuition at Cambridge meant that fellowships were mostly in this
field.
The extent to which the war encouraged the reaction against Idealism
is uncertain. One recent assessment is that it "did not provoke in
philosophy profound changes which echo on in subsequent years...It may
by that the xenophobia which induced worthy citizens to persecute dachs¬
hunds and German waiters in 19lB does have something to do with subsequent
contempt in Anglo-Saxon philosophy for Hegelian idealism. But it i3 easy
enough to demonstrate that an argued philosophical basis for such con-
2
tempt existed at least a decade before the outbreak of war in 19lB."
This is certainly true in the sense that as early as 1099 G.B. Moore nad
attacked Idealist ethical theory in Tne Wature of Judgement and Russell
3
had followed a few years later with criticism of Idealist metaphysics.
However, two points should be noted. Firstly, Oxford was still dominated
by Idealism (even if Cambridge was not) at the outbreak of the First
World War, according to the American Idealist Brand Blanshard who was
U
a student there in 1913. Using the evidence of examination papers, G.G.
Mure has pointed put that the logic of "Aristotle, Bacon, and Mill"
1. "Some Personal Impressions...", p. 101.
2. D. Bell, p. 171*.
3. Russell had begun moving away from Idealism from Dec. 1097. R.
Clark, Bertrand Russell, 1975, pp. 60-9.
B. Cit. A. Wood, Bertrand Russell, 1957, p. 72.
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formed "a nucleus" which dwindled "very slowly before tne idealist war
of attrition until we reach the period of the Great War."''"
Secondly, we can say that the war, even if it did not "provoke...
profound changes'' at least encouraged them. Indeed, David Bell appears
to admit as much when he concedes that perhaps it could be "more than
insignificant speculation to suggest that the blood-letting of 191^-18
really had made it difficult to take seriously the ^IdealistJ^ idea that
2
reality was a harmonious whole tending towards perfection." This
philosophical bankruptcy was what Schiller had pointed to in 1916 when
he noted that the war had "revealed that the actual world was a very
different thing from the cosmic order" which Idealist philosophers had
3"constructed in their minds." And at least one Idealist, Sir James
Black Baillie, Professor of Moral Philosophy at Aberdeen, had his "belief
in Hegelian world-reason...so deeply shaken as to be no longer susceptible
h
of justification." Under the impact of the meaningless destruction of
world war he turned from "optimistic idealism" to the study of human
K
nature in an attempt to explain what had happened.
The coincidence of the war and attacks on Idealism are especially
noticeable in the field of political theory. Hobhouse's counterblast
to Bosanquet's Philosophical Theory of the State (l&99) appeared in 1918»
although he had taken issue strongly with Idealist social and political
philosophy from the time of the Boer War. liobhouse the philosophical
1. "Oxford and Pnilosophy", Philosophy, XII, N7 (July 1937)> 298. The
first reference to Bradley occurs in the 1891 Logic paper. But cf.
R.G. Collingwood, An Autobiography, Oxford, 1939» pp. 17-19.
2. D. Bell, pp. 223-^. Cf. A.M. i^uinton, "Social Thought in Britain",
ibid., p. 131.
3. Schiller, 250.
4. Metz, p. 316.
5. See "Prefatory Note" to Studies in Human Nature, 1921, p. vii.
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Realist arid political Liberal had found conservative, not to say reaction¬
ary, implications of Bosanquet's writings deeply disturbing. Th< belief
that "the ideal is realized in the actual world and in particular in the
world of organised society"—in fact that the social world was "an
incarnation or expression of the ideal"—meant that there could be "no
question...of realizing an ideal by human effort. We are already living
in the ideal."-" The implicit quietism in such a belief is best summed
up in the title of one of Bradley's essays, Station and its Duties".
But during the war it was the Idealist view of the state "in its external
relations", which was most worrying. For, in confusing the ideal and
the actual Idealism rested on "mere generalisations of customs and institu¬
tions" wnich happened "to be familiar". Thus it set "the State above moral
criticism", constituted "war a necessary incident in its existence",
condemned "humanity" and repudiated the idea of a league of nations. In
short, Hobhouse concluded, "we see in it a theory admirably suited to the
3
period of militancy and regimentation in which we find ourselves."
1. Metaphysical Theory.♦.pp.,17-16.
2. "In political matters he was deeply conservative and reactionary...
Bradley was the implacable enemy of all utilitarian or liberal teach¬
ing; he could not abide pacifism or generalized humanitarian senti¬
ment , and any belief in the natural equality of man or in the invio¬
lability of life (whether political or religious in inspiration) he
regarded as 'sentimental', 'degenerate', and 'disgusting'". R.
Wollheim, F.H. Bradley, Harmondsworth, Middlesex, 1959, p. lE.
3. Metaphysical Theory..., pp. 23~5. A good example of Idealist argument
against a league cones in the course of an address at Manchester
College, Oxford, by Sir Henry Jones: "'Ho nation', we are told by
Mr. /ji.k.h.J Fisher, 'has yet consented or in the present state of
public ethics, is likely to consent to refer matters affecting its
vital interests, independence or honour to an international tribunal.'
I agree, and I go further. No nation ought to do so. A nation like
an individual xaay consult its neighbours as to its duty, borrow light
from its neighbours to see what it should do, but it cannot delegate
the resxxrasibility of chosing. There is a certain isolation and
sacredness of soul in this matter of morality. We can send no
proxies to meet duty or aeatu." "Morality and the War", in J.E.
Carpenter (ed.), Ethical and Religious Problems..,, p. El. In 1913
Sir Henry joined the Conservative League of Free Rations Association
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An extreme example of what Hobhouse termed the confusion of the real
and the ideal can be found in the attempt of some Idealists to e; lain
the slaughter on the Western Front in terms of good arising out of evil.
"This war", wrote the Waynflete Professor of Moral and Metaphysical
Philosophy at Oxford, "is not an accident, nor an outburst of subterranean
forces, but the act and deed of human will, and being so it cannot be merely
evil." And he went on:
"Primarily and principally what is taking place, is a tremendous
revelation of the potencies wnich in our nature—in that which makes
us men—have escaped our notice and therefore, because unseen or
ignored, working in the dark, have not yet been drawn upon and utilized.
There has been and is still going on, an enormous increase of self-
knowledge. At first this seems wholly an opening up of undreamt-of
evil. Side by side there has come to U3 a parallel revelation of
undreamt-of good. I must bear witness to my conviction that we are
beholding a tremendous inrush or uprush of good into man and his
world."1
As rhetoric this was little different from the emotionally uplifting
writings of historians who had little conception of the intricacies of
2
Hegelian metaphysics. But the Waynflete Professor in denying the charge
that such analysis was mere "sentimental optimism" could claim tnat it was
consistent with Idealist belief in "eternal progress'1. The war was "in
its essence a victory over evil", since "nothing" was "wholly evil".
War, as Hegel had shown, should be accepted as giving rise directly to
good. War like tragedy had its part to play in human history. "When
(as opposed to the Liberal League of Nations Society) which argued
for the wartime alliance against Germany as the basis for a future
league with wide powers. See his Form The League of Peace Now
(1918). Although, in a way, this was a tribute to the elasticity of
Idealist theory, Sir Henry had none of the liberal "illusions"
that structural changes could affect the transition from war to
peace without due recognition of the role of force in the world.
1. J.A. Smith, "Progres As An Ideal of Action", in Progress and History,
1916, p. 311.
2. See below p.!S5<
3. J.A. Smith, pp. 312-3.
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I ask myself whether I wish for the total disappearance of war," A.C.
Bradley wrote in 1915,"I answer 'Yes, if or wnen, uninterrupted oeace
can perform the office and generate the good of war"1,"'" For someone
with no sympathy for Idealism like F.C.S. Schiller such arguments seemed
as meaningless as the war itself. The "rational order of human affairs
was shattered before their eyes and the belief that thought" controlled
"men's feelings" and determined his acts "should have been among the
first of the illusions swept away in the wreckage of war", but still the
Idealist philosophers "insisted on finding ideal reasons to which to
2
attribute tne catastrophe."
A more savage attack on Idealist political theory was launched in
May 1916 at a joint meeting of the Aristotlean Society, the Oxford Philoso¬
phical Society arid the Mind Association.3 In a symposium on "The Nature
of the State in View of Its aternal Relations" Russell and two younger
political philosophers G.D.li. Cole (then a Fellow of Magdalen College,
Oxford) and C. Delisle Burns (a University Extension Lecturer) attacked
the idea of a benevolent state resting on the consent—the "general
will"—of its citizens in an age of mass death and military conscription.
It was the "intolerable" theories of "Mr. Bosanquet or any Prusso-phil
philosopher", Cole (who had a reputation as an enfant terrible) alleged,
which denied the role of the "individual citizen or the functional
1. A.C. Bradley, "International Morality: The United States of Europe"
in International Crisis...Ethical and Psychological Aspects, pp. ok-5.
Bradley was the younger brother of F.H. Bradley and had been Profes¬
sor of English at Glasgow (1890-1900) and Professor of Poetry at
Cambridge (1901-6). He was a noted Shakespeare scholar.
2. Schiller, 250.
3. They poured "scorn upon it /the state/ as a collection of elderly
middle-class gentlemen in control of power, gambling with the lives
of their fellows". Muirhead in Bernard Bosanquet and His Friends,
p. 190. Bosanquet himself was not at the meeting (j.A. Smith repre-
seuted the Idealists). By nature a reconciler of opposing viewpoints
Bosanquet's reply to his critics was characteristically courteous.
Bee his Social and International Ideals, pp. 30h-().
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association" in the world, of the state. As the dilemma of the German
socialists in 191^ had shown, men were "hound together not by political
or even national ties alone, but also by non-political bonds" which were
"no less compelling in the obligations they impose"."1"
Cole as a guild socialist was concerned to cut the state down to
size—it did not "exhaust either the individuality or the organisable
individuality of its citizens", nor was it "greater than its citizens".
In short, the state could not claim to use people "as mere pawns in its
own game." But it was also clear that the sovereignty of the state was
2
relative in the sense that it was circumscribed by other states. This
was the line of attack from Burns, wno in the inter-war period was a
leading ideologist of the League of Nations. Far from Bosonquet'B con¬
ception of the state as the "supreme Community", it was (judging by
results rather than intentions) "in its external relations...obstructive
to moral action." There was thus a clear need for a world "political
complex"—not just a belief in the "sentimental unity of mankind"—to
assist the resolution of "moral issues" between states "by the use of
moral criteria." But until the authority of the state over its citizens
was questioned it was difficult to see a "way by which each State could
N
yield up a portion of its sovereignty to some international authority."
Russell, as we shall see later' was already questioning the authority
1. PAS, MS. XVI (1915-16), 312-3, 316.
2. Ibid., 31^-5.
3. Ibid., 290-301. Burns castigated Bosanquet for confusing "two
quite distinct problems—(i) the relation of a citizen to the State,
and (ii) the relation of the human being to society."(29^). But this
conflation was basic to the whole Idealist approach.
h. Russell, ibid., 306.
5. See below p.176' Cole was also a member of the N.C.F., though an
inactive one. His attitude to conscientious objection was equivocal
(see below pp.-Z.tk-7 ). Burns worked in the Ministry of Reconstruction
(1917-19) and the Intelligence Division of the Ministry of Labour
(1919-20). According to Margaret Cole he also worked during the war
in M.I.5 and was not averse to passing its secrets onto his friends
in the Fabian Research Department. Growing Up in Revolution, 19^9,
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of the state by his work for the No-Conscription Fellowship. Two months
after giving his paper at Manchester College, Oxford, he was fined in
London "for statements likely to prejudice the recruiting and discipline
of His Majesty's Forces". Now he was concerned to tear away the "mythology"
in Idealist political theory, which talked of the state "as though it
were an actual entity, something remote and god-like, vastly superior
to its citizens and deserving of a quasi-adoration none of them deserve."
This was "mere superstition":
"The orders given by the State are in fact given by actual men, the
purposes of the State are the purposes of certain people in office.
There is nothing superhuman about these people. In most ages and
in most countries tney are composed of very common clay.... For
thi3 reason it must often happen that the purposes of the State are
such as cannot commend themselves to men who have more humanity or
more insight than most of their contemporaries. Such men, if they
have courage, may easily find themselves forced to resist the State;
any theory which would make it their duty to submit in spite of
adverse individual judgement would take away something of human
dignity and independence; it would savour of oriental despotism,
and if successful would prevent the best men from growing to
their full moral stature. The State embodies the wisdom of average
men, and its institutions are clogged with the superstitions of
the past. Those in whom any new wisdom is growing up, in whose minds
the seeds of some future good is germinating, cannot but find them¬
selves in greater or less degree out of harmony with established
authority. For this reason, if for no other, the duty of obedience
to the State cannot be made absolute."i
The Idealists and their critics were each speaking a different
language, to their mutual incomprehension. While for Russell the "essence
2
of the State" was "the organisation of force"," Hosanquet approached
p. 69. Another young critic of monistic state theory H.J. Laski
was in America. See his Studies in the Problem of Sovereignty,
N. Haven, 1917, pp. 6, 8, 12, 19, 20-1.
FAS, N.S. XVI (1915-16), 30b-7. Critics were quick to seize on
what seemed to be an assumption of intellectual superiority. "There
is a curious inversion of emphasis in Mr. Russell's article. It is
not impossible that a distrust of vulgar opinion should lead a nicely
analytical mind to exaggerate whatever is contrary to the general
prejudice". R.3. Perry, "Non-Resistance and the Present War...", 316.
2. Ibid., 303. "The main purposes of States in their external relations
are the exploitation of what are called under-developed countries and
the successful assertion of claims by the use of force against other
States. These are precisely the purposes of highwaymen". (308). Con¬
scription was "a wholly evil thing, quite as evil as the power of
the Church which in former days put men to death for unorthodox
thought." Principles of Social Reconstruction, 1916, p. 1+9.
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"the thought of the state...through familiarity with long-self sacrificing
lives spent in service, or on behalf of the State, of the childi i of
the poor, or from recollections of the change and opening of people's
minds, within my own experience, from stolidity and resistance to welcome
and intelligence in such matters as sanitation.""*" There was much in
Russell's criticism which seemed violently repugnant to that earnest
Victorian Bernard Bosonquet, and nothing more so than his belief in the
irrational basis of power in the state. The masses, craving security,
were but "impotent tools" in the hands of the rulers, using irrational
fears (such as fear of the outsider) for their own purpose—to satisfy
their need to dominate. "Only passion can control passion, and only a
2
contrary impulse or desire can check impulse", Russell concluded.
A neat solution, although one which did not satisfy Bosanquet.
Although Russell had expressed scepticism about the attempts to
intellectualise the conflict between Britain and Germany, his reaction
against Idealist theory of the state cannot just be seen as a theoretical
justification of the campaign of passive resistance to authority with
which he was involved in the K.C.F. His criticisms were clearly influ-
enced by natural rights theory (in resistance to authority), ideas on
future world organisation, and'arguments for the rights of groups within
1. His review,of Principles of Social Reconstruction, Mind. HS. XXVI
(1917), 233. In such people the state was "awakening in them."
2- Principles..., p. 12. PAS, US. XVI (1915-16), 302-3.
3. Interest in Rousseau had been stimulated by C.E. Vaughon's definitive
edition of The Political Writings (1915). See his "Epilogue" to
vol. 2 for an unfavourable comparison of Fichte with Rousseau.
Cole had produced a smaller edition of the Social Contract in 1913.
122
the state.In so doing he was expressing an idea, which was gaining
increasing currency even before tne war, that the state as it then
existed fell between two stools. As A.D. Lindsay noted in February
191^, the state was too snail to properly regulate international conflict,
2
and too big to allow proper "consciousness of common interests".
Russell's realisation of the importance of instinct in human nature may
also have come from his "endeavour to understand popular feelings about
3
the war", but it was also part of a wider movement of thought. There
was, Ernest Barter noted in 191^,"a certain trend of anti-intellectualiam"
abroad in 191^,^ and the experience of war would do much to strengthen it.
1. Russell was a not very active member of the National Guilds League.
S.T. Glass, The Responsible Society, 1966, p. 39.
2. "Tne State in Recent Political Theory", Political Qly.. I (191^V, 136.
3. Autobiography, II, 17. See also 38-9.
h. Political Thought in England 1848 to 191^, 2nd rev. ed., 19^7. p.
221.
123.
VI. BRITISH HISTORIANS AND THE WAR
"Fortunately in the twentieth century, the
conception that no historian has the right to be
a patriot, and that he will serve best the interests
of his country, if he try only to serve the
interests of truth, has gained considerable ground
....The influence of Lord Acton had begun to make
itself felt, not only in this country but in many
others, and there have been signs that, wherever
academic work could be carried out, free from state
control or interference, historians were returning
to the ideals of Ranke and his school. How far
progress will now be checked it is impossible to
say. But even if the value of historical work be
lowered by false ideals of patriotism, it is yet
better that it should be done badly than not at all.
The difficulty increases indeed the responsibility
of the historians of every country. No country can
afford to neglect the study of its own foreign
policy, without taking the risk that its ideals will
be misunderstood and misconstrued. We must hope for
enlightened patriotism." - C.K.Webster, The Study Of
Nineteenth Century Diplomacy
An Inaugural Lecture (1915).
British historians, practitioners of "a great inductive
science",1 were less confident about the influence of abstract
concepts, like the German theory of the state (Hegelian or not),
on the outbreak of war. "Nothing is more difficult than to
estimate the influence of abstract theory upon action", one of
them wrote in 1914. "Political theories as such, are coherently
2
conceived and held by very few persons anywhere." The historians
had the techniques of their own craft to place at the service of
the Allied cause. However, the resulting "war-history" has not
1. A.W.Ward at the International Congress of Historical Study in
London (1913). "Closing Remarks" appended to J.Bryce,
Presidential Address. Oxford, 1913, p.28.
2. J.W.Allen, Germany & Europe. 1914, p.4. But he went on to attempt
this task, as one might have expected from a historian of
political ideas who wrote the standard English Political Thought
1603-60 (1938).
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hitherto received much attention. "To treat of it would be a
painful and almost indecent task", was the warning of F.J.C.
Hearnshaw, who during the war had been one of the most prolific
3
writers of "war-history". But a less-developed sense of
"decency" does enable one to ask to what extent the wartime
writings of British historians might have influenced attitudes
to Germany, and reinforced certain long-established images such
as the role of Britain in Burope.
In 1914 history in British universities had approached
something very like its zenith in popularity as a field of study.
By the turn of the century the History Honours School at Oxford
had outstripped the school of Literae Humaniores in size although
4
the prestige of a classical education was probably still greater.
At Cambridge the Historical Tripos had gained a considerable repu¬
tation under the guidance of Lord Acton, a man of immense
prestige not confined to academic circles. In London A.F.Pollard
was beginning his campaign for the establishment of an institute
for historical research which might one day eclipse even the older
universities as centres of professional training. At Manchester
T.F.Tout and James Tait had already achieved much of what Pollard
desired for London. All the smaller universities and colleges in
Britain had chairs of history before 1914, with the exception of
St.Andrews (which still had only a lectureship in history) and
3. "History As A Means of Propaganda", Fortnightly Rev., NS CXIV
1 Aug 1923), 330. Hearnshaw believed "war-history" failed to
mislead public opinion.
4. J.F.C.Masterman, On The Chariot Wheel, 1975, pp.146-7. For
Cambridge, see Kitson Clark, 537-8.
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Nottingham (a college whose status as a university institution
was still uncertain).
By 1902 the older generation of historians, who had been
public figures as well as professional historians, were dead.1
But their ideas lived on in their pupils. Although history was
2
spoken of publicly as a science, unspoken assumptions about the
past were of equal, if not greater importance. A.L.Smith, who as
tutor in modern history at Balliol coached many future historians
(like Lewis Namier), had in turn attended the lectures of Bishop
Stubbs. In this way the mid-Victorian certainty of Stubbs about
Britain's role as the major world power was transmitted to later
3
generations. Likewise the notion of scholarly objectivity,
the belief in the possibility of complete impartiality on the part
of the historian, continued to hold sway. It was Acton's
successor as Regius Professor at Cambridge who confidently claimed
that a "complete assemblage of the smallest facts" would "tell in
4
the end." And one of A.L.Smith's former pupils wrote that the
historian "needed...an intellectual detachment so complete that
all the hopes of humanity [would] fail to arouse a dominant
1. E.A.Freeman (1823-1892), William Stubbs (1825-1901), S.R.Gardiner
(1829-1902), Lord Acton (1834-1902), F.York Powell (1050-1904).
2. Although not in the sense of the natural sciences which provided
general laws: "if history is not commonly regarded as a science,
it is only because it is too complex and too human to lend itself
to those summary methods of treatment by axioms, rules, and
formulae which are commonly taken as tests of scientific truth."
A.F.Pollard, "The Value Of History" (1911) repr. in Factors In
Modern History, rev.ed.1932,p.4.
3. "...in his history A.L. was, like everyone else, a disciple of
Stubbs, who traced the Divine Purpose in the long evolutionary
process which had ended in making England top nation." H.W.C.
Davis, A History of Balliol College, rev.ed.CDeford,19e>3,p.241.
4. J.B.Bury, "The Science Of History" (1904) repr. in Collected
Essays, Cambridge, 1930,p.l7.
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emotion."1 These two themes - an implicit belief in Britain's
mission in the world and an explicit commitment to "scientific"
history - uneasy partners it seems to us now, ran through
British historiography before 1914. There might be scholarly
debate but there was no discernable rejection of these values
until after the World War.3
One result of the quest for complete impartiality, and of
underlying historicist assumptions, was that political history -
especially in the guise of medieval constitutional history -
3
dominated university teaching. There were documents and other
records to provide the raw material of "facts". Scholarly rigour
was essential in order to deal with them. It was Bishop Stubbs
who said constitutional history could "scarcely be approached
without an effort",* as generations of readers of his Select
Charters have found. And being remote from the present, there
was less danger of partiality in the historian. As one of Stubbs•
young men put itt "The further back...that we carry our historical
studies in point of time, the greater will be tbe educational
5
value of the training". For historians interested in Britain
1. J.W.Allen, The Place Of History in Education, 1909, p.61. If
sympathise he must, it should be "Shakespearian in breadth and
highly intellectualised." This injunction is repeated in his
History Of Political Thought In The lbth Century (192a),p.xix.
2. Trevelyan's plea for History as an Art did not really raise
issues of relativist.:. However, see the criticisms ins C.H.
Firth's Oxford Inaugural lecture "A Plea For The Historical
Teaching Of History" (1904), repr. C.H.Williams (ed.) The Modern
Historian. 1938,pp.44-9, and W.Cunningham, "Impartiality In
History", Scientia. 1(1907),121-3.
3. Eg. the testimony of a Rhodes Scholar (19Q5-8), B.B.Schmitt,
The Fashion & Future of History, Cleveland, Ohio, 1960,p.7.
4. Cit. R.W.Southern, "The Shape & Substance of Academic History"
(1961) repr. in F.Stern (ed.) Varieties Of History.1970.p.412.
5. D.J.Medley (as Professor of History at Glasgow), The Educational
Value of A Study of History. Glasgow, 1399, p.11.
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in the nineteenth century (especially the period after 1870) the
continual complaint was that the documents were not being made
available.1 In this sense British historians were ill-prepared
for the role of semi-official apologists for the British declara¬
tion of war in August 1914.
Three weeks after the outbreak of war meabers of the Oxford
History School decided on the publication of an authoritative
2
presentation of the British case against Germany. On September
the 14th Why We Are At War: Great Britain's Case, a fairly sub¬
stantial volume of over 250 pages, appeared from the Clarendon
Press. This was to be the first of many "CDcford Pamphlets" on
the war and (with Gilbert M*rray*s Foreign Policy of Sir Edward
Grey) one of the most widely-quoted. Within a month it had
reached a third edition and by the end of 1914 it had gone
through five further impressions and been translated into six
3
languages. Its authors were some of the best-known history
tutors in Oxford at that time - Ernest Barker and L.G.Wickham
Legg (New College), H.W.C.Davis (Balliol), C.R.L.Fletcher (Delegate
of the Clarendon Press), Arthur Hassall (Christ Church), and F.
Morgan (Keble). In Germany too historians were busy at work on
a weighty justification of official policy, and this was published
4
a little later as Deutschland und der Weltkrieg (1915).
1. See the complaints of C.H.Firth, TRHS. Ser.3 IX(1915),20 & X
(1919), 15-24. Also H.Butterfield, "Some Trends In Scholarship
1068-1908, In The Field Of Modern History", TRHS. Ser.5, XIX
(1969),264-5.
2. Walter Raleigh (Professor of English at Oxford) claimed credit
for the idea (see The Letters of Walter Raleigh. 1928,11,411)
but in a letter to this writer Sir Keith Feiling wrote, "My
clear recollection is that the moving force in the matter was
H.W.C.Davis" (21 Mar.1973).
3. "Oxford & the War", TLS,XX,997(24 Feb.1921),114.
4. Edited by Otto Hintze, Hermann Oncken, Hermann Schumacher &
Friedrich Meinecke.
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Like their German colleagues, the Oxford historians
disclaimed any intention to write propaganda. Their appeal
was to the head rather than the heart. MWe are not politicians
they wrote, "and we belong to different schools of political
thought. We have written this book to set forth the causes of
the present war, and the principles we believe to be at stake.
We have some experience in the handling of historic evidence,
and we have endeavoured to treat the subject historically."1
And to substantiate this serious purpose there were more pages of
documents than there were of text. Authorised translations of
the German "White Book" and of extracts from the Austro-Hungarian
"dossier" on the Sarajevo assassination, extracts from the Russian
"Orange Book" (in French), from the dispatches of the British
ambassadors in Vienna and Berlin, and from Grey*s correspondence
during the July crisis - all this suggested a well-educated,
middle-class readership.
In appearance Why We Are At War had all the apparatus of
scholarship and the comprehensiveness of a history textbook. Not
only were there chapters on the diplomacy of the 1914 crisis and
on the neutrality of Belgium and Luxemburg, but also on "The
Development of Russian Policy", "The Growth of Alliances and the
Race of Armaments Since 1871", and "The New German Theory Of The
State". The fact that the "first-hand evidence", as it was called,
obviously presented a very partial interpretation of events was
quietly passed over. Except, that is, in the case of the German
"White Book" which was damned as "an official apology, supple-
2
raented by documents." In truth Why We Are At War merited the
1. 2nd rev. ed. 1914, p.5.
2. Ibid.. p.6.
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same description, and one might well speculate on the extent
to which the historian's passion for "facts" and his training in
documents led him to place so much reliance on official papers.1
The claim of British historians to be exercising the
highest standards of scholarly objectivity in their writings on
the wa$, though often made was seldom as merited as in the case
of Why We Are At War. Compared with the usual example of "war-
history" it was a sober book - as fair-minded as one could expect
from men who had no doubts as to the rightness of the British
case. Ramsay Muir, Professor of Modern History at Manchester
and later a well-known Liberal publicist, published a similar
2
study in 1914. He made the usual claim for impartiality, but
the whole tone of his Britain's Case Against Germany: An Examination
Of The Historical Background Of The German Action in 1914 was more
sensational. His list of German "crimes" rose to a crescendo
with a description of the bombardment of Louvain: an "Unspeakable
crime* Tilly's sack of Magdeburg is nothing to it; Alaric's sack
3
of Rome fades into insignificance beside it." No doubt German
action had been criminal, but the Oxford historians had been rather
more discreet in their choice of words. However the intention
of this chapter is not to compile a list of the "minor horrors
4
of war", an anthology of bad history - in much the same way as
1. And to place less, say, on the informal Anglo-French military
conversations.
2."Despite the difficulty of maintaining an attitude of aloofness
and impartiality during a great war, I have honestly tried...
to see the facts plainly, and never to tamper with them."(p.vii)
3. Ibid.. pp.41, 45,
4. The term used to describe the "minor poets, the pamphlets of
the professors, the people who write to the papers about
•Kultur'" by A.B.Shipley (Master of Christ's College,
Cambridge). The Minor Horrors of War. 1915 (preface).
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the British historians themselves ransacked the works of German
professors in search of damning passages. Rather it might be'
more useful to examine "war-history" to see just how British
historians attempted to give an historical dimension to (and
hence a justification of) official policy.
"Poor little Belgium" was a godsend for the Asquith
government. As Caieron Hazlehurst has shown, cabinet members
like "Simon, Pease, Harcourt, and above all, Lloyd George were
prisoners of their own pacific images. Supporting a wax deman¬
ded of them a reversal of life-time commitments. Belgium, as
Asquith sensed, would relieve them of unbearable embarrassmentJ'1
2
Good liberal historians like J.L.Hammond and Ramsay Muir
stressed the importance of Belgium in their writings as the
issue on which Britain had gone to war. Any suggestion that
Britain was committed before 1914 to render military assistance
3
to France was strenuously denied. But other British histor¬
ians were in no doubt that France was as important as Belgium in
Britain going to war. "You are quite mistaken in saying that
we allege no cause of war but Belgium", H.M.Gwatkin wrote to a
neutral. "In the critical days of 1914 our intense reluctance
to fight was nearly overcome by a clear conviction that we
should not let France be crushed, and we should certainly have
1. Politicians At War, 1971,p.103. But see p.14 for qualifications
to the importance of Belgium as the deciding factor.
2. See his letters to Gilbert Murray, Murray Mss.
3. Muir, "Introduction" to E.Rignano, The War & The Settlement,
1916, pp.9-10. Hence German anger when Britain declared war,
Muir claimed. But this German anger was also used as evidence
by other historians of conscious German attempts to blame
Britain for the outbreak of world war. Britain*s commitment
to aid France had been a "matter of common knowledge", the
Oxford historians claimed. Why We Are At War, pp.27-8
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fought on that ground when the invasion of Belgiuia removed our
last hesitation."1 And Ernest Barker, one of the authors of
Why We Are At War, felt able, away from the sobering influence
of his Oocford colleagues, to give free rein to his Francophilisra
in a pamphlet, Great Britain's Reasons For Going To War (1915):
"France, like England, is a democracy. France
is one of the greatest democracies of the world. She
is one of the greatest treasure-houses of European
civilisation; she is one of the great seed-beds of
liberal thought and ideas. Would England have been
right to watch unconcerned and without one proffer
of any sort of aid, the crushing by military farce of
that democracy; the rifling of that treasure-house;
the trampling down of that seed-bed? It is impossible
to answer •Yes•
Barker*s pamphlet seems to have been written for a relatively
unsophisticated audience. The further one reached for a mass
readership, the greater the danger of presenting an over-simplified,
even distorted picture. Thus R,S.Rait's Why We Are Fighting Germany
A Village Lecture (1914) claimed, among other things, that Britain
was fighting to defend French colonies. These "could only be a
mere stepping-stone to the possession of other colonies", namely
British ones: "The Germans want to seize colonies. The French
have colonies, but not in very healthy climates. Great Britain
has a great number of colonies and a large number of possessions
scattered all over the world,...Germany*s real aim is to seize
not French colonies and dependencies, but British colonies and
dependencies." Clearly, the Germans "wanted to pick their victims
off one by one, France this year and Great Britain a few years
hence." Britain, Rait concluded, should fight Germany because
that country despised "humanity" and "everything that distinguishes
3
a fighting man from a ravening beast."
1. Britain's Case Against Germa ny,1917,p.7.
2 • p .5 •
3. pp.5,8-9. Rait was Professor of Scottish History at Glasgow.
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The suggestion that, if France had been the first to violate
Belgian neutrality, Britain would have accepted this with "ready
acquiescence" touched a sensitive nerve. Had not even the authors
of Why We Are At War written that, "we fight in the noblest cause
for which men can fight", "the public law of Europe, as a sure
shield and buckler of all nations, great and small, and especially
the small"?1 "Mow little the German Chancellor realized the
Anglo-Saxon reverence for the sanctity of the plighted word",
2
exclaimed another Oxford historian. If Britain had accepted
Lichnowsky*6 offer of July 29th she would have felt "the paralysing
shame...more deadly than fifty defeats. Disgraced in the eyes of
the world, stricken in all probability with civil war, she would
easily have succumbed in final round of the world conflict" - such
was the considered opinion of the Reader in Modern History at
3
Cambridge.
However, the British stress on morality and legality, which
so infuriated the Germans, was, as the American philosopher John
Dewey (a not unqualified admirer of Britain) pointed out, not
complete hypocrisy. As he wrote in the Atlantic Monthly in
1. p.115. "Our cause, as one would expect from a people that has
fought out its own internal struggles under the forms of law,
is a legal cause. lite are a people in whose blood the cause
of law is the vital element." (p.116)
2. H.B.Bgerton, The War & The British Dominions, Oxford,1914,p.13.
On the actual place of Belgium in Allied military planning, see
S.R.Williamson, The Politics of Grand Strategy.Caiab. .Mass..
196J , esp.p.178.
3. J.H.Rose, The Origins of the War.p.185. The German offer to
respect the territorial integrity of France in return for British
neutrality was "dismissed as possessing no official character."
(p.181) A younger historian considered that Foreign policy
generally was "as a rule, a matte;: of business, not of sentiment",
but then this was in the course of a defence of Italian neutrality.
K.Foiling, Italian Policy Since 1870, Oxford, 1914,p.3
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in February 1916*
"Each nation...expresses its justification
through the ideas which its past history has made
iuost intelligible to inself - in terms, that is,
of its own national philosophy. The English are
traditionally Protestant, evangelical, and individual¬
istic in their consciousness. Their moral defence
instinctively takes a personal, a moralistic form. The
blamelessness of their own conscience, the virtuousness
of their motive - such as the defence of the sanctity
of treaties and their pledged word - support them.
Since their activities, as distinct from their consciousness,
have been largely commercial and imperialistic, it is
not surprising that the hypocrisy, the uncious
Pharisaism of the British have become proverbial among
the nations with another cast of thought. But since the
emotion of good intent is a perfectly genuine phenomenon,
the English are totally puzzled by the accusation.
Nothing is more remote from their all too hearty and
bluff straightforwardness than conscious double-
dealing."
There was a very real fear that if the German argument of
"military necessity" (to justify the invasion of Belgium) went
unchallenged, "then away [would] go all those restraints which
humanity and civilisation" had been trying to build up since the
2
seventeenth century. And in case the practically-minded Briton
1. "The Mind Of Germany", repr. in Characters & Events, 1929,1,133.
But the British defence of the Allied invation of Greece in 1915
roust have sounded unconvincing to neutrals when compared with
British defence of Belgium the previous year. J.W.Headlam,
Historical Advisor to the Foreign office (formerly a history tutor
at King's College, Cambridge) claimed that the "neutrality of the
two states was as different as black and white. For the neutrality
of Belgium was the fulfilment of a solemn engagement, the neutrality
of Greece was the violation of an engagement equally binding; if
the one was a virtue, the other was a crime." Greek refusal to aid
(as they had promised) the Serbs - "a refusal sufficient to justify
a demand that the nation which was guilty of it should be struck
out of the society of civilised states" - was enough to justify
the Allied invasion, Headlam claimed. But in addition the Allies
had only asked that their troops be given passage over Greek territory
- "never in the history of the world has a State been treated with
such consideration", he concluded. Belgium & Greece (1915),pp.3-4,
10-12. The cases were not exactly parallel, but Headlam's defence
is worthy to stand beside the pamphlets of German historians justi¬
fying the invasion of Belgium.
2. Sir H.B.Richards (Chichele professor of International Law at
Oxford), "The issues At Stake In This War ", Scientia. XII (1917)
202-3.
134.
was in any doubt, the economic historian W.R.Scott was able to
demonstrate that "the inviolability of public faith" was "not
only of supreme importance in the political sphere" but it also
lay "at the root of the whole mechanism of foreign trade and the
international money market." The alternative was "a bankruptcy
of external credit" and "a feeling of doubt and insecurity
throughout the money-markets of the world."1 There could be no
question, in such a case, of Teutonic solidarity. The British,
Ernest Barker claimed, felt "that the call of Right" was "higher
2
than the call of blood". And this term "the Right"(always
written with capitals) echoes through the writings of British
historians. It was "no mere lawyer's pretense, but the sternest
3
of all the realities" for civilised man.
Asquith had answered the charge that British policy in August
4
1914 was based upon cant "by reference to history" and this
called forth numerous articles and pamphlets all concerned to
demonstrate the continuity of British policy in Burope. Parallels
were drawn between Kaiser Wllhelm and Richelieu or Catherine II
who had both tried "tilting the balance [of power] for their own
aggrandisement", and between the attitude to small states of von
Bethmann-Hollweg and of Napoleon - for had not the latter referred
5
to Switzerland and Holland as "mere trifles"? This idea was
1. "The Economic Problems of Peace In Time Of War", Report of 38th
Meeting of British Assoc.for the Advancement of Science(1910)501-2.
The same point was made with characteristic force by Lloyd
George in a speech to London Welshmen (19 Sept.1914) cit.B.W.Ginsburg
War Speeches 1914-1917.Oxford.1917.pp.43-5.
2. Great Britain's Reasons for Going To War.1915.p.3
3. E.Barker.Mothers & Sons In Wartime.rev.ed.1918.p.67.This book of
essays reprinted from The Times went through several editions, a
tribute to Barker's ability to churn out patriotic prose.
4. Pitt's vindication of Dutch rights on the Scheldt(179J)& the defence
of Belgian neutrality by Gladstone(1870).Ginsburg,pp.35-6.
5. J.H.Rose.German Misrepresentations.1915.pp.10-19.A.Hassall.'Just
Fox A Scrap Of Paper'.Oxford.1914.p.6.Why We Are At War.p.17.
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expanded upon by the Reader in Modern History at Cambridge:
"...the war we are waging now is not on behalf
of some new-fangled notion, The independence of
the Belgians and the Dutch has been a matter of
concern to every British ruler who has had our
interests at heart. That independence has been in
turn threatened by the French, the Spaniards, again
by the French, and now, lastly, by the Germans. If
we go as far back as the reign of Edward I, we find
that he tried to prevenj the French conquering the
people of Flanders...."
The "natural tendency" of the British was "to side with the pigmy
2
...menaced by the giant", but there were also good practical
3
reasons for opposing German control of the Channel coast.
However, there were two exceptions to this picture of
historical continuity. The first anomaly, Britain at war with
Austria-Hungary to which she had "been united for centuries by
4
close ties of friendship and sympathy", did not cause too many
problems for the historian. The subordination of Habsburg to
Hohenzollern interests from the time of Bismarck suggested that
Vienna was not as much to blame in 19145. But the second anomaly,
Britain fighting on the side of Tsarist Russia, had already
troubled British liberals. The authors of Why We Are At War
attempted to provide some positive reasons (aside from common
opposition to Germany) for the alliance. First, there was their
1. J.H.Rose, How The War Came About,1915,p.12. This pamphlet was
aimed at "the young people of all English-speaking countries".
Cf.C.R.L.Fletcher, The Germans What They Covet. Oxford,1914,p.14.
2. H.A.L.Fisher, The War & Its Causes & Issues,1914,p.18.
3. Luxemburg & Serbia, being out of range of British sea-power(&
of less strategic interest) could be left to France & Russia to
defend. Why We Are At War.pp.14-15,21.
4. M.Beaven, Austrian Policy Since 1087, Oxford,1914,p.3.
5. There was disagreement over the degree of Vienna*s responsibility
in 1914. See ibid.,pp.27-8. W.G.S.Adams, The Responsibility
For The War, Oxford,1914,pp.6-7. Allen, Germany & Europe.p.58.
A.F.Pollard, The War Its History and Morals. 1915,pp.5-6.
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"common cause" for international arbitration and disarmament. Then
there was their common interest in the independence of Balkan
states and common opposition to German influence in Turkey.
Lastly, there was the beginning of "Russian constitutionalism"
which "not only coincided in time with the Anglo-Russian agreement
of 1907, but (which) also owed much to the inspiration of England."1
There had been high hopes of the Duma and also of a deeper
democracy within peasant Russia. Authors like Stephen Graham who
had written rhapsodically for years on "Mother Russia" reached
2
new emotional heights during the war. The cult of Dostoyevsky
gained new devotees. This was the background against which British
historians began to "rediscover" Russia - a Russia truly democratic
in a way which left "western constitutionmongers far behind the
times." This was how the Professor of History at Bedford College,
London, described the phenomenon:
"If by *democracy' we mean merely a form of
government, it is quite ludicrous to denounce Russia
because our own particular arrangements do not or may
not suit here. If, on the other hand, democracy means
something vastly deeper and more important than forms
of government, if it means a spirit, a point of view,
and a quality informing the life and thought of a people,
then the least Z can say is that while I see a great
deal of democracy in Russia, I do not see much of it
in England. One might, indeed, go further and say that
while, in that sense, England is the least democratic
of all European countries, and the most completely
under the dominion of the superstitions of 'class' and ^
'rank*, Russia is probably the most democratic of all."
1. p.56.
2. See the writings of J.Y.Simpson (professor of Natural Science
at New College, Edinburgh, 1904-34), especially his The Self-
Discovery Of Russia(1916).
3. Germany & Europe.p.112. Tsarist imperialism, anti-semitism and
discrimination against national minorities were due to a
"Gerraanisation of its central governing bureaucracy" (pp.110-11).
Cf. J.H.Rose, "The War & Nationality", Scientia. XVIII (1915),
27.
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There was a sense in which such ideas were a reaction to
German claims to be fighting against "Muscovite barbarism",1
but they also tell us something about the discontent among some
intellectuals with British industrial society. However this is
a theme to which we shall return later. For the present we can
note that British historians were, as one might expect, inclined
to give the Tsarist government the benefit of the doubt when
2
apportioning responsibility for the outbreak of war. This was
decidedly not the case - again as one would expect - with their
judgement of German policy (hiring the July exists. Few histor¬
ians followed the advice of the aged Liberal A.V.Dicey "to try
to form an historical view of the war","to look upon the war
from something like the point of view from which it will be
3
regarded by a fair-minded historian writing in A.D.2000." For
the "fair-minded historian" of A.D. 2000 reading the efforts of
L. See J.B.Bury'a Germany & Slavonic Civiligation.1915. in which
he claimed that Russia had more in common with western democracy
than did Germany & that Russia had "done more perhaps than
any other of the great peoples in the interests of small nation¬
alities" (p.13).
2. "If Russia was the first to mobilise, she took this step as a
consequence of German threats." Why We Are At War.p.79. There
was no other alternative if France & Serbia were to be pro¬
tected s "unless Russia meant to stand aside what else could
she have done?" Allen, Germany & Europe.pp.73-6
3. How We Ought To Feel About The War.p.5. This address to the
Working Men's College, London (Nov.1914) was one of the most
judicious wartime pamphlets from a British historian. A firm
supporter of the war, Dicey still felt its pressures on his
attempts at objectivity? "At every turn as I think about the
iniquity of Germany, and especially of the Kaiser, I am forced
to understand the feelings of men like Burke and Nelson towards
the Jacobins and revolutionists, and at the same moment I am
compelled to reflect on the impossibility of any nation engaged
in a great war judging, with the fairness which one ought to
practise, the conduct of an unscrupulous enemy." Letter to
W.P.Ker, 16 Nov.1914.cit.Rait. Memorials of A.V.Dicey.p.231.
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his predecessors during the World War of 1914-1918 it would only
be too obvious - to paraphrase Acton - where the Oxford historians
laid down their pens, and whether Meineck© or Ramsay Muir took it
up.
Muir's Britain's Case Against Germany is fairly typical of
the level of explanation for the outbreak of the war offered by
British historians. The continuity of German foreign policy,
and the conscious motives behind it, were stressed almost to the
point of crude conspiracy theory, as the following passage shows:
"The whole policy of Germany during the last five
and twenty years is of one piece. Its enormous and con¬
stantly increasing military preparations} its far-reaching
schemes of aggression in the Balkans; its attempts to
stir up discontent in South Africa, and to assert a
general protectorate over the Mohammedan subjects of the
three powers with which it is new at war; its blusterous
and bullying methods of diplomacy; its refusal to play a
fair and honest part in the discussions of the nations,
its eagerness to sow discord among the small and sorely-
tried nations of the south-east, its readiness to dis¬
regard agreements, such as that of Algeciras, into which
it had entered: - all this points to the same conclusion
which is enforced by nearly all the political literature
of these years, that the policy of the last quarter of a
century has been one long and not overskilled prepara¬
tion for the great bid for world power which was made in
1914 on so slight a pretext."1
Muir believed that he possessed "moral certainty" - clearly
something less than factual certainty - that all the arrangements
for war had been completed in Germany "long before the Archduke's
murder". There was the evidence that gun platforms had been
1. p.163. Muir had no sympathy with German fears of Russia and
their consequent fierce anger at Britain's lending aid to Franco-
Russian "encirclement" of Germany. But J.W.Allen was able to
recognise the reality of this fear & the "to a very large extent
genuine" feeling of the Germans that they were "waging a war
that was defensive from the beginning." Germany & Europe,p.35
D.Medley even conceded the implications of this for German
military policy: a large army, a large navy & frontier forti¬
fications (since she had no natural borders). Why britain Fights.
Glasgow,1914,p.6. But such attempts to the sympathetic under¬
standing advocated by Dicey were very rare.
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secretly constructed at strategic points in Belgium by German
agents; German coalers had taken up station a week before the
assassination at Sarajevo; the Kiel Canal had been widened, the
summer manoevres enlarged; and German investors had rushed to
sell Canadian Pacific stock, in London. "Is it, in the face of
these facts, possible to deny that Germany had for some years
been preparing to engage in war, and that even if the Archduke
had never been murdered, war would have come this summer?", Muir
asked his readers.1 Perhaps there was more of E.Phillips
Oppenheim in Muir than in other historians, but even fairly
level-headed colleagues could make wild assertions - for example,
that pre-war German societies which sought "mutual good under¬
standing" with Britain were but "a blind behind which she developed
2
her devilish plots".
Paradoxically, what was written by British historians in the
heat of battle has been restated, after a "revisionist" interval
of some forty years (1920-60), by a new generation of German
historians under the leadership of Frits Fischer. The very title
of his book Griff nach der Weltmacht (1961) calls to mind the claim
by British historians nearly half a century earlier that Germany
was aiming at no less than world power and the destruction of the
British Empire. i And on the idea that social and political
1. Muir, Britain's Case.pp.15-20
2. O.J.Medley, "The War & The Races Of Europe", Proc, Of Royal
Philos. Soc.Glasgow,XLV1 (1914-15),15.Medley, as we have just
seen, was capable of better things.
3. Eg. F.J.C.Hearnshaw, Main Currents Of European History 1815-1915,
1917,pp.303-4. Germany, to cover its own colonial failures,
planned "to seise from the older colonising nations more
attractive and profitable regionr." Conquest, "supplemented by
indemnities", would also solve other "financial, ijdustrial and
commercial difficulties".
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pressures in Wilhelxsine Germany disposed its ruling elite to
risk war in 1914, we can note that G.W.Prothero (an important
organiser of British wartime propaganda) was writing in 1916t
"The prospect of domestic revolution has driven rulers into
foreign wars before now; and it can hardly be doubted that the
spectre of Socialism and the menace of a revolutionary proletariat
have contributed to make the great capitalists, the dominant
military party and the Emperor himself, already inclined on other
grounds to war, more ready to adopt this solution as an
alternative."1
Prothero was one of the more knowledgeable historians when
it carae to German affairs. He had studied in Germany under Sybel
(1073-4) and ten years later translated the first volume of
2
Ranke's Weltgeschichte. However, the study of modern German
history in Britain was carried forward virtually by A.W.Ward alone.
3
The generation of historians who followed Seeley and Bryce
produced little on German history. One suspects that much of the
interest in Germany consisted of a vague feeling for Wissenschaft
and Rultur. for the cultural concept of "Germany", rather than
great knowledge of the social and political realities of the modern
Reich. It was this blindness which the Cambridge historian, J.
Holland Rose castigated in his lectures on the war. "Treitschke
1. German Policy Before The War.p.33 Gf.Hearnshaw,Main Currents....
pp.301-S. M.Sadler, Modern Germany & The Modern World.1914.
pp.11-12. Pollard, The War.... p.20.
2. Published as Universal History (1884).
3. James Bryce wrote hie classic work The Holy Roman Empire in 1864.
Sir John Seeley*s Life & Times Of Stein appeared in 1878.
Ward's Germany 1813-1R90 appeared between 1916 & 1918, although
it had been begun before the outbreak of war. It was the first
comprehensive history of modern Germany by a British historian
& its tone, one reviewer noted, was one of "serene detachment" &
"absolute impartiality" (EHR, XXXIII, ii (April 1918), 284).
Ward wrote virtually all the chapters on German history in the
Cambridge Modern History, apart from those written by continental
scholars (notably Oncken & Meinecke).
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and Bernhardi aro excused as freaks, alien to the Gorman genius
in its best form, as typified by Goethe, Kant, Schiller", he
noted. But Imperial Germany was "not now the land of Goethe, Kant,
Schiller. She is the creation of William I and II, of Roon,
Moltke, Bismarck and Kruppj and she takes after her creators.1"
Despite this coupling of Bismarck with the creators of
Prussian military power, he was not treated too unfavourably in
the wartime writings of British historians. A typical assessment
was this one by W.T.Waughs "Bismarck was unscrupulous enough and
at times brutal enoughs but there was in his diplomacy a coolness
and restraint which stand in the sharpest contrast to the bluster
2
and swagger of his would-be imitators." To the Oxford historians
J.A.R.Marriott and C.Grant Robertson Bismarck was the "embodiment
of the Fredrician tradition." "In the line of his defects,
crimes or blunders, megalomania cannot fairly be placed. The
intoxication of success, the fever of nationalist pride, never
3
mastered his head." The legacy of Bismarck would be scrutin¬
ised more critically during another world wax, but for the moment
he was placed (though with some vague misgivings) in the company
of the "good" Germans. However, the same could not be said of
1. Origins Of The Wax.p.157
2< Germany« 1914,p.60.Cf.Muir, Britain's Case.pp.125-7. A.D.Lindsay,
War Against War, Oxford, 1914,p.11. But see Fisher, The War... .
p.lO.
3. TUc Evolution of Prussia. Oxford,1915,pp.425-6. This book stayed
in print until after the Second World War. Robertson's
Bismarck (1918) still reads well after nearly 60 years. F.M.
Powicke *s Bismarck & the origin of the Gernan Empire(1914).
which appeared before the outbreak of wax, and J.W.Headlam's
Bismarck and The Foundation Of The German Eapire (1899)
concentrated on the period before 1870.
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Heinrich von Treitschke who vied with General (retired) Friedrich
von Bernhardi as the most-quoted German name in the writings of
X
British historians.
For British historians the "Prussian School" of German history
epitomised all that had gone wrong with German intellectual life
after the 1870s. H.A.L.Fisher, writing with the bitterness of
one who remembered the old "good" Germany, penned this indictment
of Treitschke and his disciples:
"They have exalted material power and have
belittled the empire of moral sentiments. They have
applauded war as an instrument of progress and national
hygiene. Holding that aggression is a symptom of
vigour, and vigour the sign manual of political virtue,
they have championed every violation of right which lias
subserved the aggrandisement of Prussia. They have
scorned small states because they were small and have
applauded big states because they were big. And in
their violent but not unnatural reaction against the
quietism and happy contemplation of that old and
pleasant Germany for which Mozart wrote music and
Goethe verse,...they have exaggerated with Teutonic
thoroughness the brutal side of politics as a thing
much to be respected.••."2
Ironically, in his own country Treitschke had suffered neg¬
lect since his death in 1896. In 1914 "Germans were surprised
to find the almost forgotten Treitschke singled out as one of the
intellectual instigators of the war", writes a recent biographer.
But the singling out of Treitschke was not entirely inaccurate.
In a subtle way he had influenced, and continued to influence,
1. A translation of Treitschke's monumental history of 19th-century
Germany began only in 1915. H.W.C.Davis* study of The Political
Thought Of Treitschke(1914) was a reasonably fair-minded study
(see pp.163-4,173).
2. "Modern German Historians" (April 1915), in Studies in History
& Politics, Oxford, 1920,p.125. Cf.Why We Are At War,pp.109-12.
3. A.Dorpalen, Heinrich von Treitschke. N.Haven, 1957,p.298.
J.W.Allen recognised this in 1914: "To the great majority of
Germans, as to the great majority of Englishmen, Treitschke
can be little more than a name." Germany and Europe,p.4.
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the assumptions of the German ruling elite. Even the new
generation of historians, led by Erich Marcks and Max Lenz, who
looked to Ranke rather than Treitschke for inspiration seemed
to echo many of the latter• s ideas, as they had been described
by Fisher.1 In nationalist circles in Germany the writings of
2
von Bernardi, "the faithful disciple of Treitschke", kept the
ideas of the Master - reinvigorated by a dose of Social ilarwin-
ism - in circulation. In Britain a Bernhardi-like figure,
Professor J.A.Cramb, kept Treitschke»s ideas before the public
almost up until the outbreak of the war.
John Adam Cramb (1861-1913) is a rather mysterious figure.
After taking a classics degree at Glasgow University (1835), he
had gone to Bonn University and attended Treitschke's lectures
(presumably in Berlin). After teaching at Queen Margaret's
College, Glasgow (1887-90) he went to Queen's College, London
(1892-1913), where he taught for the rest of his life. Although
he was styled Professor of History, the college was in fact a
private girls' school.3 He was a friend of Frederick York Powell,
Regius Professor of History at Oxford (1894-1904), and like him a
man of fertile imagination and little scholarly discipline. Cramb
was involved in Lord Roberts' campaign for compulsory military
service and, perhaps as a result of this, lectured from 1910
1. On the "Neo-Rankeans", see J.A.Moses, The Politics of Illusion.
1975,pp.10-26, McClelland, German Historians ....pp.207-24.
2. Why We Are At War.p.112. MoSt of his writings were translated
into English: Germany & The Next War (1912), Britain as Germany's
Vassal (1914), How Germany Makes War (1914), The New Bernhardi
(1915).
3. L.M.Russell, John Adam Cramb (1950) is an adulatory portrait
(with Cramb's lectures) by an ex-pupil.
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onwards at Staff College, Caraberley, and at other "military
stations" throughout Britain. He was thus, at the most, on the
periphery of the community of academic historians in Britain.1
Despite this Cramb's posthumously-published lectures on
Germany and England(1914) became one of the best-known exposit-
2
ions of Treitschke*s writings. It was widely quoted by British
historians - including the authors of Why We Are At War - and
other academic writers who sought to explain the "German mind".J
In fact, the book, reconstructed (literally) from lectures given
early in 1913, is a strange rambling series of reflections on the
4
dangers of "Pacificism", and on the "Tragic conflict" of Britain and
5
Germany, rather than a systematic exposition of Treitschke*s ideas.
As one critic wrote, Cramb "was himself strongly imbued with the
spirit of the movement" of thought he had set out to expound.
1. Apparently inability to subscribe to Anglicanism prevented his
gaining a professorship at King*s College, London.
2. The "popular edition" (1915) has on its covers "Treitschke
Expounded", "Bernhardi Explained".
3. Why We Are At War.p.117. C.S.Terry, Treitschke, Bernhardi & Some
Theologians. Glasgow,1915,p.9. Muirhead, German Philosophy..,,
pp.83-4. G.Slater, War & Peace In Europe,1915,pp.33-5. A.E.
Zimraern in R.W.Seton-Watson et al. The War & Democracy.1914,pp.120,
350. D.H.Macgregor in W.P.Paterson(ed.) German Culture,p.317.
W.A.Phillips, "Europe & the Problem of Nationality", Edinburgh
Rev., 221(1915),40-1. One of the few unfavourable comments is by
A.F.Pollard ("a popular but shallow book"), "The War & The
British Realms" in T.Brooke & H.S.Canby(eds.) War Aims & Peace
Ideals «N.Haven.1919.p.117.
4. "...in war man values the power which it affords to life of
rising above life, the power which the spirit of man possesses
to pursue the Ideal." (p.60).
5. "And one can imagine the ancient, mighty deity of all the Teutonic
kindred, throned above the clouds, looking serenely down
upon that conflict, upon his favourite children, locked in a
death-struggle, smiling upon the heroism of that struggle, the
heroism of the children of Odin the War-god!" (p.137: last para¬
graph in the book).
6. C.E.Playne, The Pre-War Mind In Britain, 1928, pp.199-
200. """"
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But if Cramb was widely read, few historians echoed his
Social Darwinist belief in the inevitability of Anglo-German
conflict.1 Where Cramb had talked of the impossibility of
'•friendly rivalry" between the two powers, British historians
set out to praise British foreign policy (especially that of
Grey) for its attempt to foster just such friendship. "The
characteristics of Sir Edward Grey's diplomacy during the past
ten years", wrote C.S.Terry, "have been transparent honesty, and
a disposition to be conciliatory which no rebuff could repress."
Faced with a slowly changing power situation on the Continent as
the result of German unification, British policy refused to be
driven into extreme course of action. Grey "neither thwarted
or opposed Germany's aspirations". He "took the German menace
seriously, but met it with consideration and common sense". And
"Germany's almost insane hatred" of Grey was a "confession of
her knowledge" that he had "presented the case against her in
2
terms of civilisation itself". Such eulogies of Grey were not
uncommon, and his defence of the balance of power in Europe was
seen as the lynch-pin of Britain's sensible middle course. As an
international lawyer put it, while it could not be called a
"fundamental principle of International Law", yet the European
1. One exception was D.J.Medley: "A rapidly-growing nation full
of enterprise must needs find outlet for its energies or it
will die of congestion. But if it can find salvation only at
our expense, we must protect ourselves or become mere satellites
of the rising power. Germany believes that there is not
room in the world for herself and us at the same time."
"The War & The Races...", 15.
2. British Diplomacy 1902-14", Aberdeen Univ. Rev., Ill, 8(Feb.
1916), 153-4. Cf. Rose, Origins.... pp.183-4. Allen, Germany
& Europe, pp.98-102.
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balance was "a political principle indispensable to the existence
of International Law in its present condition".1
For the Germans, who tended to write of the European balance
as an outdated concept (at least in its existing form), the
British stress on legality and morality seemed hypocritical.
"Public opinion in England is wonderfully responsive to cant",
wrote the sociologist Ferdinand TtSnnies. "it is like a musical
automat - one needs only to throw a cant phrase into the slot and
2
the instrument begins to grind out a highly moral melody." The
German habit of unsentimentally viewing the established order -
whether it was the European balance or the British Empire - in
terms of real power was rather embarrassing to the British. One
of the Oxford pamphlets on the war was entitled Is The British
Empire The Result Of Wholesale Robbery?- to which its author,
the Beit Professor of Colonial History at Oxford (H.E.Egerton)
replied defensively: "No doubt in the making of the British
Empire, as in other human transactions, things have happened that
one may wish might have happened otherwise". But, if Britain
had been "fortunate in her opportunities, her use of them" had
been "assuredly not more unscrupulous than the use made of their
3
opportunities by other nations."
1. A.P.Higgins, The Law Of Nations & The War. Oxford,1914,p.21.
2. Warlike England. N.Y. 1915,p.22
3. Oxford,1914,p.27. A similar justification of the French empire
by two Oxford historians: "No doubt the colonizing powers of
Europe have sometimes alleged a grievance which did not exist,
or have made a mountain out of a molehill, in order to justify
the establishment of a protectorate. But each case must be
judged on its merits; and we have no right to denounce France
as a robber simply because she has become the protector of
numerous uncivilised or half-civilised communities." F.Morgan
& H.W.C.Davis, French Policy Since 1871, Oxford 1914,p.12.
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Treitschke had portrayed Britain as "a middle-aged burglar
who desired to retire from business, and therefore proposed that
burglarys should cease." Germany was the "young and enter¬
prising burglar, just starting a promising career." And there
was at the bottom of Treitschke's idea that right was "a question
of might", B.A.Sonnenschein admitted, "a sense of outraged justice."
In moral terms one could not "justify Great Britain*s having
painted red one-fifth of the habitable globe". But nor could
one"justify the fact that A earns five times as much as B, but
not one-tenth the income of C", Sonnenschein concluded. "In
this workaday world we have to be content with a rough kind of
justice, and to acknowledge accomplished facts. We must live
and let live."1 But Sonnenschein, who had been born in London
in 1B51 of an Austrian father, was not typical of British aca¬
demics in his understanding of German jealousy of Britain's*^>lace
2
in the sun".
The apologists for the British Empire were unashamedly
idealistic. Once German criticism had been answered, there were
no limits to what was felt to be well-earned self-congratulation.
"The English are not much given to introspection, nor are they
gifted in explaining what they aim at or what they do", wrote one
Cambridge historian. "They live by instinct, and advance by
experience and their policy seems from hand to mouth, but it is
an expression of national character, and is thus a continuous
tradition." But under the stress of world war, "wherein Empires
1. Through German Eyes, Oxford, 1915,pp.14-15.
2. He had been the first to call attention to the manifestos of
German professors in the first months of the war.
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and the principles upon which they have been built are put to the
test", the manner in which the Empire had rallied to Britain was
proof enough of its true nature. "Against the German ideal of
Empire - the march of Teutonic culture over the earth" - one could
place the British Empire. It was truly one of "those subtle and
half conscious compromises, through which the English achieve
their full power of co-operation."* Germany - the "nation of
machines" - could never understand "the dominance of personality",
the importance of "individual resource and character" for the
British.2
This self-image was a potent one, and British historians
frequently drew attention to the national reputation for gifted
amateurism and the "clean rigour" of British games. The Germans,
Ernest Barker alleged, approached sport with the "deadly concen¬
tration of a mind which never relaxes its rigour in play, the
passionate earnestness of a combatant who has never learned in a
mimic struggle to abide by limiting rules". This had led to
"the temper, which, wedded to the doctrine of necessity of State",
3
had produced poison gas and "massacre by submarines". K.A.L.
Fisher was making much the same point when he noted that young
Englishmen read articles on golf and cricket or bridge, while
4
young Germans read books on war. In short, the ideological
1. E.A.Benians, The British Empire & The War, 1915,pp.3-4,16.
After the war Benians (with J.H.Rose & A.P.Newton) edited the
Cambridge History Of The British Empire(1939-)in which similar
ideas were repeated (see esp.vol.2,1940).
2. O.Lodge, "The War From A British Point Of View", Scientia.XVII
(1915), 191.
3. Mothers & Sons In Wartime.pp.67-8. The "tap-root" of the differ¬
ence lay in the British "instinct for truancy" as against German
"docility". The British could not tolerate being "set in a
mental uniform and placed under spiritual drill"(p.69).
4. The War,...p.9.
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dimensions of the world conflict for British historians were
well-expressed by Ramsay Muir*s explanation of the basic
antipathy between Germany and Britain: "Science over against
sportsmanship; discipline over against self-government."*
Nor was this picture of political freedom and encourage¬
ment of individualism altered by the fact that Britain possessed
the world*s greatest empire. What was "the outstanding mark of
the British Empire?", the Professor of Politics at Oxford asked.
Why, it was "the freedom of the people in it and the security
2
which union gives". Far from being "a machinery to enable
the English to exploit a quarter of the globe", it was in fact
"a far-reaching and elastic structure, wherein the force of
nationality" could have "free development". It was an example
of "union and peace" to set before the rest of the world.What
then of those embarrassing exceptions - "thrown in our teeth",
H.E.Egerton complained. Ireland and South Africa by no means
disproved the general rule. National aspirations were quite
acceptable if "compatible with the interests of the Empire as a
4
whole". When talk turned to a league of nations later in the
1. "The Antipathy Between England & Germany", Scientia. XVIII,
(1915), 266.
2. Adams, Responsibility....pp.19-20. The principle of "unity
through diversity" was claimed to be present in British policy
as early as the 18th century(in former French Canada).
"Difficult as it may be for the logical, systematic German
mind to realize it is still the fact that different kinds of
patriotism may co-exist side by side simultaneously in the same
man." Egerton, War & The British Dominions,p.13.Cf.Fisher.
Value Of Small States.p.22
3. Benians,p.!0
4. War & British Dominions.pp.17-18. "Does Ireland, too, believe
that the cause of law is the vital element in the blood of
Englishmen? That England assumes with tenderness, out of courage
of nobility, the protection of small nations? That it battles
for them against militarism for the cause of justice?" Tonnies
had asked (Warlike England.p.12).
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war it is not surprising that more than one British historian
offered up the British Empire as an obvious model,*
We began this chapter with the suggestion that the
Edwardian historians4 credo of strict objectivity was in some
sense undermined by the prevailing historicist assumptions about
British history and Britain's role in the world. Perhaps it was
this conflict which prompted H.E.Egerton to give the impression
of momentary doubt in the course of a defence of British policy.
"Often the deeper our knowledge," he wrote, "the stronger becomes
the case which can be made for the side which has failed and is
therefore discredited. But there are limits to these grounds
for cool-headed doubt and scepticism; and when the case of our
adversary can be decided by his own admissions, it would be the
2
merest pedantry to affect an attitude of uncertainty." This is
perhaps the best summary judgement that one can make of the war¬
time writings of British historians. The seeds of "war-history"
were there before 1914 in the essentially nationalistic (and
sometimes imperialistic) assumptions of British historiography.
The image of Britain as protector of the small states of Europe
through the balance of power was so deeply-held that not even
the wartime reaction against the wilder excesses of "war-history"
1. Eg. A.F.Pollard, "The Paradox Of The British Empire" (June
1917) repr. in Commonwealth At War,p.228: "It is the only
permanent league of nations in existence, and its nations
comprise all sorts and conditions of peoples."
2. War & British Dominions.p.22. One could recognise the good
points of Napoleon whilst claiming that "the resistance to
Napoleon's aims to world-empire to have been necessary". But
the same could not be true of Serbia & especially of Belgium




1. In R.W.Seton-Watson»s Britain In Europe 1789-1914 (1937) the
continuity of British policy in Europe is stressed in much
the same way as it had been during the war, though without the
obvious moralising (see esp.pp.35-7). During the Second
World War the image was re-emphasised even further. Eg. see
A.L.Rowse, "The Historical Tradition Of British Policy", in
The English Spirit.1944. pp.29-J4 & "The Tradition Of British
Policy", in The End of An Epoch, 1947,pp.39-49.
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VII. "THE PEACEFULNESS OP BEING AT WAR"
"His tempi* of learning war lays in temporary
ruins - ruins not only material but spiritual....
Who cares to-day wholeheartedly for the Hittites
or Minoans? Who raises to-day the question of
the Origins of Tragedy or Comedy? Learning
and still more research is a hard mistress; she
will have your whole heart or none of you, and
which of us has the genius to die the great death
of Archimedes? War upsets every value; the beam
is suddenly kicked, and down falls the scale of
learning....The odd and interesting thing is,
not that war should temporarily upset values, but
that this very upset...which places learning
lowest, is positively welcomed by just the man who
might be expected to resent it - the scholar and
thinker."
- Jane Harrison, Peace With Patriotism.
(1915).
With the outbreak of war the universities and colleges
began to change in appearance. Undergraduates and younger dons
disappeared into the army and navy. "The melancholy of this place
now-a-days", Bertrand Russell wrote from Cambridge, "is beyond
endurance - the Colleges are dead, except for a few Indians and
a few pale pacifists and bloodthirsty old men hobbling along vic¬
torious in the absence of youth. Soldiers are billeted in the
courts and drill on the grass; bellicose parsons preach to them in
stentorian tones from the steps of the Hall."* For Russell the
war was an almost unbearable tiqte, but for many other academics it
was a time of something approaching exhiliration. "Its going to
be a good war, though some of us will have a lot to bear", the
Professor of English at Oxford wrote in the first days of the war.
1. To Lady Ottoline Morrell, 19 Mar.1916, cit. Autobiography.
1,61.
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"I've often known this must come when I've heard the Germans talk
about their destiny and their plans for achieving it. I'm glad
I've lived to see it, and sick that I'm not in it."1 And
together with Robert Bridges [the Poet Laureate] and Gilbert
Murray, Raleigh joined the Oxford Volunteers to "rise at six every
day to line hedgerows in the dark and 'advance in rushes' across
the Oxford meadows." The younger dons saw active service, as
did Sir John Myres, Wykeham Professor of Ancient History at Oxford,
who commanded raids by small craft on the Turkish coast, where
his "ingenuity and buccaneering spirit served him no less than his
detailed knowledge of the geography and people of the Asia Minor
3
coast".
However, most academics being over military age, stayed
at home. in common with the general public they had little
idea of the realities of trench warfare. as the historian R.H.
Tawney (a private in the Manchester Regiment) pointed out, the
1. W.Raleigh to Mrs.W.Crum, 8 Aug.1914, cit. Letters, ii, 404
2. R.Brooke to R.Loines, Dec.1914, The Letters Of Rupert Brooke.
1968,p.644. Aldous Huxley, then a Balliol undergraduate, was
less impressed:
"The Volunteers in vomit-colour
Go forth to shoot the lamb of God.
Their leaden faces redden to a blazing comet-colour,
And they sweat as they plod.
Parson and poet-laureate,
Professor, grocer, don,
This one as fat as Ehud that, poor deart Would grow the
more he ate
Yet more a skeleton.
Some have piles and some have goitres,
Most of them have Bright's disease,
Uric acid has made them flaccid and one gouty hero loiters,
Anchylosed in toes and knees."
From letter to L.Gielgud, 30 Sept.1917, A.Huxley, Letters,1969,p.135
3. J.Boardman in DNB 1951-60.p.763.
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people on the Home Front created for themselves an "image of war",
not as it was, but a "picturesque" version which flattered their
"appetite for novelty, for excitement, for easy admiration", and
superficial emotion.* Ernest Barker, an otherwise sensible
historian, could write of the Western Front as if it were some
2
kind of gigantic playing-field. Another historian J.W.Allen
claimed that the young men at the Front were feeling "for the
first time in their lives" that they were "wholly right with the
world", "doing their whole duty and nothing else". "In that con¬
sciousness" they were dying* If that were not "happiness", then
3
what could happiness be, Allen asked. And as late as April
1917 the economic historian W.R.Scott told an audience at University
College, London, that "in the modern British system" soldiers were
4
"recognised as men not as inanimate pieces in a vast war game".
Was it really, one wonders, so easy to explain the terrible losses
of the previous year? The significance of all this rhetoric is
not so much the hideous unreality of the "image" of war (that
much is obvious), but rather that the war brought to the surface
- as it did in France and Germany - a series of images of society
which had been partially obscured during peacetime.
1. "Some Reflections Of A Soldier" (Oct.1916), repr. in The Attack
& Other Papers. 1953,pp.24-6. "The reality is horrible, but it
is not as horrible as the grimacing phantom which you have imag¬
ined", Tawney told readers of The Nation who hopefully were more
serious-minded. But for most civilians the lighter-hearted
picture of cheery Tommies hunting down Huns like "merry assasins"
was more popular.
2. Mothers & Sons....p.14.
3. The Danger Of Peace.1915.p.8. However, at least one historian
(T.F.Tout) did receive letters from farmer students at the Front
which spoke of "putrefying corpses". See letters of A.L.Prince
& R.Bedford in Tout Mss.
4. The W.S.Jevons Lecture for 1917j Economic Problems Of Peace
After The War. Cambridge,1917, Ser.1,8.
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This was noticed by Jane Harrison, classical scholar in
peacetime, and part observer part participant in the great
upsurge of nationalism among British intellectuals. The same
"watchwords", she noted, appeared time and time again - "discipline,
faith, simplicity, convention, law, obedience". There was not
so much a eulogy of war, as there was on the Continent, but rather
a recognition that it had a positive and creative side: "War is
savagery - a setback to civilisation - and yet, or rather because
of this, it has for the quite young - say, for those under thirty
- a singular charm lacking to the middle-aged." But if British
academics were any indication, the middle-aged were quite ready
to Join Rupert Brooke in breaking free of the old orthodoxies.
"Ten years ago to mention the word *duty* was to write yourself
down a fogey." Now everyone talked of "Home and Country",
"Church and Army". The creed of "individualism", Harrison con¬
cluded, had been replaced by "collectivisra".* This too was
the thesis of A.L.Smith, who told an audience at King*s College,
London:
"War is indeed a mighty creator. It is an
intellectual awakener and a moral tonic. It stirs
men to think, and thinking is what we most lack
in Bngland. It creates a conscious unity of feel¬
ing which is the atmosphere needed for a new start.
It purges away old strifes and sectional aims, and
raises us for a while into higher and purer air.
It helps us to recapture some of the lofty and
intense patriotism of the ancient world. It
1. Peace With Patriotism. Cambridge, 1915,pp.10-14. The reaction
against peace as "a poor, emasculate and even effeminate
business" had been "less explicit" in Britain than in France,
and though "quite as anti-intellectualist, much less logical
and theoretical". Only T.E.Hulme could be compared with
P&guy or Barres, one might argue.
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reveals to us what constitutes a modern nation,
the partnership between the living, the dead,
and the yet unborn."1
Since Smith's nationalism was a christian nationalism, he
had to reassure any waverers that the war could be justified
without doing violence to Christian teaching. This was the theme
of his contribution to the series of Oxford pamphlets on the war,
The Christian Attitude To War (1915). Taking as his text "Resist
not evil", Smith wrote as follows:
"There have been, in all Christian times,
some who make this text contain the whole duty
of a Christian towadds war. 'War is organised
murder.• But the general view of mankind has
decided that things are not as simple as this,
and the Christian duty not so one-sided. Even
the texts make it possible to present the other
view. The essential elements of Christianity,
as it appears to the intelligent non-Christian
races, are that it inculcates the sacrifice of
everything in a righteous cause, and that its
founder was a man who gave his life for other
men; and are not these the two facts which axe
just the redeeming side of war? It was a great
general (Sherman) who said, *War is Hell*, but
a still greater (Moltke) who said, *War is the
most devilish but almost the most heroic of
human things.* Do not our highest and deepest
feelings forbid us to accept 'Peace at any price'
as a maxim? Do we not feel already at work among
us all the enobling and the purifying influence
of this spirit of sacrifice? Do we not see also
how it has brought out in the whole nation the
sense of brotherhood, how one month brought us
nearer to acting as a true Commonwealth than
sixty years preceding? And if we look beyond
our shores, could it be a possible conception of
Christian duty to look on impassively at the
sufferings of Belgium? Would that be loving
our neighbours? No, not so simple is the great
problem, how to bring both aspects of the
1. "The People & the Duties of Empire"? in The Empire & the
Future, 1916, pp.43-4.
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Christian spirit to bear upon the facts of
modern life; how to interpret the duty of
unselfishness without deserting the duty to
the oppressed.
Such theological casuistry was common enough from academic
2
apologists for the war, and the image of ''sacrifice" was one
3
which ran through much of the writing. What is perhaps more
interesting is the reaction against industrial civilisation which
the war brought to the surface in the writings of middle-class
intellectuals like Smith. Much of the peacetime existence of
British society was "uglier, more fundamentally evil, more anti-
Christian than even the cruelty, waste and idiotic folly of war".
The New Testament, Smith claimed, had expressly denounced wealth
rather than war, for thefirst was the "more deadly corruption"
for the "soul of modern societies". If the war could generate
"a mighty spiritual force" then it would have been "worth its
cost, not only in millions of pounds, but its cost in killed and
1. pp.3—4.
2. Eg. F.C.Burkitt (Professor of Divinity, Cambridge) noted that
modern eschatological theory showed the Sermon on the Mount to
be Interim Sthik. acceptable only in a world which believed in
imminent "cosmic catastrophe" to usher in the kingdom of god.
See report of his lecture in Caudaridge Rev..XXXI. 895(20 Jan.1915),
143. Another noted Cambridge theologian J.Oman (university
Lecturer in the Philosophy of Religion) rejected the argument
of some theologians that in accepting the state Christianity
also accepted war. He felt that "moral surrenders" to the
oppression of others was a worse evil than war. Like Smith too,
he wrote of war as a "cleansing fire" after "the accumulation
of pestilential decay" & hoped for a new world to "spring out
of the blood drenched ground?'. Oman, pp.23-35.
3. Eg. "The Prussian has so polluted the earth that the rest and
best of mankind has to descend into the mire to cleanse the
defilement away. The descent, the humiliation, and the suffer¬
ing are not good things in themselves, but only as sacrifice.
It is the spirit that matters and the purpose that sanctifies
the squalor of the via dolorosa. "A.F.Pollard, "A Parable of
the War" (Aug.1917) repr. in Commonwealth At War,p.254.
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wounded, in widowed and orphaned and childless*'.1 All this
was not unlike "the ideas of 1914*' expressed enthusiastically by
the German academics, and it seems that Werner Sombart's jibe at
shallow Manchesterturn in his wartime polemic Handler und Helden
2
(1915) was not lost on Smith. It was because the Germans thought
of the British as "decadent money-grubbers, soulless individualists,
that they thought their cause the cause of world progress", Smith
wrote in a pamphlet for the Christian Social Union. "We see they
left out the good side of individualism, freedom, individual
liberty, a priceless thing. But were we not in danger of leaving
out discipline, unity, self-sacrifice, till the war recalled us
3
to the elemental requisites of natural life." The war, Smith
thought, provided an opportunity for a new departure:
"The time has come to meet the old, narrow,
exploded form of individualism in English thought
by definitely developing that other aspect of
life which is conveyed in the words Co-operation,
Community, Corporateness. Our literature, our
politics, our society, one might say our religion
itself, is saturated with the conception of the
•individual*; in spite of the fact that, literally,
there is no such thing among human beings as an
individual; and that even if there were, it would
still be more intelligent and profitable to regard
him in his true character of a member of a
community
This theme of the recreation of a sense of community
under the stress of war is one which occurs time and time again
1. Christian Attitude To War, pp.4-6
2. Sombart contrasted the "traders" with the German "heroes".
See Ringer, pp.183-5.
3. The War & Our Social Duty. 1915,p.3. The war gave the oppor¬
tunity to combat "*the gospel of self-interest* as the econo¬
mists of the last century were wont to call it".
4. Christian Attitude....p.16
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in the writings of British academics. It was as if - as Jane
Harrison put it - that war provided conditions for satisfying
the longing for '•fellowship" in "the real student, the born don".
"Thinking can only be shared with the elect feeling almost is
fraternity."1 But it was also linked to the underlying sense of
disquiet in the years before 1914 at the apparent moral vacuum
at the centre of British life - at least this was the analysis of
2
people like C.F.G. Masterman and Charles Gore, as well as Smith.
There were other manifestations of this disquiet; the fascination
for some British intellectuals of peasant Russia. This latter -
what one might call the cult of the raoujik - of course reached
new heights with the wartime alliance with Russia. A typical
comment in this vein was that by an Oxford theologian who quoted
approvingly the maxim that "The kind heart of the Russian moujik
is a more valuable asset to civilisation than the mighty brain
3
of a German professor." Ironically, the German professors
themselves made the same claim for deeper moral values for their
own Kultur. If the welcome for war in 1914 was less explicit
amongst the British academic community, it was there all the same.
The difference was that in Germany the standard-bearers of traditional
1. Peace With Patriotism.p.9.
2. See D.Newsome, "The Assault on Mammon; Charles Gore & John
Neville Figgis", J. of Ecclesiastical History. XVII, 2 (Oct.
1966), 227-41. Newsome does not mention Smith, but well
before the war he was writing of the need fen: a "reconstruction
of the sense of community" to replace "rampant 'Manchesterdom'".
Spencer's maxim "Man versus the State" was already "a grotesque
antithesis". Vast forces lay dormant in "the associative
principle". The need was "to strike the right balance between
an extreme socialism, which might ruin production and culture,
and a Mammonism which might provoke men to Anarchism." Smith,
"History & Citizenship A Forecast", Comhill Mag.. NS.XXVI, 5
(May 1909), 607ff. See also his Ford Lectures at Oxford (1905),
Church & State In The Middle Ages. Oxford, 1913, p.134.
3. L.P.Jacks, "Changing Mind...", 342
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liberal values were fewer in number and perhaps less influential.
In Britain there was still considerable suspicion, even
among liberal intellectuals Who supported the war, of the state
of mind summed up in the phrase "the peacefulness of being at war"
- the feeling that the ideological truce occasioned by war should
not just be tolerated but positively welcomed. This phrase had
been coined by L.F.Jacks, Principal of Manchester College, Oxford,
and editor of the popular theological periodical the Hibbert
Journal. The war, Jacks claimed, had brought to England a "peace
of mind" she had not possessed for years. The calm was the result
of burdens everyone had to bear. It was "comparatively easy to
love one*s neighbour" when one realised that all were "common
servants and common sufferers in the same cause".1 The war had
aloo administered a much-needed shock to bring Britain out of
the deep malaise into which it had fallen. "I can imagine nothing
worse for my native land than another century of such a life as
we were living before the war", Jacks told a gathering of the
2
"Fight For Right" movement in 1916. And while that Victorian
liberal Graham Wallas could have been expected to share this con-
deranatation of the social irresponsibility of the affluent classes
in Edwardian England, the complacent view of wartime consensus which
preceded it rather stuck in his gullet. It was the state of mind
which reminded him of the Parliamentary Committee*s recruiting
1. "The Peacefulness Of Being At War" (1915) repr. in G.Wallas,
Men & Ideas. 1940, pp.99-102.
2. "Interim Religion, p.77.
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poster of "a solder's smiling face with the inscription, fHe's
happy and satisfied, are you?"'1
Wallace wondered whether "peacefulness" was "so supreme
a human good" that it made "war the best form of international
relationship", and, if war were judged evil, whether "peaceful¬
ness" was at all useful during wartime. Not surprisingly, in
view of his powerful critique of Social Darwinism in prewar
writings like The Great Society, his answer to the first question
was an emphatic negative. Besides this "peacefulness" was
"doomed by the nature of things to be transitory". But this
brought up the second question. The value of "absolute surrender
of consciousness" was obvious for the soldier in the trenches.
It was "an anodyne" which few would grudge him and possibly "an
important source of military efficiency". There might even be
a "certain military value" in a like surrender by non-combatants,
but it was something in which Wallas just could not share. To
do so, he wrote, "would be to abandon as far as I am concerned
any attempt to control by reasoned thought the policy of my nation".
Surrender of consciousness was just not possible for the liberal
intellectual. It was better to have "unrest of thought" than to
allow the war to go on after its continuance ceased "to be the
less of two monstrous evils". National policy, Wallas concluded,
"should even during the fighting be guided not only by the will to
2
conquer but also by the will to make possible a lasting peace.
1. "Comment on Dr Jack's Article 'The Peacefulness of Being at




With this article first published in the New Republic
Wallas had gone to the heart of the dilemma for the liberal in
wartime - the reasonable limits of criticism of official policy.
For Wallas Wilhelmine Germany represented all that he opposed
politically - "a medieval aggressive dynasty wielding the whole
material force of a fully consciousness national machine-industry".
But there was a danger that in fighting this immoral force the
Allies would be caught up in a contest of rival pcwers, instead
of opposing ideologies. To this end Wallas sought to influence
liberal opinion in Britain and America against a future punitive
2
peace settlement. Among liberal intellectuals there was a wide¬
spread fear that the violent forces unleashed in 1914 might well
become self-perpetuating; that the war might become an end in
itself. As L.T.Hobhouse wrote in 1915s "It is the painfully
won tradition of fear and self-restraint that man learns to impose
on himself with so much effort which, being in a sense an arti¬
ficial fabric, is ever liable to yield to the crude instincts of
naked self-assertion which it scarcely covers, and with difficulty
3
holds in." Hobhouse had been initially even more enthusiastic
for the war even than Wallas - and this despite the fact that his
1. "Veblen*s Imperial Germany & the Industrial Revolution", Quarterly
J. of Economics.XXX.i(Nov.1915}.182. Wallas felt that if it had
not been for the war "this phenomenon would have been transient",
a characteristically optimistic conclusion.
2. See his letter to Lord Bryce proposing a manifesto with the sig¬
natures of "a few big men, yourself perhaps, with a couple of
historians, and a bishop or two, and one or two respected and
independent men in business and politics" (17 Mar.1916, Bryce Mss.
UB.23). Such names were intended to influence the British Govern¬
ment against pursuing "economic war" against Germany. In America
Wallas was well-known to Professive intellectuals, some of whom
(eg. Felix Frankfurter) were government advisors, and he contri¬
buted articles to the New Republic (ed. by Whiter Lippman). Later
in Feb.1918 Wallas was consulted by Wiloon's "Special Commissioner"
Ray Stannard Baker (together with Cole Murray, & A. E.Zimmern) on
war aims. See Wiener,pp.168-74; A.J.Mayer, Politics & Diplomacy of
Peacemaking. 1968,p. 35. ~ ~~
3. World In Conflict.P.28. The greatest danger was in Germany, but (p.t.o]
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close friend J.A.Hobson, and his sister Emily were active in the
anti-war movement. lie was even prepared to consider military
and industrial conscription, until they became distinct possi¬
bilities in 1916. But in the last two years of the war Hobhouse
became increasingly disillusioned with Lloyd George's pursuit of
"total victory".1
At this point we should consider briefly the impact of
the controversy over conscription on the academic community, for
the argument was in part an extension of the one between Wallas
and Jacks over the "absolute surrender of consciousness" by the
individual citizen in wartime. But conscription or national
service was also an issue in which academics had been involved
well before 1914. At the end of the nineteenth century Oxford
University could boast the largest volunteer batallion in England.
Its organiser L.R.Farnell, Rector of Exeter College, became an
eager propagandist for Lord Roberts's National Service League.
This body had been established in 1902 to press for the introduc-
2
tion of compulsory military service. After Haldane's reorgan¬
isation of the Army between 1906 and 1909 the universities had
been encouraged to establish Officers' Training Corps, but the
(3. cont. from previous page)
racialist imperialism was not "the peculiar product of the
German mind", as the Boer War had shown. The decline in res¬
pect for law and order in Edwardian England seemed to Hobhouse,
a Gladstonian Liberal, to be due as much to the political
extremists of the Left as to the reactionary Right (pp.46-52).
1. H.Smith, 267-72. Hobhouse ended up amongst the moderate liberal
"Writers' Group", which included Wallas, Hobson & Hurray.
2. Farnell, pp.148-57, 327. One of the Exeter Fellows has des¬
cribed the Corps training at Aldershot during the Boer War and
going down with ptomaine poisoning after eating tinned peas
recommended by Farnell as "a gentle laxative". See R.R.
Marett, A Jerseyman At Oxford. 1941, pp.154-5.
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N.S.L. still pressed for the introduction of compulsion.1 For
this campaign they recruited the services of two historians -
F.J.C.Hearnshaw, Professor of History at King»s College, London,
2
and C.G.Coulton of Cambridge. '
Coulton, always a doughty controversialist, had been giving
his own Liberal interpretation to the argument for compulsion since
the time of the Boer War. Citing the example of Switzerland,
Coulton stressed that "in history, compulsory service has been
the usual note of the democracies, while despots have preferred
a paid army". It was, he claimed, "an obviously democratic
principle that all the necessary burdens of the state should be
3
shared as equally as possible among all citizens".
1. Lectureships in Military History & Strategy were established at
Manchester & Oxford in 1905 (the latter was converted into a
professorship in 1909). At Manchester there was a lively protest
meeting against the new post. See Fiddes,p.l43.
2. Letter from professor L.S.Hearnshaw to the writer, 15 Dec.1975.
Coulton, Fourscore Years, Cambridge, 1943,p.270. Coulton took
over as a speech writer for Lord Roberts on the death of another
historian J.A.Crarab.
3. The Case For Compulsory Service.1917,p.3. "Democracy & Compulsory
Service", Hibbert J.. XV,2(Jan.l916), 204. Coulton claimed that
the Swiss short-service officer was less likely to be Jingoistic
than a career professional. In the ranks one received training
in physique and character together with an opportunity to reach
the top - "while the millionaire might vegetate in the ranks,
the artisan might rise to the highest military postst" A Strong
Army In A Free State. 190Q,p.37. Any "illiberal tendencies"
apparent in Germany were "mere local accidents easily separable
from the essential principle of universal service". "A Liberal's
Plea for Compulsory Service", 19th Century. LX(Nov.l906), 721. To
win over socialists. Coulton pointed to Bebel, Vaillant, and
above all Jaurfes (Coulton had his L'Arm^e Nouvelle translated
into English) as Continental advocates of compulsion. One could
distinguish, he claimed, between offensive and defensive war, and
the '^general spirit of a Nation in Arms" was defensive. Nor could
such an army be used as strike-breakers against the wishes of a
large section of the population. The Case For.... pp.258,278.
To win over Liberals, Coulton pointed out that "to-day in the
civilised world, the majority of democrats" treated a voluntary
army "as scarcely more practicable" than voluntary taxation.
The national education and insurance systems showed the way the
(p.t.o.)
165.
Historians were specially involved in the whole controversy over
conscription during the First World War, since arguments from
history were considered as important as the widespread contemp¬
orary use of conscription on the Continent. Hearnshaw and Coulton
both pointed, for example, to the Anglo-Saxon fyrd as the ancestor
of modern national service. The line was then traced carefully
through the Assize of Arms (1181), the national levy of Tudor
times and the militia. "Far from voluntarism being the immemo¬
rial tradition of the English race", Hearnshaw wrote in 1916, "it
is a mushroom innovation established (and that only tentatively
and provisionally) under the eyes of our grandfathers." Later
in the same article he referred to the "degenerate descendants
of the Victorian era who, deluded by the pacifist prophecies of
the Manchester School of politicians, forgot their martial tradi¬
tions , shed their soldierly qualities, and relegated defence to
voluntarists." In short, voluntarism was not a "'heritage* to
be proud of and to cling to", but a "recent humiliation and dis¬
grace, utterly of a race which aspires to be imperial, or lays
claim to leadership among mankind".*
In this the roles of historian and propagandist were
unhappily mixed, for Hearnshaw was very definitely claiming to
use his historical expertise in this and other articles. The other
(3. cont. from previous page)
army had to develop. And (this was the clincher) none less than
John Stuart Mill had given his imprimatur to such a scheme
(ibid.,p.202). But even with this strongly democratic thesis,
Coulton hinted at the possibility of using compulsion as a means
of social indoctrination. Under the existing system "the
ordinary British voter" had "no direct reminder of his civic
duties". British school-boys were "never systematically taught
what the Fatherland" had done for them and what their "recipro¬
cal duties" were in return. "A Liberal's Plea...",724.
1. Hearnshaw, "Compulsory Military Service in England", Quarterly
Rev., CCXXV,447(April,1916),417. Coulton, "Our Conscripts At
Crecy", 19th Century. LXV (Feb.1909), 251-7.
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arguments of the advocates of wartime compulsion did not involve
such role confusion. There was the moral argument - that Britain
had 'hitherto stood on a lower moral plane than the countries of
the Continent". There was, it was argued, "some justification
for the German contempt" of a country which relied "so largely
upon pay and economic forces to provide men for her army".*
A.L.Smith weighed in with a description of the "soul-destroying"
effect of voluntarism on society. Compulsion, he argued, "would
be putting national defence on the sound basis of national duty".
It would guard against the danger,"which was perhaps the chief
cause of decadence of ancient Rome, the dereliction by the
2
individual of his duties of active citizenship". Yet another
historian, J.Kirkpatrick (Emeritus Professor at Edinburgh), hoped
that compulsion "would go far to reduce the huge crowds of
betting, drinking, smoking and swearing crowds of spectators at
races and football and other matches" - and this at a time when
3
better men were at the Front. Behind these moral strictures, the
advocates of compulsion assumed that "the right to call upon subjects
to aid in the defence of the realm" was "inherent in the very con¬
ception of sovereignty". In evidence they were able to cite Mill,
Green, Bradley, Bosanquet and - surprisingly perhaps - Hegel. It was
the function of the State, Hearnshaw claimed, to secure, as far
1. Sonnenschein, Idols Of Peace and War, p.9 and letter to Times,
5 June 1915,p.9d.
2. Christian Attitude....p.13. Smith also floated the idea of
"non-military, industrial service" to counter talk of class
war. But he wanted "honest respect" for the conscientious
objector (pp.8, 14, 18).
War Studies, 1914, pp.26-32.
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as it could, "the good life of its citizens". The "logical and
inevitable corollary" of this was that it was the "duty of every
citizen to support and safeguard the State".3*
The influence of Idealist political philosophy - especially
that of Bosanquet - was obvious in all this. The Cambridge his¬
torian J.Holland Rose, for example, talked of "true liberty" as
primarily "the liberty of the community or nation". "In compari¬
son with that ideal the liberty of the individual is of small
moment", he wrote in a letter to The Nation. If the liberty of
the community was endangered then "every member of it ought to
2
offer his services (his life it need be) to ensure its survival".
The opponents of compulsion appeared "anxious to enjoy all the
advantages of life in a community" while claiming "a right to act
on their own judgement, and to deny the General Will" - at least
this was the impression of the Cambridge economic historian
Archdeacon Cunningham, who, as we shall see in the next chapter,
3
was a strong opponent of conscientious objection. The opponents
of compulsion were not slow to label these assertions giving a
4
licence for unbridled "state absolutism" on the German scale.
But few academics were prepared to write in such uncompromising
terms as John Oman who, despite his firm support of the war, could
only see danger in the talk of compulsion. "With compulsory
1. "Compulsory Military Service...",417. Freedom In Service. 1916,
pp.38-9 (article repr. from the Morning Post)
2. XVIII, 16 (15 Jan.1916),576.
3. The Commonweal. 1917,p.108.
4. See correspondence in The Nation,XVIII,18(29 Jan.1916), 640
(C.D.Burns, Lytton Strachey), 19(5 Feb.1916) ,672-3 (C.H.Herford);
XVII , 21(19 Aug.1915), 633 (A.J.Grant, Professor of History at
Leeds). Also letters of Coultons XVII, 9(29 Jan.1915), 12
(19 June 1915),14(3 July 1915), 17(24 July 1915), 19(7 Aug.1915);
XIX, 11 (10 June,1916), 14(1 July 1916), 17(22 July 1916),
20(12 Aug.1916).
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military service effective control over our foreign affairs,
even the control of our subsequent disapproval, would pass from
our hands", he wrote in 1915. "And, with that loss, our
liberties at home would begin to be in grave peril."1
As soon as it became apparent, late in 1915, that some
kind of conscription would be introduced, it became increasingly
difficult for those who supported the war (including virtually
all the academics) to argue against a measure which seemed to
promise its more effective prosecution. From the conscrip-
tionists there was much talk of cleaning up the "laggards" and
2
"slackers". The only area where influence could be exerted
was over the operation of the tribunals established to hear con¬
scientious objections to military service. Liberal academics
with very different views on the war - Lowes Dickinson and Gilbert
Murray, for example - were equally exasperated by the "extremism"
of the "absolutists" (those objectors who refused even alternative
3
service) and of the authorities who allowed no exemptions at all.
But when it became clear that the Government was allowing the
maltreatment of conscientious objectors, the liberals rallied them¬
selves and signed a protest manifesto published in the magazine of
War & Its Issues,pp.84-5
2. Scott, Economic Problems.... Ser.1,11. Seton-Watson in Nation,
XVII, 25(18 Sept.1915),803j "The one essential is that no one of
either sex or whatever age shall be free to say during the war
that the country does not ask for his or her services, or after
the war that he or she did no work for the war." Three months
earlier the heads of 14 Oxford colleges had written to The Times
calling for an "immediate announcement of forthcoming legislation
to establish national service for the home, the workshop and the
fighting line" to replace "the voluntary go-as-you-please methods"
(2 June 1915, p.7e). Those who did not sign were F.W.Pember (All
Souls), C.B.Heberden (Brasenose), T.B.Strong (Christ Church), T.Case
(Corpus Christi), L.R.Phelps (Oriel),W.A.Spooner (New), W.Lock
(Keble) & Sir John Rhys (Jesus). The letter died a few months later
in December 1915.
3. Nation,XIX,8 (20 May 1916),209-10 (C.H.Herford),22(26 Aug.1916),
664 & 24(9 Sept.1916),729(Dickinson).One of the few defences of
"absolutists" came from V.Gordon Childe(then at Queen*s College,
Oxford); ibid., XIX,25 (16 Sept.1916),760.
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the No-Conscription Fellowship.1 And although there were honour¬
able efforts on behalf of objectors by people like Murray, Fisher
and Keynes - peoplewith entree to government circles - there were
as many voices from within academic circles raised against the
whole conception of conscientious objection itself. A.V.Dicey,
so many of whose thoughts on the question of reprisals against
Germany had contained good sense, supported moves to deprive objec¬
tors of their right to vote in national and municipal elections
- something which, ironically, the Representation of the People
2
Act of 1918 managed to do.
Dicey's claim, that a false "sentiment of political toler¬
ation" protected objectors from suffering the appropriate penal¬
ties for their lack of civic consciousness, hardly squares with
the actual treatment meted out to them. But what seemed to
liberals to be obstinacy on the part of the "absolutists" was
construed in the worst possible way by people with little sympathy
with those who questioned the judgement of the government. "The
State does not and cannot submit the validity of its enactments
to the private judgement of its subjects", Hearnshaw wrote in a
book entitled, significantly, Freedom In Service (1916). The
1. Dickinson, Fisher, A.J.Grant, Herford, W.B.Johnson (King*s
College, Cambridge), J.O.F.Murray (Master of Selwyn College,
Cambridge), G.Unwin, Wallas, J.Ward (Professor of Mental Phil¬
osophy, Cambridge). Tribunal, 30 (12 Oct.1916),3.
2. Dicey, "The Conscientious Objector", 19th Century, LXXXIIX
(Feb.1918)37LAlso he proposed additional taxes for them. The
1918 Act disenfranchised them for 5 years. For the efforts of
Murray, Fisher and Keynes, see J.Rae, Conscience & Politics.
1970, passim; D.Boulton, Objection Overruled, 1967, pp.165-6,
191-2; Keynes, Collected Writings. XVI, 160-1, 177-9; A.S.
Peake (professor of Biblical Criticism at Manchester), Prisoners
of Hope. 1918, passim; Murray's introduction to M.Hobhouse,
"I Appeal Unto Ceasar". 1918. This last was written by Bertrand
Russell, although not even Murray knew this.
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state had to demand "implicit obedience". The individual had to
recognise "that politically he has no separate existence".1
There was, however, an even less agreeable side to this opposit¬
ion to conscientious objection - the stigmatising of pacifists as
2
"degenerates, cosmopolitans and undesirables" , or as a group of
3
theologians put it simply "foreigners". Clearly the record of
academics - as of the rest of British society - on this issue was
a very mixed one. No doubt the increasing pressures of war in
1916 did not help otherwise intelligent men to maintain what we
would now see as a sense of equity.
The conscription issue was an acid test for liberal values,
but not in every case. R.H.Tawney, a young W.E.A.tutor in 1914
had enlisted as a private in the Manchester Regiment on the out¬
break of war. After being invalided back from the Front and
discharged from the Army (after some difficulty with the War office),
Tawney worked with other advisors of Lloyd George on a memorandum
which recommended industrial and/or military conscription up until
the age of sixty. Under the heading "National Obedience" it was
1. pp. 45-6, 95-6. Hearnshaw proceeded on the assumption that
error was "in inverse ratio to the magnitude and complexity
of the respective organisms concerned". Thus mankind was less
likely to be wrong than the nation, the nation than class, class
than the individual. "At the present moment...the conscience
of mankind is rightly asserting itself against the conscience
of Germany; the conscience of the British nation is rightly
asserting itself against the conscience of the 2.L.P.) the
conscience of the organised churches is right asserting itself
against the conscience of the pacifist." Democracy At The Crossways.
1918,pp.375-6. Cf.B.V.Arnold, War-Time Lectures. 1916,p.132
2. Hearnshaw, Democracy At The Crossways,p.274 & Freedom In Service,
p.46.
3. Including J.H.Moulton (Professor of Philology, Manchester) & H.J.
White (Professor of Theology, King's College, London). Westminster
Gazette. 13 Jan.1915,p.2c. For years before the war Moulton had
held strongly to the Quaker position and had been Vice-President
of the Peace Society. His support for the war and compulsion caused
much criticism in the Society after 1914. W.F.Moulton,pp.111-2.
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argued that "obedience to the considered decision of the Govern¬
ment should be rigidly enforced upon all sections of the Community".
The Home Front was to be fully mobilised with no half measures.
And, in a clear reference to industrial unrest and trouble from
the South Wales miners, the memorandum concluded: "It is detest¬
able that the conduct of industry, any more than the manning of a
fire-trench, should be the subject of haggling over the division
of financial spoils wrung from the country in its hour of need.
The soldier at the Front expects from the civilian and from the
Government a sense of obedience to duty and an enforcement of
discipline as severe and as exacting as that to which he is him¬
self accustomed."1
By this time Tawney had moved from his prewar Liberalism
towards the ethical Socialism of his Acquisitive Society (1921).
But there were other Socialists, like Harold Laski, who although
supporting Britain*s entry to the war were opposed to conscript-
2 3
ion; not to mention those, like G.D.H. Cole , who opposed the
war itself. The difference was that Tawney had been a front-
soldier (one of the few survivors of his company). His experience
on the Somme separated him from the liberal intellectuals behind
the lines whose idealism was faltering under the heavy casualty
figures of 1916. As Tawney wrote of them in October 1916:
1. T.Jones, Whitehall Diary. 1969, 1,3-5.
2. Laski,pp.19-21. Holmes-Laski Letters, 1953, 1, 10, 43, 103, 148.
Laski was critical of Russell*s wartime publications in America:
Why Men Fight and Political Ideals.
3. Cole's position was rather ambiguous. See his Labour In wartime.
1915, chptr.I and below p.1£>7- -
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"While you seen - forgive me if I an rude - to have been surren¬
dering your creeds with the nervous facility of a Tudor official,
our foreground may be different, but our background is the same.
1
It is that of August 1914. We are your ghosts." This belief in
2
the "moral quality of war" Tawney never lost, although in the
last two years of the war he came to feel that "the loyalty which
was given to the cause for which the War was undertaken" was
being "transferred to the War itself". The end was "no longer
thought of as the reconciliation of enemies through the victory
of a principle", but merely as "the last trick to be snatched by
the winner of a game of bluff and cunning". Even the idealism
of the front-soldier, "the generosity which would feel that the
nation were contaminated if it snatched material advantages from
the world's misery, the liberal spirit which knows that even
among its enemies there is a better mind", was daily denounced as
3
treason to the war dead.
Much of what Tawney wrote during the war expressed ideas
very similar to those of his old tutor at Balliol A.L.Smith. Both
men welcomed war as a counter to the peacetime ethic of possessive
individualism. For Tawney military training - "the conversion
of a mob into an army" - was like "organising an unorganised body
4
of workers". Where Smith talked of the "corruption" in tlie soul
1. "Some Reflections Of A Soldier",p.23."...to kill in hatred is
murder, and we are not murderers, but executioners." p.27.
2. "The Philosophy Of War", Athenaeum, 4616 (April 1917),169.
Only the adhesion to a set of "moral principles" could justify
war. The Sword Of The Spirit.1917,pp.3-4.
3. Sword Of The Spirit.p.10. "The inertia, the apathy, the weight
of custom and routine, which make it difficult to begin [a war],
make it hardly less difficult to contemplate its being ended,
and in proportion as the soldiers grow more pacific, the civil¬
ians grow more bellicose."
4. Cit. J.M.Winter, Socialism & The Challenge Of War,1974,p.158.
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of modern society, Tawnev pointed to the "cult of power" In
capitalist society.1 And what did Tawney hope would follow the
war? A society which would allow "the free development of the
2
ancient pieties of Europe"{ in short, something very like Smith*s
picture of war as a "moral tonic". No doubt this was an indi¬
cation that Tawney*s views were not too far removed from those of
the Christian Social Union, of which Smith was a member. But
it shows too that the war, for the moment at least, was as
productive of some strands of social thought as it was to be des¬
tructive of others - liberalism in particular. The disillusionment
during the later years of the war (and during the first postwar
decade) of liberal intellectuals like Wallas, Hobhouse and Murray
(who we turn to later), has perhaps obscured the role of other
intellectuals (the great majority) for whom the war was indeed an
"intellectual awakener".
However, intellectual dissent during the war is important
- if only because of Russell*s stature as a critic of the war -
and it is to this, and to a consideration of the differing roles
of three liberal intellectuals, that we now turn.
1. For Tawney*s demonstration of "the not very obscure analogy
between a conception of politics which would trample on all
moral laws in the pursuit of political power, and a conception
of economic life which regards any kind of organisation as
justified by its efficiency, and therefore holds that there are
no moral principles upon which economic conduct need be based",




VIII. THE QUESTION OF A COMPROMISE PEACE.
"Mr.Trumpington (to Mr.Mitford)....In
Cambridge, they have ever bred strange
doctrines; being more obnoxious, as I suppose,
to the winds of learning that blew from over¬
seas; in Oxford, as I conceive, we live more by
the memories of our past."
Ronald Knox, Let Dons Delight
(1939)
The advocacy of compromise peace during the war was not
common amongst British academics, but such that there was became
associated with Cambridge rather than its sister university.
While Oxford University Press produced a long series of patriotic
pamphlets on the war (most written by members of the University),
Cambridge became notorious for the Cambridge Magazine, an unofficial
publication edited by the brilliant and eccentric undergraduate
C.K.Ogden.1 Begun in 1912 the Magazine achieved a circulation
of 25,000 during the war, and a national reputation far beyond
2
that of its sober rival the Cambridge Review. While never a
pacifist magazine (like the No-Conscription Fellowship's Tribunal).
the Cambridge Magazine did open its columns to people like Bertrand
Russell, Lowes Dickinson and Siecfried Sassoon, as well as to
literary figures like Thomas Hardy, John Masefield and Arnold
Bennett. Because of this it came to have a reputation for
1. Later author of Basic English (1930) & joint-author of The
Meaning of Meaning (1923)
2. One attraction was "Notes from the Foreign Press" (including
those of the Central Powers) by Mrs C.R.Buxton.
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"pacifism", although such a charge would have been difficult to
prove. William Ridgeway, Professor of Archaeology at Cambridge,
spent much of his time on this task, complaining that every week
Dickinson and others poured "gentle streams of luke warm water
upon patriotic enthusiasm".* Other academics - many of them
supporters of the war - sprang to the Magazine*s defence, but
Ridgeway*s campaign may well have had something to do with the
2
attack on its offices in Armistice Week.
The unsavoury reputation acquired by the Cambridge Magazine
(among the noisy patriots, at least) was shared by the Union of
Democratic Control, a foreign-policy pressure group with strong
Cambridge connections. The U.D.C. had been established in December
1914 by Radical Liberals (like C.P.Trevelyan), anti-war socialists
(like Ramsay MacDonald) and liberal intellectuals (like H.N.
Brailsford and J.A. Hobson). Lowes Dickinson and Russell - we
shall examine the ideas of these two academic "dissenters" in
greater detail in following chapters - organised the Cambridge
branch which soon became the largest outside London. Again, Trinity
was the college most involved - no fewer than thirteen of its
3
Fellows were members of the U.D.C. The main objective of the
1. Morning Post, 24 Feb.1917, p.6e. Other protests came from
members of the "Fight For Right" movement (E.Underhill & Sir
Francis Younghusband). See also letters from R.H.MacLeod
(lecturer in Indian Law at Cambridge). 1 Mar.1917,p.4 & T.C.
Fitzpatrick (Vice-Chancellor of Cambridge University) 27 Feb.1917,
p.4f. The latter was at pains to deny that the Cambridge Magazine
had no official connection with the University.
3• Cambridge Mag.. VI,15 (3 Mar.1917), 382-3; 17(17 Mar.1917); 18
(24 Mar.1917); 20(19 May 1917),np.Protests came from Dickinson,Wallas,
Murray, E.V.Arnold, J.B.Bury, Quiller Couch, C.H.Herford. For
the Armistice Weekriot see I.A.Richards, "Some Recollections of
C.K.Ogden", Encounter, IX, 3(Sept.1957),10-11.
3. Including G.H.Hardy, G.E.Moore (whose Principia Bthica was later
alleged to have provided the ethical basis for pacifism), A.S.
Eddington (Professor of Astronomy), D.A.Winstanley, E.W.Barnes,
F.G.Hopkins(Reader in Physiology). See Cambridge Mag.,IV,13(13
Feb.1915),260;11(30 Jan.1915),223;V,21(20 May 1916),470-1.Also
G.H.Hardy, Bertrand Russell & Trinity.Cambridge,1970,p.22.
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Union was to oppose "secret diplomacy" and to press for the
"democratic control" of foreign policy, presumably through Par¬
liament. The rest of its programme was based on the assumption -
as the Secretary of the Cambridge branch put it - "then made by
almost everybody, that the war must be won, and...won fairly
quickly".*' The U.D.C. was (in its avowed aims at least) not so
much concerned with prewar British policy, or even with the war
2
itself, but rather with the future peace settlement.
Taken on its own, the proposal on "democratic control"
expressed the kind of sentiment to which all good liberals -
whether they supported the war or not - could subscribe. One
could hardly find a more "respectable" supporter of official
policy than Lord Bryce, yet his presidential address to the British
Academy in 1915 showed concern at the control of foreign policy
3
decisions by so few people. But it was another liberal who
pointed out that "the foremost obstacle" to "democratic control"
L, Hardy, p.11.
2. Other aims were: (i) to hold plebiscites before transferring
territory between states, (ii) to establish an "International
Council" of states, (iii) general disarmament and nationalis¬
ation of the arms industry, (iv) to oppose "economic war"
against Germany after the war.
3. "How few are the persons in every state in whose hands lie
issues of war and peace. In some of the now belligerent countries
the final and vital decisions were taken by four or five persons
only, in others by six and seven only. Even in Britain decisions
rested practically with less than twenty-five, for though some
persons outside the Cabinet took a part, not all within the Cabinet
are reckoned as effective factors. It is probable of course
that popular sentiment has to be considered, even in states
more or less despotically governed. Against a strong and def¬
inite sentiment of the masses the ruling few would not act.
But the masses are virtually led by a few and their common
opinion is formed, particularly at a crisis, by the authority
(p.t.o.)
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was not so much "the existence of an aristocratic caste or its
alleged aversion to intruders from another class, as the boundless
and dispiriting indifference of the masses" to problems of foreign
policy.1 If there were no "keen and well-informed public opinion",
A.F.Pollard wrote at about the same time, "democratic control"
would simply be "a proposition that expert knowledge should be
2
controlled by general ignorance". But men like Pollard and Seton-
Watson did tend to believe that the existing foreign policy elite
was, if not a sinister class interest, not particularly efficient
3
or well-informed.
Conservative historians, like F.J.C.Hearnshaw, were more
sceptical about the possibilities of creating well-informed public
opinion. When Hearnshaw considered "how unreasonable and belli¬
cose uninformed public opinion" tended to become "at times of
excitement", he could only feel "thankful" that hitherto foreign
policy had been the preserve of an elite. And touching on some¬
thing often ignored by the theorists of the U.D.C., he noted:
"If it is a fact that from time to time unwilling and pacific
peoples have been dragged or driven into war by bellicose govern¬
ments, it is equally a fact that at other times cautious and
reluctant governments (both autocratic and bureaucratic) have been
(3. cont. from previous page)
and the appeals of those few whom they have been accustomed to
to trust and obey. And, after all, the vital decision at the
vital moment remains with the few. If they had decided otherwise
than they did, the thing would not have happened. Something
like it might have happened later, but the war would not have
come then and so." PBA, 1915-16, pp.9-10 (see also p.24).
1. R.W.Seton-Watson, What Is At Stake. Oxford,1915,pp.4-5.
2. "History & Science" (April 1916) repr.Commonwealth At War.p.122
Cf. A.L.Smith to E.D.Morel, 5 Sept. 1914, Smith Mss.
3. H.Hanak, Great Britain & Austria-Hungary During The First
World War. 1962,p.178
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forced into war by bellicose public opinion, or have with difficulty
held back a populace less pacific than themselves."1 But although
this difference of opinion was a basic one, what Kearnshaw objected
to most was the assumption that all governments were, to some
extent, responsible for the outbreak of the war. "The war was not
due to the 'European Anarchy', but to Austro-German design",
Hearnshaw wrote in a reference to Lowes Dickinson. All states were
2
not "equally guilty", for two stood "convicted as criminals". one
Cambridge critic of the U.D.C. pointed out that once one accepted
"that war was inevitable", then there was "nothing left to justify
mistrust" of British diplomacy.3 But the confusion between the
inevitability of war due to an anarchic international order, and
belief that "secret diplomacy" was in some way responsible for war,
does not seem to have unduly troubled the U.D.C.
More serious was the fact that the U.D.C., although pro¬
fessing to avoid controversy on the origins of the war, was coming
increasingly to be seen as an advocate of compromise peace.
According to the secretary of the Cambridge branch, this character¬
isation was "to a considerable extent justified".* The fact that
it was the unstated assumption which underlay much of U.D.C. writ¬
ing on the war only served to lend credence to talk of "machinations
of secret traitors" and a "sinister" combination of "secret
5
diplomatists". What so enraged people like Hearnshaw, Heitland
1. Main Currents....pp.6.352-3.
2. Democracy At The Crossways.p.470.
3. W.E.Heitland, If We Win. Cambridge,1915,p.13.
4. Hardy,p.13.
5. W.E.Heitland, "Democratic". Cambridge,1915,p.39. Hearnshaw,
Democracy At The Crossways.p.479 & "Democratic Control".National
Rev. .LXVI.6 (Feb. 1916&8C,
J
17 9.
and G.G.Coulton, whose Main Illusions of Pacificism (1915) exposed
the "Angellite" basis of the U.D.C.,1 was that this body cast
doubt on the official British version of the outbreak of the war
without giving any evidence for this scepticism. Unless there was
an attempt to produce evidence, Heitland claimed, any attempt to
blame Grey for "causing unnecessary bloodshed" was little short
2
of treasonable. This from a Fellow of St.John*s College,
Cambridge, was an indication of the considerable feeling against
the U.D.C. among some of the dons. Matters had not been helped
by the fact that the first public meeting of the Cambridge branch
had been addressed by E.D.Morel, one of the most extreme opponents
3
of government policy. Later in the war Morel was equalled in
his reputation as an uncompromising critic of government policy
by Bertrand Russell, at that time Lecturer in Logic and the
Principles of Mathematics at Trinity College, Cambridge.
For what seemed to be the main body of British academics
- at least those who expressed themselves publicly - there was
acceptance of the war as "an end in itself". The intellectual
brilliance of Russell and the tortured doubts of Dickinson (surely
the most prolific of the liberal "dissenters") should not obscure
the fact that for most academics (as for the public at large) the
danger was not that the war would be pursued too vigorously, but
rather the opposite. The address by the Professor of History at
1. Cambridge,1915. Characteristically, Coulton did not pull his
punches when dealing with Angell, who he accused of emigrating
"to make money and popularity by lecturing in America, as an
American against the country of his birth" (p.82).




Bedford College, London, in May 1915 was typical of many such
arguments against the U.D.C. suggestions that a compromise peace
should be considered. "The common will to peace", J.W. Allen
claimed, was "really a negative thing", "a mere revolt or a
shrinking from the consequences of war". A nation "which refused
war merely by reason of its natural fear and shrinking would be
hopelessly decadent and doomed to disappear". Aside from the
moral justifications for "rentless war" against Germany - for had
not she "made war upon the soul of man" - there were the realities
of war itself. "There is only one thing of real importance, and
it is to get Germany helpless. When we have done that we can be
as generous as we please." The advocates of compromise peace
implied, if they did not say openly, that so far as the war was "not
quite immediately defensive" it had "no rational purpose at all".
A peace based on agreement for "the automatic avoidance of war in
the future" was no substitute for one based on military victory.1
This in fact was the core of the objection by the patriotic
dons to the criticism of the Union of Democratic Control of
official policy, and it explains the sense of outrage felt by many
academics at Bertrand Russell's espousal of "pacifist" sentiments.
To say that war was irrational was to sound patronising to the
fervently patriotic. To talk of compromise peace was to ignore
2
the desire for revenge. To talk of compromise peace was also
1. Allen, Danger Of Peace.pp.8-9.17.30.33. Cf.letters to The Times
of Oliver Lodge (3 Feb.1915,p.9e) and Professor E.C.Clark
(13 Feb.1915,p.9d).
2. This was illustrated by A.F.Pollard's article on "The Temptation
of Peace" where he claimed that the U.D.C. talked "of peace and
reconciliation without a thought of atonement". In the name of
"ethics" they denounced "all justice as revenge" & in that of
"progress" pleaded for the status quo ante beHum. How could
these people "make peace with Miss Cavell's murderers, with the
slave-drivers of Belgium, and with the perpetrators and accom¬
plices of the Armenian massacres"? "A nation's capacity for
sacrifice in moral causes", not readiness to make peace, was "the
test of its morality". Repr. in Commonwealth At War. pp.181,
185-6.
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to ignore the lessons of history - or so it seemed to historians
like A.V.Dicey and J.Holland Rose. The example of the war with
Napoleon seemed especially potent, as the title of one of Rose's
articles "1815 and 1915" suggests.1 For the next two years there
was a sustained campaign in the press by academics to quash any
2
talk of peace without victory. The weight of academic exper¬
tise and influence was clearly marshalled against the U.D.C. and
its fellow-travellers.
But during 1916 even some hitherto staunch supporters of
the war-effort began to waver. Typical of the growing apprehen¬
sion as to the consequences of indefinite continuance of the war was
a series of War-Time Lectures (1916) published by B.V.Arhold,
Professor of Latin at University College, Bangor. Arnold predicted
that if the war went on much longer there was a definite danger of
revolution at home and abroad (especially in the Austro-Hungarian
Empire) and the establishment of revolutionary left-wing regimes.
The defeat of the Central Powers, he wrote, would mean that "the
wild ideals and hideous cruelties of the French Revolution would
be re-enacted: and the whole proud structure of German civilization
would crumble into nothing". The Dual Monarchy would be split into
a "do*an petty kingdoms...engaged upon mutual wars upon the model
1. Contemporary Rev., CVII,I(Jan.1915), 12-18. See also his "'Peace
Without Victory' What Is The Verdict Of History?", New Europe.
II, 13(15 Feb.1917), 129-36 and "The Folly Of Early Offers Of
Peace", Fortnightly Rev.. NS.XCVII, 580(April 1915), 693-704.
Also Dicey, "Wordsworth & the War", 19th Century, LXXVII (May
1915), 1041-60.
2. Eg. letters to The Times from H.J.Haverfiald (Professor of
Ancient History, Cambridge) 17 Aug.1917,p.5e; J.P.Mahaffy (Provost
of Trinity College, Dublin) 21 Aug.1917, p.4c. Also Hearnshaw,
Main Currents.... p.342 & A.F.Pollard, "Is It Peace?" (Jan.1917)
repr. in Commonwealth At War.p.193.
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of the Balkan states".1 Events would show a certain degree of
truth in this prediction, and it is difficult just to write Arnold
2
off as merely a conservative Germanophile. In November 1916
he wrote in A.R.Orage*s New Age that Britain would have to face
the facts about "Pan-Germanism and "Central Europe"", for they
could not be altered. It "would be a crime to destroy" ""Berlin
to Baghdad*". "Why indeed, should we oppose ourselves to "Central
Europe*7" Arnold asked. "It is, to say the least, a half-way
3
stage to "All Europe*." This was very different from the map
of Europe envisaged by British historians.
In November 1916 - a year before the publication of the
Lansdowne Letter - it was not easy to call publicly for a negot¬
iated peace, even if it were argued that this would best serve
the interests of France and Belgium. Arnold had to phrase his
suggestion carefully - "even the bravest of peoples" might "in
the end be forced to yield to necessity". But in a remarkable
passage, Arnold dared to ask his readers: "If Germany were to
conquer England, and admit Englishmen to its citizenship, should
4
we individually suffer?" This was worthy of Bertrand Russell
1. p.76. Britain would become "the helpless appendage of a European
combination of States." "Germany"s Peace Offer", New Age.XX,
4(23 Nov.1916),80-1.
2. Although he was this also. Arnold felt that English ridicule of
Kultur was "misplaced". It was in fact "the maintenance of law
and the upraising of industry". "To cross the border from German-
Austria to the East" was "to pass to the conditions of the Middle
Ages when neither life nor property had any security". War-Time
Lectures,p.76.
3. "Reckless Propaganda", New Age,XX,5(30 Nov.Igl6),103-4.
4. War-Time Lectures. 86, 75. A German occupation, Arnold claimed,
would "preserve the English social system as it now exists from
the violent catastrophies which now threaten it. As such we might
expect it to be welcomed by the upper and middle classes, but
viewvd with suspicion by the well-to-do and powerful working men's
unions. The course of events has shown that even in England
material interests count for nothing with any class as against a
strongly roused national sentiment."
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at his most provocative, and the fact that Arnold seems to have
escaped public abuse merely demonstrates that "Lansdownism" was
making talk of a compromise peace more respectable than it had
been a year earlier. Arnold had the grace to admit the similarity
of his ideas with those of the U.D.C.1, but this can have been of
little comfort to the radicals and liberals who had been (and were
being) hounded for "pacifism". Arnold's dire predictions of
revolution in Britain were again aired in a series of anonymous
2
articles in The Times in September 1917, and in a memorandum on
"Labour In Revolt" circulated among members of the War Cabinet
3
by Lord Milner.
While labour unrest continued to concern conservative
1. Ibid.,p.137. Like theU.D.C., Arnold feared that a rejection
of peace-feelers from Bethman-Hollweg would only strengthen
the military part in Germany, already flushed with success on
the battle-front. "Germany's Peace Offer", 80-1.
2. 25-28 Sept. 1917. The last article opened with the claim that
there was a "revolutionary movement" which had "long passed the
stage of mere talk" & Whtich had "realised itself in formidable
action". "There has been no attack on the throne, no rioting
in the streets, no destruction of visible property} but changes
have already been brought about which are thwarting the efforts
of the Government to conduct the war with efficiency, and if
these changes go further they will bring the country into confu¬
sion." (p. 9b) .
3. War Cabinet Minutes, CAB. 24/24. Arnold compared the "working
class movement" with Pan-Germanism & Sinn Fein in the "passionate,
revolutionary fervour" of its supporters. It was distinct from
"middle-class" pacifism & "Lower-class" revolutionary activity
in London's East End, being centred amongst "well-paid artisans"
in Clydeside, the Midlands, South Wales miners & dockers in general.
Leadership was young and alienated from trade union bureaucracy,
and much influenced by the Russian Revolution. The movement had
"humbled Government" and could impoverish the country with its
demands, undermining "confidence in lawful authority" and causing
large-scale industrial violence. And he concluded: "The crushing
of such a movement is one of the ordinary tasks of Government, and
almost any method within reason, will crush it if carried out with
decision and courage. But I do not myself believe that it can be
done without serious conflict." (pp.160-163). Beatrice Webb's
version (from Tom Jones) was rather inaccurate. See her diary,
5 Oct.1917,pp.96-7. For contrasting academic views of industrial
unrest, see W.A.Spooner, "Two Permanent Causes of Industrial
Unrest", Church Quly.Rev.. LXXXV,3(Oct.l917), 121-34 (sympathetic)
and letters of N.wedd to F.P.Bulmer, 27 June 1915 & 19 Jan.1916
(favouring industrial compulsion without limits).
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academics1 like Hearnshaw and Arnold in 1918, the last year of the
war saw yet another U.D.C. objective attain political respecta¬
bility. From early in 1915 the Union had envisaged the establish¬
ment of an "International Council" as an essential part of any
postwar settlement. At about the same time the "Bryce Group"
first met for private discussions to work out the details of a
postwar league. Prominent in this group, besides Bryce, were
Dickinson, Wallas and J.A.Hobson. Public debate, however, was
still "hampered by the prevailing belief that the league movement
was a stop-the-war movement, and that such action would be to the
2
advantage of Britain's enemies". There were also other more
basic conservative objections to the league idea. The idea that
it was possible to set up machinery for the settlement of inter¬
national disputes aroused scepticism, as well as hostility. This
can be seen in a lecture by J.W.Allen in May 1915:
"I do not believe that any judicial or concilia¬
tion machinery could ever prevent war, car even
really affect the probability of war. The most it
would ever do would be to postpone a war: and it is
doubtful whether postponement of war is ever a gain
....War is the logical, that is, the necessary, issue
of a certain psychological situation. So far as
that situation is created by governments, they are
responsible for the war: but certainly it is never
created by any single group of men....Hardly ever,
if at all, is the technical and diplomatic question
upon which, formally, war is commenced, expressive
of the cause of war, except very indirectly and ^
incompletely. Often it is a mere pretext for war.""
1. Eg. Hearnshaw, Democracy At The Crossways, pp.l90ff.
2. Bryce to T.Marburg, 7 Dec.1916 cit. R.J.Bartlett, The League
To Enforce Peace. Chapel Hill, N.Carolina, 1944, p.66.
Ironically in Germany "the league was generally regarded...
as pro-ally".
3. Danger of Peace, pp.27-9. Cf. W.H.D.Rouse cit. C.E.M.Joad,
Under the Fifth Rib. 1932, p.75.
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Allen was not only criticising the personalised explan¬
ation for war so favoured by the U.D.C. - the machinations of
diplomatists and politiciams - but was also repeating many of the
objections to liberal internationalism expressed earlier by
Idealist philosophers like P.H.Bradley and D.G.Ritchie. And, in
view of the postwar disillusionment of liberal intellectuals,
there was an element of realism in the conservative position. As
one Cambridge don wrote in a pamphlet criticising the U.D.C.:
"I do not believe that any League, however
solemn, will suddenly change the nature of mankind,
and (if I may so express it) humanise human societies
once and for all. A higher morality is more likely
to invent better machinery than a better machinery
to create a higher morality. This does not imply
that better machinery will not be helpful. The
danger is that machinery devised in a moment of
enthusiasm and responding to the aspirations of
war-worn peoples may appear less satisfactory when
enthusiasm has been cooled by time."
Clearly, this left the door open for some kind of conser¬
vative interpretation of league proposals, and in the last two
years of the war - especially after the entry of America into the
2
conflict - the league movement took on new life. The "Bryce
Group" published its proposals and the League of Nations Society
(established in May 1915) took on the task of educating public
opinion. However, it was the League of Free Nations Association
which represented such conservative support that existed.
1. W.E.Heitland, "Democratic'.' p.24. Heitland was also sceptical
of that other liberal ideal - national self-determination. In
the Balkans explanations of "the moral beauty and political
advantage of (say) 4,000 minority of one race peaceably yield¬
ing to 4,500 majority" of another was, to say the least, an
unpromising task. Heitland, If We Win, p.2.
2. The Lansdowne Letter of course had argued for a postwar league
to settle international disputes, as well as for a statement
of limited war aims, as a means of strengthening the peace
party in Germany.
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Significantly, it was founded three years after the League of
Nations Society, and consisted mainly of "more *reputable*
people, known most of them...to have been ardentsupporters of the
war, and good haters of Germany".* Not surprisingly its vision
of a postwar league differed greatly from that of the Society,
which it tended to regard as "a fad of liberal and religious
o
idealists". The Society envisaged a league consisting of "any
civilized State desiring to join", but tended to be rather vague
on the question of enforcing league decisions. The Association,
by contrast, clearly hoped that the existing wartime alliance
against the Central Powers would continue as the basis of a strong
3
postwar league wielding armed power. As one of its members put
it, the Allies were "already engaged on the purposes of a league
of peace". Germany and its allies would be excluded until they
renounced their "barbaric ambition". And he continued: "Germany's
weapon must be broken in its hands. Germany,...must lose its trust
in military force and seek greatness in soma other way. It must
learn to despise military ambition. It must recognise the politi-
4
cal crudeness of the spirit and will to dominate."
1. Dickinson, The Autobiography of G.Lowes Dickinson, 1973,p.191.
The Council of the LFNA included W.G.S.Adams, E.Barker, R.M.
Burrows (Principal of King*s College, London) J.R.Carpenter, W.G.
Geldart (Professor of English Law, Oxford), L.P.Jacks, Sir Henry
Jones, G.Murray, C.W.C.Oman, Sir William Osier (Professor of
Medicine, Oxford), Sir Frederick Pollock, Sir H.R.Reichel
(Principal of University College, Bangor), W.Sanday, E.de Selin-
court (Professor of English, Birmingham), Sir Paul Vinogradoff.
The views of a good number of these warrant Dickinson's description.
2. G.Murray, cit.H.R.Winkler. The League Of Nations Movement In Great
Britain 1914-1918.N.Brunswick. N.Jersey, 1952,p.70.
3. Ibid.,pp.50-4. Also the contributions of G.Murray & G.L.Dickinson
to "A League Of Nations Now? A Symposium", War & Peace. 59 (Aug.
1918), 305 &60 (Sept.1918), 327-8 (publ. as a supplement to The
Nation).
4. Sir H.Jones, Form The League Of Peace Now. 1918,pp.3-4. But cf.
the views of another member: E.Barker in Times, 28 June 1918,
p.5c.
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The seal of political respectability for the league idea
was finally given when members (and former members) of the govern¬
ment began publicly to advocate it. In January 1917 Lloyd George
had set up the Phillimore Committee (which included among its
members the historians A.F.Pollard and J.Holland Rose). In May
General Smuts and Lord Hugh Cecil joined Bryce and the Archbishop
of Canterbury in addressing a public meeting at the Central Hall,
Westminster. In March 1918 the Philliraore Committee presented
a detailed league scheme to the Cabinet, and in October the League
of Free Nations Association and the League of Nations Society
decided to amalgamate - the latter body giving up virtually all
its "idealistic" programme in the process.1 The middle-of-the-
road approach of the new League of Nations Union was reflected in
the keynote address given by Viscount (formerly Sir Edward) Grey,
who had emerged from two years retirement from politics to take
2
up the league crusade as President of the Union. Undoubtedly,
this crusade helped to revive the flagging ardour of liberal
1. Winkler, pp.76-7. Pollard wrote one of the most informed pamph¬
lets, on the evolution of the league idea in history. In this he
criticised the schemes (presumably those of Dickinson and other
idealists") which stressed justice rather than security, tribunals
rather than treaties, and which tended to ignore the strength of
national sentiment (as an obstacle to international organisation
as well as to arbitration of disputes). His conclusion that
"elaborate schemes on paper" were "less satisfactory" than methods
which were slower to develop but more realistic, was echoed by
historians and international lawyers. See Pollard, The Leagueof
Nations An Historical Argument. Oxford,1918,pp.29-63. Also:
B.Barker, A Confederation of Nations, Oxford, 1918; R.Muir,
Nationalism & Internationalism. 1916; F.Pollock, The League Of
Nations. 1919; L.Oppenheim, The League Of Nations.1919; T.J.
Lawrence, Lectures On The League of Nations.1919; W.T.S.Stallybrass,
A.Society Of States.1918.
2. Although a league should not be used as a weapon against Germany,
Germany should only be admitted after she had shown a clear desire
to adopt democratic instititions. There was a clear implication
that economic blockade could be used to achieve this. It was
largely due to Grey that the two groups came together. See
Dickineon-Woolf letters, woolf.Mss
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academics, like Gilbert Murray, who had become mildly infected
with "Lansdownism".* Those who had striven for future inter¬
national cooperation from the first months of the war, like
Lowes Dickinson and J.A.Hobson, were understandably bitter. And
it is to Gilbert Murray that we now turn in order to examine the
pressures which drove a liberal academic first into enthusiastic
support for the war and then into equally enthusiastic support
for what originally had been an idea of the anti-tfar intellectuals
- the League of Nations.
1. Murray, together with liberal critics of official policy
(eg. G.P.Gooch) signed a manifesto presented by Lord Loreburn
to Lansdowne to thank him for his initiative.
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IX. GILBERT MURRAY
"However badly we may have been or are yet
likely to be demoralized by this war, that is a
lesser evil than if all Burope were conquered by
Germany. And even to be conquered by Germany
now, after all we have suffered, would be a
lesser evil than to have submitted to her without
a struggle." - Gilbert Murray, "The Turmoil of
War (1917).
"It is quite probable that the effects would
have been less disastrous if we had stayed out
and allowed Germany to become the complete master
of western Europe, on more or less equal terms
with U.S.A. and Russia." - Gilbert Murray to
Bertrand Russell, 20 August,1955.
Shortly before his death in 1957 Gilbert Murray said, in
a broadcast talk, "there has never been a day...when I have failed
to give thought to the work for peace and for Hellenism. The
one is a matter of life and death for all of us; the other of
maintaining, amid all the dust of modern and industrial life,
our love and appreciation for the eternal values."1 Murray
always maintained that the life of scholarship and the path of
political commitment were inseparable. Although he did not have
2
a political career like James Bryce, Murray was also a member
of the intellectual elite (a generation after Bryce) which believed
that privilege conferred certain duties. As one of his colleagues
noted: "He set his course by a tradition which was both Victorian
and classical; to him it was unquestionable that, in peace as in
1. 5 Jan.1956 cit. A.Toynbee, "The Unity of Gilbert Murray*s Life
& Work", in Murray, An Unfinished Autobiography. 1960,p.212.
2. He was asked several times to stand for parliament. Ibid..
p.108.
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war, the public call must be obeyed first, and that research,
however laborious or entrancing, was a privilege of unclaimed
leisure. He could not split his personality as to teach Greek
without being a political animal."* Another member of this
"intellectual aristocracy" who married Murray*s daughter described
2
his politics as those "aristocratic liberalism". And, under¬
pinning the belief in the social obligations of the rich and
powerful, was the legacy of Murray*s classical studies - "an
unshakeable trust in reason" and a belief that "extremism or
3
fanaticism, even in a good cause" was "a bad thing".
4
At school in England Murray read Mill and Spencer, and
at Oxford, with L.T.Hobhouse and others, he started the Oxford
5
Home Rule League in 1885. When he came back to Oxford as Regius
Professor of Greek in 1908 he was not only a leading classical
scholar but also a politically active Liberal intellectual with
radical pretensions. In 1912, for example, he presided over
meetings organised by Oxford Fabians in support of striking
municipal transport workers. As an undergraduate at Oxford he
had joined the Volunteer Corps, but during the Boer War he wrote
1. I.Henderson, "The Teacher of Greek", ibid.,pp.146-7.
2. A.Toyribee, ibid.. p.215
3. J.A.K.Thomson, "Foreword" to Murray, Myths & Ethics.1944.pp.
viii-ix.
4. Murray had been born in Sydney & spent his first 11 years there.
5. Murray was also close to Arthur Sidgwick (brother of Henry),
Fellow of Corpus Christ! College and like Murray a Greek scholar
and Liberal. Corpus had a reputation for political liberalism,
with Fellows like Sidgwick, F.C.S.Schiller and (for short periods)
G.Wallas and L.T.Hobhouse. L.R.Phelps (Oriel) was another of
the few "Home Rulers" among the dons.
6. Ashley & Saunders, p.20.
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a scathing criticism of "National Ideals"1 and joined F.W.Hirst and
2
J.L.Hammond in writing essays for Liberalism and Empire (1900).
When the Liberal Government came to power Murray continued to
criticise British foreign policy, as someone who stood on the left
of the Liberal Party. In the preface to his wartime defence of
Grey's foreign policy Murray described his position - before his
change of heart in 1914 - as follows:
"I have been unhappy about Morocco and Persia;
profoundly unhappy about our strained relations with
Germany; sympathetic in general towards the Radical
and Socialist line on foreign policy; and always
anxious to have the smallest Navy vote that a
reasonable Government would permit.
I have never till this year [1914] seriously
believed in the unalterable aggressive designs of
Germany. I knew our own Jingoes, and recognized
the existence of German Jingoes; but I believed
that there, as here, the government was in the hands
of the more wise and sober part of the nation. X
have derided all scares and loathed (as I still
loathe) all scare mongers and breeders of hatred.
I have believed (as I still believe) that many
persons now in newspaper offices might be more
profitably housed in lunatic asylums. And I also
felt, with some more impatience, that though as an
outsider, I could not tell exactly what the Government
ought to do, they surely could produce good relations
between Great Britain and Germany if only they had
the determination and the will." 3
But now Murray admitted that "on a large part of this
question" he had been wrong. Addressing a meeting at the Essex
Hall, London, in 1916 Murray asked: "Have I any doubt in any
1. "National Ideals: Conscious & Unconscious", IJB (0ct.l900)
repr. in Essays & Addresses. 1921. Murray's first sentence
reads: "If I had one remark and one only to make about National
Ideals, it would be this: that the conscious and professed ideals
are as straws in the wind; the unconscious or concealed ideals
are the real forces that govern mankind." (p.160) Cf.his second
thoughts on this in 1921, ibid.,p.8.
2. Murray's essay was on "The Exploitation of Inferior Races in
&ncient & Modern Times".
3. Foreign Policy....pp.9-10.
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corner of my mind that the war was right? I have none. We
took the path of duty and the only path we could take." Yet,
only fifteen years previously - as Murray also admitted - in
this very hall he had spoken against British policy in South Africa.
"I little imagined then that I should live to speak in favour of
the policy of a much greater and more disastrous war", he conclu¬
ded rather sadly.1 What had caused him to change in 1914?
Undoubtedly it was the German invasion of Belgium, which, as we
have seen, operated so powerfully on the consciences of liberal
intellectuals like L.T.Hobhouse, L.J.Hammond and Graham Wallas.
With them Murray had signed neutrality manifestos, but between
the time of his signing (26 or 27 July) and its publication (3
August) he was converted to support for the war by the published
documents. "They all told fundamentally the same story", he
wrote in his defence of Grey. "The statesman whom I had sus¬
pected as over imperialist was doing everything humanly possible
to preserve peace; the Bower whose good faith I had always
championed was in part playing a game of the most unscrupulous
2
bluff, in part meant murder from the beginning."
But even more than the documents - important as they were
- it was the figure of the Foreign Secretary which was crucial in
sustaining the return to the fold of most liberal intellectuals.
Forty years later Murray recalled "that calm and irresistible
speech of Grey's to Parliament on the third of August", "a speech
1. Ibid., p.10. "Ethical problems of the War", in J.E.Carpenter
(ed*)» Sthical & Religious Problems..,, pp.7-8, 2.
2. Foreign Policy.... pp.10-11. others found the documents
quite unconvincing. Eg. see Maclver, As A Tale That Is Told,
p.75.
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which he had not had time to prepare, but which yet seemed
perfectly clear in its narrative and consistent in its reasoning".1
To the Morels, Russells and Conybeares, Grey was either a knave
or a fool. To Murray he became the perfect embodiment of the
English gentleman. All the cynical brilliance of Metternich,
Talleyrand or Bismarck seemed "so utterly opposite to the charac¬
teristics of this quiet, able, unpretending Englishman of country
tastes, simple in word and thought, a little tongue-tied and shy,
leaxned in birds and good at fishing, and kindling quickly to warm
2
sympathy in all questions of labour". This was why Murray could
not understand the special venom reserved for Grey - no one
seemed further removed from the world of "secret diplomacy". This
"queer delusion", Murray felt, was a reaction to the bipartisan
approach to British foreign policy during the July crisis. The
"peril [was] so awful that wise men were mostly willing to measure
their words and avoid the possibility of fanning any dangerous
3
smoke into flame". This then was the background against which
Grey*s policy had to be judged:
"If here and there on some point of detail he has
not driven as clever a bargain as he might; if he has
not stood up to our friends Russia and France as
defiantly as some of his less responsible critics would
have done; and if, here and there, he has not pressed
fearlessly forward in support of some weak nation to
which British liberal sympathies went naturally forth;
if under his guidance, with all our enormous naval
1. The League of Nations Movement,1955,p.3.
2. Foreign Policy....p.123. "He seems so unlike a diplomat. The
traditional qualities of the diplomat, the polished surface,
the social brilliance, the narrow ruthless outlook, the skill
in moving gracefully among traps and mines, the smiling false¬
hoods and coups of unscrupulous cleverness..."
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expenditure and prestige, Great Britain has
sometimes seemed to have little spare strength
for the running of avoidable risks or the champion¬
ing of disinterested causes; let those who criticise
him who can still say he over-rated our danger. The
rest of us will only be grateful for ever to one who
through all these years of crisis acted justly and
sought no aggrandizement, who kept faith with his
friends and worked for a good understanding with his
enemies, who never ^>oke a rash word to bring the
peril nearer, and never neglected a precaution to meet
it when it should come."*
Murray had fewer reservations about changing his mind on
the eight years of Grey*s tenure of the Foreign Office than many
of his friends. He did not, for example, agree with "a Radical
friend"who claimed that, although "•for the last twelve days1"
Grey had been "•working for peace1", British policy generally
2
before 1914 had "'been making peace impossible'". Murray now
swallowed the Dual and Triple Ententes, Morocco and Persia. Even
over Persia, where Radical criticism of Grey had been so strong,
Murray concluded that, if he did not "feel any enthusiasm" for
Britain*s record in Persia, still it was difficult to see how it
3
could have been much better. His attitude to unrepentant
critics of Grey, like H.N.Brailsford and Bertrand Russell, was
that such writers were "in their way high-minded, disinterested,
courageous, and often very clever" but, for all that, "impassioned
4
advocates, not fair-minded inquirers". To these two critics
1. Ibid.,p.127.
2. Ibid.,p.11
3. Ibid..p.04. "After all it is not always the fault of the doctor
if the patient dies." His conclusion about Morocco was much
the same and he noted of the non-white world (& Ireland) that,
while there were "a few rusty spots on our large shield", one
could not "have free institutions everywhere". The Way Forward.
1917,p.22.
4. Foreign Policy..., p.9. He damned Dickinson in the same way by
pointing out that "neutrality of opinion" was not the same as
"sincere and honest impartiality". "Conclusions Without
Premises", Nation. XVIII, 13 (24 Dec.1915), 480, 482.
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Murray was bound by ties of friendship and marriage,1 and
relations between Murray and Russell though on the surface
friendly (despite different views) were seriously strained. While
professing not to charge Russell with being "'the friend csf every
country but his own'", Murray came pretty close to implying just
2
this. Russell for his part claimed that Murray*s "charmingly
idyllic" account of Grey's foreign policy was written "under the
3
tutelage" of the Foreign Office. And, while claiming that their
4
friendship still lived "in the eternal world" Russell wrote
elsewhere of Murray as "a snivelling sentimental ass", "as
squashy as a slug".^
Although Russell's comments tell us something of the bitter¬
ness brought by wartime divisions, one must admit that some of
Murray's writing warranted the description.G But the strongest
impression one gets from reading his wartime articles and pamphlets
is of a liberal conscience grappling with the problem of the evil
of war - for Murray was under no illusion about that t
"I have all my life been an advocate of Peace.
I hate war, not merely for its own cruelty and folly,
1. Brailsford & his wife were former pupils of Murray when he was
Professor of Classics at Glasgow (1889-99). Murray had married
Russell's cousin Lady Mary Howard.
2. See Foreign Policy.... pp.5-8. Murray had been called just this
in his time. During the Boer War he had written that those who
were called this were "at least friends of almost all humanity
and in practice...often the best friends of their own country".
"National Ideals,p.181.
3. Policy of the Entente.pp.2, 145.
4. Letter to Murray 28 Dec.1915, cit. Autobiography, II, 49-50.
5. Letter to L.Donnelly, 14 Dec.1914, cit. Clark, p.248.
6. Eg. "When I realize most fully the burden we are bearing, the
ordeal of the fire through which we are resolved to pass, I am
not only proud of my country, I thank God that, if this awful
event was to fall upon humanity - this awful evil to avert
another yet more awful - that our country was called upon to
stand in the very van of the battle and of suffering, and that
we have not flinched from our task". "America & England" (Nov.
1916) repr. in Faith. War & Policy, 1918, p.181.
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but because it is the enemy of all the causes that
I care for most, of social progress and good govern¬
ment and all friendliness and gentleness of life,
as well as of art and learning and literature. I
have spoken and presided at more meetings than I can
remember for peace and arbitration and the promotion
of international friendship. I opposed the policy
of war in South Africa with all my energies, and
have been either outspokenly hostile or inwardly un¬
sympathetic towards almost every war that Great
Britain has waged in my lifetime."1
Murray could thus "sympathize with every step" of the
pacifist argument but baulk at acceptance of what seemed evil.
For it was a "cardinal fact that in some causes" it was "better
to fight and be broken than to yield peacefully". The "mere act
2
of resisting to death" could be "in itself a victory".
However, Murray did not confine himself to the firmer
3
ground of philosophical objection to non-resistance. He was soon
on the slippery slope which leads from "national honour" to talk
of the "nobleness" of war. At the time of the Boer War he had
written of patriotism as the practice of "always admiring what¬
ever you yourself happen to do", and national "self-interest" as
4
the basis of international politics. Now Murray professed to
see "national honour" and "dishonour" as indeed "real things".
No doubt a "deal of nonsense" was talked about them, but they were
real all the same. Their "characteristic" was that they could
not be bargained. Honour was "simply that which a free man values
1. "How Can War Ever Be Right7" repr. ibid.. p.20 (This had
originally appeared as an Oxford pamphlet on the war) Murray
had also newly translated Euripides* anti-war play Trojan
Women. a project into which he put his most intense feelings.
2. Loc,cit.
3. See below p. 2,4-5",,
4. "National Ideals...", p.103
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more than life and dishonour as that which he avoids more than
suffering and death", Murray wrote in September 1914. And what
was true of individuals was also true of nations. Nations which
did not follow this axiom were simply "corrupt". Belgium was there¬
fore not merely a case of "self-preservation" for Britain but also
one where interest coincided with honour. "Dishonour would have
brought with it a subtler and more lasting disadvantage, greater
in its sum than immediate death", Murray concluded.1 War was
thus "not all evil". As "true tragedy" it had "nobleness and
2
triumph in it as well as disaster".
Murray did not have such intimate ties with German culture
as fellow-Liberals Bryce and H.A.L.Fisher - he had never studied
3
at a German university for one thing. This may account for a
certain ferocity in his attitude to Germany; certainly for his
taking few pains to distinguish between "good" and "bad" Germans.
In one of the first pamphlets on the war published by Oxford
University Press Murray wrote as follows s
"We have now not only to strain every nerve to
help our friend [France] - we iaust strain every
nerve also to injure our enemy. This is horrible,
but we must try to face the truth. For my own
part, I find that I do desperately desire to hear of
German dreadnoughts sunk in the North Sea. Mines are
1. "How Can War Ever Be Right7",pp.25,30,32,39-40. Murray charac¬
terised the German invasion of Belgium as an attack by a
"wicked man" on a "little girl" - an image well calculated to
arouse righteous indignation.
2. Ibid..pp.41-2. Murray conceded that this was "dangerous ground"
which lent itself easily "to foolish bombast". "We must not
begin to praise war without stopping to reflect on the hundreds
of thousands of human beings involved in such horrors of pain
and indignity that, if here in our ordinary hours we saw one
man so treated, the memory would sicken us to the end of our
lives". But still it was possible "to see in this wilderness
of evil some oases of extraordinary good".
3. His marriage prompted him to give up a chance to study under
von Wilamowitz-Mttllendorff in Berlin.
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treacherous engines of death; but I should be
only too glad to help in laying a wine for theui.
When I see one day that 20,OCX) Germans have been
killed in such-and-such an engagement, and the next
day that it was only 2,000, I am sorry."*■
But when reduced to "terms of private human life" Murray could
see the tragedy of it all: "Maass is with his regiment, and we
shall do our best to kill him and after that to starve Ulf and
2
Ulf's mother." Yet for Murray this was - as the Germans would
have put it - "A regrettable necessity". The starvation in
Poland, as the result of the British blockade of the Central
Powers, was "part of the normal means of war....There was no
choice." It was not easy "to think of actions much more horrible",
but the alternative was "something equivalent to helping the
enemy".
If one accepted the war, then much of what Murray said was
a realistic assessment of the consequences. But at times the
tone of Murray*s writing suggested a more emotional and new-found
enthusiasm for what had become a moral crusade. "Some English
liberals", he wrote in October 1914, "seem to be sorry and half
ashamed that we have Russia as an ally; for my own part I am glad
and proud. Not only because of her splendid military achievements,
but because, so far as I can read the signs of such things, there
is in Russia, more than in other nations, a vast untapped reservoir
1."Thoughts On The War", (Aug.1914) repr.ibid.p.7 (this had
appeared as an Oxford pamphlet).
2. Loc.cit.
3. The Problem Of Foreign Policy, 1917,pp.9-10. Elsewhere Murray
insisted that "No human being in Germany need starve" because
she was "completely self-supporting". Great Britain's Sea
Policy. 1917,p.24 ~
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of spiritual power, of idealism, of striving for a nobler life.
And that is what Europe will most need at the end of this bitter
material struggle."*' Similar Russophilia can be found in much
of the writing on the wear, but Murray had only a few months
previously signed a neutrality manifesto which had called Russia
"only partly civilised"; a power whose governing class was
"largely hostile to Western ideas of political and religious
2
freedom". Such a volte face was uncommon even among British
liberals - suspicion of Russia did not always evaporate with
support for the war. Murray began to keep company with members
3
of the "Fight For Right" movement, a patriotic ginger group.
Murray in common with most other Britons was ready to
believe the worst of Germany, especially after the publication of
the Bryee Report. He knew of the evidence uncovered even before
4
its publication and Murray continued to talk of "the great
criminals and semi-maniacs in Germany and Austria" who had caused
5
the war. He completely turned his back on the liberal view of
the world he had once held and now agreed that the Germans had
"plotted" the war for many years. As an American critic wrote in
1928, the original liberal view "was inadequate for the substan¬
tiation of the idealistic theories which were essential to the
Liberal's support of the war. Bricks cannot be made without straw
1. "First Thoughts On the War,p.18.
2. See above p.63.
3. Members included Bruce, R.Muir,W.Temple,P.Kerr,L.P.Jacks,H.Wickhaa
Steed, R.Bridges, H.Newbolt ,F.Pollock,W.Ward,B.Underhi ll,F.Younghuabanc
4. See letters of H.A.L.Fisher to Lady Mary Murray,Fisher Mss.Box 7.
5. "The Turmoil Of W&r"(Mar.1917).repr.in Faith.War & Policy.p.254.
German "frightfulness" was a logical continuation of prewar plotting.
Germany had gone "at each step outside the old conventions". "The
broken treaty, the calculated ferocity in Belgium and Northern France,
the killing of women and non-combatants by land and sea and air, the
shelling of hospitals, the ill-treatment of wounded prisoners; all
the doctoring of weapons with a view to cruelty; the explosive bullets
the projectiles tinctured with substances which would producea gangre¬
nous wound; the poisoned gasses; the infected wells. It is the same
method throughout." "Ethical Problems Of The War",p.20.
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nor could the ideal of a war to end war be erected upon so narrow
a ground as that afforded by the conviction that the war arose
out of a diplomatic 'failure to improvise a Concert.Germany's
'heavy balance of criminality in the last crisis* did not furnish
enough handle for the newly uplifted Sword of Peace."1 This is
certainly true of Murray. He moved further from his prewar
liberalism than other liberal, intellectuals who supported the
2
war. Once his initial commitment to the war was made Murray had
to go on believing in the rightness of the Allied cause - that is,
3
unless politicians were "using the language of mere hypocrisy".
Privately, however, Murray was beginning to voice his fears as
early as May 1915. In a letter to J.L.Hammond he wrote:
"The thing that I mind is the realization
that it is not the higher England, the England
of freedom and moderation, that is fighting now;
it is just England the mass of brute force and
passion and cunning. And so, 1 suppose, it was
bound to be....I had hoped against hope that, for
once, war would not necessarily bring oppression
and reaction. But I fear it will be the Pitt
business all over again....We are a nation very
like Germany without its discipline - a nation
which scarcely deserves to win, or deserves it
about as much as Russia does, because she was
originally innocent."^
In public Murray put on a brave face and told the "Fight
for Right" movement that although militarism - in the form of Lord
1. I.C.Willis, England's HCly War. N.Y. 1928, p.125
2. Eg. A.D.Lindsay: "We recognize that for the general condition
of Europe which made such a war possible we may, along with
other nations, have been partly to blame, yet we hold that in
the immediate situation we were guiltless and that it made
most for the eventual peace of Europe that we should fight."
War Against War, Cocford, 1914,p.3.
3. The Way Forward,p.24
4. 20 May 1915, Hammond Mss. vol.30
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Roberts and Colonel Maude - did exist in Britain, they had as
yet no political influence. Despite "this froth or scum",
which sometimes floated to the surface, Britain remained "funda¬
mentally true to her great traditions" and trod underfoot that
which threatened its reputation as "a nation of 'white men1, of
X
rulers, of gentlemen". The role of the liberal intellectual
was therefore to ensure that patriotism continued to be the preserve
not just the Jingo. The danger was that "the many thousands of
social reformers and radicals", who instinctively loathed war and
had "only been convinced with the utmost resistance, if at all of
the necessity of...fighting", might "from disgust and discourage¬
ment fall into the background". That, Murray felt, "would be
the last culminating disaster. It would mean that the war had
ceased to be a war for Free Europe against militarism, and had
become merely one of the ordinary sordid and bloody struggles of
nation against nation, one link in the insane chain of wrongs
2
that lead ever to worse things."
But when could one decide the moment that war against the
Central Powers had achieved the "deliverance of humanity from the
power of the Sword", "Freedom for all nations, and for all men
3
and women inside the nations" ? The dilemma which Murray as a
liberal faced is apparent in his address to the "Fight for Right"
movement in March 1917. Anyone who prolonged the war "one day
1. "How We Stand Now", For The Right, pp.88-91,94-5.
2. "First Thoughts On The War",p.17.
3. The Way Forward, p.16
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longer" than was "necessary for the establishment of the Right"
would be "more wicked than the wretches who caused the war",
Murray claimed. Such a man could see the consequences of his
actions more clearly even than the German rulers who had embarked
upon war in July 1914. But one should not wish for the war to
be ended "a day sooner" than "Public Right" became the law of the
civilised world once again. "One is sometimes bewildered by this
drag in two contrary directions", Murray noted, "bewildered till
it is hard to see clear."1 This bewilderment was evident in
2
Murray*s association with Lansdownism in January 1918 at a time
when he was still counselling against peace talks. For a peace
settlement not to be motivated by "a mere grabbing or Jingo senti¬
ment" there first had to be military victory. "If we make peace
now we make peace with militarism triumphant", Murray wrote in the
Daily News. "If we propose peace now we are offering terms to the
very dragon we set out to destroy. Remember we are fighting for
a just peace. Let us face the facts. Let us not trouble too
much about our Northcliffes and our Carsons. When a different
spirit begins to rule in Germany and Austria there will naturally
3
come a change here and in France.
The long effort to keep British liberalism "fully in touch
4
with the war" seemed to have paid off a few weeks later when Lloyd
George's statement of war aims appeared, follcmed soon by the
1. "The Turmoil Of War", p.254.
2. Together with G.P.Gooch, Dean Inge, Stanley Unwin & Noel Buxton,
he signed an address presented to Lansdowne commending him for
his initiative. M.Holroyd, Lytton Strachey, Harmondsworth,
1971,p.756 n.15.
3. 1 Jan.1918, cit. Willis,p.247, nb.
4. Murray to Fisher, 10 Aug, 1914(typescript),Murray Mss.Box 19.
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publication of President Wilson's Fourteen Points. It now seemed
to Murray that his fears of "punitive tariffs, the crushing of
Germany, annexations, war-indemnities, new naval stations, and the
whol imperialist farrago" had "disappeared into the bog of No-man's
Land".'" There now seemed a real chance of the kind of peace
settlement which Murray had hoped for from the first weeks of the
2
war. It was Wilson - for Murray as for Dickinson - who was now
the "leader of the Allied cause"; a welcome counter to the
3
"Northcliffian Ministry" led by Lloyd George. Indeed, there
seemed no obstacle to a "clean peace" except military stalemate.
If the strain of war was "prolonged beyond a certain point" it
seemed "almost inevitable that the common longing for peace among
the suffering poor throughout Europe, reinforced by a vague but
widespread conviction that, while their Governments can never
agree, they themselves are agreed" would lead to European revol-
4
ution which could even affect Britain. The fear of what Murray
called a "Bolshevik peace" was common to liberals like Fisher
and leaders of the moderate left like Beatrice Webb, to supporters
5
of the war like Murray and critics like Dickinson.
But there was little direct likelihood of revolution in
/
Britain, or so it seemed to Murray,6 and he was more concerned
1. "Preface" to Faith, War & Policy, pp.ix, xiv
2. See his letter to Fisher op.cit. and "Thoughts On The War".
3. "Preface" to Faith, War & Policy, p.7dlv. Letters to J.L.Hammond
from 1916 onwards, Hammond Mss.vol.30.
4. "Preface" to Faith, War & Policy,pp.xi-xii.
5. See: Webb, Diary, 4 Nov.1916; letters to A.E.Zimmern from J.Bryce
(13 Feb.1919) & Headlam-Morley (16 Feb.1919), Zimmern Mss.Box 1;
Fisher, An International Experiment, Oxford, 1921,p.11.
6. "...except in the sense that a very great transfer of votes at
a General Election might be termed a revolution." "Preface to
Faith, War & Policy.p.xi.
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with the "grave danger of political reaction". As he wrote to
E.D.Morel in August 1919, the "imminent and ghastly danger" was
"comparatively slight on the revolutionary side but very great
indeed on the reactionary, protectionist, military side".1 As a
Liberal he felt himself caught between this and the Jingoism of
the "mob". "The political reaction" would "not take the form of
a mere wave of extreme conservatism". The "real danger" would
be "a reaction against anything that might be called mellow and
wise in politics", "a struggle between crude, militarist reacion
2
and violent, unthinking democracy". This had been the basis of
his objection to the U.D.C. idea of "democratic control" of
3
foreign policy as it had been part of the reason for his efforts
4
on behalf of conscientious objectors persecuted by the Government.
The price of Britain's entry into the war had been a marked
diminution of moral purpose. "It was part of the price we had
to pay", he told the "Fight For Right" movement. Total war meant
that a "high and austere duty" was handed over to agents who could
not possibly perform itj "to masses of very ordinary people, and
not only of very ordinary people, but of stupid and vulgar and
drunken and covertous and dishonest and tricky and cruel and brutal
people, who will transform your imagined crusade into a very
1. 23 Aug. 1919, Morel Mss.
2. "Ethical Problems Of The War", p.5. "Preface" to Faith. War &
Policy. p.iv
3. Increased democracy was no "substitute for character and
wisdom" and could in fact lead to "recklessness", "unreason"
and "chauvinism". It all depended on what was meant by "the
people": the readers of "the yellowest type of newspaper" or
those who rose to "the mind's eye as one returns from a meeting
of the Workers' Educational Association or a particularly good
trade union discussion". "The Democratic Control Of Foreign
Policy". Contemporary Rev.. CIX, 2 (Feb.1916), 180-91 (a review
of A.Ponsonby, Democracy & Diplomacy).
. One his visit to Asquith to prevent death sentences being carried




There was no disguising Murray*s disillusionment - the
distaste which sprang from life-long teetotalism was the least
of it. "We want to democratise the country...but we do not want
2
to vulgarise it", Murray lamented - a lament echoed by subsequent
generations of genteel liberals. All around him the world of
the first fifty years of his life was crumbling. The war had
exacerbated "every kind of social instability" and fostered a
"habit of violence in public things". There had been heroism
and self-sacrifice, but the war had also revealed "startling flaws"
in the social order. Murray listed these for the Civic and
Moral Education League: the amount of "hysteria" which lay so
close to the surface, "the defects of the governing machine, the
immense power of the organised lie and the hideous tyranny of the
advertisement; the thinness of the crust which separates civili¬
zation from savagery; and the rapidity with which human beings
become inured to stories and even actions of cruelty, which not
only have sickened them, but would have seemed incredible to them
3
in the years before the war." Hence the importance for Murray
of the League of Nations. He was one of those people for whom
it "offered all the advantages of revolution without its troubles.
1. "The Turmoil Of War", pp.240-1.
2. "The Pale Shade", 1917, p.35. In the course of this pamphlet
(widely distributed in America) Murray stoutly defended royalty,
the House of Lords (except for the Tory "stranglehold") and,
most of all, the English gentleman.
3. "Is An Estimate Of Our Own Age Possible?", Contemporary Rev,.
CXVI, 2(Aug.1919), 133.
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There need be no social upheaval, no abandonment of ancient values;
simply a slight twist to the existing machine of international
relations, and all would be well."1
Through the twenties and thirties Murray continued to preach
that the only way to salvation lay through the League. "If our
civilization is to be saved", Murray told students at Aberystwyth
in 1933, "we must meet the campaign of violence by reason, by fair¬
ness, by accurate information, and by trust in the ultimate good
2
will and good sense of the great mass of disinterested mankind."
This work for the League and peace in the thirties is largely beyond
the scope of this chapter, but we can note that Murray1s approach
to the League was in some ways a natural extension of his pvewar
liberalism. "The parallel holds good between the governing and
the governed Britons on the one hand, and on the other between
Great Britain and the lesser breeds without the law which Britain
was to bring within the pale." Such is the assessment of
3
Salvador de Madariaga, who worked closely with Murray during the
thirties. Murray never ceased to regret the passing of the
"Victorian Cosmos" - life with values, public morality order and
respect for the law - and all his efforts were directed towards
1. Troublemakers. p.156
2. The Cult Of Violence. 1934,p.18
3. "Gilbert Murray & the League", in Murray, Unfinished Autobiography,
pp.186-7. "The assumption, the subconscious attitude was that
Britain would rule the waves of international assemblies as she
had ruled the waves of the sea; that she knew best what was good
for the happiness of other nations." Madariaga calls Murray &
Lord Robert Cecil "Civic Monks" in their "desire to widen the
scope and concept of their deity" from Britain and the Empire
to greater international organization (p.178).
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the recovery of that "wholesome tradition" "of veracity, of
consistency, of honesty and economy, and of intellectual compe¬
tence" inherited from Peel, Salisbury and Gladstone.1 He claimed
too that the war had caused "a certain change of emphasis" in
his attitude to political change - a new appreciation of true con-
2
servatism - but it was the world rather than Murray which had
changed the most.
Murray's faith in the League saved him from the disillusion¬
ment which affected that other Gladstonian Liberal L.T.Hobhouse
3
after the war. In a sense the consistency of his beliefs over a
lifetime, which spanned two world wars, also prevented him from
coming to terms with the problem of "the cult of violence",
although in the thirties he came to believe (as he had during the
First World War) that the League had "to stand up against violence
4
for the sake of right". His Cambridge contemporary Goldsworthy
Lowes Dickinson, with whom Murray had disagreed so profoundly
during the war, had similar hopes of the League although he died
before Nazi Germany presented the most serious challenges to it.
But in other ways the two men were completely different. Dickinson,
the retiring don, invented the name "League of Nations" and was
one of its earliest supporters during the war. But apart from a
1. Problem of Foreign Policy, pp.5-6. The Ordeal Of This Generation.
1929, pp.173-9. Like Hobhouse (see above p.105 ) Murray held
the erosion of a synthetic world view (especially in science) as
in part responsible for the existing "chaos".
2. "Before the war I was a Liberal, and I believe now that nothing
but the sincere practice of Liberal principles will save European
society from imminent revolution and collapse....Before the war I
was eager for large and sweeping reforms, I was intolerant of
Conservatism, and I laughed at risks. The social order then had
such a margin of strength that risks could be safely taken. Now
I feel a need above all things of qualities that will preserve
civilization." Problem Of Foreign Policy.pp.5-6.
3. P.Weiler, "The New Liberalism Of L.T.Hobhouse", Victorian Studies.
XVI, 2(Dec.1972),160 n.61. Hobhouse died in 1929.
4. Letter to E.Lyttleton,ll Jan.1937 clt.J.Smith. "1889-1957 Some
Personal & Chronological Notes From The Correspondence", in Murray,
Unfinished Autobiography.p.115.
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short term of service on the "Committee on Intellectual Cooper¬
ation" Dickinson took no part in League affairs in Geneva after
the war. Murray, although he had hoped for some postwar
"Concert" during the early months of the war, did not publicly
espouse the cause of the League until 1918 when, as we have seen,
it had become a politically respectable thing so to do. After
the war Murray became the foremost League intellectual - Chairman
of the League of Nations Union in Britain (1922-38) and President
of the International Committee on Intellectual Cooperation at
Geneva from 1928 onwards.
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X. GOLDSWORTHY LOWES DICKINSON
"Yet still, after centuries of stumbling,
reason is no more than the furtive accomplice of
habit and force. Force creates, habit perpetuates,
reason the sycophant sanctions. And so he [Man]
drifts, not up but down, and Nature watches in
anguish, self-forbidden to intervene, unless it be
to annihilate. If he is to drive, and drive
straight, reason must seize the reins; and the art
of her driving is the art of politics."
- Geoffrey Vivian in G.L.Dickinson,
A Modern Symposium (1905).
The character of Geoffrey Vivian, "a man of letters", in
Dickinson*s most famous book has been said to be "the character
whom he cast in the role of himself".* But from the time of
the First World War until his death in 1932 Dickinson was known
to the public as publicist for the League of Nations and author
of The International Anarchy (1926), a book with an influence com¬
parable with Angell*s Great Illusion a quarter of a century
earlier. As we have seen, Dickinson, like Gilbert Murray, was
involved in political affairs before 1914, standing to the left
of main-stream Liberalism. It was as the author of the then
standard text on The Development Of Parliament During The Nineteenth
Century (1895) that Dickinson wrote a series of long letters in
The Nation during the controversy over Lloyd George*s budget in 1910.
1. D.Proctor, "Introduction" to Dickinson*s Autobiography.p.2.
2. VI, 23 (5 Mar.1910),881; VII, 6(7 May 1910), 205-6; 8 (21 May
1910), 277-8: 9(28 May 1910), 312; 10 (4 June 1910), 348-9.
Or rather, as author of the French translation (1906), for in
a new preface Dickinson disassociated himself from his earlier
criticism of the House of Commons & general antagonism to
democracy (and presumably of his support for a second chamber).
In 1895 Dickinson had been "a kind of Socialistic Tory".
Autobiography. p.144
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As a young Fellow of King*s College, Cambridge - he had been
elected for a dissertation on Plotinus (1887) - Dickinson's
views had been those of an elitist conservative. "He took the
Tories at their own valuation as aristocrats, and held with Plato
that the best should rule", another Fellow of King's wrote of
him.*' In this he was probably like a great many Oxford and
Cambridge dons. But the Boer War encouraged Dickinson to turn
to Liberalism, and he began to see that "Tory rule meant pluto-
2
cracy, not as he had held aristocracy". As B.M.Forster points
out, this was in a sense a "return" since Dickinson had been
3
influenced as an undergraduate by the writings of Henry George.
Dickinson's later writings show traces of the earlier
elitism, and he never quite lost a rather fastidious horror of
4
the working classes whose cause he came later to espouse. His
dislike of violence extended to the ideas of the revolutionary
1. Wedd, 178.
Loc.clt.Forster.p.72
3. See Forster, pp.32-42. Dickinson had progressed through bell-
ringing, reforming prostitutes, the Church of England Temperance
Society to working on a co-operative farm (1885) started by
Harold Cox, later a member of the Bryce Commission on German
atrocities in Belgium.
4. "For the working classes as then existing he had little enthus¬
iasm, and it was not until much later in his life that he
established personal contacts with them. He had been brought up
in a Victorian household, he minded his h's being dropped, he
knew he ought not to mind, still he did mind. And - a more
serious aversion - he could not see that the working-class move¬
ment was proceding in a direction which was either good or new."
Even after he moved further left as the result of the war,
Dickinson persisted in his doubts. "He feared that there would
be a levelling down, instead of a levelling up....Thus, although
he came more and more to condemn our economic system and advocate
drastic changes, he had no sympathy whatever with the Marxian
who rejects Shakespeare and Chekhov on the ground that they
wrote for capitalists." Ibid, pp.72-3.
socialists,1 and there was in Dickinson*s prewar political
philosophy something of the fashionable literary anarchist of
the London salon. "I have far more sympathy with Proudhon and
with Kropotkin than with Marx and the Social Democrats", he wrote
2
in 1900. In short, when airing "socialist" views, Dickinson
3
would quote from Mill or Ruskin or Whitman,but not Marx. As far
as international affairs were concerned, Dickinson views seem to
have been a mixture of optimism about the prospects for peace and
a vague foreboding of future war. ••There may, indeed, be war
between Germany and England", he wrote in November 1907, "but, if
so, it will be because the government and peoples of those countries
4
have willed it; not because of any necessity to be." But in
August 1914, a few days after the outbreak of war, Dickinson
exonerated the "peoples" but not their governments from blame.
Writing in an obviously emotional state, he wrote of the death and
destruction which would be the only certain outcome:
"Not one of the men employed in this work of
destruction wants to perform it; not one of them
knows how it came about that he is performing it;
not one of them knows what object is to be served
by performing it. The non-combatants are in the
same case. They did not forsee this, they did not
want it, they did not choose it. They were never
consulted. No one in Europe desires to be engaged
in such work. We are sane people but our acts are
1. "It would be hard to find any possible case for international
war which would be as strong as the case for social war, if the
analysis of the militant socialists were correct and sufficient.
I do not myself think it is; and, further, I think no solution
by force of the social question is possible, even if it were
desirable." "Is War Inevitable?",222.
2. "Quo Vadis?", Independent Rev.. VIII,2(Feb.1906),156.
3. Eg. "The Social Ideal of Democracy", Working Men*s College J..XI,
209(Dec.1910), 430-3 & XII,210(Jan.1911),18-19. These were
lectures Dickinson gave at the college. He also lectured at the
L.S.E. & for University Extension.
4. "Peace Or War?",132
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mad. Why? Because we are all in the hands of some
score of individuals called Governments. Some
score among the hundreds of millions of Europeans.
These men have willed this thing for us over our
heads. No nation has had the chance of saying No.
The Russian peasants march because the Tsar and
the priest tell them to. That of course. But
equally the German Socialists march; equally the
French Socialists. These men know what war means.
They know what its effects must be. They hate it.
But they march. Business men, knowing too, hating
too, watch them march. Working men watch them march,
and wait for starvation. All are powerless. The
die has been cast for them. The crowned gamblers
cast it, and the cast was death."*■
The war was a terrible blow to Dickinson. There was a feel¬
ing of sheer helplessness for a man over fifty years of age who
did not feel able to fight the Germans with his pen. As he wrote
to Janet Ashbee in November 1914; "It would be easier to bear,
and probably one would get the perspective better, if one were a
young man who could serve, or had trained oneself for some function
that might be useful now. But if one's whole life has been given
up to trying to establish and spread reason, and suddenly the gulf
opens and one finds the world is ruled by force and wishes to be
2
so, one feels forlorn, indeed worse than forlorn." This despair
was deepened by the ostracism Dickinson experienced In Cambridge.
As President of the Cambridge branch of the U.D.C. he was an
3
obvious target for the super-patriots. Being of a far more sen¬
sitive nature than Russell, Dickinson became a virtual recluse
1. "The Holy War", Nation. XV,19(8 Aug.1914),700."...common men
are tools. The rulers play on them like pipes."
2. 4 Nov.1914, in C.R.Ashbee Journal, vol.17. Janet was the wife
of C.R.Ashbee.
3. Dickinson had joined reluctantly. K.G.Robbins, The Abolition of
War. Cardiff,1976,p.49.
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during wartime, confining himself to the writing of pamphlets
and articles on the war.1 Later he moved to the more anonymous
surroundings of London. But he was not persecuted like his
colleague at King's, A.C.Pigou. "I suffered nothing in Cambridge
2
except a complete want of sympathy", he later wrote. But this
was bad enough for someone like Dickinson.
After the dismissal of Russell from his lectureship at
Trinity Dickinson wrote bitterly that "endowed semi-public
institutions" were "no place for genuine and independent minds".
"If you are honest and intelligent you must be a heretic and an
3
outcast." But, compared with Russell, Dickinson was not cut
out to play the role of outcas-t. "Dickinson was a mam who inspired
affection by his gentleness and pathos", Russell once reman:ked.
And he continued:
"When he was a Fellow and I was still an under¬
graduate, I became aware that I was liable to hurt
him by my somewhat brutal statement of unpleasant
truths, or what I thought to be such. States of the
world which made me caustic only made him sad, and
to the end of his days whenever I met him, I was
afraid of increasing his unhappiness by too stark a
realism. But perhaps realism is not quite the
right word. What I really mean is the practice of
describing things which one finds almost unendurable
in such a repulsive manner as to cause others to share
one's fury. He told me once that I resembled
1. "My sense of isolation from common opinion, my melancholy, and
my clear sense of fact (for I must call it) caused me to retire
altogether from such life as there was in the place. I lived and
ate alone, when I was in Cambridge, and saw almost nobody. The
long winter evenings still linger with me. Shut into my room, I
seemed for a time to have shut out the world. My dim reading
lamp, the rich red wallpaper, the flickering fire, were my background!
Autobiography,p.196(written May 1927). See Proctor's comments,p.24.
2. Ibid..p.195. "Cambridge is just dead. It has something of the
alleged repose of the tomb, and that's all one can say for it."
Letter to N.Wedd,4 Nov.1916. Wedd Mss.Box 3. For Pigou,see below p.
3. Letter to N.Wedd, 4 Nov.1916, Wedd Mss.
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Cordelia, but it cannot be said that he resembled
King Lear."1
One of Rus8ell*s "unpleasant truths", with which Dickinson
seemed never to have come to terms, was the problem of human
violence. Roger Fry echoed William James when he noted that
Dickinson*s writings betrayed "far too optimistic and naive" a
"conception of human nature". They showed "no notion of how much
a primitive and prelogical mentality still survived in civilised
man". E.M.Forster was nearer the mark when he added that Dickinson
2
did in fact realise this but refused to face the "consequences".
But one might go one step further. Dickinson was intellectually
and temperamentally incapable of facing the consequences of a
view of man which suggested, if not that war was inevitable, that
some kind of violence was. The writings of Professor Cramb, he
noted in November 1914, could not be "answered. Those things lie
3
too deep for argument. One is one kind of man or the other."
And there Dickinson left it, having no desire to read Cramb or
anyone like him. But, as we shall see, the experience of war
pushed Dickinson further to the limits of his faith that reason
1. "Some Of My Contemporaries At Cambridge", Portraits From Memory.
1956, pp.67-8. The authoress Vernon Lee, another U.D.C.
member was exasperated by Dickinson*s "fairmindedness" and
claimed "that he was 'wrinkled with scruples*". Forster,p.l33.
See also K.Martin, Father Figures. 1966,pp.117-27 & WooIf,
Beginning Again.pp.190-1.
2. Forster, p.136. This too was the view of the leader writer in
the Morning Post who noted of Dickinson*s criticism of the public
school cult of games: "The football match of which he is the
horrified witness, is merely the microcosm of an even fiercer and
more horrible struggle from which his sensitive nature instinctively
veils itself. That unreflecting patriotism of which he complains
is nothing but the tribal or racial instinct of self-preservation
which exists in all healthy animals and all healthy flocks of
animals. Mr Dickinson*s quarrel is really with Nature. It is an
offence to him that there should be *violent instincts*." 9 Jan.
1918, cutting in Dickinson Mss. See also Dickinson*s reply
ibid.,15 Jan.1918,p.6.
3. Letter to J.Ashbee,4 Nov.1914,C.R.Ashbee Journal.
would prevail.
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As an early member of the U.D.C. Dickinson made the custom¬
ary obeisance to the idea of democratic control of foreign policy.
As he wrote the Professor of Political Economy at the L.S.E.: "Of
course public opinion is anything but infallible. Yet I think
that publicity in diplomacy, if and so long as diplomacy goes on,
is essential. For one does have a chance of enlightening opinion,
but one has none of enlightening foreign office officials and
militarists and diplomatists."1 And he noted in an American
magazine in August 1916: "It is a diplomatist's war. None of the
peoples wanted it, and none of them would have stood for it, if in
some way they could have been jointly consulted in the light of
2
the full knowledge of the facts." This belief in the pacific
nature of the electorate was, however,somewhat shaken by Italian
entry to the war at a time when the full extent of the carnage
was becoming apparent. How could it be explained? Dickinson
admitted that it had been probably "forced...by popular enthusiasm".
And if this were true, then for those who believed in the Allied
cause it was "an example of the sound instinct of the people
3
defeating the erroneous calculations of the statesmen". One
cannot help but feel that here Dickinson was trying to have it
both ways, given his doubts about the war.
Letter to E.Canaan, 11 Sept.1914, Canaan Mss. 1022. Canaan himself
was rather sceptical of the practicability of "democratic control".
See his letters to E.D.Morel, 12 Sept.1914 & C.R.Buxton,13 April
1916, Canaan Mss.1023.
2. "Democratic Control of Foreign Policy", Atlantic Monthly, CXVIII,2
(Aug.1916),145."...this war, like all wars for many centuries in
Europe, was brought about by governments, without the connivance
and against the desires and interests of peoples....War is made -
this war has been made - not by any necessity of nature, any law
beyond human control, any fate to which men must passively bow."
"Wars are made by governments acting under the influence of govern¬
mental theory." "The War & The Way Out", Atlantic Monthly.CXIV.6
(Dec.1914), 820. The War & The Way Out.1914.p.10
3. "Democratic Control...",148.
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Dickinson was never as unequivocally opposed to the war
as was Russell. In his first pamphlet, for example, he began
with the disclaimer that it was 'not a 'stop the war' pamphlet.
Being in this war, I think, as all Englishmen think, that we must
go on fighting until we can emerge from it with our territory and
our security intact, and with the future peace of Europe assured,
so far as wisdom can assure it."* Nor did Dickinson criticise
Sir Edward Grey during the war - in public at least. In the
European Anarchy (1916), the forerunner of his International
Anarchy, Dickinson even described him as "probably the most pacific
Minister that ever held office in a great nation". "I am not,
and have not been, one of the critics of Sir Edward Grey", he
2
concluded. This was not very different from the eulogies of
Grey composed by Gilbert Murray. Why then were Dickinson's writ¬
ings listed with those of Russell by the War Office Censor (March
1917) and the National Peace Council forbidden to collect them on
3
behalf of the Nobel and Carnegie peace organisations? That he
was a leading U.D.C. intellectual was enough reason in itself.
But in addition, a reader of one of Dickinson«s pamphlets would
have come away with the impression that his support for the war
was qualified to say the least.
In a way it seemdd that Dickinson could not really make up
his mind. "While...it is unhistorical and unjust to pretend that
1. War & The Way Out.P.7.
2. pp.22, 126
3. C.Playne, Britain Holds On. 1917. 1910. 1933, p.59
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Germany as such stands for domination, and the Western Powers
for freedom", he wrote in 1915, "yet we may say with truth that
a victory of the Western Powers, so far as their influence can
reach, should make for freedom, while a victory of Germany will
make for domination." A carefully-weighed judgement unusual
among British historians during the war. Yet, only a few pages
earlier, Dickinson had talked of the war as just "one of the
many wars for power and position".1 Much of Dickinson's writing
on the war was, as his friend Nathaniel Wedd commented, "shorn
2
of its rhetoric just an impotent, helpless cry of the heart".
It was this lack of what might be called"tough-mindedness" in
Dickinson which probably attracted him to the idea of an "inter¬
national anarchy" as the cause of the war. It enabled hiia to
account for the breakdown of peace in impersonal, even mechanistic
terms, and so to play down the element of individual responsi¬
bility on all sides. As he wrote to Leonard WooIf: "From these
and most of the despatches, one gets a curious and disconcerting
impression that none of the diplomats seriously wanted war,
indeed that all feared it, but that the situation like a greek
3
fate was leading them on into it."
While Dickinson agreed "with the general view outside
Germany that the final responsibility for the war at the last
1. After The War. 1915, pp.13,7. At other times Dickinson came
very close to the talk about Kultur common in the usual justi¬
fications for British policy (eg. see p.111).
2. Letter to F.P.Bulmer, 21 Feb.1915 (typescript), Wedd Mss.
"Dickinson says we could not avoid making war and he hopes
we shall win: but on the other hand he does nothing to help
us to win and always talks of war as wicked in such a way as
to imply that it is wicked of us to take part in it. The fact
is he is upset by the horrors of war and cannot stop to make
his attitude logical or his position clear." Wedd to Bulmer,
10 Sept.1917 (typescript) Wedd Mss.
3. 2 Nov.1918, Woolf Mss.
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moment" rested with the Central Powers, he disputed "with full
conviction" the view "universally held in England" that Germany
had been ••pursuing for years past a policy of war", while all the
other powers had sought only peace.1 The invasion of Belgium
was not the culmination of long-term German policy, but merely
"an episode in a war already begun" - the previously bloodless
i
warfare of competing states in an unregulated international system.4
Belgium was thus only "a contributory cause of British inter¬
vention" , although Dickinson agreed - in public at least - "with
the general view" that it would have been "neither right nor wise"
3
for Britain to abstain after 1914. If Germany made war inevit¬
able "at the last moment", the origins still lay in the "state of
fear and suspicion on both sides". "When there is such tension
...in the European situation", Dickinson concluded, "some Power
or other will be tempted to precipitate the catastrophe, and some
4
Power or other will always succumb to the temptation." If it
had not been Germany in 1914, it would have been Russia the
following year. "And some other year it might have been France
or England. The War came out of the European system, the system
of states armed against one another, and dominated by mutual
suspicion and fear." So long as that system continued to operate
1. European Anarchy, pp.134-5
2. After the War, p.7.
3. "The War & The Way Out: A Further Consideration", Atlantic Mthly..
CXV, 4(April 1915), 513. The Choice Before Us. 1917, p.v. Privately
Dickinson wrote to Leonard Woolf:"...I think nations really never
go to war merely in defence of supposedly outraged international
law, but always for their interests. We should never have gone
to war merely because the Germans broke the treaty. And we should
probably have aided and abetted France if she had wanted to break
it." 7 Dec.1916 ,Wool£ Mss. This was the kind of allegation made
publicly by Morel & Russell during the war.
4. "The Basis Of Permanent Peace", in Towards A Lasting Settlement.
1915,p.15.
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there would always be a danger of war.1 These views, expressed
as early as the first months of the war, were Dickinson's
2
lasting contribution to the postwar debate on the war.
After the first months of the war Dickinson seems gradually
to have lost interest in the idea of "democratic control" and to
have spent less time working for the U.D.C. Unlike Russell, who
also moved away from the apparent dead-end of the U.D.C., Dickinson
did not move further "left". From 1915 onwards he became increas¬
ingly involved in agitation for a postwar league of nations, and
generally kept company with "the moderate liberals of the Bryce
3
Group". It was Dickinson (or perhaps someone else in this
group) who first coined the terra "league of nations", and certainly
he was an important intermediary between the U.D.C., the Bryce
Group and the American League to Enforce Peace. A recent American
estimate is that, apart from his scheme for an international
police force, "Dickinson's ideas were the common denominator of
early American and European peace programmes. Within the United
Kingdom numerous internationalist, pacifist and reform organis-
4
ations and Liberal and Labour party politicians propagated them."
Dickinson was the very antithesis of a "remote and ineffectual
don". "Remote", perhaps. But "ineffectual"? Dickinson's auto-
1. "The War & The Way Out* A Further Consideration", 518. Britain,
he noted elsewhere, was fortunate in one respect: "As ambitious,
as quarrelsome, and aggressive as other States, her geographical
position has directed her aims overseas rather than towards
the Continent". European Anarchy.p.11.
2. Taylor, Troublemakers.pp.16.162-3.
3. M.Swartz, The Union of Democratic Control, Oxford,1971,p,132.
4. M.D.Dubin, "Towards The Concept Of Collective Security: The
Bryce Group's 'Proposals for the Avoidance of War", 1914-1917,
International Organisation.XXIV.2(Spring 1970),289.Also: L.W.Martin
Peace Without Victory.N.Haven,1958,p.62;Dickinson.Autobiography.
pp.190-1.For Dickinson's justification of plans fox an international
police force to an audience of "pure" pacifists,see his "The Problem
Of Armaments & A League of Nations".Friend's Quly.Examiner.LI.202
(April 1917),193-7. *
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biography makes it clear that his greatest wish was "to influence
opinion and the course of events".* To the extent that the
league movement, as we have seen, had become politically respect¬
able by 1918, Dickinson succeeded in this objective.
However, in the first two years of the war Dickinson*s
path was a lonely one. He was the only British representative
at a meeting in the Hague in April 1915 held under the auspices
of the Anti Oorlog Raad (Committee Against War) to discuss inter¬
national law and the prevention of war. The Organisation Centrale
pour une Paix Durable which resulted from this meeting was
2
severely criticised in the British press. Dickinson saw Grey
when he returned but received little encouragement, though the
latter expressed no objection to Dickinson's plans for an American
3
lecture-tour to publicise the league idea. The admirer of
Kropotkin in 1906 now, nine years later, found international
anarchy an indisputable raison d'etre for international organis¬
ation. "A league of Europe is not Utopia. It is sound business",
he wrote in 1914. And a year later: "The ideal of the future is
federation and to that ideal all the significant facts of the
4
present point. It is idle for states to resist the current".
1. "I never wanted to write learned and scholarly works....Whether
I have been at all successful I doubt. Events can be influenced
by thought, but only if the thought is more original than mine
has ever been, and the personality behind it more massive.
Voltaire and Rousseau did for France and Marx for Germany and
the world what I should have liked to do for England."Autobiography.
pp.145-6.
2. Eg. the international lawyer T.E.Holland in The Times.18 Oct.
1915,p.4d. See also M.Z.Doty,The Central Organisation For A
Durable Peace(1915-1919).Geneva,1945,passim. There were German
& Austrian representatives at the meeting.
3. Autobiography.pp.193-4. The tour lasted Feb. to April 1916.
4. War & The Way Out.p.41. After The War.p.21. It was neatly encap¬
sulated by Sir Arthur Salter in his preface to the posthumous
edition of The International Anarchy(1937):"Internation anarchy
is the cause of war; and international government, therefore, the
indispensable condition of preventing it." (p.vii)
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But privately Dickinson feared that military stalemate might be
the only way to peace - and that would "never be accepted till
everything else" had been "tried in vain".1 When the war still
continued after the terrible losses of 1916, Dickinson's worst
fears seemed justified. He had now to recognise "the fundamental
fact" that men's actions were "controlled more by passion than
by reason". Passion was "aroused by abstract notions and words"
and thus it became possible for men to sacrifice everything for
causes which had "no bearing on their real interests, whether
2
material, moral or spiritual."
It was not in the "real interests" of the British people,
Dickinson argued, for their government to "crush" Germany. True,
she had "behaved barbarously in Belgium" and at sea, but there
were dangers in pursuing a policy of unconditional surrender.
Any plans to punish the Kaiser and German officials, any talk of
"annual tribute" or annexation of German colonies, would nip in
3
the bud the growth of a German peace party. After the Economic
Conference of the Allies in Paris in June 1916 Dickinson was
especially worried by the possibility of "economic war" against
Germany when military hostilities had ceased. As he wrote to
C.P.Scott, editor of the Manchester Guardian, there seemed "only
too much reason to fear" that the Allies were "continuing the
1. Letter to C.R.Ashbee, 26 Mar.1915, Ashbee Journal.
2. Choice Before Us.p.88
3. "On 'Punishing Germany'", War & Peace. 11, 20(May 1915),121-2.
See also: "The German Socialists and The War", ibid.. 11,
23(Aug.1915),168-9j "A German On the War" J.Hibbert..XIV.
l(Oct.1915),30-6(but see L.P.Jacks's editorial note p.33n.);
letters to Nation. XVIII,9(27 Nov.1915), 326 & XIX, 25 (16
Sept.1916), 757-8 & 27(30 Sept.1916), 324.
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war, not to achieve their avowed objects, but to realize
illegal schemes of conquest" which would "leave the condition
of Europe worse than before", perhaps even more alarming was
the threat to civil liberties in Britain. The "persecution of
conscience" was a direct outcome of continuing the war for its
own sake.1 The revelations next year of secret Allied diplo¬
macy by the Bolsheviks confirmed all Dickinson's fears that an
opportunity for compromise peace had been missed. In a letter
to Gilbert Murray he laid the responsibility for the demise of
civilian control in Berlin squarely at the door of the Allied
governments:
"For the sake of definition, not of controversy,
I will say that I agree with you that once war had
broken out, it was 'inevitable' that every means
would be adopted, at every cost to everything, to
win the war. Hence, if other governments offered
their aid only on terms which were contrary to all
their and our professions, our government could
not refuse. This is all the hideous logic of war.
But, on the other hand, it is equally 'inevitable'
that effects should produce causes[sic]. And from
the moment those treaties were entered into, our
professions became insincere, and being known to
be insincere by the decent people in enemy countries,
the possibility of a meeting point on a good 'league
of nations' peace between the internationalists...
of all countries was ruined. No one could think
worse than I do of the German military party. They
show what they are sufficiently now they are in
power. The tragedy is that there [sic] were not
in power until Brest-Litovsk, but only fighting for
power. They would, 1 believe, have been defeated,
if the allied governments had been able and willing
to meet the policy of the Reichstag majority with
sympathy instead of with blank negation."2
1. 10 June 1916, Scott Mss. B.M.Add. 50908. See also Dickinson's
Economic War After The War. 1916 and "Economic Policy After
The War", War & Peace. Ill, 35(Aug.1916),167-8.
2. 3 May 1915, Murray Mss.Box 81.
223.
No doubt Dickinson overestimated the strength of "pacific
and internationally-minded elements" in Germany, and it is inter¬
esting to compare his analysis with that of his Cambridge
colleague J.M.Keynes. Keynes was sceptical of the favourite
liberal distinction between German government and people. Writing
in August 1916 under the pseudonym "Politicus", he saw at least
"passive acquiescence " in the attitude of Germans towards their
governments foreign policy. "The idea that the German govern¬
ment is entirely freed from this influence and can make the
people do exactly what it wishes will not bear examination", he
noted. "Had the will for peace in Germany been wholehearted and
strong and really widespread, it would not have been so easy to
bamboozle the people in August 1914." For this had in fact been
necessary.1 Hew then did this affect the advocates of a com¬
promise peace? Keynes felt that they had to establish first
that there was military stalemate, and second that an early peace
would prove "durable", before they could "hope to influence any
important section of public opinion" in Allied countries. And
he continued:
"So long as we think that there is a reasonable
chance of *crushing* Germany and *dictating* terms,
there is not the smallest doubt we shall insist on
going on. On the other hand, even when we have
finally made up our minds that there will be no decisive
military victory, we shall refuse and rightly refuse
to make peace, if we think it probable that it will
be used by Germany for a policy of 'reculer pour mieux
1. "Face The Facts", War & Peace (Aug.1916) repr.Keynes,Collected
Writings. XVI, 183, A year previously Keynes had written that
Germans were not as different from the rest of the world as
wartime propaganda claimed. The "general note" in Germany
was one of "moderation, sobriety, reasonableness and truth".
"The Economics Of War In Germany", Economic J., XXV, 3
(Sept.1915), 452.
224.
sauter•. We could at least hang on and let
•attrition* work for a year or two, until a different
result becaiae probable. Pacifists must show that
a different result is probable now, and unless they
can do that, the most convincing demonstrations of
•deadlock* are in vain."1
Events were to prove Keynes right. Many people were
beginning to doubt the effectiveness of attrition, but the number
confident of the possibility of compromise peace in 1916 was much
smaller.
. .'11
The secret treaties not only prolonged the war but, in
Dickinson*s eyes, they were also "largely responsible for the
character of the Treaty of Versailles". Yet, although he fully
accepted J.M.Keynes*s denunciation of the penal aspects of the
2
Treaty, Dickinson had to swallow it as a "Hybrid Peace". If
he wanted to see Wilsonian plans for international organisation
come to fruition, the most he could do was press for far-reaching
revision, and not rejection. Unlike many wartime supporters of
j
Wilsonian ideas, he did not desert the American President. As
he wrote in the house journal of the League of Nations Union, "the
territorial and economic provisions" were "framed on the tradit¬
ional lines of cupidity and fear". Over this monstrous fabric
thus erected" the League was "left to float, like a rainbow in
the sky". But still it was "an achievement which, at the outbreak
of the war, would have seemed to most men incredible". Criticism
was justified, but it had to be remembered that the League was
1. "Face The Facts", ISO. The attribution to Keynes is on circum¬
stantial evidence only (see p.179).
2. The "effect, and, presumably the intention" was to'tiestroy Germany
as a great economic Power", to make her "a helot nation".
"The Choice Before Us", Covenant.I.2(Jan.1920).186-90. "The
Plight erf Germany", Nation. XXVII, 11 (11 Dec.1920),381.
3. See Dickinson to Wilson, 20 May 1919, cit. Mayer, Politics &
Diplomacy, p.877.
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"the creation of victorious states just emerged from a bloody
and bitter war. And to expect this fact not to be reflected
in the terms of the Covenant, and in the behaviour of the Govern¬
ments , was to expect a cool magnaminity which victors have never
been able to show."1 Such cool-headed analysis was not common
among intellectuals of the liberal-left in 1920.
According to E.M.Forster, the war made Dickinson a suppor-
2
ter of the Labour Party, and his analysis of the war in books
like The Causes of International War (1920) and War Its Nature
Cause And Cure (1923) showed the influence of this with their
references to the "social class" basis of British foreign policy.J
The war, he wrote in 1920 had killed liberalism: "war is the
opposite of Liberalism; and Liberals, when they wage it, cease to
be Liberals." The growth of national hatreds and of the con¬
flict of Capital and Labour had also killed liberalism, but there
was more danger in "the bitter intransigeance of the possessing
classes than from any desire of the mass of workers to have re-
4
course to violence. This was, at best, qualified faith in
working class internationalism, and Dickinson still saw the masses
as "easy dupes of imperialism". Before "working people" could be
1. "The Choice Before Us, 186. Dickinson did, however, try to
understand how such a "Hybrid Peace" had come about: "To say
that the Allied nations went to war in order to do what they
have actually done may be unjust....while certain generous con¬
ceptions haunted the upper storeys of men's minds, the currents
of tradition, of habit, of half-unavowed interest and ambition
were sweeping them, all the time, along the old channels".
2. p.95.
3. A class basis "so direct, so simple, so unamenable to discussion
and argument, as to resemble an instinct". Causes of International
War,pp.69,103. Cf.International Anarchy, 19J7 cd.,p.36
4. "The Future Of British Liberalism", Atlantic Mthly. ,CXXV,4(Ap±il
1920), 550, 554. Except of course for Bolshevism which Dickinson
feared would find fertile ground in a Germany suffering from a
penal peace. See "The Plight Of Germany", J81 &"Bolshevism",
International Rev., NS.ll,7(July 1919),544-8.
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"secured for internationalism" they would have to "stand up
against a deadly assault of imperialism upon their predatory
instincts".1 Possibly what Forster calls Dickinson's "hatred
2
of crowd psychology" was even stronger now, after the popular
clamour for revenge in Allied countries. In a pamphlet written
for the Swarthraore College peace "handbook" series Dickinson
faced the unpalatable fact of the "colossal egotism of the herd":
"...'people', the great mass, that is, of the
uninitiated, who pursue their daily work and play,
until the trumpet of doom blows from the heaven of
their rulers, these must be regarded as victims and
dupes, not accomplices, in the great game. But
though that may be so, yet the masses must bear their
responsibility, seeing that it is their passions,
instincts and emotions that respond to the call when
it is made...
One might compare nations to patients liable to
outbreaks of homicidal mania, but normally sane,
kindly, helpful and productive. Certain words,
rashly spoken, are known to bring on the attacks.
Wise and humane keepers would, therefore, avoid
speaking to them."3
In Dickinson's last major book The International Anarchy
he ended with the words: "Europe is armed, suspicious, and
4
covetous, even more than she was before the war". The next six
1. Causes Of International Weir, pp.103-4
2. p.86. The Allied goeernments had "created a Frankenstein, and
Frankenstein insisted on his pound of flesh at Versailles."
"Future of British Liberalism" , 553.
3. Causes Of International War.pp.82-5. In his bibliography
Dickinson cited Wilfred Trotter's Instincts of the Herd in War
& Peace (1916), a pioneering work of social psychology with an
influence comparable to McDougall's book eight years earlier.
Trotter denied that the mass of voters exercised rational choice.
The "herd instinct" encouraged conformity & fear of deviance.
Any consensus was thus basically irrational, conservative &
acquiescent to authority.
4. p.492. In a note of June 1927 added to his Autobiography Dickinson
wrote: "I know that this is a good book - I believe it to be
possibly the best book on the subject; because it is the only
one I know which stresses the only important fact, that it is
not this or that nation nor its policy, but the anarchy, that
causes wars. The book was considerably and favourably enough
reviewed, but it has not sold as much as a thousand copies. Another
testimony to the general truth that truth is the last thing
people care about." (pp.198-0).
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years until his death in August 1932 did nothing to relieve
Dickinson*s disillusionment. In a review of K.A.Bratt*s The
Next War (1930) he conceded that the younger intellectuals were
fighting new battles but these, he feared, had little to do with
the cause of peace. Bolshevism and Fascism, the "principal
manifestations of youth", whatever else they were, were "movements
towards war".* Dickinson continued to believe in the League of
Nations to the end, but a League with effective sanctions includ-
2
ing the use of military force. And perhaps this is an approp¬
riate point to leave Dickinson for, despite all the criticisms
one can make of his conception of international politics, there
was still underneath a visible strand of political realism.
The same problems were approached in a different way by Dickinson*s
Cambridge contemporary Bertrand Russell. It might be said that
the latter, though more able to come to terms with impulse, had
a less realistic conception of international politics.
1. "The Abyss", Nation. XLVIII, 6(8 Nov.1930),212.
2. Eg. his last article on the subject: "Would You Fight For The
League?", Clarion, III, 6(June 1931), 107-8. Cf. The Future
Of The Covenant. 1920,pp.5-11,13 & "The League under Fire",
Foreign Affairs. VI, 2(May 1925),262-3.
XI. BBRTRAND RUSSELL
"...men of learning, by allowing partiality
to colour their thoughts and words, have missed
the opportunity of performing a service to man¬
kind for which their training should have
specially fitted them....Men of learning, who
should be accustomed to the pursuit of truth in
their daily work, might have attempted at this
time, to make themselves the mouthpieces of truth,
to see what was false on their own side, what
was valid on the side of their enemies. They
might have used their reputation and their free¬
dom from political entanglements to mitigate the
abhorrence with which the nations have come to
regard each other, to help towards mutual under¬
standing, to make the peace, when it comes, not
a mere cessation due to weariness, but a fraternal
reconciliation, springing from realisation that
the strife has been a folly of blindness. They
have chosen to do nothing of this. Allegiance
to country has swept away allegiance to truth
....The guardians of the temple of truth have
betrayed it to idolaters, and have been the first
to promote the idolatrous worship.u
- Bertrand Russell, "Justice In
War-Time"(1915).
Russell*s writings during the war on British foreign
policy reflect a liberal idealism which would have seemed unexcep¬
tional in time of peace. In his reply to the defence of Sir
Edward Grey's policy by his friend Gilbert Murray, Russell noted
that all the standards by which historical judgements were usually
arrived at had been cast aside: "We perceive that in previous wars
among the great powers similar views have been held on each side,
to be unanimously discarded by subsequent historians; and we do
not believe that what has always been false before has now
suddenly become true."1 A quarter of a century earlier Henry
1. Policy of the Entente,p.3.
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Sidgwick, who had taught Russell at Cambridge, had made a similar
plea for careful and balanced assessment of the justifications
offered by contending parties in international disputes. But unlike
Sidgwick,1 Russell insisted that the intellectual's duty remained
exactly the same even when his country had gone to war. "There
is no reason to expect an unusual degree of humane feeling from
professors", he wrote in 1915, "but some pride of rationality,
some unwillingness to let judgement be enslaved to brutal passions,
we might have hoped to find." But, alas, it was a vain hope.
The "ingenious distortions" of German international lawyers and
the "subtle untruths" of British historians were but two examples
of the general failure of intellectuals on both sides "to resist
the process of self-deception to which their Governments invited
2
them. "
Since there was little influence he could exert on Germany,
Russell proposed to concentrate his energies on criticising the
foreign policy of his own country, for here there was "far more
3
hope of reform". Such hopes would be "Utopian in regard to Germany*'.
But this order of priorities for the intellectual in wartime
1. The "thoughtful and moral part of every community" could not be
expected to "keep coldly aloof from patriotic sentiment" once
war had broken out. "The Morality Of Strife", 14. See above
p a 3 .
2. "Justice In War-Time...",pp.10-12. "What little attempt at
truth there has been has been almost wholly confined to Social¬
ists, who had none of the educational advantages which proved so
unavailing among professors."
3. Policy of the Entente.pp.vi-vii. It was "important that England,
the birthplace of liberty and the home of chivalrous generosity,
should adopt in the future a policy worthy of itself, embodying
its best, not deviously deceptive towards the hopes of its more
humane citizens....above all because I love England...I wish to
make the English people aware of the crimes that have been commit¬
ted in its name, to recall it to a temper in which peace can be
made and preserved, and to point to a better national pride than
that of domination."
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which seemed logical enough to Russell, aroused bewilderment in
people like Gilbert Murray. Writing of Russell's apparent failure
to feel any moral indignation at the invasion of Belgium, he asked:
"if this is the sort of language, or anything like the sort of
language, he would have used if England had done what Germany did?
Suppose our fleet had treacherously seised Antwerp, suppose a
tenth part of the devastation and outrage which Belgium has suffered
had been ordered by our officers and committed by our men? I
feel sure that, in that case, Mr.Russell and I would have been
standing on the same platforms; my language would probably be
stronger than it is now, but Mr Russell's would be utterly unrecog¬
nizable."1 But while Belgium, as we have seen, had been a crucial
moral issue for Murray, for Russell it merely represented the
hypocrisy of power politics. The invasion had ohown Germany "at
its worst" but it had not shown Britain in a very favourable light
either. And in words borne out by more recent research Russell
remarked: "if the Germans had not attacked Belgium there would
have been more resignations in the Cabinet and less unanimity of
public opinion, but the Government would have found it impossible
to stand aside while Prance was crushed. France, not Belgium, was
2
for us the decisive factor."
Given Russell's rather jaundiced view of the nation state,
which we touched on earlier, there was reason enough to see a
difference merely of degree (rather than of kind) between British
1. Foreign Policy....p.8 .
2. Policy of the Entente, pp.4-5. Cf.C.Hazelhurst, Politicians at
War, p.14.
and German foreign policy:
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"Stripped of Parliamentary verbiage, the
fundamental fact about the European situation
is that all the Great Powers of Europe have precisely
the same objects - territory, trade and prestige.
In pursuit of these objects no one of the Great
Powers shrinks from wanton aggression, war and chic¬
anery. But owing to the geographical position of
Germany and our naval supremacy, England can achieve
all its purposes by wars outside Europe, whereas
English and Russian policy has shown that Germany
cannot achieve its aims except by a European war.
We have made small wars because small wars were what
suited our purpose; Germany has made a great war
because a great war was what suited Germany's
purpose. We and they alike have been immoral in
aim and brutal in method, each in exact degree which
was thought to be in the national advantage."1
There was a certain logic in all this, although Russell
was obviously begging the question of whether Germany's "aims"
were not more potentially destructive. Russell's ideas on the
international system rested on two assumptions. First, that
"Germany had as good a right to an Empire as any other Great Power,
but could only acquire an Empire through war". Second, that
peace could no longer be maintained by "a static conception of
international relations". "In a world where nations grow and
decay, where forces change and populations become cramped, it is
not possible or desirable to maintain the status quo for ever",
Russell claimed. If peace was to be preserved, nations had to
"learn to accept unfavourable alterations of the map without feeling
that they must first be defeated in war, or that in yielding
they incur humiliation". This was as true of Britain as of any
power - perhaps truer, since it was Britain which Germany sought
to emulate:
1. "The Ethics Of War", IJE, XXV,2(Jan.1915),127-9. For Russell's
justification of "wars of colonisation", see below p. 2<f3n.2,.
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"The mood in which Germany erabarked upon the
war was abominable, but it was a wood fostered by
the habitual mood of England. We have prided our¬
selves on our territory and our wealth; we have
been ready at all times to defend by force of arms
what we have conquered in India and Africa. If
we had realized the futility of empire, and had
shown a willingness to yield colonies to Germany
without waiting for the threat of force, we might
have been in a position to persuade the Germans
that their ambitions were foolish, and that the
respect of the world was not to be won by an
imperialist policy. But by our resistance we
showed that we shared their standards....So con¬
vinced were we of the sacredness of the status
quo that we never realised how advantageous it was
to us, or how, by insisting upon it, we shared
the responsibility for the war."
This is suggestive of intellectual justifications for
appeasement of Germany in the postwar period, a policy which
o
Russell supported at least until 1938. But it also shows the
lack of importance Russell attached to the concepts of national
interest and balance of power so important in international poli¬
tics. In Morocco, Russell, like H.N.Brailsford and E.D.Morel,
considered that British policy had been quite without justifi¬
cation. Britain "ought to have met Germany•s desire for school¬
boy triumphs with the tolerant simile of an elder brother".
Instead, Lloyd George's Mansion House speech had reduced British
3
foreign policy "to the German level". At times like this it
seemed that Russell had, not only a healthy scepticism of national
1. Principles Of Social Reconstruction, pp.85-6. "Germany had no
good ground for ency; we had no good ground for resisting whatever
in Germany's demands was compatible with our continued existence."
"War As An Institution", Atlantic Mthly..CXVII.6(May 1916),605.
2. In 1941 he still felt "the arguments for the policy of conciliation
were very strong" up to the time of Munich. Letter to N.Y.Times.
11 Feb.1941.cit.V.J.McGlll. "Russell's Political & Economic Philos¬
ophy" , p.A.Schilpp(ed.) The Philosophy Of Bertrand Russell.
Evanston & Chicago,1944,p.585 n.13. But as late as April 1939 he
supported Roosevelt's mediation attempt. See Clark,pp.465-6.
3. Policy Of The Entente.p.35
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honour and the like, but also little real conception of just how
deeply ingrained they were in the minds of people. It probably
did not matter that the Germans cherished "a desire to own African
swamps", of which Britain had "a superfluity".1 But his claim
that the "only things worth fighting for are the things of the
2
spirit" showed a certain insensitivity to the hopes and desires
of ordinary people. It was this feature of his wartime writing
which one historian linked (perhaps unfairly) to Russell*s talent
for logical thought!
"The morality of peace is the strongest
weapon of the pacifist, and there is no assumption
more common or more confident in that school of
thought than that the conscientious objector is the
superman of pure reason and a paragon of virtue; if
all men reasoned as they do there would be no war,
and the prevalence of war is due to animal instinct
and low rationality. That, no doubt, is true as an
abstract proposition, and it is not a mere coincidence
that the intellectual protagonist of pacifism in
England is an expert in the field of mathematical
abstraction."3
Of course Russell was at pains to present the pacifist
alternative as an eminently reasonable course of action - the
emotional rhetoric of religious pacifism was as foreign to him
4
as conventional patriotic sentiment. What Britain should have
weighed in considering its reaction to the German invasion of
Belgium was not "the legal fact that a treaty was broken", but
rather "the fact that a terrible cruelty was inflicted on an
1. "The War & Non Resistance", Atlantic Mthly.(Aug.1915) repr. in
Justice In War-Time.p.33.
2. "The Philosophy of Pacifism", in Towards Ultimate Harmony.1915.
p.8. Russell was speaking at a conference on "pacifist Philosophy".
3. A.P.Pollard, "The Temptation of Peace" (1916) repr. in Common¬
wealth At War.pp.177-8.
4. Only rarely would exasperation break through the logic of argu¬
ment! "But, of course, all that I have been saying is fantastic,
degrading, and out of touch with reality. I have been assuming
that men are to some extent guided by reason, that their actions
are directed to ends such as *life, liberty, and the pursuit of
happiness*." "The War & Non Resistance",p.52.
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unoffending nation1'. The "question which England had to consider
was, not whether Germany had committed a crime", but whether she
"should do anything to mitigate the bad consequences of that
crime by going to war". "If we had not come in the Belgians would
in all likelihood not have resisted the Germain army", Russell
claimed. "In return for a free passage and for our neutrality, the
Germans would have respected Belgian independence, and Belgium would
have been spared almost all it has suffered." And, in confirma¬
tion of this analysis, Russell could point to Luxemburg, it also
vims under international guarantee but it was "impossible to compare
its sufferings with the devastation, murder, and rapine...
inflicted on Belgium".'1'
In August 1914 Britain had encouraged Belgian resistance
- for its own strategic rather than idealistic reasons, Russell
could have added at this point - and terrible suffering had
resulted. If this were not to be repeated (and, in the case of
Luxemburg, newly inflicted) when the tide of war began to go
against Germany, some kind of compromise peace would be necessary.
"The obligation of honour towards Belgium", Russell wrote, "is
more fully discharged if the Germans are led to evacuate Belgium
by negotiation than if they are driven out at the cost of destroying
2
whatever they have left unharmed. As we have seen, the advocacy
1. "The War & Non-Resistance: A Rejoinder To Professor Ferry", 25,
27. "If the faithful observance of treaties were a frequent
occurrence, like the observance of contracts, the breach of a
treaty might be a real ami not merely a formal ground for war,
since it would tend to weaken the practice of deciding disputes
by agreement rather than by armed force. In the absence of such
a practice, however, appeal to treaties is only to be regarded
as part of the diplomatic machinery." There was thus "a certain
unreality" in official explanations of British involvement. "The
Ethics of War", 127-9.
2. "The Danger To Civilisation", Justice In War-Time,p.122
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of a compromise peace had been severely criticised, not only by
the "good haters" of Germany, but also by people like Maynaxd
Keynes. But what of Russell's arguments for Belgium allowing the
free passage of German troops? This would have been rejected
out of hand by most patriotically-minded Englishmen, but G.G.
Coulton did ask some hard questions in his book The Main Illusions
of Pacificism. His objections to Russell's scenario centred on
the fact that neutrality imposed obligations as well as privileges
on a state like Belgium:
"It would be impossible to find any purely
moral plea which would justify the Belgians in...
opening the back door to let Germany loose upon
the weakest frontier of France, especially since
that frontier had been left comparatively unfor¬
tified in reliance upon a treaty of neutrality
which created, not merely a Belgian privilege,
but also a corresponding Belgian duty. Secondly
what valid reason has Mr Russell for supposing
that Belgium, by betraying her trust, would in
fact have avoided the horrors of invasion? In
any fairly equal war, Belgian soil would have
become the main battle-ground. Not only would
the English and French have had the right to go and
meet the Germanswherever they could find them, but
they would also have been justified in inflicting
direct punishment upon^Belgium for her treacherous
breach of neutrality."
Leaving aside the emotional image of Belgium "betraying
her trust", there was something in what Coulton said. Russell's
suggestion had not really resolved the terrible dilemma of the
small neutral state caught between powerful neighbours. As
1. pp.246-7. One critic suggested that Belgian non-resistance
might lead to an even greater decline in respect for the
neutrality of small states. See perry, "Non-Resistance
and the present War: A Reply To Mr.Russell", 312-3.
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Coulton pointed out, there was only "one contingency" which
could have "saved Belgium from martyrdom", and only one other
which "could have mitigated her martyrdom" - neither of which
helped Russell's case. Firstly, if "the Germans, with Belgium
connivance, had cut their way through to Paris, and had ended
the war as brilliantly as in 1366 or 1870, then the Belgians
would...have lost little besides their honour." But, in the
long-term, could Russell, "as an impartial student of politics
and morals", contemplate so complete a German victory "with any¬
thing but horror7"1 Russell could not. As he wrote many years
later, the "successes of the Germans before the Battle of the
Marne were horrible to me. I desired the defeat of Germany as
2
ardently as any retired colonel." Clearly, Russell - for all
his ability to state "unpleasant truths", was, like Dickinson,
torn between a belief that the rulers of Britain were "accomplices
in abominable crimes against humanity and freedom" and a desire
far Allied victory.
Coulton*8 second "contingency" raised even more serious
criticisms. What would Belgium have gained from allowing passage
to German troops "if the Allies had been more successful from the
first"? If there was "practically nothing to choose between the
1. Ibid..p.247
2. Autobiography.U.17.Cf.His latter to Ottoline Morrell (29 Oct. 1915)
on hearing that D.H.Lawrence was leaving England(p.55). At the time
he wrote: "I consider that either a serious weakening of England,
France, and Italy, or a serious strengthening of Germany, would be
a great misfortune for the world. I wish ardently to see the Germans
expelled from France and Belgium, and compelled to feel that the
war has been a misfortune for them as well as for the Allies. Those
things I desire as strongly as the noisiest of aur patriots...
And if any Power is to be supreme at sea, it must be better for
international freedom that that power should be England, whose
array is too small to be a danger, rather than Germany, which has
by far the most powerful army in the world. On these broad grounds,
if I belonged to a neutral country, my sympathies would be against
Germany." Policy of the Bntente.pp.vi-vii.
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German soldiery and Allied soldiery", then Belgium would "have
gained nothing, even in a material sense". Russell could only
prove one part of his case by disproving another, Coulton concluded.
"Mr Russell cannot mitigate the martyrdom of Belgium, even in
theory, except by postulating the excessive inhumanity of German
military methods, as compared with those of the Allies; and that
is precisely what he cannot afford to do."1 Coulton»s gleeful
exposure of what he felt was a logical flaw in the argument of a
master logician was a little unfair. Although Russell believed
that the ends of German foreign policy "were exactly similar" to
the ends pursued by British foreign policy, that Britain had been
more willing to provoke war in 1911 than Germany three years later,
he still conceded that "the sins of England" sank "into irtsig-
2
nificance beside the German treatment of Belgium". This ambig¬
uity certainly does not make Russell's arguments for a policy
of non-resistance, if the Germans invaded Britain, more credible.
These arguments ware presented in articles in the Atlantic
Monthly and the International Journal of Ethics between August
and October 1915 - both, significantly, American periodicals.
There would have been few journals in Britain willing to risk
printing Russell's deliberate taunts to London's clubland. One
might cite, for example, Russell's arguments for the advantages
of "tribute", levied by a victorious Germany, aver the alternative
of prolonging war if the Allies were losing. It would be cheaper
1. Main Illusions,... pp.247-8.
3. Policy of the Bntente.pp.vi-vll
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in lives ana money, and also a means of taxing "the idle rich".
Since "tribute" would logically consist of "the total economic
rent of the land and natural resources of England", "wages and
other earned incomes could not be diminished without diminishing
the productivity of English labour, and so lessening England*s
capacity for paying tribute."3' Of the potentially demoralising
effects of such levies Russell did not seem to be aware - perhaps
could not be, since the experience of "reparations" was in the
future. But it was a more sophisticated version of the argument
which people like A.L.Smith had found amongst British workers)
2
that they would be no worse off under German rule. As for the
possible loss of colonies to Germany, this could only be a
blessing in disguise, Russell argued. It would remove from
Britain the taint of imperialism - "a canker of corruption and
[political] immorality".3
This was the context in which Russell presented his
scenario for non-violent passive resistance. It is important to
note that Russell never held that this was right in all circum¬
stances . Although he was often accused of holding "the extreme
4
Quaker doctrine of non-aggression", Russell saw his position as
different from that of Tolstoy or the Quakers. Where they judged
conduct in terms of its inherent moral component, he judged "conduct
1. "The War & Non-Resistance", pp.50-2.
2. See below p.2.<J7e
3. "The War & Non-Resistance", p.50.
4. Sonnenschein, Idols of War & peace.p.13.
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by its consequences". This consequentialism had only recently
2
replaced Russell's earlier intuitionist view of ethical questions.
It meant, for one thing, that logically he could not say that the
war was unjustified on purely moral or rational grounds, because he
was presenting his "feelings'4 rather than ethical facts. It meant,
too, that he could not logically argue that passive resistance was
the objectively correct course. However, this did not prevent
Russell from presenting reasoned arguments "to clarify" those
3
"feelings". But there was a certain ambiguity in his writings
and, as Alan Wood notes, Russell "did not always keep strictly to
his opinions as a philosopher. He constantly wrote as if 'good*
4
and 'bad' had some objective meaning". This encouraged people
like A.F.Pollard to criticise Russell's apparent exaggeration of the
importance of "pure reason".5 But perhaps one of the most percep¬
tive criticisms was that of T.B.Hulnte.
1. "The War & Non-Resistance",p.41. "The principle that it is always
wrong to employ force against another human being...has always
been rejected by the great majority of mankind as inconsistent
with the existence of civilised society. In this, no doubt, the
majority of mankind are in the right. But I think that occasions
where forcible resistance is the best course are much fewer than
is generally believed and that some very great and important advan¬
ces in civilization might be made if this were more widely recog¬
nized." (ibid, .p.40.)
2. Russell had been greatly influenced by G.E.Moore's principla sthlca
(1903) which had argued that one knew by intuition what was good
(good being an indefinable non-natural quality). The objectively
right action was thus that which would have the least unfavourable
consequences. See D.H.Munro, "Russell's Moral Theories", in
Bertrand Russell. N.Y.1972,pp.328-30.
3. "The Ethics of War", 127. "The fundamental facts...in all ethical
questions are feelings} all that thought can do is to clarify and
systematize the expression of these feelings." See L.W.Aitken,
Bertrand Russell's Philosophy of Morals. N.Y.1963,pp.63-5.
4. Bertrand Russell, 1957, pp.84-5.
5. See above p.253.
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Hulme was with the Royal Marine Artillery cm the Western
Front (where he was killed in September 1917) when he published his
objections to Russell in the pages of the Cambridge Maoasjne and
(even more forcefully) in the New Age. He had published little
apart from scattered articles and translations of Bergson and
Sorel.1 As a severe critic of Bergson, Russell had not commended
himself to Hulrae and philosophically the two men were poles apart.
To Hulme Russell*s views were "the result of an entirely commonplace
and uncritical acceptance of the liberal ideology" that has prevailed
since the eighteenth century. Russell*s ethical ideas were those
• of a "rationalist hiwmnit&xian", but he (Huliae) sought a "more
2
tragic system of ethical values". There was much that was unfair
in Hulme's attack on Russell - and some abuse - but he did note that
Russell's subjectivism in ethics "debarred" him from saying that
"pacifist impulses" were "better than the low atavistic instinct
behind the opposed ethic". The most Russell could say was "that he
3
prefers pacifist instincts", Huliae concluded. And in an answer
(entitled "The Kind of Rubbish We Oppose'*) to Russell*s lectures on
Social Reconstruction Hulme complained that Russell always gave
"many Reasons" why wars were evil, but only "Impulses that made men
1. He came to St.John*s College, Cambridge, with an exhibition in
mathematics in 1902, but was sent down in 1904, possibly for hitting
a policeman in May Week. However, at intervals he continued to
attend the lectures of Sorley & McTaggart at Cambridge. Bergson, who
he first met in 1907, exerted an even greater influence and Hulme
wrote a series of articles on him for the New Age (1909-12) and
translated his Introduction to Metaphysics (1913). His translation
of Sorel*s Reflexions Sur la Violence appeared in 1915.
2. "War Notes by North Staffs", New Age, XVIII,IS(2 Max.1916), 413. He
had dealt roughly with Russell's definition of "scientific philos¬
ophy" (separated off from traditional philosophical problems) in an
unpublished essay. See his Speculations.1924.pp.28-9.43.
3. "War Notes By North Staffs", loc.cit. Earlier Hulme had talked of
Russell's "insufferable complacency" which was "so satisfied that
its own ideals" were "the inevitable ideals at man - that opposition
appears almost pathological and is regarded with tolerant pity". "War
Notes By North Staffs", New Age. XVIII,17(24 Feb.1916),390. Russell
was not treated as roughly as Clive Bell.See ibid.XVI1.218(13 Jan.1916)
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think them justifiable". Russell never seemed "to admit that any
real Reasons" could exist among supporters of the war.*
No doubt one of the passages in Russell*s lectures to
which Hulme most objected was his denial that the war was concerned
with real rather than imaginary principles. Men's "sense of right"
2
or of the "public good" was very subjective. It depended very
much on their "own impulses and passions, a subjective thing, much
influenced by prejudice and class-interest and accidents of geo¬
graphy or education". "Ethical notions", Russell told the Aristot¬
elian Society, "are very seldom a cause, but almost always an
effect, a means of claiming universal legislative authority for our
own preferences, not as we fondly imagine, the actual ground for
3
those preferences." For Britain the war was not a contest of
principles - it was "trivial for all its vastness". "No great
principle is at stake, no great human purpose is involved on either
side", Russell wrote. "The supposed ideal ends for which it is
4
being fought are merely part of the myth." Certainly it was
1. Repr. from Cambridge Mag.(3 Feb.1916) in Further Speculations.
Minneapolis,1955,p.180• This avoided "the necessity for any tedious
examination of the actual arguments" used by opponents by depriving
them "at one stroke of all validity". Russell replied that he was
"concerned to represent both sides as moved by impulse", and that
difference of "ethical valuation" was on the surface only. Ethical
agreement could "only arise through similarity of desires and
impulses". The claim which Hulme and others made for the "univer¬
sality" of their ethical judgements merely embodied "the impulse
to persecution or tyranny". And Russell concluded} "I wish North
Staffs would tell us explicitly what are the things which he values
for so long as he keeps silence about this, the controversy remains
indefinite." Reply to Hulme repr. in Further Speculations.pp.209-13.
2. "It is sheer cant to speak of a contest of might against right, and
at the same time to hope for a victory of the right. If the contest
is really between might and right, that means that right will be
beaten, what is obscurely intended, when this phrase is used, is
that the stronger side is only rendered stronger by men's sense of
right. But men's sense of right is very subjective, and is only one
factor in deciding the preponderance of force." Principles of Social
Reconstruction.p.67
3. Contribution to "Symposium: The Nature of the State In View of Its
External Relations^302.
4. "Justice in War-Time.•pp.13-14.
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"legitixaate to make war in order to end war", but - despite the
rhetoric of intellectuals like H.G.Wells - there was " no reason
to think that this war had any such purpose.1"
Nor was this a war of self-defence in any real sense. As
Russell explained to a pacifist conference in July 1915i "Everywhere,
the war is regarded as a war of self-defence. And, whatever may
have been true of its origin, it has become, from the moment of its
2
outbreak, in actual fact a war for self-defence." The war,
which had begun with an aggressor state and a victim state, had
rapidly become a weir of self-preservation on both sides. This had
been recognised too by Maynard Keynes who sympathised with the
dilemma in which the German socialists were placed in August 1914.
At first they had opposed government policy:
"But when it was generally believed that the
enemy had set foot beyond the frontier, how could
a party which represented a third of the German
nation take the responsibility of active and
practical opposition to those whose business it
was to defend the country? It is the horrible
paradox of war and the perpetual scourge of peace
parties in all countries, that when once war is
joined it is for all nations a war of defence - a
scourge of which those who, I will not say love 3
war, but hate lovers of peace, do not spare the use."
Here Keynes and Russell were expressing a view of the war
very similar to that popularised by their Cambridge friend Lowes
Dickinson, although Russell, characteristically, expressed the
4
idea in a more provocative form.
1. "The Mar & Non-Resistance. A Rejoinder to Professor Perry", 26.
2. "The Philosophy of Pacifism",p.8. This had been seen by the 19th
century American pacifist Adin Ballou. See R.wasserstrom, "On
the Morality of War: A Preliminary Enquiry", in Wasserstrom (ed.)
War & Morality. Belmont, Calif., 1970, pp.90-4.
3. "The Economics Of War In Germany", 449.
4. Of the naval race Russell wrote: "I do not say that our fear was
irrational or groundless, and I do not say that we were wrong to
(p.t «o.)
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Russell rightly considered that if "the right of self-
defence" were "unreservedly admitted", then "no effective theoretical
opposition to war" was possible.* But one might add that his owi
conditional pacifist ideas still left the thorny problems of deciding
which wars were justified and of the efficacy of passive non-resistance
(if rightness was to be judged by consequences). He would allow
that wars of principle might in some cases be justified, that wars of
self-defence, if against an inferior civilization, we8® justified,
2
as were wars of colonisation when judged solely by "results". It
is perhaps sufficient to note that Russell's actions (if not ethical
(4 continued from previous mge)
take precautions. What I do say is that the measures we actually
took were ideally calculated to bring the danger nearer, to
increase the aggressive temper which was beginning to grow up in
Germany, to persuade the Germans that we would yield nothing to
the claims of justice....1 say that our policy revived warlike
feeling in France, and fostered it in Germany." The British were
thus at least "accomplices in abominable crimes against humanity
and freedom". Policy of the Entente.p.16.
1. "The Philosophy of Pacifism",pp.8-9.
2. The claim of "principle" should be approached "very sceptically".
Civilised communities were justified in "defending themselves
against savages" since this would preserve civilization. Defence
against another civilised state would merely harm civilization.
Wars of colonisation were "totally devoid of technical justifi¬
cation" and were "apt to be more ruthless than any other sort of
war". But they at least had "the merit, often quite fallaciously
claimed for all wars, of leading in the main to the survival of
the fittest". It was "chiefly through such wars that the civilised
portions of the world" had been extended. These, however, were in
the past. Since 1870 such wars had really, like the First WorlcWar,
for prestige and plunder. "The Ethics Of War", 130-7. This last
point was not unlike that made 25 years earlier by Russell's former
teacher Henry Sidgwick, that "nations most advanced in civilization"
tended to "absorb semi-civilised states in their neighbourhood, as
in the expansion of England and Russia in Asia and of France in
Africa". This could not "be altogether condemned" since it seemed
"clearly conducive to the general happiness that the absorption
should take place". But conditions for legitimacy were difficult
to define, and conflict among civilised states very probable.
"The Morality of Strife", 12.
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theory) in later life suggested that these exceptions were open to
considerable debate. But what of Russell's recommendation that
"both the right and the duty of self-defence" resulted fro® "too
material a conception of human and national welfare"? The things
in life which really mattered were "not subject to force*' and could
be "defended without the help of armies and navies", Russell had
claimed.1 Although Russell, would have denied that the civilis¬
ation, which he wished to preserve was that of a small and privileged
elite, one wonders whether the mass of Englishmen would have shared
Russell's order of priorities. But, even passing over this, was it
true that what was of "real value could not be endangered if a
3
merely passive resistance were offered to the invader"?
Certainly, one could agree that many of the "evils"
suffered by an invaded country were "due to the resistance offered
4
to invasion". But Russell also envisaged a disarmed Britain,
"after a generation of instruction in the principles of passive
resistance", being able to stake German rule, after invasion, quite
impossible. As he wrote in reply to an American critic s "A nation
sufficiently numerous and strong to resist successfully by force
of arms will also be able, if it choses, to resist by the method
of the strike, by mere refusal to obey. No one seriously supposes
that the Germans would undertake to govern England, even if we had
no array and navy. The were political difficulties would be insuper-
5
able." "Passive resistance would discourage the use of force (by
1. "The Philosophy of Pacifism*',p.9.
2. Eg. in Political Ideals. 19o3,pp.25-35(first U.S.edition 1917).
3. "The Philosophy of Pacifism",p.9.
4. Loc.cit.
5. "The War & Non-Resistance: A Rejoinder To Professor Perry",27.
Russell was much influenced by syndicalism and had (ironically,
in view of his controversy with its translator) read Sorel's
Reflections On Violence. Russell, Roads to Freedom.1918,pp.70-93.138.
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the invaders) by arousing a sense of shame in the aggressive
nation", for there would be absolutely no pretext for aggression.
The German High Command "could not congratulate themselves upon
their military prowess". "To the soldierly mind, the whole exped¬
ition would be ridiculous, causing a feeling of disgust instead of
pride." Within Germany the "opposition of whatever was not
utterly brutal" would be aroused. By this time, "if all Englishmen
still passively resisted, administration by Germany would be
impossible....after shooting a few, the Germans would have to give
up the attempt in despair."*
The legacy of the Second world War is a conflicting one.
Should Russell's case be judged in the light of Denmark or of the
Jews? Russell himself certainly changed his mind on this point as
2
the result of the Second World War, but even in 1915 at least one
American critic had pointed to potential difficulties: "One cannot
even hope to avoid evil because it may be the determination of the
enemy to perpetrate that which one holds to be evil." If the
intention was to defend that Which was held to be good, then there
were "only two alternatives: To yield, with the expectation that
these good things will be destroyed, or to resist in the hope that
they may be preserved, albeit at great cost and in diminished
1. "The War & Non-Resistance", pp.44-80. "The philosophy of Pacifism",
"Much the same conditions - large population, public spirit,
power of organisation - are required for passive non-obedience as
are required for success in armed conflict." "The Wax & Kan-
Resistance: A Rejoinder to Professor perry", 23, The "fortitude and
discipline" needed were probably even greater for non-resistance.
"The Philosophy Of Pacifism",pp.10-11.
2. Non-resistance "depends upon certain virtues in those against
whom it is employed. When Indians lay down on railways, and
challenged the authorities to crush them under trains, the British
found such cruelties intolerable. But the Nazis had no such
scruples in analogous situations. The doctrine which Tolstoy
preached with great persuasive force, that the holders of power
could be morally regenerated if met by non-resistance, was obviously
(p.t.o.)
246.
measure."1 During the war Russell seemed to pin more hope on peace
through a "central government of the world" wielding armed force,
although he continued to stress that this had "no bearing upon the
question of whether non-resistance would be a good policy, if any
2
nation could be induced to adopt it".
This concept of strong international government, together
with Russell*s talk of "the present international anarchy" and "the
tragic chain of violence" which had led to the war, shows the
common ground he shared with Lowes Dickinson. But Russell was more
inclined to come to terms with "the herd instinct". In an essay
of 1935 entitled "Some Psychological Difficulties Of Pacifism In
War Time" Russell admitted that the war had been an educative
process for the pacifist. Before the war they had not known of
"the wiles of the herd instinct", which were less obvious in peace¬
time. And Russell continued: "We did not realise that it is stim¬
ulated by the cognate emotions of fear and rage and blood-lust,
and we were not on the look-out for the whole system of irrational
beliefs which war-fever, like every strong passion, bring in its
3
train." On the evidence of Russell's published writings this
change of heart had begun with the war itself. Mis letter to the
Nation printed on August 15th 1914 spoke of the play of "forces of
(footnote 2 cont. frost previous page)
untrue in Germany after 1933. Clearly Tolstoy was right only when
the holders of power were not ruthless beyond a point, and clearly
the Nazis went beyond this point." Autobiography.II.193. As late
as 1936 (a year after the Nuremburg Laws) Russell maintained his
old views. See Which Way To Peace?.1936.pp.136-7.140-3.
1. Perry, "Hon-Resistance & the Present war: A Reply to Mr Russell",
310-11. Ferry seems to have been pro-Allied. See his "What Is Worth
Fighting For?".Atlantic Mthlv..CXVI.6(Dec.1915).822-31.He adopted a
similar philosophical stance in World War II. See his Puritanism A
Democracy,N.Y.1944,pp.609-13 & our Side Is Right.Cambridge.Mass.1943.
passim. """""
3. "The Philosophy of Pacifism",pp.10-11,14."The War & Non-Resistance",pp.
44-8.No country,he felt,was likely to adopt non-resistance unilaterally.
3. In J.Bell(ed.) We Did Not Fi<frt 1914-18. 1935,p.330.
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national greed and national hatred - atavistic instincts, harmful
to mankind at its present level, but transmitted from savage and
half-animal ancestors".*
Russell, therefore, did not believe that future world
peace was simply a matter of establishing the machinery for its
2
enforcement. He had been influenced by instinctualist psychology.
1. XV,20(15 Aug.1914),738: "...a whole population, hitherto peace¬
able and humane, precipitated in a few days down the steep slope
to primitive barbarism, letting loose in a moment the instincts
of hatred and blood-lust against which the whole fabric of society
has been raised. *Patriots* in all countries acclaim this brutal
orgy as a noble determination to vindicate the right; reason and
mercy are swept away in one great flood of hatred; dim abstractions
of unimaginable wickedness...conceal the simple fact that the
enemy are raen.JJLke ourselves neither better nor worse". This
hatred was "concentrated and directed by Governments and the press,
fostered by the upper class as a distraction from social discontent,
artificially nourished by the sinister influence of the makers of
armaments, encouraged by a whole foul literature of *glory* and by
every text-book of history" with which the minds of children were
"polluted". Russell's first reaction was thus a mixture of con¬
ventional U.D.C. theory combined with a realisation that the war
had indeed been welcomed by large sections of the population.
2. Russell was sometimes ambiguous on the point of whether a hypo¬
thetical "Council of Powers" should exercise military power or
rely on public opinion to inforce its decisions. Cf. "The Phil¬
osophy Of Pacifism", p.101 & "The War & Non-Resistance",pp.41,
59. But this was perhaps the result of a failure to resolve his
ideas on law & force. First he speaks of the "internal orderliness
of a civilised community" as a great achievement, and then makes
the customary liberal analogy (as Maclver had done for example)
to the pacification of international anarchy; the two essentials
for world peace being true "respect for treaties and international
law" and a "growing realisation" that wars sire "cruel and immoral".
But then he speaks of law as merely the codification of force.
Thus, if "the abject of civilisation" is "to secure justice, not
to give victory to the strong", then law cannot be "the best way
of settling disputes": "Law is too static, too much on the side
of what is decaying, too little on the side of what is growing. So
long as law is in theory supreme, it will have to be tempered,
from time to time, by internal revolution and external war.
These can only be prevented by perpetual readiness to alter law
in accordance with the present balance of forces. If this is net
done, the motives for appealing to force will sooner or later
become irresistible. A world-State or federation of States, if
it is to be successful, will have to decide questions, not by legal
maxims which would be applied by the Hague Tribunal, but as far
as possible in the same sense in which they would be decided by
war. The function of authority should be to render appeal to force
unnecessary, not to give decisions contrary to those which have been
reached by force." principles of Social Reconstruction.pp.52-67.
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and he may have read McDougall and Trotter (his use of the term
"herd instinct" suggests at least an indirect acquaintance with the
latter). Certainly he had read Bernard Hart*s little book The
Psychology Of Insanity (1912), which was designed to present the
ideas of Freud - "probably the most original and fertile thinker
who has yet entered the field of abnormal psychology" - to a general
public." The visible world conflict was thus rooted for Kussell
in man himself 3
"There is in all men a disposition to seek out
occasions for the exercise of instinctive feelings,
and it is this disposition, rather than any inexorable
economic or physical fact, which is at the bottom of
enmities between nations. The conflicts of interest
are invented to afford an excuse for feelings of
hostility; but as the invention is unconscious, it is
supposed that the hostility is caused by some real
conflict of interest....The cause of this absence of
harmony between our instincts and our real needs is
the modern development of industry and commerce....
[l]n the modern world our economic organisation is
more civilised than our emotions, and the conflicts
in which we indulge do not really offer that prospect
of gain which lets loose the brute within us."2
However, Russell found it surprising that "so primitive a
feeling" as "herd instinct" could "attach itself to somewhat arti¬
ficial aggregations such as modern States or even alliances of
3
States", and he was not satisfied with merely a simple biological
1. See Hart's preface pp.v-vii. Russell cites it in Principles,
p,15n. Russell may also have read an article on "War & Sub¬
limation" by Freud's disciple Ernest Jones in the International
Rev. (Zurich), I, 10 & 11 (24 Dec.1915), 443-61. This journal
had published one of Russell's articles earlier the same year.
Certainly Jones's argument was echoed by Russell: eg. "The old
primitive passions, which civilisation has denied, surge up, all
the stronger for repression. In a moment, imagination and instinct
travel back through the centuries, and the wild man of the woods
emerges from the mental prison in which he has been confined."
"War As An Institution", 607.
2. "is Permanent Peace Possible?", Atlantic Mthly.(Mar.1915) repr.
in Justice In War-Time.pp.87-8.
3. "Why Nations Love War", War & Peace (Nov.1914) repr. ibid.,
p.61.
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explanation for war. He recognised the "idealistic" motivations
- for national honour as much as for power, wealth, prestige,
and the "sheer desire for excitement". There was " a passionate
devotion to the Nation, conceived as an entity with a life of its
own". This "impulse of heroism for the welfare of the nation"
was "more widespread than any other kind of subordination to some¬
thing outside self, with the sole exception of parental affection".
It was "by far the noblest of motives" making for war and it could
not "be combated by merely material considerations".1 Inevitably
Russell was drawn towards the same search for a "moral equivalent"
undertaken previously by William James. His solution Russell found
inadequate but all he himself could offer were "partial solutions"
- peaceful outlets for men*s energies which cumulatively would
2
diminish the "force" which made for war.
It was not enough to show, as Angell had done, that wars
did not benefit the capitalist and financier. "Socialism as a
panacea" seemed to Russell also to be mistaken, since it was "too
ready to suppose that better economic conditions" would "of thorn-
3
selves make men happy". But, on the other hand, Russell was also
sceptical of the idea, commonly held by peace advocates, that
national pride could simply be transformed into a wider, international
patriotism, patriotism, he noted, was "in essence religious, like
1. Ibid..pp.61-4
2. principles of Social Reconstruction.pp.95-6. However, Russell
does sound rather like James when he talks of "imagination and
love of adventure" being catered for by "intensification" of
political life in a world state and of the necessity for conflict
in human society separated, where possible, from evil and
hatred. "War As An Institution", 607-12.
3. principles Of Social Reconstruction.p.43
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the impulses that lead to martyrdom". It could only be "adequately
combated by a wider religion, extending the boundaries of 000*6
country to all mankind". But such extension eroded the "primitive
gregarious instinct underlying patriotism", and it became -
"except in a few men gifted with an exceptional love of power" -
"a very pale and thin feeling" when compared with the ••devotion"
that led men "to face death willingly on the battlefield".^ This
then was the nub of the matter 1
"The economic and political forces which make for
war could be easily curbed, if the will to peace
existed strongly in all civilised nations. But so
long as the populations are liable to war-fever, all
work for peace must be precarious; and if war-fever
could not be aroused, political and economic forces
would be powerless to produce any long or very des¬
tructive war. The fundamental problem for the
pacifist is to prevent the impulse towards war which
seises whole communities from time to time. And
this can only be done by far-reaching changes in
education, in the economic structure of society, and
in the moral code by which public opinion controls
the lives of men and women."2
1. "Why Nations Love War", p.64.
2. "War As An Institution, 608. "No hostility is more instructive
than that of cat and dog, yet a cat and dog brought up together
will become good friends. In like manner, familiarity with
foreigners, absence of journalistic incitements to fear and
suspicion, realisation that their likeness to ourselves is much
greater than their unlikeness, will entirely prevent the growth
of the impulse to go to war. The desires for triumph and power
can be satisfied by the ordinary contests of football and politics
unless the nation's pride is embodied in large and efficient
armaments. The feeling that war is the ultimate test of a nation*s
manhood depends upon a rather barbarous standard of values, a
belief that superiority in physical force is the most desirable
form of superiority. This belief has largely died out as between
individuals in a civilised country, and it seems not Utopian to
hope that it may die out as between nations". "Why Nations
Love War", p.65. The "incitements" of politicians, journalists,
financiers and arms manufacturers Russell considered "exactly
analogous to those of men who distribute indecent pictures or
produce lascivious plays". "The War & Non-Resistance",P.58.
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Maynard Keynes said of Russell that he "sustained a pair
of opinions ludicrously incompatible. He held that in feet human
affairs were carried on after a most irrational fashion, but that
the remedy was quite simple and easy, since all we had to do was
to carry them on rationally."* Russell may have had this bon mot
in mind when he described Keynes's wartime work at the Treasury as
advising the Government on how to achieve "the maximum slaughter
2
at the minimum expense". There was some truth in each of these
rather unkind remarks. Russell foundhimself impaled on the horns
of a philosophical dilemma; Keynes found himself dining with Lloyd
George. Bach in their way reflected the dilemmas of the academic
in wartime - as did the paths of Gilbert Murray and Lowes Dickinson,
though less starkly. All four expressed fears for the fabric of
civilised Europe, but none more strongly than Russell who saw, not
only the horrors of modern warfare, but also a return to the Dark
Ages. Not only was the war "perpetrating moral murder in the
3
souls of vast millions of combatants", but it threatened the
"universal exhaustion" of Europe:
"In all that has made the nations of the West
important to the world, they run the risk of being
involved in a common disaster, so great and so
terrible that it will outweigh, to the historian
of the future, all the penalties of military defeat
and all the glories of military victory....[The]
small stock of very unusual energy that makes mental
1. Cit. A.J.Ayer, Russell. 1972,p.150.
2. Clt. A.Wood,p.83.
3. "Heroism is succeeded by a merely habitual disregard of danger,
enthusiasm for the national cause is replaced by passive
obedience to orders. Familiarity with horrors makes war seem
natural, not the abomination which it is seen to be at first.
Humane feeling decays, since, if it survived, no man could
endure the daily shock." "The Danger To Civilisation",pp.110-11.
Here Russell approached the reality of war more closely than any
of his detractors.
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progress...is being w&ted on the battlefield....
[i]f the war lasts long, it is to be expected that
the great age of Europe will be past and that men
will look back to the period now cooing to an end
as the later Greeks looked back to the age of
Pericles. Who then is supreme in Europe will be
a matter of no importance to mankind; in the madness
of rivalry, Europe will hive decreed its own
insignificance....The collective life of Europe,
which has carried it on since the Renaissance in the
most wonderful upward movement known to history,
will have received a mortal wound which may well
prove mortal."
For Russell, whose philosophical horizons had been extended
by Georg Cantor's Mannichfaltiqkeitslehre and Gottlob Frege's
Beqriffsschrift. it seemed "the politics of Bedlam" which decreed
that all Germans were now moral enemies. In July 1900 he had gone
with Alfred North Whitehead to the International Congress of
Philosophy in Paris. His meeting with the mathematician Giuseppe
Peano was, Russell later wrote, "a turning point in ray intellectual
2
life". But now the wax had Interrupted plans for a similar con¬
gress in London in 1915 and it seemed difficult in the midst of
world conflict to envisage a time when scholarship would again
-;.v
become international. Even when the first steps were made towards
reconciliation between the scholars of the Central Powers and the
Allied states after the war, the publicly-expressed misgivings of
some of their number were proof enough that the "collective life
of Europe" had indeed received a wound - though not a mortal one
as Russell had feared.
1. "The Danger To Civilisation",pp.105,117,120. To W.Rothenstein
Russell wrote on New Year's Day 1916i "I wonder whether this
year will see the end of the madness, and what will be left of
Europe when peace returns. We who knew life before the war will
coiae to seem like odd survivals of a softer age, like the Romans
who lingered on after the barbarian invasion." Cit. Rothenstein,
Men & Memories. 1932,11,316.
2. Autobiography, X, 144.
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XII. WARTIME PRESSURES ON ACADEMICS,
"May I plead...with the great local
authorities, and especially those of England
and Wales; with the Lord Mayors ami Councils
of our cities; and with the Education Committees
of our Counties, that they will have patience
with us University people, and with other
teachers, and will not, in their natural desire
for smoothness, endeavour to force us to repress
unpopular opinions or to expel those among us who
have unusual thoughts or sharp, unwary tongues?
...In hours of great excitement some eager eyes
•see red* and red alone. But a University, if
you give it freedom, does not all *see red* at
the same time."
M.E.Sadler, "The Universities & The War"
(August 1916)
The dismissal of Bertrand Russell from his lectureship at
Trinity College, Cambridge, is perhaps the best-known case of the
infringement of academic freedom in a British university during
the First world War - although a Judgement on it depends, as we
shall see, on one*s definition of "academic freedom". There appear
to have been no other dismissals in Cambridge during the war,
although there is evidence of pressure being exerted against dons
believed to have pacifist leanings. Sydney Cockerel1, Director
of the Fitswilliam Museum and "supernumerary Fellow" of Jesus
College suffered great unpopularity among his colleagues for his
"supposed pessimism" about the war.1 Even in Trinity, a college
where the U.D.C. found support among the younger Fellows, G.H.Hardy
found that life for the honest doubter could be "unpleasant", and
this experience contributed to his decision to take up an offer
1. W.Blunt, Cockerell. 1964,p.163. He ceased to be a Fellow of
Jesus in 1916, but this seems to have been the result of
the terras of tenure.
2. "
of the chair of Geometry at Oxford after the war. Dickinson
suffered no more than isolation as the result of his views on the
war, but his colleague at King's A.C.Pigou was actively persecuted
by some fellow Cambridge economists. But before turning to Pigou
we shall examine a similar case at Oxford where the number of
U.D.C. members and sympathisers was smaller than at Cambridge.
Convbeare: F.C.Conybeare was one of the most eminent Armenian
scholars of British birth. He had been a fellow of University
College (1880-7) but, being possessed of private means, he was able
to resign his fellowship. However, he continued to live in oxford,
remained on the list of the Faculty of Theology in the university
calendar, and was regarded as one of Oxford's leading scholars.
He was also the author of more controversial works, such as The
Dreyfus Case (1898), which defended the Captain on the basis of
private information, and the Historical Christ (1914) which lead
to his resignation from the Rationalist Association. In short,
his views were probably not unlike those of his Oxford colleague,
Gilbert Murray, although*1!* reaction to the outbreak of war was
very different.
Conybeare began to have doubts about the war well after
initial British involvement In August 1914. "In August, September
and October", he wrote, "I felt so sure that England had all the
right on her side and Germany all the wrong, that Z hardly troubled
1. Hardy, p.10. He did not return to Cambridge until 1910. The
patriotic dons were led by R.H.MacLeod (Lecturer in Indian Law)
and Professor Ridgeway, who disliked females and claimed that
Newnham College was a nest of U.D.C.sympathisers. See Cambridge
Mao.. VI,8(17 Feb.1917),322-3 and 14(24 Feb.1917),367. Also
J.Stewart, Jane Ellen Harrison. 1959,p.151.
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to read the diplomatic documents....At the beginning of October
my attention was first drawn to the [German] Emperor»s correspon¬
dence with the Tsar, and I realized that he had made a sincere
effort for peace in the days July 28-31." This being so, Conybeare
felt that he had to speak outi "I am not the man to see clearly
the point in favour of the enemy and to conceal it."*
Next Conybeare turned for documentary evidence to M.Phillip
Price's Diplomatic History Of The War (1914), a book "temperately
2
written without bias or flag-waving", as he put it. Conybeare
then came to his own conclusions as to the relationship between
the two Central Powers in the July crisis. The Archduke Franz
Ferdinand was "a sensible fellow" with a sensible policy of concil¬
iating the subject nationalities of the Empire. For this display
of good sense he was murdered by the Serbians. The Austrian
ultimatum was thus quite Justified and the difficulties of the
German position understandable. "I quite realize what a testy,
obstinate, authoritative and somewhat senile old gentleman" the
Wilhelmnstrasse "had to deal with" in the person of Franz Joseph,
Conybeare noted. Especially when he was "aided by that arch-
3
oppressor the Magyar Tisza."
But Conybeare was concerned mostly with Grey, the minister
who had secretly "mortgaged our fleet, our only serious arm, to
France unconditionally." With the Triple Entente Britain was "as
1. "New Light On The Causes of The War", in England On the Witness
Stand. N.Y., 1915,p.99. Also see clipping in University College
Library with E.F.Carritt*s comments.
2. Gilbert Murray considered it "somewhat hurried and inaccurate, as
well as a little morbid in its surmises." The Foreign Policy Of Sir
Edward Grey. Oxford,1915,p.12.See also Murray to J.L.Hammond,
21, Junel915, Hammond Mss. vol. 30.
3."New Light On the Causes Of The War",pp.99-100
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much lashed to Russia's chariot wheels as France." Although Grey
wanted peace, he had "set himself to follow Sazanof who...had him
in his waistcoat pocket". Sasanof had been the one who wanted
war. "The more Germany yielded, the more provacative and imper¬
ious he became." But Grey was also at fault. He did not tell
the Cabinet or the House of Lichnowsky's conciliatory proposals
(using the excuse that they were unofficial) because he knew they
would accept them. So far this was a fairly typical G.D.C. version
of events, but what really got Conybeare into trouble was his claim
that Grey had "tricked" Britain into war. It was worse than the
case of the Ems telegram for "Grey had acted more criminally than
1
Bismark ever did."
All this Conybeare had written privately to Kuno-f>i&yer,
Professor of Celtic Philology at the university of Berlin (1911-19),
2
who was in America during the war. He had written in one lettert
"I do not see any harm could result from my opinions being known,
and I air them very freely here, already at two meetings of
3
university tutors and the other night before the Fabians." Meyer
must have taken this as permission to publish, for Conybeare's
letter was widely distributed in America in at least two pamphlets.*
1. Ibid..pp.100-4. "Take my word for it, Grey will, in good time,
be running for his life over this sinister business." Parliament
had "been utterly hoodwinked. "Presently they will send hia to
the gallows." Emphasis in the original. Keith Robbins has noted
that, "Opinion on the Left wavered uneasily between the view that
he (Grey] was feeble and gullible, a mere tool of his permanent
officials and the conviction that he was devious and secretive."
Sir Edward Grey. 1971,p.300
2. Meyer had been Professor of Comparative Philology at Liverpool
(1894-1911) and had been Batch criticised in Britain for his
remarks about Ireland and the possibility of a German invasion .
See above p. 92-«
3."New Light On the Causes Of The War",p.106. The Oxford philosopher
F.C.S.Schiller expressed similar views in a letter to Bertrand
Russell (19 Aug. 1914}j "It seems clear to me on his own evidence
(p.t.o.)
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When news of these got back to Britain there was an immediate out¬
cry. Sidney Ball, member of the Fabian Society and Fellow of St.
John*s College wrote to The Times to disassociate himself from
Conybeare, stressing that the meetings to which he referred were
private and unofficial.1 Angry letters appeared in the Morning
Post from other Oxford scholars and an editorial in the paper
2
called for the court-martialling of Conybeare as a traitor.
Walter Raleigh, one of the most beligerently anti-German
Oxford dons, felt that this response would be enough to make
Conybeare "willing to do anything short of crawling" in order to
3
be left alone. But Conybeare, although no Bertrand Russell,
appeared to regret the publication of the letter but not its con¬
tents. Private discussion (and it had been a private letter)
(footnotes continued from previous page)
that Sir B.Grey must bear a large share of the catastrophe,
whether he acted as he did consciously or stupidly. He steadily
refused to give Germany any assurance of neutrality oa any con¬
ditions, until he produced a belief that he meant England to
fight, and Germany thereupon ran •aniak*. But the evidence shows
that she was willing to bid high for our neutrality (Lichnowsky'
offer)....It is sickening to think that this deluge of blood
has been let loose in order that the tyranny of the Tsar shall
be extended over all the world. "Cit. Russell, Autobiography. XX
44-5. Schiller was possibly at the meeting of tufors.
4. Also as The Awakening Of Public Opinion in England. N.Y.,
1915.
1. 2 July 1915, p.9d.
2. See letters from A.J.Butler (Brasenosa College), J.T.Cunningham
(former Fellow of University College) who considered people like
Conybeare "cowards as well as traitors", G.W.Prothero who wrote
of "virulent and libellous attacks" on Grey: 19 June 1915 (p.9e)
21 June 1915 (p.6e), 22 June 1915 (p.6g) 24 June 1915 (p.6d).
3. Raleigh to G.W.Prothero, 30 June 1915, Prothero Mss., PP.3/IV.
See also letters of 1 & 3 July 1915, and letters published in
Letters Of Sir Walter Raleigh, n, 429-30, 434 to W.McN. Dixon
and Meyer.
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was quite in order, although perhaps his references to Grey had
been "intemperate". Grey was less a knave than a fool - "a
weak man and given to vacillation".5 Conybeare went ahead and
published an article in an American magazine on "Responsibility
For The War" in which he concluded that "the future historian...
2
will blame Russia and Germany about equally".
Two years later Conybeare said his last public word on
the subject in a letter to the Cambridge Magazine. Again, his assess¬
ment laid emphasis on Grey*s weakness:
"When I so intemperately attacked Sir Edward
Grey on this score [the rejection of Lichnowsky*s
offer], I ignored the fact that - in spite of his
declaring on August 1, 1914, that his hands were
free - he was really bound hand and foot by commit¬
ments made (even before he assumed office) by
King Edward and Lord Lansdowne in 1904. He
inherited those obligations,a nd only lacked the
insight into events, the foresight, courage,
originality, and force of character needful in
order to break away from them, and orientate out
national policy afresh, while there was yet time to
do so, say, prior to Agadir in 1911. It was,
however, human ly speaking impossible that he
should at the last moment, in August 1914, treat
those commitments as scraps of paper) in my letter
which gave so much offence to some of my friends,
whose judgement I respect, I assumed - it is true
in deference to his denials of their existence - that
he could and should have so treated them. He
was indeed no more to be blamed for refusing the
German offer of August 1, 1914, than a clock for
striking the hour. If any were to blame, it was
they who had fashioned, wound up, and set the
clock going."
1. Oxford Magazine. XXXIII, 24(18 June 1915), 396(&2*» 378-9) Morning
Post. 21 June 1915 (p.6f.), 23 June 1915 (p.6d).
2. Open Court. XXIX, vii (July 1915), 395n.(letter to the editor
P.Carus), 402: Germany "deliberately provoked us to war, as I
consider, Sazanof provoked the poor Kaiser; and I fear that there
is nothing for us now but to fight it out." See also ibid..
viii (Aug.1915),506.
3. VI, xxiii (2 June 1917),661.
259.
Just who "they" were Conybeare did not specify. No doubt
the readers of the Cambridge Magazine did not require the identifi¬
cation of vested interests. But in Oxford Conybeare*s naiae was
still unpopular. He had, after all, held to his criticism of
Grey (though now on the grounds of his being a mere cipher).1. His
position in Oxford became so uncomfortable that in 1917 he sold
2
his house there and eventually moved to Folkestone. As he wrote
to an American magazine from neutral Spain in 1916t "Let any one
in Berlin or London or Paris to-day raise his voice in favour of
3
peace and the entire press will denounce him as a traitor." This
could well have been the bitter comment of our second "dissenter",
the Cambridge economist A.C.Pigou.
Pigou: A.C.Pigou, Fellow of King*s College and Professor of Political
Economy (1908-43) at Cambridge, had not been involved in contro¬
versy before the war. He seems to have had no taste for the rough
and tumble of public debate - something which his Cambridge con¬
temporary Russell often relished. Vociferous criticism of his
views on the war "was responsible", a former pupil noted, "for
transforming the gay Joke-loving, sociable, hospitable bachelor
of the Edwardian period into the eccentric recluse of more recent
times. In the words of his colleague and life-long friend
C.R.Fay, •World War I was a shock to him, and he was never the
1. "In a word it was Russia's war and we had to consent to all
her wishes." Conybeare to B.D.Morel, 8 Jan.1921, Morel
MSS.F.9.
2. When he died Conybeare left his valuable collection of Armenian
books to the London Library, not the Bodleian.




same afterwards." Like his Cambridge colleague J.M.Keynes,
Pigou worked for the Government during the war (part-time at the
2
Board of Trade). But he also continued to lecture in Cambridge,
and, significantly, did voluntary ambulance work at the Front in
France, Belgium, and later in Italy, where G.M.Trevelynanwas doing
3
similar work. His experiences at the Front sickened him, but
even more unpleasant, in some ways, was the campaign against him
by some of his Cambridge colleagues.
Pigou seems to have doubts about the war from the beginning.
In February 1915 he published in The Nation "A Plea For The State¬
ment Of The Allies* Terms", which contained the following sentence}
"There are some of us who believe that Germany, like Britain,
entered upon this war reluctantly, not as the result of a deep-
laid plot, but from the mishandling of a diplomatic situation."
Pigou also stressed that the pursuit of "victory for its own sake"
and the imposition of a "penal peace" could only be a miskake.
Why did riot the Allies state their war aims?,he asked. Was it
4
because they feared that Germany might accept them? Not surprisingly
this interpretation, close to the ideas of Lowes Dickinson, pro¬
voked an outcry.
1. H.G.Johnston, "Arthur Cecil Pigou 1877-1959", Canadian J, of
Economics & Political Science. XXVI, i (Feb.I960), 153.
2. Fruits of this work appeared in numerous articles and the book
The Economy & Finance Of The War Being A Discussion Of The Real
Cost Of The War and The Way In Which They Should Be Met (1916),
3. Trevelyan undertook ambulance work because poor eyesight pre¬
vented his acceptance into the Army. Pigou*s was a conscient¬
ious decision.
4. XVI, xix (6 Feb.1915), 591. See also the report of a Cambridge
Union debate in which Pigou took part, Cambridge Mag. IV,
xvii (13 Mar.1915), 336.
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The Morning Post printed an editorial called "The Professor•«
Past" and commented that "we seem to remember that Professor Pigou
has always been favourably inclined to Germany" .* It is not too
difficult to see the kind of picture that the Post was drawing for
its readers. The evidence for its assertions about Pigou*s
political loyalty was not given. The letters of two Cambridge
colleagues of Pigou squashed the idea that his views were common
within the University, and called for a penal peace settlement.
Germany had "committed crimes against God and man", wrote one of
thera. She was "ready to interpret any generosity as a sign of
weakness on the part of the Allies and as a tribute to her own
rectitude."2
Undeterred by this Pigou wrote again to The Nation in May
1915 to warn against "undiscriminating hatred" of Germans, espec¬
ially those living in Britain, in the wake of the sinking af the
Lusitania and the use of poison gas by the Germans on the Western
Front. His argument was based on thedistinction - common among
British liberals - between the two Germanics. it was, he wrote,
"incumbent upon us to recollect that the direct responsibility for
German methods of warfare lies upon the shoulders of a few men.
1. 15 Feb. 1915 (p.be) and 27 Feb.1915 (p.6e). For critical
letters and Pigou*s reply seat 17 Feb. 1915 (p.6f), 23
Feb.1915 (p.6g), 27 Feb. 1915 <p.6e).
2. W.Cunningham (Fellow of Trinity), Nation. XVI, xx (13 Feb.
1915), 619. Also H.S.Jones (Trinity), Morning Post.
25 Feb. 1915, (p.6f)s German power had to be "absolutely ground
to powder".
3. XVI, xix (15 May 1915), 222.
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by whom the Empire is controlled, and not upon those of the great
mass of the German people.
Six months later Figou gave an address to the London peace
Society in which he returned again to the question of peace terms.
Obviously influenced by U.D.C. ideas, Pigou saw three principles
as essential for any successful peace-making: the right of
national self-determination, negotiations ''with goodwill", and
negotiation Initially on the basis of the status quo ante bellua.
Pigou*s main concern was that "none of the nations concerned"
should be "left suffering under a sense of outrage and wrong".
For this reason "general war indemnities" were to be excluded,
though not "money compensation to Belgium", as Figou put it, "a
concession to right and not to mere power". As well as opposing
plans to transfer the Kiel Canal to Denmark and destroy the German
fleet, Pigou rejected talk of "deposition" of the Kaiser, and, an
enforced change in the construction of the German Empire.1 This
revealed the deep gulf between Pigou and liberals like Gilbert
Murray, for whom forcing internal change in Germany was perhaps
the main reason for supporting the war.
Although his proposals had been couched in very moderate
2
language, Pigou again incurred the wrath of the Morning Post.
1. "The Conditions Of A Permanent Peace", War & peace. Ill,
28 (Jan.1916), 54.
2. Peace negotiations should be "started on the general basis of
the territorial status quo before the war. That should be the
basis of the negotiations. In certain cases, however, it would
be necessary to depart from that basis, ami I suggest that the
departure should be made in this way. All the belligerents
should recognise the right of others to territorial possess¬
ions as these existed before the war, and whenever any change
was made it should be made by way of purchase. An arrangement
of this sort might, I think, be so carried through as to leave
no strong thirst for revenge or feeling of outrage and humil¬
iation in any of the belligerent countries." Ibid.. 54-5.
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which returned to the attack with an editorial headed "Professorial
Pedantry".1 In Cambridge R.H.MacLeod wrote an angry (and not
particularly clear) letter to the Cambridge Daily News, which
drew a reply from J.N.Keynes (father of J.M.Keynes), while not
in agreement with Pigou, Neville Keynes felt obliged, as Chairman
of the University Special Board for Economics and Politics, to
rebut the charge that Pigou, by speaking at the Peace Society con-
2
ference, was neglecting his job. The existence of Neville
Keyne's diary for these years enables one to see the full extent
of the campaign of vituperation against Pigou within the University
itself, for Keynes scs Registrar of the University was privy to most
3
deliberations. There were concerted attempts to remove Pigou
from his chair of Political Economy and in his diary for the eighth
of May 1916 Neville Keynes records, "A very trying meeting of the
General Board (of Studies) to consider Pigou's claim not to serve
in the army in consequence of the need of the University for his
services.4
Pigou did not have the easy time with the local conscient¬
ious objectors tribunal that his colleague of military age, J.M.
Keynes, had. The latter could claim that he was engaged on work
of national importance and the Treasury secured his exemption.
1. 26 Nov. 1915, p.6d.
2. 30 April 1916,np. For Maclood, see above p.ZStfn.ll.
3. See entries for 30 April; 6, 8, 10, 19, 22-23, 25-6, 29-30 May;
13, 19-22 June 1916; 25 and 29 April,1917.
4. The entry gives details of the vote.
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Unfortunately Pigou only worked part-time at the Board of Trade.
Unfortunately too, he had an implacable enemy in H.S.Foxwell,
Fellow of St.John's College, Cambridge, and Professor of Political
Economy at University College, London (1881-1928). Foxwell had
been an unsuccessful candidate for the Cambridge chair of Political
Economy against Pigou in 1908. He also belonged to a rival school
of economic thought, the "historical school" of protectionist
economics (Pigou was a follower of Alfred Marshall), and seems
to have had far right-wing views.1 For whatever reason (personal
spite seems to have been a strong influence), Foxwell appealed
against the tribunal's award of exemption from military service
to Pigou. He offered "if necessary [to] lecture in Pigou's place"
if his university work was not deemed to be of national importance.
Pigou would then be free to be drafted into the army. Not
until poor Pigou had been before the tribunal three times (as the
result of repeated appeals against his exemption) was he finally
2
left alone.
The reaffirming of Pigou's exemption was in no small measure
due to the staunch support of his colleagues among the economics
lecturers at Cambridge (one might specially mention J.H.Clapham)
and the Vice-Chancellor T.C.Fitzpatrick. "We wonder how far MacLeod
& Co. have been at work", Neveille Keynes confided to his diary.
"The other University men [i.e. undergraduates] whose cases
1. Cambridge Daily News. 4 May 1916,p.4a. Foxwell attended the
conference of the National Party (June 1919) as the Cambridge
delegate. W.D.Rubinstein, "Henry Page Croft & the National Party",
J. of Contemporary History, IX,I (Jan.1974), 139. Another of
Pigou's enemies Archdeacon William Cunningham (another Cambridge
"historical economist") was also a member of the party.
2. Cambridge Mag.,V,22(27 May 1916), 490. Keynes Diary, 10 & 19
May 1916. Cambridge Daily News, 22 May 1916,p.4a & b.
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originally came up with Pigou's have apparently not been called
to appear any more."1 The whole episode leaves a rather dis¬
agreeable impression, but then one might reflect that such were
the penalties for being a critic of the war when of military age
(Pigou was in his thirties). However, the treatment of another
young academic opponent of military age, G.O.H.Cole, perhaps
illustrates gentler (and more subtle) methods that could be used.
Cole: G.D.H.Cole after taking a first class degree at Balliol in
1912 had taken up a post as Lecturer in Philosophy at Armstrong
College, Newcastle, but had "found it highly uncongenial". The
transition from "the high and rarified atmosphere of pre-war
Oxford" to lecturing to technical students was not easy. Luckily
he was almost immediately elected to a prize fellowship at Magdalen
College, Oxford, "which provided him for seven years with an annual
income of several hundreds of pounds without any obligation to
teach or to do anything else, with •common room privileges*, and a
2
fine set of oriel-windowed rooms by the Deer Park." In these
aristocratic surroundings Cole wrote The World of Labour (1913)
which established his reputation as a student of trade union
affairs. Already Cole was taking a separate, if parallel, path
from the Webbs as a guild socialist.
Cole was an active member of the Oxford University Socialist
Society, which had about 125 members in 1914. However, as one early
1. Keynes Diary, 19 May 1916.
2. M.Cole, The Life of G.D.H.Cole, 1971,p.48. Magdalen under Sir
Herbert Warren (whose snobbery was equalled only by that of
Oscar Browning in Cambridge) was a rather "aristocratic"
college.
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member recalled, membership of the Society in no way dampened
patriotic enthusiasm in August 1914, and "as a result of the rush
to join up, it was soon reduced to an unrepresentative group of
fifteen or so."1 Early in 1915, according to Cole, the Society
2
decided "not to express any opinion on the war." This too
tended to be the official line of the Fabian Society. The only
group in Oxford at this time which did express critical opinions
on the war was the University branch of the Union of Democratic
Control, whose president was not a don (as at Cambridge) but an
3
undergraduate at Queen*s College, V.Cordon Childe.
According to R.Page Arnot Cole, although against the war,
was "not utterly against it. He thought that Britain had been
4
more justified in going to war, than had other Powers." But a
recent study of Cole has stressed that for him the war itself "was
5
not the polar issue; class warfare was". So far this was not
unlike the analysis of R.H.Tawney, another Oxford socialist. However,
the decisions of Cole and Tawney, faced with the fact of British
involvement in war, were quite different. Tawney volunteered as a
private. Cole (from 1915 onwards) worked as an unpaid research
officer for the Amalgamated Society of Bngineers. As his wife has
1. R.P.Arnot in Historical Bulletin of the Society for the Study
of Labour History. 13 (Autumn 1966), II. The Society had been
established in 1915 after splitting from the University Fabian
Society (established 1895).
2. Letter to the Oxford Mag.XXXVI. 16(15 Mar.1918), 231-2. Hearing
that the War Office contemplated action against the "pacifist"
society, R.W.Postgate (a pacifist) resigned his chairmanship and
Cole get a motion passed by the Society to the effect that it
had never been "pacifist". M.P.Ashley and C.T.Saunders, Red
Oxford. Oxford, [1933],p.25.
3. Later Professor of Prehistoric Archaeology at Edinburgh (from 1927).
4. Arnot, loc.cit. Arnot later became the historian of the Miners*
Federation.
5. L.P.Carpenter, G.D.H.Cole. Cambridge, 1973,p.36.
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pointed out, he "was never a 'pure* pacifist, one who believed that
there was nothing in the world worth fighting about",1 but a
defence of alleged British interests in Belgium were less important
to him than a defence of trade union rights at home. This
attitude annoyed some of his colleagues, like Beatrice Webb. Even
militant pacifists like Clifford Allen wondered if Cole was not
2
simply avoiding a moral issue, but one can agree that his position
(given his belief in the plurality of allegiances) did have a
certain logic.
Although Cole, like Russell, was a member of the No Conscription
Fellowship (they seem to have been the only academics who were), he
was not an active one. Most of his time was taken up with union
work, which he was able to claim was of "national importance" to
get exemption from military service. This suited the members of
the Oxford Tribunal * most of them dons. As Beatrice Webb noted
(a little acidly, one suspects)s "It is said that the College
authorities who dominate the tribunal, did not choose to see a
3
Fellow of a College humiliated and made to look ridiculous."
Cole was lucky that he had no enemies in Oxford who might appeal
against his exemption (Figou's fate), although at one point he seems
4
to have feared this. The Fellows of Magdalen may, as Margaret
Cole suggests, have had*Vx> formulated desire to punish" Cole.5
1. M.Cole,p.72.
2. Russell was more sympathetic: "Was G.D.H.Cole right In deciding
his work for labour to be of greater values than standing out
for A.E.[Absolute Exemption] as a C.O? B.R.[Bertrand Russell]
said yes since he did not make any bargain re.expression of
opinion." Clifford Allen Diary (31 Mar.1918) cit.M.Gilbert,
Plough My Own Furrow. 1965,p.111.
3. Diary, vol.33, 18 Mar.1916.
4. Letter to G.Murray (18 May 1916) asking him to attest to his
conscientious objection. Murray Mss.Box 57.
5. Life of G.D.H.Cole.P.71.
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They may even have had some idea of protecting free expression
of opinion. But it may have also been the case that by engineering
Cole's exemption for trade union work, they hoped to avoid assoc¬
iating the name of the College with anti-war agitation. It was bad
enough, they might have felt, to have had Jim Larkin of the Irish
Transport Workers* Union in College as Cole's guest during the
Dublin lock-out, without giving Cole the chance to now associate
with anti-war agitators like E.D.Morel or Clifford Allen.
But what his colleagues were willing to do for Cole they
were not willing to do for his "followers" - undergraduate members
of the Socialist Society who came before the conscientious objector
tribunal. According to Beatrice Webb, even theological students
preparing for the ministry had "been turned down with contumely"1
- a sure sign that the tribunal was taking a hard line. One of
the members of the Socialist Society J.Alan Kaye, an undergraduate
from St. John's College, applied to the tribunal to be registered
as a conscientious objector only to find himself convicted under
the Defence of the Realm Act to two months imprisonment for dis-
2
tributing material for the No-Conscription Fellowship. Another
member Rajanl Palme Dutt, classical scholar of Balllol, was also
1. Diary, vol.33, 18 Mar.1916. The previous year 80 "members of
the university" (unnamed, but presumably undergraduates) had
written to the Daily Chronicle to protest at the call for con¬
scription by the heads of Oxford colleges (see above p. ) and
threatened that many of them were "prepared to go to any lengths
in resisting any form of conscription". The fact that their
names were not given was understandable, although "patriotic"
dons made much of this omission. See Daily Chronicle. 5 June 1915,
p.5b; 7 JUne 1915,p.5b| 9 June 1915,p.6c.
2. Kaye applied for exemption as "an international socialist".
Aldous Huxley described how at this point the military represen¬
tative "leapt up and made a Phillipic against him, bringing up
the fact that he was the son of a naturalised German, that he
was a Jew, that he had often been in Germany and finally... tho*
perhaps it was a little pathetic...that he was a member of the Fabian
(p.t.o.)
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sent to jail in 1916 and sent down for socialist anti-war propa¬
ganda the next year.1 The feeling against conscientious objectors
was so strong that the Warden of Wadhara College, J.Wells, suggested
2
that lists should be published - presumably to make life as
difficult for thera as possible. It was a similar hostility to
pacifism in Cambridge which led to Bertrand Russell's dismissal
from his Trinity College lectureship. This was perhaps the most
celebrated case of pressure on academic freedom during wartime.
Russelli At the outbreak of war Russell was already pacifically
inclined. Earlier, under the influence of the Webbs, he had been
a Liberal Imperialist and a supporter of the Boer war. However,
early in 1901 he had become "a pro-Boer and a Pacifist". This was
part of a sudden change in his conception of the world, a process
3
which he later described as "a sort of mystic illumination", and
which seems to have been akin to religious conversion in its com¬
pleteness. In 1903 he resigned from the "Coefficients" which
(footnotes cont. from previous page)
Society. On the grounds of his being of alien extraction he
declared that the army did not want him and that the tribunal had
no powers to deal with him, a civil court meeting the case more
adequately. The military man brandished a manifesto of the No-
Conscription Fellowship, which Kaye had distributed and which was
thought to do harm to recruiting." (Letter to Leonard Huxley,10
Mar.1916). Kaye, "a practicer of the Pure Intrigue", after appeal
was released on bail. Huxley, Letters, pp.92-4.
1. His entry in Who's Who reads; "First Class Honours Moderations,
1916; First Class Literae Humaniores, 1918; imprisoned as socialist
war-resister, 1916; sent down from Oxford for Socialist anti-war
propaganda,1917". See also letters of V.G.Childe to Gilbert Murray
27 May[l918?] to 17 Nov.1918, Murray Mss.Box 57.Included with these
is a typescript statement on his being forced to resign from his
post at St.Andrews College,University of Sydney, because of his
political views. He had returned to Australia, after receiving an
Oxford research scholarship, to avoid trouble in Oxford over his
views on the war.
2. Oxford Mag..XXXIV.15(10 Mar.1916),256 & 16(17 Mar.1916),273.
3. Autobiography. 1,146.
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H.G.Wells described as a "curious little talking and dining club
...which met monthly...between 1902 and 1908 to discuss the future
of this perplexing, promising, and frustrating Empire of ours."
On the test of whether the Empire came before all else, Russell
"flung out of the club" concluded that he "would rather wreck the
Empire than sacrifice freedom."1 It was, as Wells perceptively
observed thirty years later, "a parting of the ways." The issue
of tariff reform was merely symptomatic of a more basic difference
in world views.
Russell's candidature in the Wimbledon constituency (in
1907) on behalf of the National Union of Women's Suffrage Societies
was a sign that he had moved to the left of the Liberal Party. So
too was his strong criticism of Liberal foreign policy from 191G
onwards. Over Persia he joined Professor B.G.Browne in the con¬
demnation of Russian suppression of constitutional liberties. To
Lady Ottoline Morrell he described Grey's policy as helping "in
the perpetuation of a crime against liberty, justice and civilis¬
ation. .. .Motive i fear of Germany - which nearly caused war last
summer and is the ground for a vast naval expenditure. Cure: Friend-
2
ship with Germany. Means: Assassination of Grey."
As one might have expected, therefore, Russell was one of
1. Wells, Experiment in Autobiography. II, 762-5. The club, founded
by Sidney Webb, included Haldane, Leo Amery, Lord Milner and
three academics: W.A.S.Hewins (Director of the L.S.B.,1895-1903),
H.J.Mackinder (Principal of Reading College, 1892-1903, then
Hewin's successor at the L.S.E., 1903-8, as well as teaching
geography at Oxford and London), and M.Sadler (Professor of
Education at Manchester, 1903-11 and Vice-Chancellor of Leeds
University, 1911-23). Hewins & Mackinder became Liberal Unionist
M.P.s, Sadler had earlier worked in the Education Department.
2. Undated [1912?] cit. Clark, p.244.
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the group of radical Liberals who in 1914 campaigned against
British involvement in the threatened European war. He busied
himself collecting the signatures of Cambridge dons for the state-
I
raent (published in the Manchester Guardian) recommending a policy
of neutrality for Britain. He was one of the few British intellec¬
tuals who did not change his mind after the British declaration of
war on the third of August and he just could not understand why
/■ i- •
liberal intellectuals "like J.L.Hammond, who had been writing for
years against participation in a European war, were swept off
their feet by Belgium".1 In part this stemmed from a basic
scepticism when faced with the moralising rhetoric of liberal
apologias, but there was, too, a streak of gritty realism in Russell's
2
conception of foreign policy - although he could also use moral
arguments himself, as he had done over Persia.
The war for Russell thus involved a position as clearly-
defined as that of the intellectuals who now supported British
policy. "I never had a moment's doubt as to what I should do", he
wrote later. "I have at times been paralyzed by scepticism, at
I j
times I have been cynical, at other times indifferent, but when
the war came I felt as if I heard the voice of God. I knew that
it was my business to protest, however futile protest might be.
1. Autobiography, II, 16. Russell broke with Hammond and with G.M.
Trevelyan and H.W.Massingham (editor of The Nation), over their
support for the war.
2. "Germany is less guilty and we are less innocent, than the news
from London would make you think. It is plain (though under the
influence of war-fever people here deny it) that Germany and
Austria thought they could punish Serbia without causing Russian
intervention and that they desired a diplomatic humiliation of
Russia. They did not expect war, but were hurried into it by the.
Russian general mobilisation. As for Belgium, that was, for us,
merely a pretext. It has long been universally known that Belgian
neutrality would be violated in the next Franco-German wax. All
the Great Powers except France are to blame., but not Germany
only; it is the terror of Russia that has produced Germany's
apparent madness....And if we succeed, the .only Power that will
profit is Russia - the land of the knout." To Lucy Donnelly,
(p.t.o.)
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My whole nature was Involved... .1 hardly supposed that much good
would come of opposing the war, but I felt that for the honour of
human nature those who were not swept off their feet should shcwr
they stood firm."1
Prom the beginning Russell was very close to the members
of the executive of the U.D.C. and he was one of the main forces
in the establishment of a branch in Cambridge. As we have seen, by
mid-1915 many people formerly sympathetic to the idea of
"democratic control** had begun to turn against the U.D.C. Russell,
as one of its best-known publicists, was singled out for special
criticism. After "the sinking of the Lusitanla, "he wrote, "a
fiercer spirit began to prevail. It seemed to be supposed that
2
I was in some way responsible for the disaster." I wonder where
R[ussell] will end up", wrote the philosopher Bernard Bosanquet.
"His views about the war are not unreasonable 1 think, but the
steps he has got involved in are undesirable. I all but gave my
name to the Union of Democratic Control when it first started but
felt an instinct that it would develop into things one could not
3
approve."
Russell*s pamphlet War The Offspring of Fear (1915), pub¬
lished by the U.D.C., earned the distinction of being probably the
first work to be publicly burned in a British university4 since
(footnotes cont. from previous page)
22 Aug.1914 cit. B.Peinberg & R.Kasrils, Bertrand Russell's America.
1973,1,51. Apart from the reference to Russia, a generally more ***"




3. To R.F.Hoemle, 11 June 1916.cit .Bernard Bosanquet & His Friends .p. 174,
4. According to one of Russell*s former pupils the incendiaries were
led by one of the divinity Professors. Clark,p.257.
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Froude's Nemesis of Faith more than half a century earlier. The
lectures given by Russell in the Caxton Hall, London, between
January and March 1916 brought his name be/ore an even wider
public. They were published as Principles of Social Reconstruction
(1916) on the recommendation of Professor J.H.Muirhead who never¬
theless did not share all Russell's views on the war. This book,
like his wartime essays - published as Justice In Wartime (1916)
1
- gave Russell a following in Araetica as well, and some copies
reached soldiers at the Front. At least one young officer was
nearly persuaded to declare a conscientious objection to the war
2
after reading Russell. Not surprisingly Russell's name (and that
of the U.D.C.) began to be linked with the anti-conscription
3
campaign which was gathering strength from mid-1915 onwards.
A.R.Taylor, an Oxford philosopher then holding the chair of Moral
Philosophy at St.Andrews, wrote to The Times to protest at "die
failure of the authorities to prosecute Russell. "Is there one law
for the working class agitator and another for members of the Whig
oligarchy Who are also Fellows of Trinity College, Cambridge?" he
4
asked. But Russell was not deterred, and when the Military
Service Bill was passed through Parliament in January 1916 he
began to work for the No-Conscription Fellowship.
1. Ibid.. p.269. Principles of Social Reconstruction was published
in America as Why Men Fight (1917), a title Russell did not
entirely like.
2. "...I stayed up late and read B.Russell's 'Justice in War Time', and
went to bed so impressed with its force that I determined to stand
out openly against re-entering the Array." A.G.West, Diary of A Dead
Officer. Oxford,1919,p.50(19 Aug.1916). West had been reading
English Literature at Oxford and had joined the Public Schools
Batallion. He did, however, return to France (promoted to officer)
and was later killed. Siegfried Sassoon apparently made his (gore
successful) decision before meeting Russell. See The Complete
Memoirs Of George Sherston. 1932,p.477.
3. "There is a general belief that our friends [Dickinson & Russell]
when not making speeches or pamphlets against their country, spend
their time persuading possible recruits not to enlistt I cannot quite
believe that! N.Wedd(Fellow of King's College)to R.F.Bulmer, 21
Feb.1915,Wedd Mas.
4. 17 Sept.1915,p.9e.See also R.W.Seton-Watson & Russell.ibid..18 Sept.
1915,p.9e & 20 Sept.1915,p.9e.
From June 1910 until February 1918 Russell was a leading
member of the N.C.F., becoming its acting-chairman when Clifford
Allen and other leaders were imprisoned. In this capacity he wrote
ten feature articles and 45 editorials for the N.C.F. magazine
The Tribunal, including one fox which he was imprisoned for six
1
months in 1918. Even more than his work for the U.O.C. this put
Russell quite beyond the academic pale. If, like Lowes Dickinson,
he had involved himself in the league of nations movement when
U.D.C.work had appeared to reach a dead-end, Russell would have
retained a modicum of academic respectability. But the N.C.F, was
2
"a much less * intellectual* body than the U.D.C." - the only
other academic member was G.D.H.Cole, and he was not a very active
one. But for Russell this political activism injected new mean¬
ing into his life. "I look round my shelves at the books of
mathematics and philosophy that used to seem full of hope and
interest, and now leave me utterly cold", he wrote in 1916 to
Ottoline Morrell. "The work I have done seems so little, so
3
irrelevant to this world in which we are living."
Russell's isolation from Cambridge was increased as Trinity
dons who had belonged to the U.D.C. got commissions in the army and
left. J.B.Littlewood, for example, turned his mathematical skills
to good effect "doing ballistics as a Second Lieutenant in the
1. J.G.Slater, "Bertrand Russell and The Tribunal", Russell. I,
(Spring 1971), 6-7.
2. Hardy,p.15.
3. 27 May 1915, cit. Autobiography. H, 52.
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Royal Artillery".1 Russell was left as the only critic of the
war in College - or at least the only one who would speak out. He
began to find himself avoided at high table. His friend and
firmer philosophical mentor John McTaggart Ellis McTaggart asked
him no longer to come and see him "because he could not bear" Russell's
2
opinions on the war. His close friend and collaborator on
Principia Mathematics Alfred North Whitehead, who had a younger son
killed in the war, disagreed strongly with Russell's views and a
3
lasting coolness grew up between them. Russell, it is true,
increased his own isolation by his uncompromising - some would have
4
said provocative - attitudes. But he did have some very antago¬
nistic colleagues, in particular Henry Jackson, Regius Professor
of Greek and Vice-Master of Trinity, and it seems the main force
5
behind Russell's removal from his lectureship.
Even before this actually happened there were hints of
1. C.P.Snow, "Foreword" to G.H.Hardy, A Mathematician's Apology.
Cambridge, 1967,p.39.
2. Russell, "Some Of My Contemporaries at Cambridge" Portraits Fran
Memory. 1956,p.67. As an undergraduate McTaggart was "a follower
of John Stuart Mill, a radical, and an empirical realist. But
after a year or two..., having discovered Hegel and become an
idealist, he became also, for most purposes, a conservative" -
"an imperialist, a believer in public schools and universities (of
the older type), a lover of all ceremonies and traditions, of
feasts, port wine, scarlet robes, professorships, mayors and
corporations, bishops, the House of Lords, and in fact everything
English except the House of Commons", McTaggart was "the most
curious combination imaginable of Dr.Johnson, Hegel, and Robert
Browning". Dickinson, Autobiography.p.143 (this passage was
written in 1921).
3. But as Russell later noted, "it was much more my fault than his
that these differences caused a diminution in the closeness of
our friendship." Portraits From Memory,p.93. See also letter
from Whitehead 4 June 1916 cit. Russell, Autobiography.n,65.
4. "If I were Prince of Peace", A.E.Housman (Professor of Latin,
Fellow of Trinity) said to E.H.Neville, "I would choose a less
provocative Ambassador." cit. A.Wood, Bertrand Russell,p.89.
5. "What pigs the Germans areI It is a sacred duty to hate them."
(Jackson to Sir G.O.Trevelyan, 20 Mar.1917) "There was a time
when I shaank from taking life, and might perhaps have become
(p.t.o.)
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difficulty over Russell»s position at Trinity. When the lecture¬
ship in Logic and the Principles of Mathematics came up for re¬
newal early in 1915 there was an attempt to get him a fellowship
which would have afforded him greater security. In the end the
College Council renewed the lectureship far another five years,
although they knew Russell's view on the war. The reason for
this, according to Hardy, was that Russell's intention of using
his two terms leave of absence for political activities had alarmed
the Council. Bestowing a fellowship, they had felt, might "be
interpreted as a public gesture of approbation, and might have
had serious effects on the future of the Collage".1 The fact
that Russell was not a Fellow of Trinity after the expiry of his
prise fellowship (1895-1901) meant that his position was that much
more vulnerable, since a Fellow could only be deprived of his
fellowship in exceptional circumstances.
Russell appeared before the Lord Mayor at the Mansion House
in London in June 1916, charged with "statements likely to pre-
3
judice the recruiting and discipline of His Majesty's forces" in
(footnote cont. from previous page)
a conscientious objector. But in 1889 I learned to kill mosquitoes
and I regret that I am now too old to kill a German or two."
(to G.P.Bidder, 6 May 1916) "When the country is in danger, I
think that those who are not prepared to come to the rescue should
lose their citizenship." (to Sir G.O.Trevelyan, 12 Mar.1916).
R.St.J.Parry, Henry Jackson. Cambridge,1926,pp.94,101-2, 107.
Also p.96. A similar figure at Trinity was Francis JFenkinson
(University Librarian):"Irish rebels and pro-Germans of whatever
nationality stood in his esteem a degree below the enemy; 'pacifists'
and 'defeatists* were not far off, although he respected conscience
and was against compulsion." H.F.Stewart, Francis Jenkinson.
Cambridge,1926,p.76.
1. Hardy,pp.25-9.Permission for leave was only obtained with difficulty.
2. Under the old statutes "disgraceful conduct" or a criminal con¬
viction of a Fellow could lead to expulsion by the College Council.
A lecturer merely held office "during the pleasure of the Council".
Hardy,p.43-4. With a lecturer there need be no mention of dis¬
approval in a dismissal.
3* So® Rem v, Bertrand Russell. 1916.
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a pamphlet he had written to protest against the imprisonment
of a conscientious object.1 The charge does not seem to have been
borne out by the evidence - perhaps the reason for the Governments
suppression of the report of the proceedings. Russell's friends
were able to attend, Lytton Strachey leaving us this description:
"The Lord Mayor looked like a stuck pig. Counsel for the prose¬
cution was an incredible Daumier caricature of a creature - and
positively turned out to be Mr.Bodkin. 1 felt rather nervous in
2
that Brigand's cave."
Russell was convicted and ordered to pay a fine of £100,
a sum paid by anonymous friends when his valuable library was
threatened with sale as a result of his non-payment. The Trinity
College Council then decided, "That, since Mr Russell had been
convicted under the Defence Of The Realm Act, and the conviction
has been affirmed on appeal, he be removed from his Lectureship
3
in the College." Technically the Council was within its rights.
A Lecturer, unlike a Fellow, held office "during the pleasure of
the Council" who could dismiss him without reference to the opinions
of the other Fellows not on the Council (the majority). However,
the evidence which Hardy published for private circulation
points fairly conclusively to the Council acting as they did
1. The Case Of Brnest F.Everett. 1916, repr. in Russell,
Autobiography. H, 63-4. See also Boulton,pp.182-5.
2. Cit. Holroyd,p.622.
3. H.McL.Innes to Russell, 11 July 1916, cit. Autobiography. H,
68. Russell seems earlier to have realised that he could lose
the lectureship (see his letter to Lady Ottoline, cit,
ibid.,67).
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because of Russell's general views on the war.1
Russell's dismissal aroused a good deal of adverse critic¬
ism among British philosophers who, though not agreeing with
Russell's views, felt able to"respect honest convictions" and had
2
expected the College Council to do the same. One of the older
Fellows of Trinity James Ward, pioneer in the developing discipline
of psychology, gives some idea of the feeling amongst the pacifi¬
cally minded minority in Trinity, in a letter to Russellt "I am
amassed and grieved to see how you are being badgered and hounded
about. It is most outrageous, and what the motive for it all may
be I am quite at a loss to surmise. Are they afraid that you
will sneak off to America or is there some rabid fanatic trying to
3
persuade us that you are what the McTaggarts call us * pro-Germans?
There were also public protests from other {fellows and former
members of Trinity College, including one on active service.^
There was a world of difference between the views of the handful
of Fellows on the College Council (all older men) and the body of
Trinity Fellows as a whole. "Something will have to be done
when the younger ones come back", F.M.Coroford wrote to Russell.
"I am sure there would have been a majority of the whole body
against the Council, if it had come before a full College meeting."5
1. Hardy, pp.43-6 (a remarkably charitable view of the Council's
action). McTaggart, one of the Fellows to vote for the resolution,
was not unsympathetic to Russell whose views he felt were no
stronger than those of at least one other member of the staff." The
dismissal had simply been "because of his conviction....I looked
on the case as if it had been one of removal of a Fellow.... I do
not blame Russell morally. I think he acted honourably [revealing
himself as the author of the pamphlet]....But I do think that
after such a conviction he ought not to ho a lecturer of Trinity."
To N.Wedd, 12 Nov.1916, Wedd Mss.Box III.
2. See letter from S.Alexander & F .M.Cornford.cit. Russell .Autobiography.
XX,68.
3. 3 Sept.1916.cit. Russell, Autobiography. n, 71
4. Nation.XIX.19fS Aug.1916),568;20(12 Aug.1916),596-9(from 3 mathe¬
matics don#i G.H.Hardy, J.B.Littlewood, S.Chapman); 25 (16 Sept.
1916),759(D.S.Robertson).
5. 23 July 1916.cit.Russell. Autobiography. XI, 69
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But the difficulty was that under war-time conditions a
general meeting was very difficult to arrange, many of the younger
dons being on active service. And anyway such drastic action
would have been deemed inappropriate by many. "The Council, in fact,
were for the time in an impregnable position; they had only to sit
tight and say nothing."1 In the end there was an official pro¬
test to the Council from twenty-two (out of a total of over sixty)
Fellows. "Without implying concurrence in Mr Russell's political
views" the signatories "deplored the fact of a reversal of
2
University traditions". However, no action was proposed to be
taken while the war continued, and it was not until 1919 that
Russell was offered another five-year lectureship (which he
accepted).3
In public at least the argument among academics overthe
rights and wrongs of the Russell case was conducted with little
4
reference to conceptions of academic freedom. For Liberals the
action of the Council could be construed as "shoddy Prussianism" -
1. Hardy,p.43.
2. Proof of manifesto in J.M.Keynes Mss.Box 17(Sc.2).
3. Only to resign for personal reasons & year later. The manifesto
calling for Russell's reinstatement was signed by 28 Fellows
(including all who had served in the armed forces during the
war), and 5 others approved but did not sign (Including Ward had
no wish to sign "anything that would whitewash the action of
the Council" in dismissing Russell. Cit.Hardy.p.53). It contained
the veiled threat that college harmony could not be maintained
if it were rejected, but significantly it did not imply "that
the action taken during the war was not right in the circumstances
then obtaining". For the text see Hardy,pp.49-51.
4. It has been said that the British experience of academic free¬
dom depends "much more on tradition, on atmosphere, and on
public opinion than upon legally established rules." Lord Chorley,
"Academic Freedom in the United Kingdom", Law & Contemporary
Problems. XXVIII (Summer 1953), 662. It might be argued that
this offers less protection.
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the kind of criticism made of proposals to introduce conscription.1
But it was Lowes Dickinson who pointed to the obvious fact that
2
"Mr. Russell's offence was political". Gilbert Murray, too,
found it ironical that a university institution of all places should
place penalties on opinion. If there was "any place where opinions,
supposed to be pernicious", could "be aired with comparative safety
and exposed to the full blast of intelligent criticism", then
3
surely that place was "one of the great seats of learning". But
there were not many who felt that here an issue of principle was
4
at stake.
This description of the impact of the Russell Case suggests
that it was confined largely to Cambridge and to Trinity College
itself. No doubt the difficulties of war-time had something to do
with this. One could also say that the "parochial" nature of the
British academic at this time (one was a Fellow of Trinity or a
Lecturer in London rather than a member of a "key profession") was
also important. In America, by contrast, where there were also
cases of dismissal of academics in "loyalty cases", the stronger
professionalisation of university teaching led to the establishment
of guidelines on academic freedom in wartime by the newly-formed
American Association of University Professors (1915).5 In Germany
1. Eg. C.H.Herford (Professor of English at Manchester and an old
Trinity man) saw it as a combination of "German abuse of author¬
itative power malignly compounded with English contempt for ideas."
Nation. XIX, 17 (22 July 1916), 503.
2- Nation. XIX, 18 (29 July,1916),537.
3- Nation. XIX, 26 (23 Sept.1916),790-1.
4. But see J.Stewart, Jane Ellen Harrison.p.152
5. Not that the A.A.U.P. was conspicuous in the defence of what was
after all its raison d'Atre - academic freedom. Its leaders A.O.
Lovejoy and J.Dewey were both strong supporters of American entry
to the war. Their report on "Academic Freedom in Wartime" recognised
four grounds for dismissal of faculty (three of them involving no
(p.t.o.)
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where the idea of lehrfreiheit was first formulated the fate of
academic critics of the war was mixed. The University of Munich
resisted government attempts to secure the dismissal of Professor
F.W.FOrster, but a more outspoken critic G.F.Nicolai, Professor
of Physiology at the University of Berlin,was deprived of his
chair and imprisoned at least twice for his views.*
Certainly one can say that the British Governments treat¬
ment of Russell did amount to something like persecution, espec¬
ially when he was sent to prison for six months in May 1918 for
"having made certain statements likely to prejudice His Majesty*s
2
relations with America". But even before this the Government had
been able to harass Russell by restricting his movements (as some¬
one who had been convicted under D.O.R.A.) within Britain. Lloyd
George claimed that Russell had to be prohibited from giving
lectures in special security areas (including all coastal towns and
cities) because they "undoubtedly interfere with the prosecution
(footnote continued from previous page)
prior government action t(i) conviction for disobeying a law or
wartime regulation, (ii) involvement in anti-conscription propa¬
ganda or opposition to military law, (iii) attempting to dissuade
others from assisting the war effort, (iv) "hostile and offensive
expressions concerning the United States or its government" (in
public or in private) by Professors of German origin. Not surpris¬
ingly, there were many cases of dismissals and forced resignations,
of which those of W.A.Schaper (Professor of Political Science,
Minnesota), J.McK.Cattell (Professor of Psychology, Columbia)and
H.W.L.Dana (Professor of Comparative Literature, Columbia) are
only the most celebrated. See J.R.Mock, Censorship 1917. Princeton,
1941,pp.32-3; R.Hofstadter & W.Metzger,pp.495-506;Gruber,
chapter V.
1. Fbrster moved to Switzerland after the war after being ostracised
by nationalists. R.H.Samuel & R.H.Thomas, Education & Society in
Modern Germany. 1949,pp.127-8. Nicolai finally escaped dramatically
to Denmark. R.Holland, The Forerunners.1920.pp.140-74. and
Nicolai, Biology of War.pp.v-vi. 9-11. After the war he became
a Professor of Sociology at the University del Littoral in Argentina.
2. On the strength of a report of speeches in the U.S.Senate, Russell
alleged that American soldiers woujd be used as strike-breakers in
Britain as they had in their own country. See "The German Peace
Offer", Tribunal. 90(3 Jan.l9l8),I(repr. in Russell, Autobiography.
11,79-81). Russell had in fact made the same charge five months
earlier(Tribunal,72(30 Aug.1917),2.
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of the war in this country'*.* But for Russell, new without means
of support, perhaps the worst blow was the refusal of the Foreign
Office to grant him a passport to travel to America to lecture on
2
Logic and Ethics at Harvard. Quite apart from the issue of
civil liberty there was the simple question of financial support.
Russell was lucky therefore to have friends prepared to
rally round and support him when he came out of prison in September
1910. Gilbert Murray organised a memorial, signed by many of
the leading philosophers, to raise money to support a lectureship
of from £150 to £200 a year for three years "in order to enable...
(Russell) to devote himself exclusively to philosophical work, in
the form of teaching or research or both. It is to be feared,
however, that he may find this impossible, since in the present
state of public feeling no ordinary university institution is
likely to be willing to employ him as a teacher after his expulsion
3
from Trinity College, Cambridge." As one of the signatories,
A.E.Taylor (who in September 1915 had called for the prosecution
of Russell) pointed out, universities in Britain had "to think
very much of student fees, and...any which appointed Bertrand
1. Hansard. Ser.5, LXXXVI (Oct.-Nov.1916),538-40. For subsequent
debate, see ibid., 863-82,1127-8 & LXXXVIII(Nov.-Dec.1916),146,
288-300. See also the file in the Keynes Mss.(30.12) relating
to the National Council for Civil Liberties arid the Russell Case.
2. On the grounds that he had been convicted under D.O.R.A., but
really because they considered him "one of the most mischievous
cranks in the country". Cit. Feinberg & Kasrils,pp.60-1.
3. Manifesto among Keynes-Russell letters, J.M.Keynes Mss. 32.2
(also in Murray Mss.Box 57). Signatories were S.Alexander,
H.W.Carr(Secretary of the Aristotelian Society), G.D.Hicks
(Professor of Philosophy University College London),T.P.Nunn
(Professor of Education, London), A.B.Taylor, J.Ward, A.Whitehead.
See also various letters to Murray, 7-20 Sept.1918, Murray Mss.
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Russell might have to face a real falling off from the illogical
wrath of the British parent in his present mood." And he
concluded, "I certainly do not see what is going to become of
lehrfreiheit if he can be victimised in this way without a very
energetic protest."1
For all his difficulties Russell was fortunate in being an
eminent philosopher and a man with connections in high places.
Unlike his fellow political prisoner E.D.Morel he was able to get
into the first division at Brixton Prison on appeal. With more
comfortable conditions he was able to read and white what he wanted
(provided that he did not indulge in political propaganda). Acting
on the suggestion of Gilbert Murray, Lord Balfour had intervened
with the Home Secretary on behalf of a fellow-philosopher to secure
2
prison conditions which would not break him physically or mentally.
What greater contrast could there be to this than in the treatment
meted out to Professors in British universities who happened to be
of German origin. These dismissals aroused virtually no publicity
and, unlike the Russell case, they have been virtually forgotten.
When the war broke out in 1914 university teachers who were
German nationals could expect to be Interned (if they were males
of military age) in Britain. This was in fact what happened to
1. Letter to G.Murray, 4 Sept.1918, Murray Mss. Box 57. This had
also been a consideration with Trinity College Council when
dismissing Russell, according to Dickinson. See his letter to
N.Wedd, 4 Nov.1916,Wedd Mss.Box.3.
2. See Murray to Russell, 27 Mar.1918, cit. Russell, Autobiography.
II, 82(& 34). Also letters of Murray to Russell, 10 Feb.1918
to 7 April 1918,Murray Mss. Box 46; Russell to H.W.Carr, 29
Mar,1918 to 17 April 1918 cit. M.R.Thompson, "Some Letters Of
Bertrand Russell To Herbert Wildon Carr", Coranto (1976),
15-18.
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Julius Freund, Professor of German at Sheffield (1906-15J.1 Other
German nationals, like Max Freund (Professor of German at Belfast,
1903-14) were in Germany when the war broke out. All were quickly
removed from their chairs and lectureships by resolutions of the
2
governing bodies. However, anti-German feeling was not very
discriminating. Pepple with German names were easy targets for
hatred, even if they were British nationals or Germans who had
lived in Britain for twenty years or so and who had just never taken
3
British nationality. Provincial universities and colleges -
with the exception of Manchester, where there was a large community
of German origin and many university teachers with German names -
were least able to withstand local pressure because of the strong
4
representation of local interests on their governing bodies.
1. At the end of 1916 his professorship was terminated by the
University Council because it believed "there was little likeli¬
hood that students would want to be taught by one of his nation¬
ality". A.W.Chapman (former Registrar) to the writer, 26 July
1973. Freund went on to become a professor at Berlin (1919).
2. The claims for arrears of salary was not settled until 1927,
by which time Freund was Professor of German at the Rice Insti¬
tute in Texas. See T.W.Moody & J.C.Beckett, Queen♦s Belfast 1845-
1949. 1959, II, 457 & n.6, 611. There were similar cases with
lecturers in German at Reading (K.Holl), St.Andrews (G.Schaafs)
and Dundee (W.Stede). Official records of Reading University
College Council (27 Oct.1914) and Minutes of the St.Andrews
University Court (19 Oct.1914, 10 May,1915). The Professor of
Greek & Reader in Oriental History at Liverpool (1911-14) C.F.F.
Lehmann-Haupt resigned soon after the outbreak of war. Annual
Report of Vice-Chancellor (courtesy of Mr A.Allan, University
Archives). The Professor Sanskrit & Comparative Philology at
Edinburgh (1875-1914) H.J.Bggeling was in Germany at the out¬
break of war and resigned his chair. His high standing within
the University is shown in the long extract in Senate minutes
regretting his retirement. Edinburgh University Senatus Academicus
Minutes (5 Nov.1914). His son continued to teach German in the
University.
3. W.T.S.Sonnenschein (Vice-Principal of Brasenose College,Oxford)
with his father W.Swan Sonnenschein) assumed his paternal grand¬
mother 's name Stallybrass, although hewas still affectionately
known as "Sonners". H.G.Hanbury in DNB 1941-50.p.816. His
uncle. E.A.Sonnenschein (Professor of Latin at Birmingham)did
(p.t »o.)
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Anti-German hysteria was present from almost the first
days of the war, but it reached its height from 1915 onwards. In
December 1914 the shelling of East coast towns, in January 1915
the first Zeppelin raids, in April 1915 the sinking of the
Lusitania, all fuelled the hysteria. In April 1915 there were
anti-German riots in London's East End, and in May the Stock
Exchange excluded brokers of German birth (even if naturalised).
In October 1914 the First Sea Lord (Prince Louis of Battenberg)
was forced from office because of his German origins. In May 1915
the Unionists secured the exclusion of Haldane from office, pres¬
umably because his penchant for Hegel made him suspect. Spy
mania affected otherwise intelligent people, and together with
stories of Russian soldiers with snow on their boots passing
through Britain, provide evidence of the disturbed state of the
public mind. The Principal of Birmingham University, Oliver
Lodge blamed the shell-shortage cm spies and agents provocateurs.
The "natural tendency of hard-worked and ignorant men to drink
and idleness" was, he claimed "readily fostered by aliens".1
footnotes continued from previous page)
not change his name, although his son did (to Somerset). Sir
Charles Waldstein (born in America of German parents), former
Professor of Art at Cambridge, anglicised his surname to Walston.
See his letter to N.Vtedd, 12 May 1918, Wedd Mss.Box 3. The
orientalist Arthur Schloss became Arthur Waley.
4. There was only one Manchester professor with a German back¬
ground : Arvid Johannaon had been born in Russian ruled Livonia
and educated at the universities of Dorpat, TUbingen and Berlin.
He had been professor of German at Manchester since 1895 and
Dean of the Faculty of Arts from 1916. By the time of the out¬
break of war Arthur Schuster (another naturalised Briton of German
origin) had moved from his professorship of Physics at Manchester
to the Secretaryship of the Royal Society.
1. The War & After. 1916 pp.152-3. Such aliens were "loathsome and
filthy as well as horrible" (p.154). Cf. the belief of Arthur
Hassall that Britain had for many years "been infested by spies,
who were to be found in every grade of...society and who regularly
notified their views of the political situation to the German
authorities". Hassall,p.4.
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In May 1915, the month of Haldane's fall, the Government
announced further alien internments. At this time a letter
appeared in The Times from five professors of German origin hut
British nationality, mho held chairs of German at Oxford, Cambridge,
Birmingham, Leeds and London. They declared their "unswerving
loyalty** to the country of their adoption.1 Five days later
another letter appeared in which the professor of International Law
at Cambridge - another British national of German origin -
2
expressed disgust at German atrocities in Belgium But subsequent
events showed thatnot even such declarations could save at least
two of the signatories from further criticism, and ultimately
persecution, by the communities in which they lived. We will look
in more detail at three of the cases:
Wichmann: Karl Wichmann was Professor of German at the University
of Birmingham. lie had been born in Germany, taken a degree at
Kiel University, and then had come to Britain very probably for
political reasons. He lectured at Birmingham before taking up
a chair in German at Sheffield (1901-7), finally moving back to
Birmingham as Professor of German in 1907. According to Sir William
Ashley, eminent economic historian and Vice-Principal of Birmingham
University, Wichmann was a great admirer of Britain:
1. 14 May 1915, p.lOd. The signatories were K.H.Breul (Cambridge),
H.G.Fiedler (Oxford), A.W.SchUddekopf (Leeds), K.Wichnann
(Birmingham), R.Priebsch (London). There were many similar
letters at this time.
2. 19 May 1915, p.10b. Lasa Oppenheira had been in Britain since
1895 and had been naturalised in 1900. Like many other Anglo-
Germans he had left for political reasons. But he was still
very sensitive, as his reaction to a colleagues jibe about the
"Anglo-German" appearance of his legal writing showed. See
his "On War Treason", Law Quarterly Rev. XXXIII,ooodL (July
1917),266. '
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"...with a great admiration of English political
institutions and a great detestation of Prussian
methods of government and of Prussian militarism.
While proud of the traditions of the great age of
German philosophy and Literature and Music - the
age of Kant, and Goethe and Beethoven - he greatly
disliked the materialistic tendencies of modern
Germany. I must confess that there always seems to
me a strain of unpracticality in his ideas, but, in
theory and temperament, he was poles asunder from the
pan-Germain or militarist German type. His influence,
I am convinced, among his students, was on the side
of all that is high and noble in the best of German
literature of the past."1
The occasion for Ashley*s letter was the news that Wichmann
was the subject of investigation by the "Certificates of Natural¬
isation (Revocation) Committee" in London. Ashley was at pains
to portray Wichmann as a "good German". In Wichmann*s lectures
on "German Institutions" he had pointed out to the students "the
lack of genuine self-government in the German constitution".
From Ashley's letter it is also clear that Wichmann had been forced
to resign from his chair in 1916 "due to the action of the City
Council, which...was not based upon any specific charge of any kind
but on the broad principle that no German might hold a Chair in an
English University". Wichmann had then withdrawn from Birmingham,
not because of "any specific fault on his part, or any charge against
him, but because, whether wisely or not, it was thought that his
presence was undesirable in a munition area, and in a university
2
where so much confidential work was being done for the Government."
1. Letter to the Secretary, Certificates of Naturalisation (Revocation)
Committee, 21 Oct.1918. (Courtesy of Birmingham University
Archives).
2. Loc.Cit. There was research at the University on explosives,
gas, aircraft, alloys and submarines. See M.Sanderson, The
Universities and British Industry 1830-1970. 1972,pp.221-3,
229-30.
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No more is heardof Wichmann, who disappears quietly from
university records.1 His chair remained vacant until 1918 when
Dr Sandbach, formerly Special Lecturer in Commercial German, became
Professor . The fate of Wlchmann*s colleague at Leeds is known.
It could be said that A.W.Schttddekopf was killed by the mental
anguish of seeing the two countries he loved best at war with each
other, and perhaps too by the shoddy treatment he received from
the community in which he lived.
SchUddekopf; Albert-William SchUddekopf had been Professor of
German at Leeds since 1896. Born in Germany he had graduated from
GBttingen in 1885 and then settled in Britain. He was Professor
of German at Bedford College, London (1888-90), before coming to
Leeds as a Lecturer in 1890. With the outbreak his difficulties
were compounded by his wife*s habit of speaking her mind. Her
comments on the truthfulness of the Bryce Report had led some local
people to complain to the Vice-Chancellor Sir Michael Sadler. In
July 1915 the local M.P. (J.Butcher) asked the Home Secretary
whether it were true that SchUddekopf had "refused to allow his
son [a Second Lieutenant in a Territorial Regiment] to fight against
the Germans". Apparently the Professor was quite "willing that
his son should serve for home defence, but did not wish him to
2
fight Germans abroad".
1. There is no official mention of his resignation in the Report
To The University Council for 1916-17(letter to the writer from
Miss C.L.Penney, 26 July 1973).
2. Hansard. Ser.5 LXXIXI (July 1915), 185-6. Butcher had been Fellow
of Trinity College, Cambridge (1875-84).
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Although Shttddekopf had signed the letter of loyalty
in May 1915 (see above) he was now prohibited by the Home Secretary
from associating with members of the armed forces "without the
permission of a competent military authority" - and this despite
the fact of his being a naturalised British subject. In November
1915 the University was forced to grant hira indefinite leave of
absence because the City of Leeds Education Committee had threatened
to withdraw its grant to the University.1 In June 1916 Sadler
advised Schtiddekopf to resign, and three months later he died in
a nursing home in Harrogate aged fifty-four.
The third case involved not a Professor of German but an
eminent German-born orientalist. C.Hermann Eth£ held a combined
chair of German and Oriental Languages at University College
Aberystwyth from 1875. Like Wichraann and Schttddekopf, he "was a
political exile who was too liberal to live easily in Bismarck*s
2
new Germany." After four years as a lecturer in Oriental Languages
at Munich (1367-71) Eth& came to Britain where he married an English
woman and gained an international reputation amongst scholars for
his catalogue of Persian, Turkish, Hindustani, Pushti and Arabic
manuscripts in the Bodleian Library (from 1872) and his catalogue
of Persian manuscripts in the India Office Library. This reputa¬
tion was recognised by Oxford*s appointment of Sth£ as Public
Examiner for the Honours School of Oriental Studies (from 1887).
1. Information supplied btj the German Department, University
of Leeds, June 1973.
2. E.L.Ellis, The University College of Wales. Aberystwyth
1872-1972. Cardiff, 1972, p.171.
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As a former colleague pointed out, the only reason he never got
a chair in a German university was due to his liberal political
views t
"Witfch the growth of his reputation attempts
were made naturally to recall hire. To many
Oriental faculties in German universities it
seened anomalous that one of the first Persian
scholars in Europe should be spending the prime
of his life in teaching French and German at a
little town on the coast of Wales, and he was
repeatedly nominated for an Oriental chair* Very
possibly he would have accepted the call. But
all these attempts broke down before the resolute
refusal of the Imperial Ministry to tolerate a
scholar of his suspicious political opinions in
a German university chair."1
When war broke out Eth4 and his wife were in Germany, but
he was allowed back to Britain at the request of the College autho¬
rities. Back in Aberystwyth in October Bth& and one of his
2
colleagues - an Englishman with a German name - were threatened
by a mob led by a local magistrate and a town councillor. Eth&
took refuge with his wife's family, and, although in obvious
financial difficulties, was asked to resign by the College Council.
Even the small pension offered by the College was attacked by a
member of the Town Council who asked "why a member of the family
of brutes who left our men to die and Jeered when they saw their
3
coffins pass" should receive even £150 a year. This affair caused
a good deal of strain between town and gown in Aberystwyth.
Although Bth4 (unlike Wichmann and SchUddekopf} had never
1. C.H.Herford, Times. 6 Nov.1916,p.10c.
2. G.A.Schott (Professor of Applied Mathematics) who had a German
wife.
3. Dr Harries was referring to a report on Wittenberg Camp. The
Town Council condemned the annuity. Times. 13 April,1916,p.lid.
The Professor of History in the College (E.Edwards) who was
present strongly defended Eth4.
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become naturalised, he had been in the country for forty-two years.
All the time Eth£ had worked in the India Office (for no remuner¬
ation since 1901) no one had ever suggested that he was "concocting
treasonable information for Berlin".1 Bth4 died at Reading in
1917 without returning to the College that he had served so faith¬
fully. "Despite his age", the College historian writes, "he was
a casualty of the war Just as certainly as any young soldier
2
killed at the Front."
These seem to have been f ha only cases of persecution -
all the more discreditable in the cases of Wichsaann and SchUdde-
kopf because they should have been able to expect to be treated
as loyal British subjects, which they were. Some of the opposition
among Cambridge conservatives, like Ridgway, to the idea of an
English Tripos - put forward during the war - was probably due to
anti-German feeling, for two of the leading reformers were Hermann
Breul (Professor of German) and B.G.W.Braunholtz (Reader in Romance
3
Languages), both German-born. Herman George Fiedler, Taylorian
Professor of German at Oxford (1907-39), had his loyalty called
into question by an undergraduate magazine early in 1915; the
4
title of the article was "Can The Leopard Change His Spots7"
Although 144 undergraduates protested publicly against the "innuendo
1. Herford, op.cit.
2. Ellis,p.173.
3. See E.M.W.Tillyard, The Muse Unchained. 1958,pp.29,35,61.
4* The Varsity. XIV,340(9 Feb.1915),I. See also: XIV,341 (16 Feb.
1915), 1-2; 343 (2 Mar .1915),$ and 344(9 Mar.1915), II.
Fiedler had been a lecturer at Queen Mary College, Glasgow (1833 -
90) and Professor at Birmingham (1890-1907) before coming to
Oxford.
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and veiled threats", it was perhaps surprising that only two dons
signed the protest letter.*" Two months later Fiedler was taken
to task by a Fellow of Jesus College (A.E.W.Hazel) for not being
specific enough in his condemnation of Germany when he had written
to The Times with other professors of German in May 1915. "An
ambiguous declaration of this kind", Hazel wrote, "may save their
windows, but will hardly save their reputations." Fiedler must
have taken this to heart, for a week later he sent a letter to
the Oxford Magazine stressing his revulsion at the sinking of the
2
Lusitanja and at the German use of poison gas.
In this examination of the pressures on political dissent
in universities in wartime perhaps the most interesting conclusion
is the extent to which academics themselves were willing accom¬
plices of a general sensitivity to criticism. Although the number
of academics apparently willing - for whatever motive - to persecute
their colleagues may not seem large, they were not greatly out¬
numbered by those who publicly defended the right of people like
Pigou or Russell to openly criticise official policy. The attitude
of the majority was either tacit acquiescence or a desire not to
get involved. Whether academic freedom was in fact being infringed
during the wax of course depends on one's definition of being
infringed, but it would be hard to deny that the war revealed the
definite limits to freedom of speech which an academic could expect
1. Oxford Mag.. XXXIII, 15(5 Mar.1915), 248 and 16 Q2 March,
1915), 263.
2. Oxford Mao.. XXXIII, 20 (21 May 1915), 328 & 21 (28 May 1915),
342. After the war Hazel became Principal of Jesus College.
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to onjoy.1 The treatment of German-born academics revealed not
only the irrational hatreds of wartime but also the extent to
which the newer universities and colleges were vulnerable to
2
community pressure. But the treatment of Russell by Trinity
Collage Council also shows that similar pressures could operate -
1. Strictly defined it is "the freedom...to investigate or discuss"
one*s subject and to express "conclusions, whether through
publication or in the instruction of students, without inter¬
ference from political or ecclesiastical authority, or from the
adrainistrative officials" of the university, unless one's methods
"are found by qualified bodies" of one's profession "to be
clearly Incompetent or contrary to professional ethics". A.O.
Lovejoy, "Academic Freedom" in Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences.
1930, I, 384. Lord Chorley was using a similar definition when
he claimed in 1963 that in Britain there did not "appear to
have been any case where even a colorable argument has been
advanced that a dismissal took place which involved a breach of
academic freedom". Chorley, 664, Cf.E.Ashby, Universities British.
Indian. African. 1966,p.292. However, in America by the end of
the nineteenth century professors were attempting to include
extramural freedom of speech into a broader definition of
academic freedom. This was reflected in the 1915 Report of
the Committee on Academic Freedom and Tenure of the A.A.U.P.
See Hofstadter & Metsger,pp.403-12. Needless to say, the
lernfreiheit component of the original German definition of
academic freedom was not stressed in Britain or America.
2. Manchester seems to be an exception. Hot only was there
apparently no persecution of professors of German origin, but
the Professor of Economic History George Uhwin held his chair
although he was a meisber of the U.D.C. and of the Fellowship of
Reconciliation. Urrarln also organised lectures for "that
miscreant Russell" and owned to "going about in a sneaking
way insinuating the subversive principles of the Sermon on the
Mount at Methodist Colleges ami other unlikely places". Cit.
R.H.Tawney, "Introductory Memoir" to Unwin's Studies In Economic
History. 1927,p.liii. Unwin*s views were very like those of
Dickinsont "no nation was guiltless, and, compared with the
general responsibility, the relative criminality of the differ¬
ent combatants was a question of secondary importance."
(ibid..p.Ill) Unwin»s colleague at Manchester R.H.Tawney
expressed similar views in his Commonplace Book (pp.81-2).
though more indirectly - on the two ancient universities. What
A.B.Taylor called "the illogical wrath of the British Parent"
spelt possible future financial trouble just as much as an
unsatisfied local education committee.1
Yet, although some academics suffered persecution because
of the atmosphere of wartime hysteria, some of their colleagues
were engaged in feeding war hatreds, working in the largely
clandestine British propaganda machine.
1. I have not been able to find any evidence that wartime con¬
scientious objectors had any difficulty in obtaining academic
posts after 1918. There were cases of universities refusing
to take conscientious objectors as students during the war,
and there was a proposal in the House of Lords to bar
conscientious objectors from the teaching profession in
state schools (Nov.1917). However, this was defeated much
to the relief of H.A.L.Fisher. See Tawney "Introductory
Memoir ", pp.liii-liv and Rae,pp.199-200.
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XIII. BRITISH ACADEMICS AND PROPAGANDA AGAINST
GERMANY
"In the wars of to-day, which comprise entire
peoples, thought is enlisted; thought kills as well
as cannons; it kills the soul; it kills beyond the
seas, it kills across centuries; it is the heavy
artillery which works at a distance."
Romain Holland, Clerambault
(1920).
The dividing line between propaganda and history can be
fine, and never more so than during wartime. The writings of British
philosophers and historians, which we have examined in previous
chapters, were often little more than attempts to give an ideological
basis for Allied war aims and policies. In a sense they were propa¬
gandist, although there was often very little to distingiiish them
from more scholarly writing on the subject of, say, German culture
and politics, of Britain's role in Europe. It is easy enough with
the classicist Gilbert Murray to distinguish propagandist from
scholarly writings. But what of the historians, whose business it
was to write, in peacetime, the history of Wilhelmine Germany or of
modern European diplomacy? Was it just coincidental that historians
were the most prolific wartime pamphleteers? Or was it the result
of the position of the historian in British society? Acton had
written that a "knowledge of the past, the record of truths revealed
by experience", was valuable not just for itself, but as "an
instrument of action" and a "power" for "the making of the future".1
1. "Inaugural Lecture On The Study of History" (1B95), repr. in
Lectures on Modern History. 1906,p.2.
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And while some British historians took issue with Acton*s injunction
to make moral judgements, few dissented from his belief that modern
history was characterised by unmistakable signs of "forward movement".
It is perhaps not surprising then that historians were
intimately involved in the development of official British propa¬
ganda. In 1914 Britain was as unprepared to wage what would now
be called propaganda warfare as it was to fight a long continental
campaign. G.W.Prothero, editor of the Quarterly Review and
previously Professor of History at Edinburgh (1894-9), was one of
the first people to realise this deficiency, and in the first month
of the war he raised the xaatter in The Times. His letter, headed
"A Fight To The Finish", expressed grave concern at the "evidence
that in large and influential sections of the population" the war
was "not regarded with whole-hearted approval, or, indeed, approval
at all." The reason, Prothero claimed, was that "even if the
demands of honour and the maintenance of treaties" made a "widely-
understood appeal", vital British interests did not appear to be
involved. And it was clear that it was with "the vast masses of
working people in the north and centre of England" that prothero
1
was concerned. His fears might be dismissed as those of a
conservative with little knowledge of working class opinion except
that one of the leading lights in the university extension and
adult education movement confirmed them. One can find ample evi¬
dence in the papers of the Balliol history tutor A.L.Smith of his
own attempts to combat the disturbing lack of enthusiasm for the
1. 20 Aug.1914, p.3b.
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war among members of his classes
Smith used the W.E.A. as a means of reaching working-class
opinion, and the titles of his lectures which survive and the
broadsheets suggest the message he attempted to put acrossi "The
People and the Duties of Empire**, "The Empire Fabric", What The
2
War Really Means"f "Never Again". Privately Smith and Prothero
worried over the workers who greeted recruiting drives with the
3
claim that they would not "be any worse off under German rule",
and the revelations of German "frightfulness" in Belgium from early
1915 onwards gave them welcome ammunition to use in their lectures.
At the same time the neutral "market" overseas became more impor¬
tant in the considerations of those involved in propaganda. Still,
it is not completely true that propaganda was "directed, not
towards the ignorant masses, but to educated doubters", and one
can find many published lectures delivered to unsophisticated
audiences.5 The Oxford University Extension Delegacy had a well-
organised network of lecturers, and its secretary J.A.R.Marriott,
like Smith, sought to make use of this to reach working-class
1. Eg. his circular letter to W.E.A.branches which mentions Prothero*s
letter but in which Smith feels that it might be better that any
campaign should "come less academically and more through their
own working class organisations, and if possible through membership
of their own class; so as to be above suspicion of being in any
•interest* (political, religious, academic or social)." Smith Mas.
Box x, Group X. A year later Smith felt that there had been a
"•clarification* of working-class opinion", due largely to W.E.A.
lectures. Letter to A.Schuster, 15 Oct.1915. Cf. R.H.Tawney to
A.L.Smith, 27 Dec.1917, cit. Winter,p.170.
2. See Smith Mss.Box.1/Group 1.
3. Smith to F.Cunliffe,25 Aug.1914.loc.cit.See also Prothero to W.H.
Dawson, 15 Mar.1915,Dawson Mas.WHD/268.
4. Marwick, Deluge.p.45
5. Eg.Dicey, How We Ought To Feel About The War (a lecture at Working
Men *s College .London) & Ashley .The' wa'FlTTtsr Economic Aspects (a
W.E.A. lecture at Birmingham), both Oxford pamphlets on the
war.
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opinion. "Propaganda in the narrower sense was not within our
proper province", he wrote later. "But we substituted for our usual
lecture subjects, courses which had a direct bearing upon the war,
its antecedents and issues.1 No doubt Marriott's intentions were
not unlike those of Smith, and the Delegacy and W.E.A. were soon
represented on a "central committee" of national patriotic organi¬
sations , like the Victoria League and Cavendish League, together
2
with the Business Men's League and the Social Service Bureau.
Should the universities become involved directly in this
patriotic activity? B.A.Sonnenschein, Professor of Classics at
Birmingham, thought they should take "a prominent part in the
campaign of enlightenment" which was "needed not only to stimulate
recruiting, but also to clear away some cobwebs from the minds of
3
certain sections" of the population. However, Alfred Marshall,
the eminent Cambridge economist, sounded a note of caution about
the proposal to recruit academics as travelling patriotic lecturers.
Picking up one of prothero's points - that there should be no need
for "bitter or inflammatory" addresses, since the truth about
German actions was bad enough - Marshall raised the spectre of
jingoism. "It is to be remembered", he wrote, "that a great many
Germans, especially among the working classes, are very averse to
1. Memories Of Four Score fears. 1946,p.153. Marriott, like Prothero,
was an ardent Imperialist (though a Tory, while Prothero was a
Liberal Unionist). On the political colouration of Extension
lecturers, see S.Rcwbotham, "The Call To University Extension
Teaching 1873-1900", U.of Birmingham Hist.J. .XII.1(1969).57-71.
2. The committee set out to "unify and coordinate the work of the
several leagues and associations already engaged in educating and
arousing the country as to the reason, justice, and necessity of
the War." Prothero's letter to Times. 5 Sept.1914,p.9d. See letters
from T.B.Strong (Vice-Chancellor of Oxford University) & L.R.
Parnell (Rector of Exeter College), Times. 31 Aug.1914,p.4b. Also
from the historians J.H.Rose & C.G.Robertson, Times. 21 Aug,1914
(p.4c),26 Aug.l914(p.5a),27 Aug 1914(p.7e). " ~
3. Times. 5 Sept.1914,p.9d.
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wars of exploitation, but, like similar classes at home, ace
exasperated by insults to the fatherland."1 But quite apart from
this, Marshall insisted that intellectuals should not abandon
their usual standards of critical enquiry just because war had
broken out. And, making no secret of his own attitude to things
German, he wrote that "those who know and love Germany, even while
revolted by the hectoring militarism which is more common there
2
than here , should insist that we have no cause to scorn them.
"Professorial folly", wrote one correspondent in response
to Marshall*s letter. But perhaps even more wounding were the
attacks from other academics. L.R.Farnell, Rector of Exeter
College, Oxford, and a pugnacious wan at the best of times, felt
that such "moderate and compromising speech" was "unworthy of this
moral doomsday of Europe, and flatly inadequate as a criticism of
3
Germany*s guilt." But J.H.Morgan, Professor of Constitutional
Law at University College, London, came to the heart of the matter
with his claim, in answer to Marshall, that "any attempt...to dis¬
criminate between the German Government and the German people,
between the policy of one and the culture of the other" was "an
otiose and dangerous thing". Like Marshall, Morgan had seen German
1. Times. 26 Aug.1914,p.9a.
2. Times, 22 Aug.l914,p.7tt. Cf.Memorials Of Alfred Marshall.1925.
pp.490-1. Marshall, however, was in no doubt that Britain was
fighting in "the right cause". Letter to C.P.Scott, 10 Mar.1915,
C.P.Scott Mss.
3. Times. 25 Aug.1914,p.7d & 31 Aug.1914,p.4b. Farnell had been
involved in agitation for conscription before 1914. See
above p.Ifc3 .
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Wissenschaft at first hand - in the University of Berlin of Treitschke*s
day - but he had concluded that the professors were completely the
creatures of the state which appointed then. They and the wider
German public were the accomplices of German imperialism. "No one
who has lived in Germany", he concluded, "can fail to be impressed
with the hypnotism exercised upon the German mind by the pomp and
circumstance of war. It has acted like an opiate on all the finer
feelings of the people."1 This argument for total war was couched
in stronger terms than was usual among British academics, but then
2
Morgan seems to have been more Germanophobic than most. Scholars
like Jaiaes Bryce and H.A.L.Fisher were more reluctant to give up
their notion of the two Germanics - militarist, authoritarian
Wilhelmine Germany and the gentler, cosmopolitan Germany of their
youth. But this distinction tended to lose its force as the war
went on, and as propaganda concentrated on the dangers of premature
peace and on the need for total victory.
In the first two years of the war there was, as we have
seen, a great flood of idealistic writing by British academics.
This began to peter out by 1916 - no doubt the slaughter on the
Western Front had something to do with this - by which time the
official government propaganda machine was revealing itself publicly.
1. Times. 28 Aug.1914,p.5b & c.
2. Morgan was attached to the B.E.F. in France as legal advisor
(1914-19) and was involved in collecting evidence of German
atrocities. After the war he was a member (till 1923) of the
Inter-Allied Council of the Control Commission for German Dis¬
armament and he actively opposed German rearmament. In 1945 he
interrogated most of the major Nazi war criminals. For
evidence of his wartime Gerraanophobia, see below j>p.3£0 -i.
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Yet even before the creation of the War Propaganda Bureau in 1916
the Government was organising propaganda, although great care was
taken to obscure the fact.1 Early in the war C.F.G.Masterman,
Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, had been entrusted by the
Cabinet with the task of consulting with leading figures from the
worlds of journalism, literature and the universities with a view
to speeding the flow of privately-organised propaganda against
2
Germany. Out of these meetings grew a clandestine propaganda
bureau under Masterman, with offices in Wellington House, centre of
the National Insurance Commission. Some of the Commissions civil
servants took up this new work. These transfers, together with
the building itself, were, as the head of Pictorial Propaganda
later noted, admirable comouflagefor propaganda warfare. "Wellington
House", as it became known to the select few, was concerned, not
with supplying news to the press (this was the job of the Foreign
Office), but with "the production, translation, and distribution
of books, pamphlets, Government publications, speeches...dealing
with the war, its origin, its history, and all the difficult and
varied questions which arose during its development". It was also
concerned to place "articles and interviews designed to influence
1. See M.L.Sanders, "Wellington House and British Propaganda
during the First World War", Historical J.. XVIII,1(1975),
119-46.
2. Including J.M.Barrie, F.M.Hueffer (later Ford), A.Bennett
R.Bridges, G.K.Chesterton, Conan Doyle (who had been knighted
for his services in defending the British army from atrocity
charges during the Boer War), J.Galsworthy, T.Hardy, J.Masefield,
A.E.W.Mason, G.M.Trevelyan, H.G.Wells and Gilbert Murray.
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opinion in the world*8 newspapers and magazines, especially in
America."1
One of Wellington House's most successful ventures was the
distribution of the manifesto of the Oxford theologians Xo The
2
Christian Scholars of Europe and America, which most recipients
did not recognise had any connection with official propaganda
distribution. Just how this happened has been described by W(
Macneile Dixon, Professor of English at Glasgow and head of the
American office for Wellington House. With a list of all the
principal American newspapers and of all the leading public
men in the United States, he was able to send them pamphlets
and books as though they had come from the publishers themselves,
3
and not from the propaganda bureau. Further, the publications
written by members of Wellington House, or commissioned by it,
were issued by commercial publishers (including Oxford University
Press) or by non-official propaganda bodies, like Prothezo*s
Central Committee of National Patriotic Organisations. Wellington
House supplied them with literature, and they in turn "interested
in their scheme manywell-known people" in Britain. These people
directed the literature "to their distinguished friends abroad",
4
giving "a personal touch to what was in essence propaganda".
1. I.N.Nicholson, "An Aspect Of Official British Wartime Propaganda",
Cornhill Mag..NS.LXX.5(May 1931),594. The civil servants included
Sir Claud Schuster & Ernest Gowers (later author of Plain Words).
2. S.P.Mews, "Religion & English Society In The First World War",
Cambridge Ph.D.thesis,1975,p.12.
3. Dixon to J.D.Squares, 20 Jan.1933 cit.Squires, British Propaganda
At Home & In The United States from 1914 to 1917.Cambridge Mass.,
1935,p.57. Dixon took over the American office from Sir Gilbert
Parker (1916).
4. S.Gaselee, "Prefatory Note" to G.W.Prothero, Select Analytical
List of Books Concerning The Great War.1923.p.iil.See also
material in Prothero Mas.,esp.correspondence with informants on
neutral opinionj Countess Martinengo in Italy (pp.II) & Miss
(p.t.o.)
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So wrote another wartime academic employed in propaganda work.1
Apart from civil servants, seconded from other departments,
academics were probably as numerous as journalists on the staff
of Wellington House. Arnold Toynbee, Fellow and Tutor of Balliol
College, was involved in organising propaganda for the American
market until his transfer to the Political Intelligence Department
of the Foreign Office in April 1918. This was the beginning of
a long familiarity - on and off - with the corridors of power. He
was a member of the British delegation to the Paris Peace Conference,
advising on Middle Eastern affairs, and twenty years later in
another world war he again headed a team of expert advisors at the
Foreign Office, housed this time in Balliol College. From King's
College, Cambridge, came J.W.Headlam who had worked as Historical
Advisor in the Foreign Office before the war. Lewis Nanier, who
advised on Polish and Austrian affairs, also divided his time
between Wellington House and the Foreign Office. Edwyn Bevan, the
classical scholar formerly of New College, Oxford, was assigned
the job of studying the German press and he soon became an author-
ity on the pan-German movement. Later he was joined by H.H.
Joachim, philosophy don at Marton, whose major work ironically
had been The Nature of Truth (1906)2 and Norman Kemp Smith,
(cont from previous page)
S.Norton in America (pp.Ill) also letters from academics in America
(pp.3/V1/1-3) & from Wellington Home (pp.3/VI/4). Also J.Ward
to F.von HUgel, 16 Oct.1914, von HUgel Mss.3126.
1. Caselee was a Fellow of Magdalene College, Cambridge (1901-19)
who worked in the Foreign Office during the war (1916-19) and
went on to become Librarian & Keeper of Papers (1920-).
2. Joachim, the son of a Hungarian who had settled in Britain,
worked in propaganda 1917-19. He was, notes his biographer, "most
scrupulous in dealing with German documents, such as captured
soldiers* diaries, to avoid distorting the translation to a
sense more favourable to the allied cause than it properly
bore." H.W.B.Joseph,"Harold Henry Joachim 1868-1938".FBA.XXIV(1938).
405.
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translator of Kant and Professor of Philosophy at Princeton - a
position which gave him useful American contacts. Finally there
were three popular novelists: Gilbert Frankau, Anthony Hope
(Hawkins) and Sir Gilbert Parker (also a Tory M.P.), as well as
the dramatic critic William Archer.
From the first the United States was the main object of
attention and several academics, like Sir George Adam Smith (Vice-
Principal of Aberdeen University) and G.G.G.Butler (international
lawyer and historian, of Corpus Christi College, Cambridge), went
on speaking tours to drum up support for the war.1 In America,
unlike Britain, propaganda (and academic involvement in it) was
much more openly organised by the Committee on Public Information,
an official body under the journalist George Creel, and the
National Board of Historical Services, a group of historians
working under the chairmanship of Professor James T.Shotwell of
Columbia University. The latter body, although not a government
agency (in fact its closest ties were with the American Historical
Association) and although it aimed not "to swerve in any way from
historical impartiality", produced iaaterial very like the more
obvious propagandist writings of historians working for Creel«s
2
committee. According to Lord Bryce, who admired the way the
American historians had organised themselves to support the war
effort, a body like the National Board was not really possible
1. See Smith, Our Common Conscience (1918) & Butler, International
Law and Autocracy (1917).
2. N.B.H.S. announcement Git. Gruber,p.l25. On the American scene
generally; see Gruber, chptr.IV; J.R.Mock & C.Larson, Words
That Won The War. Princeton, 1939, chptr.7; L.Gelfand, The
Inquiry. N.Haven, 1963,p.44.
in Britain where historians formed "a very small class" .* But
one could argue that it was hardly necessary. British historians
seemed to require no prompting to get on with the task of enlight¬
ening the public on the issue® involved in the war, and their
pamphlets and articles could be widely distributed on the clandes¬
tine Wellington House network.
However from 1916, when Wellington House was reorganised,
propaganda increasingly became the province of the newspapermen
rather than of the scholar. Harold Lasswell, father of American
research into techniques of propaganda, has remarked of journal¬
ists that "they are not hampered by what Dr.Johnson has termed
•needless scrupulosity*• They have a feeling for words and moods
and they know that the public is not convinced by logic, but
2
seduced by stories." And when the two press lords Northcliffe
and Beverbrook took over British propaganda in 1913 there seemed
to be a relaxation of standards, and the academics in Wellington
House (Headlam, Toynbee, Namier, Ziioraern and Bevan) Moved to the
more exalted surroundings of the Foreign Office.3 Nevertheless,
before these changes, Wellington House had always claimed that
although it presented "facts and general arguments based upon
facts" its intention was to make its audience "take a right view
1. Letter to F.J.Jameson, 21 Nov.1917, cit. L.F.Stock, "Some
Bryce-Jameson Correspondence", AHR, L,2(Jan, 1945),268.
2. Propaganda Technique Xn The World War. 1927,p.32
3. On the complex organisational changes 1916-18, see Sanders,
122-9. On the exit of the academics, see A .Headlam- Mor ley,
"Introduction" to J.W.Headlam-Morley, A Memoir Of The Paris
Peace Conferetx;e 1919.1972.p.xx. AvZiraraern had been Fellow
and Tutor of New College, Oxford (1904-9) before joining the
Board of Education in 1912. After the war he had a distinguished
academic career. His New College colleague, R.W.Seton-Watson
stayed to work for Northcliffe, sending propaganda into Eastern
Europe.
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of the actions of the British government".1 Its most serious
2
lapse from these standards - the "Kadaver Factory" story - was
largely the result of outside pressure. But Masterman and Lord
Bryce were not above agreeing to the replica of the "Lusitania
3
medal" which had (to say the least) an ambiguous basis in fact.
Bryce, who did not work for Wellington House although he seems
to have acted often as an advisor, was also involved in the
specialist field of atrocity propaganda. In this he was assisted
by Arnold Toynbee.
The publication of evidence of German and Turkish atrocities
was the one area where the printed word held its own against the
4
newer medium of the motion-picture in propaganda. And perhaps
the most outstanding success for Wellington House was the Bryce
Commission of Inquiry into alleged German atrocities in Belgium.
Not only was Bryce one of Britain's most eminent scholars - a
historian and political scientist - with strong ties of affection
1. First Report (June 1915) cit. Sanders. 120.
2. The story of Germans melting down dead soldiers* bodies for
glycerine (for fertiliser and explosives) originated with Haig*s
Chief of Intelligence (General Charteris). The "whole idea was
repugnant to the more scrupulous men in Wellington House, who
already had some doubts as to the authenticity of the tale."
Nevertheless they circulated bound volumes of Louis Raemaker*s
Cartoon History Of The War (1916) in which there was a cartoon
showing the use of German corpses for the manufacture of glycer¬
ine. J.M.Read, Atrocity Propaganda 1914-1919. N.Haven, 1941,
p.38 & n.76. Sanders, 137-9. A.Ponsonby, Falsehood In wartime.
1928,pp. 102-13. "" —
3. Sanders, 140. The medal was originally satirical in intention
but the British (perhaps unwittingly) interpreted it as cele¬
bratory. Bryce referred to the medal in his Presidential
Address to the British Academy in 1916 as an example of the
German Government keeping "its subjects in ignorance of the facts
of a war" - the medal had shown "that the Lusitania was a vessel
not only laden but conspicuously overladen with munitions of war."
PBA. 1915-16,p.24. Bryce did not enlighten the academicians of
the "facts" concerning the replica.
4. The shortage of paper also helped curtain printed propaganda.
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and respect for the German Wissenschaftbut he had also been a
very popular British ambassador in the United States (1907-1J).
He was every inch the public's (especially the American public's)
image of a grey-bearded, dispassionate scholar, as well known in
Cambridge Massachusetts as in Cambridge England. As a leader in
the St.Louis Republican put it: "If there is a man in the entire
British Empire whom the people of this nation are prepared to
2
believe implicitly, it is James Bryce." And this was a common
reaction in America when the sensational findings of the Bryce
Commission were published.
The outbreak of the war had been a great shock to Bryce. H.
A.L.Fisher, himself a member of the Bryce Commission, has left
this description of how Bryce's attitude to Germany stood in 1914:
"From early youth he had drunk deeply from
the well of German literature and historical science,
counting as one of the happiest recollections of
his life those student days in Heidelberg, in that
delightful, old, idealistic Germany, which had been
so easy and hospitable and so intent upon the things
which minister to the higher needs of man. Then as
a young man he had made his literary reputation by a
treatise on German history (The Holy Roman Empire.
1864], which won for him a widening circle of friend¬
ships among German students, which he was careful
and glad to preserve. Having been brought up in
the strongly anti-Louis-Napoleonic atmosphere of his
generation, and being somewhat defective on the side
of French humanities, he was perhaps inclined to
overrate the specific contributions of the German
genius to the literary culture of Europe. Moreover,
1. Bryce had studied law at Heidelberg in the 1860s. Later he
received honorary doctorates of law from the universities
of Jena (1908) and Leipzig (1909).
2. Cit. H.C.Peterson, Propaganda For War. Norman, Oklahoma,1939,
p.58. On Bryce's influence in America, see E.S.Ions, James
Eryce & American Democracy 1870-1922.1968.
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although he was alive to the dangers of Prussian
militarism he had always hoped and believed that
the forces of moderation and good sense which he
knew to be widely spread among the German people
would prevail against the mania for violence. He
was never, therefore, in the company of the
alarmists."1
The German invasion of Belgium was decisive for Bryce*s
attitude to the war, as it was for most British liberals. But
Bryce was closer to Germany, intellectually and emotionally, than
most. Thus the distinction between "good" and "bad" Germans
was very important for hira. Writing in 1916 of the ideas of the
necessity and desirability of war, and of the elevation of the
state above morality, Bryce noted:
"I do not attribute to the German people an
adherence to the former set of doctrines, for I do
not know how far these doctrines are held outside
the military and naval caste which has now
unhappily gained control of German policy, and I
cannot believe that the German people, as I have
hitherto known them, ever since I studied at a
German university more than fifty years ago, could
possibly approve of the action of their Government
if their Government suffered them to know the facts
relating to the origin and conduct of the war as
those facts are known to the rest of the world. We
have no hatred of the German people....Our quarrel
is with the German Government."2
Bryce obviously had a great belief in the force of public
opinion, and the theme of one of his wartime presidential
addresses to the British Academy had been the power of modern
governments to thwart this safety-valve.3
1. Fisher, Bryce.O.126-7
2. The Attitude Of Great Britain In The Present War. 1916,p.26
3. See PBA, 1915-16,pp.23-5.
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Once Bryce had made the distinction between German govern¬
ment and people, he felt quite able to support the British war
effort whole-heartedly. For Bryce the war presented itself♦fes a
conflict of principles", and, since Britain's cause was "righteous",
there should be no half-measures.1 As he wrote to an American
friend: "At present we rejoice to believe that it is not going to
be a war of half-measures and limited liability. War is one of
those things that if done at all ought to be done with all one's
2
might." This seems to have been his position throughout the
war. Although he was a leading member of the movement for a post¬
war league of nations, he was never numbered among the left-
liberal critics of official policy. He published many pamphlets
and articles for the American market to air, as he told Theodore
Roosevelt, the "supreme moral issues" of the conflict. The
Allied cause, he told Bayard Henry, was "a righteous cause". That
4
was the thing to be "constantly impressed" on Americans, and this,
together with his success in blackening the German reputation in
America, was Bryce's great contribution to British propaganda. The
1. Attitude Of Great Britain.pp.24-3.
2. To B.Henry, 5 April 1917, cit. Fisher, Bryce.II.159
3. 21 Mar.1917.cit.ibid..11.159
4. 5 April 1917, cit.ibid..11.159. There was, too, "one point of
similarity" to the American Civil War. "Had the curse of slavery
prevailed, all moral ideas would have been sadly set back, not
to speak of political ideals. So now if Germany were to succeed,
the sense of right and the sentiments of common humanity would
receive a terrible blow...." To C.W.Kliot, 25 June 1915, cit.
ibid., n, 155. Eliot had written on behalf of the
Union cause during the Civil War.
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The investigation into alleged German atrocities in Belgium
served also to strengthen Bryee*s resolve to support the war
effort and to dispel any doubts he might have had about the common
prejudices against German methods of warfare. This, too, was the
intended effect on neutral (especially American) readers of the
official report.
Commissions of inquiry into alleged atrocities were a
feature of the propaganda campaigns of most belligerent states,
even the smaller ones like Serbia and Belgium. "One after the other
established an inquiry, or an #atrocity commission*, always with
the avowed purpose of getting at the •truth1, the »real facts*."*"
The attitude of the soldiers at the Front, if Robert Graves is
any guide, was one of extreme scepticism. As Graves wrote in his
literary autobiography:
"Propaganda reports of atrocities were, it was
agreed, ridiculous. We remembered that while the
Germans could commit atrocities against enemy civil¬
ians, Germany itself, except for an early Russian
cavalry raid, had never had the enemy on her soil. We
no longer believed the highly-coloured accounts of
German atrocities in Belgium} knowing the Belgians now
at first-hand. By atrocities we meant, specifically,
rape, mutilation, and torture - not summary shooting
of suspected spies, harbourers of spies, francs-
tireurs. or disobedient local officials. If the
atrocity-list had to include the accident&l-on-
purpose bombing or machine-gunning of civilians from
the air, the Allies were now committing as many
atrocities as the Germans. French and Belgian civilians
had often tried to win our sympathy by exhibiting mut¬
ilations of children, stumps of hands and feet, for
instance, representing them as deliberate, fiendish
atrocities when, as likely as not, they were merely
the result of shell-fire. We did not believe rape
to be any more common on the German side of the line
than on the Allied side,"2
1. J.M.Read,p.64. Like many other American historians of the inter-
war period Read stresses the role of Allied propaganda in the
U.S.entry to the war.
2. Goodbye To All That. Harmondsworth, 1960,pp.152-3.
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Graves was writing at the height of the reaction against
the war in 1929, and no doubt this coloured his account. But of
course atrocity propaganda was not intended for front-soldiers
but rather for the civilians at home and in neutral states. With
this consideration in mind, the use of eminent jurists and aca¬
demics by the Allies on their atrocity commissions showed a greater
degree of sophistication in propaganda than the German use of
government employees (usually the Ministries of War and Foreign
Affairs) alone.1 In Britain there had at first been some talk
of having the popular novelist Rider Haggard as a member of the
Bryce Commission because of his name and his experience as a
chairman of Quarter Sessions, but it was felt by the Government
"that a reputation for writing blood-curling stories of a highly
imaginative order" would not be appropriate to a body with a rep-
utation for sober objectivity. In the event the "Commission on
Alleged German Outrages" consisted, besides Bryce, of four lawyers
(all King's Counsels), the historian H.A.L.Fisher (at that time'
Vice-Chancellor of Sheffield University), and the economist and
journalist Harold Cox. The lawyers were Sir Alfred Hopkinson
(former Vice-Chancellor of Victoria University, Manchester), Sir
Edward Clarke (former Tory Solicitor-General 1886-92), Sir Kenelm
1. Eg. The Belgian report (1915) carried the names of 3 professors
of the University of Brussells (Catier,Nys & Wodon). See Belgium,
Report on the Violations of the Rights of Nations..1915,1,
xxxiv-jcocv. Prince Max Baden suggested to the Kaiser "a Report
on Atrocities, no longer Issued as heretofore, by our official
authorities, but endorsed by the responsible signatures of well-
known German jurists and philanthropists." Cit. J.M.Read,pp.142-3.
See also Peterson,pp.38, 40.
2. Sir J.Simon (Home Secretary) to H.A.L.Fisher, 15 Dec.1914,
Fisher Mss.Box 3/2.
3. Cox had been Secretary of the Cobden Club (1899-1904), Liberal
M.P. (1906-9) and was editor of the Edinburgh Review.
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Digby (a former permanent Under-Secretary at the Home Office)
and Sir Frederick Pollock (former Corpus Professor of Juris¬
prudence at Oxford).1 The collection of evidence began in
September 1914 and over 1,200 depositions were taken from Belgian
witnesses, under the supervision of the Director of Public
Prosecutions, Sir Charles Matthews. Evidence from British soldiers
at the front was collected by Professor J.H.Morgan, Home Office
representative with the Expeditionary Force, who also collected
2
the diaries of dead German soldiers for use as evidence.
In the 1930s historians, and especially American revision¬
ist historians, made much of the fact that a great deal of the
evidence from witnesses outside London was collected by twanty
barristers who had, in the words of the Bryce Report itself, "no
authority to administer an cath".3 H.C.Peterson, writing in
19i9, concluded that the Bryce Report "was a collection and not
an analysis....Rumours and opinions were included uncritically.
It is not impossible that many of the statements used were the
product of leading questions. Incomplete versions of actual events
were the basis of the report." In addition it "dignified a great
4
many old wives* tales and considerable barrack-room gossip."
J.M.Read, writing two years later, distinguished between atrocity
1. Clarke had been a Tory M.y. (1880-1900,1906), Digby Vinerian
Reader in Law at Oxford (1868-74) and County Court Judge
(1892-4).
2. G.B.Hoae Office. Committee On Alleged German Outrages. Report.
I, 3-4.
3. Loc.cit. They were instructed "not to »lead* the witnesses,
or make any suggestions to them, and also to impress upon
them the necessity for care and precision in giving their
evidence." However, they were encouraged to cross-examine them.
4. Peterson, pp.S3-4.
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stories and evidence of the execution of franca-tireurs. the
latter being allowed in international law.1 There was, he con¬
cluded, "not one clear-cut case of confessed »atrociousness•" in
any of the stories although many told "of the execution of alleged
2
france-tireurs and more, of plunderings." Interestingly enough
this seems to have been suggested as a possibility by Alfred
Marshall - although, it should be stressed, before the publication
of the Bryce Report. In August 1914 he had written to The Times
to point out that tales of German troops "shooting civilians in
cold blood should never be repeated without inquiry whether the
laws of war had been broken by hostile action on the part of the
3
non-combatants."
This was extremely courageous of Marshall, and, at a time
when most people seemed to believe the worst of the Germans, he
pointed out that when Britain had been at war other nations had
1. Sir T.E.Holland (former Chichele Professor of International
Law at Oxford) had pointed out that the Hague Convention (1907)
ruled decisively "against the legality of resistance by indi¬
vidual civilians" to an invading array. "Lawful belligerents"
had to be "responsibly commanded", to bear "distinctive marks
visible at a distance", to "carry their arras openly" and to
"Conform to the laws of war". The first two requirements could
be dispensed with if there had not been time to organise properly.
Writing at the time of Nurse Caveil's execution, he also noted
that (despite her invasion) Germany had certain rights of "self-
defence" flowing from her military occupation of Belgium. "No
one, for example, would have complained of her stern repression
of civilian attacks on her troops, so long as it was confined to
actual offenders". Letters to "The Times" Upon War & Neutrality
(1881-192Q), 1921,pp.77-8.
2. J.M.Read,p.204.
3. 22 Aug. 1914,p.7e. Lasa Gppenheira, Geriaan-born Professor of Inter¬
national Law at Cambridge, also stressed that the inhabitants of
a conquered country owed temporary allegiance to an occupying power,
and were thus liable to the doctrine of "war treason" for resistance.
This was a courageous thing for Oppenheira to say in wartime, and
he even pointed to the application of this doctrine by Britain
during the Boer War, However, in Belgium, Oppenheira felt, Germany
(p.t.o.)
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accused British soldiers of "cruelties of which we have been certain
they are incapable". If there had been German atrocities, then
alcohol and a "criminal" element could be the root cause.1 No doubt
Marshall was reacting against the more sensational rumours, at third
and fourth hand, which surrounded the investigations of the Bryce
Commission. The wartime atmosphere of rumour and hearsay was cap¬
tured perfectly by the unknown Admiralty clerk who wrote:
"Absolute evidence have I none -
But my Aunt's charwoman's sister's son,
Heard the policeman in Downing Street,
Say to a housemaid on his beat,
That he has a brother, who has a friend, ^
Who knows to a day when the War will end."
But amongst all the sensational evidence of the Bryce Commission
there was a "prevailing base of truthfulness".3 And one could not
simply assume that, since some of the allegations were unproven
(footnote continued from previous page)
had gone too far. The occupying power was "justified in threaten¬
ing and eventually carrying out, punishments for the purpose
of deterrence", but "by no means justified in pronouncing and
carrying out brutal and inhuman sentences." The execution of
Nurse Cavell was thus "outrageous". "Natural justice, humanity,
and the public conscience of the world demand that punishments...
be in due proportion to the harm to his [the occupying power's]
interests comprised in the criminal acts concerned. There is
neither a need nor a right of the occupant to set up a reign of
terror and frightfulness." "The Legal Relations Between An
Occupying Power & The Inhabitants", Law Quly.Rev., XXXIII,132
(Oct.1917),370. For international lawyers and the war, see
appendix X.
1. Times. 28 Oct.1914,p.9d. Marshall wanted "the dissemination of
accurate information as to the conditions under which the civil
population of a country" could "oppose the violence of an invading
army. The Belgian Government had no time to arrange this; and a few
errors by Belgian civilians seem to have been to some extent the
real occasion, and to a greater extent the pretended occasion, of
violence that has horrified the world." Cf. Marshall to C.P.Scott,
10 Mar.1915,Scott Mss.BM.Add 50908.
2. Cit.M.B.Lowndes. Diaries & Letters of Marie Belloc Lowndes 1911*1947,
1971,p.73. A good example of third-hand atrocity story is given
by the Rector of Exeter College, Oxford. A speaker on a recruiting-
drive near Newcastle told miners that the Germans had buried alive
Belgian civilians in a pit. At this appeal to "the miners' code of
(p.t.o.)
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and sensational, all the others had been greatly exaggerated.
Recent evidence shows, as an American historian put it, "that the
behaviour of the German military authorities in occupied areas was
extraordinarily severe, if not brutal, and that the Bryce Report
was essentially correct in its major indictment, namely that the
German amy used terror as a weapon of intimidation.1,1
From the perspective of the experience of two world wars we can
see this, but in 1915 it was the more sensational (and more suspect)
evidence which excited most public attention. There were stories
of the mutilation of corpses - Uhlans were reputedly the worst
offenders - the bayonetting of babies, the burning alive of innocent
civilians, the cutting off of women's breasts (as at Malinea and
Hofstade), the massacre of civilians - 400 at Andenne - the general
rape, pillage and desecration - especially by defalcation (supposedly
2
a German trait) - of property. And, even with this mound of
evidence of Hunnish bestiality, the Commission claimed to "have
rejected hearsay evidence except in cases where hearsay furnished
an undesigned confirmation of facts with regard to which" there was
already "direct testimony from some other source", or where hear¬
say "explained in a natural way facts imperfectly narrated or
(footnotes continued from previous page)
chivalry" 4,000 of them "at once downed tools and marched
to the recruiting office". Farnell heard of this and had it
tlcorrobated" by a Belgian minister at the time at work on the
Belgian atrocity report. Farnell, p.329.
3. J.M.Read,p.26. Read was making a point about all propa¬
ganda, not just the Bryce Report.
1. A.S.Link, Wilson The Struggle For Neutrality 1914-1915,
Princeton,p.41n„II, Cf.Ions,pp.250, 327 n.19; E.L.Woodward,
Great Britain.... p.210 n.2 But Cf. the critical judgement of
O.M.Smith, The Great Departure. NY,1965 (p.4) which repeats the
complaints of 1930s historians.
2. See pp.37-41 for some of the most sensational evidence.
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otherwise perplexing."1 Such exceptions no doubt explained the
inclusion of the sensational evidence, and proved to be the rock
on which the reputation of the Bryce Report (in part) undeservedly
foundered in the 1930s.
The Bryce and Fisher papers give little information on the
way the Commission went about its work, and the private discussions
which must have taken place. However, one letter from Sir Frederick
Pollock to Bryce is an interesting comment on the question of the
reliability of evidence. Apparently, Harold Cox wanted the Commission
itself to examine witnesses. Pollock was thus provoked into amaze¬
ment at "cox's state of mind in dealing with the testimony. He seems
to require a far higher degree of probability than a court of
justice ever gets, and to think that every statement of fact must
2
be absolutely true or absolutely false." But this, unfortunately
for the Report's later reputation, was just what its readers
thought. Pollock, from other evidence, seems to have been rather
a "fire-eater" and was no doubt ready to read the material uncovered
3
by the Bryce Commission in the way most damaging to Germany.
However, his former colleague on Oxford University's Faculty of Law
Sir Thomas Brskine Holland, as an international lawyer of some
repute, was generally more sceptical of atrocity stories. Zn a
letter to Bryce he pointed out that under international law an
invader could "shoot civilians who fire on his troops". It was even
1. Report.p.6. Evidence omitted*Was probably true" but unreliable.
2. 6 Mar.1916, Bryce Mas. Box UB57. See also Fisher to Bryce 7 Mar.
[1915?] and 11 Mar.1915, loc.cit.
3. Eg. see his *»A League of Peace" in For The Right. 1916,pp. 130-40.
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permissable to take hostages "for the fulfilment of agreements or
carrying out of requisitions". There was, he concluded, "nothing
in black and white about punishment for civilian resistance (not
that Germany would care if there were)".3
The hand of Lord Bryce is obvious when reading the
Commission's report. It opened with the admission that the commis¬
sioners had begun "the inquiry with doubts whether a positive
result would be attained". But the further they went, the more
2
evidence they examined, the more their "scepticism" was reduced.
This tallies with Fisher's observations of Bryce during the
Commission's investigations.3 The general conclusions as to where
responsibility for atrocities should lie, also reflected Bryce's
analysis of the situation in Germany. The individual German
soldiers were absolved from much of the blame. True, some "outrages"
were the result of individual excess - what else could be expected
when "intoxication was extremely prevalent among the German army,
both in Belgium and France". But there was more of this kind of
4
excess than "would be expected in warfare between civilised Powers".
More serious was the "deliberate plan" by which non-combatants
were "systematically killed" in large numbers during the first
1. 18 Sept.1914 & 23 Sept.1914, Bryce Mss. UB/23.
2. Report.pp.6-7.
3. Fisher, Bryce. II, 132 n.2. J.H.Morgan's claim that he approached
the evidence with initial scepticism, does not convince in view
of his readiness to give credence to atrocity stories even more
lurid than those in the Bryce Report. See Lowndes,pp.75-6, for
his disclaimer.
4. They differed "rather in extent than in kind from what has
happened in previous though not recent wars." Report, p.31.
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weeks of the Invasion of Belgium. The purpose of these killings
was "to strike terror into the civilian population and dishearten
the Belgian troops, so as to crush down resistance and extinguish
the very spirit of self-defence." The Germans used the pretext of
civilians allegedly firing on their troops "to justify not merely
the shooting of individual franc -tlreurs. but the murder of large
numbers of innocent civilians, an act absolutely forbidden by the
rules of civilised warfare."1
Yet even with this second class of outrages (the doctrine
of "necessity" in warfare) the German troops who carried out the
killings were absolved. It "cannot be supposed to be a national
doctrine", the report noted, "for it neither springs from nor
reflects the mind and feelings of the German people as they have
heretofore been known to other nations." It was a specifically
military doctrine - "the outcome of a theory held by a ruling caste
1. The general conclusions of the report were that there was proof
of frequent "deliberate and systematically organised mass¬
acres of the civilian population, accompanied by many isolated
murders and other outrages"; that men and women were "murdered
in large numbers" and women and children raped during the
general "conduct of war"; that "looting, house-burning, and
the wanton destruction of property were organised and countenanced",
even planned, by German officers - and this not because of "mili¬
tary necessity", but simply to create general terror; "that the
rules and usages of war were frequently broken, particularly by
the using of civilians, including women and children, as a
shield for advancing forces exposed to fire, to a less degree by
killing the wounded and prisoners, and in the frequent abuse of
the Red Cross and the White Flag." Stories of Belgian franc -
tireurs were rejected because sometimes the Germans did not
recognise "legitimate military operations", or they fired upon
each other by mistake, or because they encouraged stories of
atrocities by Belgian civilians (especially the gouging out of
German soldiers* eyes). This last reason for scepticism is
ironical in view of the Commission's readiness to believe Belgian
tales of mutilation. The first reason, however, is quite poss¬
ibly true (although Belgian civilians also seem to have risen up
in arras), and the second certainly so. For an objective recent
study of events in Louvain, see P.Schttller, Das Fall Lbwen Und
Das Deutsche Weiasbuch. Kttln, 1958
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who have brooded and thought, written and talked and dreamed about
war until they have fallen under its obsession and been hypnotised
by its spirit." And striking a Bryce-like note, the report con¬
cluded: "whoever has travelled among the German peasantry knows
that they are as kind and good-natured as any people in Europe."1
As we shall see later, the belief in an innocent peasantry led
astray by their leaders hardly faltered even when Bryce was faced
with the terrible evidence of massacres of Armenians by the common
Turkish soldier. But for the moment we can note that the conclusion
of the Bryce Report had an immediate bearing on the whole question
of reprisals for German "frightfulnass".
Bryce was to repeat many times his belief that the German
people were not responsible for the actions of their government.
It was necessary to quash any talk of reprisals which did not dis¬
tinguish between guilty leaders and misled people, and Bryce
could claim a certain logic for this position by pointing to the
autocratic nature of the German government. In a review of J.H.
Morgan's popular account of the Bryce Report, German Atrocities
An Offldal Investigation (1916), Bryce denied the suggestion that
all Germans shared "in all the guilt of their Government". The
strictness of official censorship, the German habit of unquestion¬
ing obedience to authority, both argued against this. And Bryce
hoped that after the war, when "the facts hitherto concealed from
the people" became known and were "reflected on with calmness",
there would be a "condemnation" of the outrages and that the
Report. pp.34-5
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Central Powers would join efforts "to regulate and mitigate the
conduct of war".1 This review was appended to Morgan*s book,
but Bryce had refused to contribute a preface on the grounds that
Morgan advocated a policy of Allied reprisals against Germany.
Yet apart frcaa this, Bryce's review accepted uncritically Morgan's
sensational conclusions. These included a belief in innate sexual
perversion among Germans who allegedly showed all the atavistic
characteristics of the original Huns. There could, Morgan
claimed, "be force in the contention of those who believe that the
Prussian is not a member of the Teutonic family at all, but a
•throw-back' to some Tartar stock". Germany was a "hybrid nation"
with the acquired "idiom" of Europe and the "instincts...of some
pre-Asiatic horde". Like "the intellectual savage" Germany
nurtured "dark atavisms and murderous impulses" beneath a civil-
, ^ 2ised veneer.
1. Repr. from Westminster Gazette. On Bryce's attitude to
reprisals, see Fisher, Bryce. II, 133-5. Bryce touched on the
question in an address at Bedford College, London, in March
1916. To hope that reprisals might "lead the enemy Government
to desist from breaches of the usages of war" was, Bryce
claimed, mistaken. For "every cruelty tends to call forth
another, and in a competition of cruelty the Government against
which we are fighting would always win. There is no reason to
think any recourse to inhuman practices shocking to philosophy
and morality, such as the enemy have adopted, would have the
slightest effect on him or promote in any way our military
success. We should not gain: indeed we should certainly lose,
because there is nothing which has more won for us the approval
of all that is best in neutral nations than that we have cham¬
pioned the cause of justice and humanity....We stand for the
interests of mankind as a whole. We acknowledge a moral law; and
we acknowledge it as a State no less than as individuals. From
that position we must never depart." "Opening Address", inter¬
national Crisis The Theory Of State.pp.6-7.
2. pp.52-3, 57. Morgan laid great stress on cases of sodomy, child
rape and what he called "deliberate defilement" and "bestial
pollution" of billets (pp.114-5). See also his letter to The
Times, 2 Aug.1916,p.7d. The official German statistics showed
the "moral distemper" of the German people, especially, wide¬
spread sexual perversion, Morgan claimed. He also cited the
(p.t.o.)
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Over million copies of Morgan's book were printed, and
no doubt the use of Bryea's name not only helped sales but also
lent weight to Morgan's wilder charges. Bryce also recommended
Morgan's translation of the German "Manual of the Usages of War on
Land", although its wartime reputation as a total reflection of
"German military ideas and methods" has been shown to be unwarranted.^
And even though Bryce opposed reprisals, the logic of Morgan's
general assertions (which Bryce did not criticise) led straight to
the advocacy of such a policy. "It is the fondest of delusions to
imagine that all this blood-guiltiness is confined to the German
Government and the General Staff", Morgan had written. "The whole
people is stained with it. The innumerable diaries of common
soldiers in the ranks which I have read betray a common sentiment
of hate, rapine and ferocious credulity. Again and again English
soldiers have told me how their German captors delighted to offer
them food in their famished state and then to snatch it away again."
It was "useless to discriminate between the people and their rulers".
The German people were "rotten to the core". One could "extirpate
2
a dogma" but one could "not alter a temperament." The roots of
"Vansittartism" were well and truly established during the First
(footnote cont. from previous page)
French historian Fustel de Coulanges on the unusually high inci¬
dence of homosexuality in Berlin. German Atrocities,p.52. Typical
of Morgan's tales of girls "abused by hordes of savage and
licentious" German soldiers, was one from Richebourg 1'Avou6
where advancing British soldiers fount^naked girl lying on the
ground "pegged out in the form of a crucifix". Morgan, Dishonoured
Apny.1916.p.19. Such a tale was calculated to suggest blasphemy
as well as rapaciousness as German traits.
1. The German War Book.1915.pp.1-11 (Morgan's introductory remarks).
Cf. J.Bell, E.Fischer & B.Widmann, Vbikerrecht Im Weltkrieg. Berlin,
1927,1,20-9,36-7. At best the views expressed in the German War
Book were semi-official, reflecting the views of "Young Turks" in
the officer corps: "eine reine Privatarbeit". In Britain France)
it was published as an official German training manual, a
"Handbook of the Hun".
2. German Atrocities.pp.44-5. 118-9,60.
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World War. Even people, who could in no sense of the word be
described as Germanophobes, reluctantly concluded that Germans
seemed to have *'a comparatively less strong inner revulsion from
atrocious actions performed by authorized agents of their Govern¬
ment."^ And Edwyn Bevan, who had close ties with German scholars,
wrote that since German soldiers had shown "a singular degree of
callousness" there must be "some want of sensibility" among the
2
German population as a whole.
Of course it was also less difficult to consider reprisals
against Germans if they could in some way be separated off from
tie rest of European peoples. Morgan had talked of "Tartar" origins,
3
and he was not alone in this. Historians tended to be more
cautious and merely talked of the Prussians (who were the "real"
4
enemy) as "German in little save language". Even the "very word
•Prussia*" was not German, J.W.Allen wrote. The Prussians "in whom
Treitschke managed to see the quintessence of the Germanic are,
at bottom either Germanized Slavs or at the most the result of a
5
mixture between Slavs and Germans." And in an age when the same
1. Gwatkin,pp.8-9
2. The Method In The Madness.1917.p.243. Although it "would no
doubt be a mistake to attribute the same callousness to all
Germans", especially that Germany represented by Meinecke &
Troeltsch, Naumann & Harnack. Cf. The reaction of a scholar less
Gerraanophile by natures L.P.Jacks, "An Interim Religion",pp.65-8.
3. Eg. Walter Raleigh*s claim that in "a portrait of eight German
generals with the Kaiser...only two have European faces - the
others are Kalmucks." Letter to G.S.Gordon, 17 Dec.1914.cit.
Raleigh, Letters, H, 409.
4. Pollard, The War....p.13
5. Germany & Europe, p.46. Like Lord Vansittart 20 or so years
later, J.H.Rose cited Tacitus as evidence of long tradition
of German deference to their leaders. Origins...,pp.21-2.
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value was not attached to life if skins were not white, the use
of the term "Hun" was significant. J.P.Mahaffy, Provost of
Trinity College, Dublin, may have had this in mind when he advised
a meeting of 180 clergy of the Church of Ireland in July 1918 that
as long as the Germans openly repudiated "all the limitations of
justice and humanity" and made "brutality and cruelty the attributes
of victory", then so long were the Allies "bound to regard them as
poisonous reptiles, or as vermin, which the most Christian men
does not feel it any violation of his duty to exterminate."1
However, Mahaffy was almost alone among British academics in calling
2
for a policy of reprisals. Certainly leading theologians, in so
far as they expressed themselves publicly, were opposed to such a
3
policy as were the members of the Bryce Commission, with the
exception of Morgan. H.A.L.Fisher, for example, stressed that
whatever the Germans might do it was for the British "to show the
world how a nation of gentlemen conducts the most arduous and terrible
4
business of life." And at about the same time (September 1914)
1. "The Ethics Of Retaliation", in Ad Clerum. Dublin, 1918,p.183.
2. Mahaffy's lecture was a lengthy justification for following the
celebrated passage in Exodus XXI, 24 & 25. This included propos¬
ing a resolution between the Sermon on the Mount and the "universal
law among sentient creates" of retaliation, by using the Aris¬
totelian model: a "proper mean"(being a moral rather than mere
arithmetical quantity) would be nearer one extreme than the other.
"The teaching of Christ might, therefore, be regarded as...an
exaggeration of the unpopular extreme [renunciation], so as to
counteract the far too prevalent extreme of retaliation or
revenge." Now, especially since there was nothing approaching
a Pax Romanus. Christ's precept was "utterly out of place". The
warped stick of human nature, to be made straight again, would
have to be bent in the opposite direction by a "stern necessity"
which overrode "all the ordinary laws of human morality".Ibid..
pp.178-84.
3. Eg.D.Cairns, J.E.Carpenter, L.P.Jacks, J.Oman, J.H.Muirhead,
A.S.Peake, W.B.Selbie, H.G.Wood, W.Temple (with Roger Fry, G.P.
Gooch, Sidney Webb & T.R.Glover) in Goodwil1.H.8(23 June 1917).
At this time Curzon was putting the idea to the Cabinet of, .
(p.t•o.)
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Sir Frederick Pollock wrote to The Times to warn against the adoption
of reprisals.1 But once it became clear that British, and not just
Belgian or French civilians were going to bear the brunt of German
"frightfulness" - in the form of Zeppelin raids and coastal bombard¬
ments - then more public men, like the novelist Sir Arthur Conan
2
Doyle, called for retaliation. In the Cambridge Review for May
1915 one can find a letter on "Asphyxiating Gases and their use in
Wartime", which claimed that there seemed "to be no valid objection
against the use of every scientific contrivance possible" against
"an unscrupulous foe".^ But for liberal academics who supported
the war it seemed neither "just" nor "politic to identify the German
people with the German Government", or to penalize German soldiers
"for their rulers1 sins". Victory would not be complete until the
German Government was "punished for its crimes" and a policy of
reprisals could not fulfil this requirement. They merely punished
4
"the innocent and let the guilty go free".
For his part Bryce, whether he realised it or not, was
(footnote continued from previous page)
bombing German cities. He was turned down (but not when he raised
the matter again in Sept.1917). See P.Kerr to Curzon in Lothian Mss.
GD 40/17/43. Also Marwick, Britain in a Century of Total War.
Harmondsworth,1970,p.112.
The War....p.30.British soldiers would be "chivalrous, temperate,
and disciplined".
1. 1 Sept.1914,p.12a & b. T.E.Holland also criticised the view that
German submarine crews should be punished as "pirates" & murderers.
His letter to Tie Times on the case of Nurse Cavell and German air
raids show commendable restraint.See Letters To "The Times",pp69-72.
2. See correspondence in The Times . 16 Oct.l915(p.9d),22 Oct .1915(p.9c$rd),
18 Oct.1915(p.9d),19 Oct.1915(p.lOf),7 Feb.1916(p.9c),11 Feb.1916
(p.7e),16 Oct.1917(p.9c) 28 Dec,1917(p.4b) from A.F.Pollard,Bryce,
W.Sanday,W.B.Selbie, A.Marshall. Also Dicey, How We Ought To Feel....
p.11; E.M.Sidgwick(widow of Henry Sidgwick)"The Morality Of Strife
In Relation To The War", International Crisis...Ethical & Psycholo-
logical Aspects.pp.19-21Resolutions of Protest....p.12.
3. XXXVI,906(19 May 1915),326.
4. A.F.Pollard,Times,30 Mar.1917,p.7e.J.A.Stewart(Professor of Moral
Philosophy at Oxford) proposed an International War Crimes Court.
Times.10 Aug.1916,p.8b & 16 Aug.1916,p.5c.
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caught up in the atrocity propaganda machine which fed the very
desire for revenge among the general public that he was so at pains
to oppose. The Bryce Report was translated into thirty languages,
and in Britain its low publication price (six pence) ensured wide
circulation. In addition, there were various "popular accounts"
(Morgan*s was just one of many) and newspapers published long
verbatim extracts. Bryce was now called upon to contribute a whole
series of introductions to further atrocity pamphlets, notably those
of Arnold Toynbee. For example there was Toynbee*s Belgian Depor¬
tations (1916) which was concerned to expose the forced shipment of
Belgian workers to Germany. This, Bryce wrote, was "virtual slavery"
unsurpassed even during the Thirty Years War. The Germans were no
better than "those Arab slave-raiders in Africa who carried off
negroes to the coast to sell." But, as always, Bryce returned to
the soldiers whi were involved - "the •Hans*...a good, simple, kindly
sort of fellow" in peacetime, but "in the Army...merely the passive
instrument of his offiers". It was the officers, not the common
soldiers, who were to blame.1
Toynbee, who as we have seen was working at Wellington House,
did not have the same concern for "Hans". His job was to whip up
feeling against the Germans, and to this end he ended his documentary
record with a list of German "outrages":
"In 1914 the Belgians were attacked,
ruined, and massacred. In 1915 they were stripped
of their manufactures and raw materials, their
1. pp. 5, 8. Recent historians have been very critical of German
policy. Eg. G.Ritter, The Sword & Scepter. 1973, III,
358-72. *
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capital and their plant. In 1916 they are
being exploited like their own cattle and machines
by the State which has inflicted all these
outrages upon them. They are being deported
forcibly to Germany and compelled by violence to
labour there that their labour may assist Germany
to secure the fruits of her crimes and to evade
a just retribution for them, at the hands of
Belgium and her Allies."*■
The evidence against the Germans was damaging, and Toynbee made
the most of this with his rising crescendo of accusation. His
lasting contribution to British propaganda was to coin the image
of Germany as a "vampire-state" that sucked "the life blood of any
nation" that fell into her cluthces. This was the logical end-
product of the "German organisational genius", Toynbee wrote in
O
his pamphlet The Destruction of Poland (1916). This had been
written especially for the Polish-American market to counter German
Claims that the sufferings of Poland were due to the Allied block¬
ade of the Central Powers.
Toynbee also produced further compilations of German
"frightfulness" for Wellington House - The German Terror In Belgium
(1917) and The German Terror In France(1917) which were based in
part on the Bryce Report and the French and Belgian atrocity
3
reports. But it was his investigation of the massacre of Armenians
1. Belgian Deportations, p.55.
3. Eg. France. Ministere des Affaires Etrangeres, Germany's Viola¬
tions of the Laws of War 1914-15. 1915 & Belgium, Report....
See also R.A.Reiss, Report Upon Atrocities Committed by tne
Austro-Hungarian Army During the First Invasion of Serbia.
(1915). 1916.
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by Turkish "irregulars" in 1915 which reveals most fully the
extent to which academics could become involved in the shady world
of atrocity propaganda. Although there was even less doubt (than in
the case of Belgium) that atrocities had in fact taken place, the
motives of the Allies in publicising them seemed to surpass the
normal cynicism of governments. News of the massacres1 reached
the Allies at an opportune moment in October 1915. The German
General Staff had not long before invited American journalists to
view the horrible evidence of pogroms in the Jewish Pale, carried
out by the retreating Russian army. Publicity for Turkish massacres
of Armenians, and, if possible, German complicity in them would be
an excellent counter to the effect of the pogroms on the powerful
2
Jewish-American community. Over fifty years later Toynbee wrote
of his (and Bryce's) innocence in the affair. Had they known of
the politics behind the investigation, Toynbee noted, "I hardly
think that either Lord Bryce or I would have been able to do the
job that H.M.G.assigned to us in the complete good faith in which
we did, in fact, carry it out. Lord Bryce*s concern, and mine,
was to establish the facts and to make them public in the hope that
1. As in 189b the Armenians were the scapegoat for Turkish military
reverses, this time in the Caucasus. Armenians in the Ottoman
army were deserting and Armenian nationalists trying to secure
Allied assistance. Armenian men were deported and together with
women and children massacred in cold blood or died from exhaus¬
tion and starvation in the mountains of central Anatolia. The
death-toll was possibly as high as if million. R.G.Hovannisian,
The Republic of Armenia. Berkeley & Los Angeles, 1971, I, Il¬
ls ; U.Trumpener, Germany & the Ottoman Empire 1914-1913. Princeton,
1968,chptr VII; M.Ferro, The Great War 1914-1918. 1973,
pp.100-1; F.G.Weber, Eagles on the Crescent. Ithaea, 1970,pp.l44ff.
2. See E.Ettinger, "The Jew in Russia At the Outbreak of the Russian
Revolution" in The Jews in Soviet Russia Since 1917.1970.pp.18-
19; L.Greenberg, The Jews In Russia. N.Haven, 1951, II, 94-103;
E.Zechlin, Die deutsche Politik u.die Juden im Ersten Weltkrieg,
Gttttingen, 1969, chptr 5-10,23.
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some action might be taken".1
The Blue Book on The Treatment of Armenians in the Ottoman
Empire (1916) was also republished by Hodder and Stoughton, thus
achieving a wide circulation. It was prefaced by supporting
letters from leading British academics. Gilbert Murray gave his
unqualified approval to Toynbee»s and Bryce's sifting of the
evidence "from regions so far removed from the eyes of civilised
Europe". "I realize that in times of persecution passions run
high, that oriental races tend to use hyperbolical language, and
that victims of oppression cannot be expected to speak with strict
fairness of their oppressors", he wrote. "But the evidence of
these letters and reports will bear any scrutiny and overpower
2
any scepticism." H.A.L. Fisher also had no doubt that the report
bore "all the marks of credibility", and then he turned to what was
to become the most important issue - that the evidence tended to
suggest that the Central Pcwers "were, in a general way, favourable
to the policy of deportation" which led to the deaths."* Bryce had
been careful not to charge them with complicity in his preface to
4
the report as no evidence pointing to this had been uncovered.
Toynbee, who had compiled the evidence and written the report, was
1. Acquaintances, 1967,p.149
2. Murray to Bryce, 27 June 1916, cit. p.xxxi.
3. Fisher to Bryce, 2 Aug. 1916, cit.p.xxix.
4. "I have not so far been able to obtain any authentic information
regarding the part said to have been taken by German officials in
directing or encouraging these massacres, and therefore it would
not be right to express any opinion on the subject." (p.14).
However, a year earlier Bryce had written to an American friend
that reports suggested that the German officials had done this.
See Fisher, Bryce. I, 153.
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also careful to say that the "active participation of German
officials" was "not sufficiently proven", and that it was "on the
whole unlikely that the German authorities initiated the crime."
The Turks had no need of "tempters". However, the Germans had made
no effort to stop the massacres although they had the power to do
so. They "had but to pronounce the veto, and it would have been
obeyed". The German Government had been "criminally apathetic",
Toynbee concluded, and for good measure added that it sought to
profit from the destruction of Armenian economic power in the
Ottoman Empire.1
Later in the war Bryce was ready to label official German
policy as "tacit acquiescence". The Germans, he wrote, had made
"themselves accessories, whether before the crime or after the
crime, to the most awful catastrophe that has ever befallen a
Christian nation." Some German consuls seemed even to have encour¬
aged the slaughter, while their government had deceived the German
people with false tales of Armenian insurrections and imposed
2
strict censorship on the revelations of German missionaries. And
Toynbee, in a pamphlet designed for distribution in America, charged
the Germans with doing a deal on the massacres. In return for
1. Armenian Atrocities. 1915,pp.106-8,110,115-6. This was based on
the official report. No mention was made of massacres of
Armenians in Russia in 1905, although Toynbee later referred to
forced deportations of Armenians by the Tsarist authorities, even
during the war, to make space for Russian settlers. Toynbee, "The
Position of Armenia", New Europe.IV.50(27 Sept.1917), 329-35.
Significantly this was after the removal of Tsarism.
2. "The War State" repr. in Essays and Addresses In Wartime,
1918, p.52.
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Geriaan "moral and military support" the Turks provided "'cannonen
futter'" for the war-effort. More than this, the policy of
"'Ottomanisation*" of minority groups, which had been carried to
the bloody extreme of mass killings, had been inspired by the
"tprussianisation*" of the Poles and the "•Magyarisation*" of
Roumanian, Slovak and Southern Slav minorities in the Dual Monarchy.1'
These were serious charges and they have been repeated by more
2
recent historians. But the most authoritative study of Ottoman-
German relations during the war, while stressing that the massacres
were part of a "deliberate" policy, concludes that it "was neither
instigated nor welcomed by the German Government". At the most
Berlin and Vienna (and some of their representatives in Constantin¬
ople) "were guilty of extremely poor judgement, a considerable
degree of moral callousness, and an altogether excessive concern
3
with what was or seemed to be politically expedient."
1. "The Murderous Tyranny Of The Turks". NY, 1918,pp.7, 23-4. The
title came from the Allied reply (Jan.1917) to President Wilson*s
request for a statement of war aims (one of the latter being
the liberation of subject nationalities in the Ottoman Empire.)
2. The Geriaan Government "was not only unwilling to irritate its
Turkish allies [by interceding] but actually wished them to clear
its prospective colony from the most formidable competitors on
the spot. The German public learned little and late of what was
afoot in Turkey." W.W.Gottlieb, Studies In Secret Diplomacy
During The First World War. 1957,p.110.
3. Trurapener, p.204. "Despite mounting indications to the contrary
they accepted far too long the spurious claims of the Porte that
its anti-Armenian policies were necessitated by widespread
sedition in the eastern provinces. More importantly, even after
it became apparent that the Ottoman 'security measures1,
including the ruthless evacuation of entire provinces, were
part of a deliberate effort to decimate and disperse the Armenian
population in Asia Minor, the German and Austro-Hungarian
governments steadfastly refused to do anything drastic about the
matter. While they abhorred and were acutely embarrassed by the
brutal policies of the Turks and directed numerous admonitions
and protests to the Porte, the statesman in both Berlin and
Vienna were too much concerned with the keeping of Turks in the
(p.t.o.)
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Perhaps it was fortunate that Britain was not placed in a
similar position, for the calculation of political advantage out¬
weighs humanitarian considerations, especially in wartime. It was
also fortunate that Bryce was unaware that the British Government
was quite willing to pursue separate peace negotiations with Turkey
which, if they had succeeded, would very probably have involved
dropping their public demand for an autonomous Armenia.* This
perhaps makes the efforts of Bryce on behalf of the Armenians of little
importance, although they did form part of a more general campaign
to dismember the Ottoman Empire. As Bryce, the veteran campaigner
of the "Bulgarian Agitation" forty years earlier, noted, the Turk
2
"as a Governing Power" was "irreclaimable". And, as with the
German "outrages" in Belgium, Bryce showed the same willingness to
believe the best of the Turkish peasants who had massacred their
Armenian compatriotsj they were honest and kindly "when not roused
by fanaticism".3 It was the Turkish government which aroused
widespread "ideological hostility", even among the ranks of British
4
foreign policy-makers. Hence the story of James Bryce and the
Armenians is not one of successful lobbying for small states -
(footnote continued from previous page)
war to risk alienating the Porte by really strong pressures. But
it should be added that there were numerous German and Austro-
Hungarian officials, particularly diplomatic and consular, who
did not condone such a policy of expediency and whose efforts to
stop or to mitigate the brutal measures against the Armenians
were a great deal more emphatic than has hitherto been assumed."
(pp.204-5). Clearly Germany did not have the control over Turkey
claimed by Bryce and Toynbee.
1. See V.H.Rothwell, British war Aims & Peace Diplomacy 1914-1918,
Oxford, 1971,pp.179-84 & (for the public war aims)pp.64-5.
2. He advocated turning the Turks out of Adrianople, Constantinople
and "the western coast regions of Asia Minor" as well as out of
Armenia, Cilicia & Syria. This would leave a "weak Turkish State"
in "Central and North Asia Minor". Preface to Toynbee, Murderous
Tyranny..., pp.iv-v. Gladstone's famous demand for the Turks to
be turned out of Bulgaria "bag and baggage" was quoted on the
(p.t.o.)
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as could be said of R.W.Seton-Watson and the South Slavs or of
Ronald Burrow and the Greeks1 - but rather of the use for propa¬
ganda purposes of a scholar's reputation, and a liberal's
P
conscience. Dying in 1921 Bryce was spared the massacres in
1922 of Greeks by Turks at Smyrna, and the reconquest of the Straits
by Kemal Pasha. Ironically, Toynbee lost himself the new Korges
chair of Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies in the University of
London because of his reporting (for the Manchester Guardian) of
Greek atrocities against the Turks in 1919.*
Toynbee, who had done so much work for anti-German propa¬
ganda during the war, during the 1930s became one of the leading
apologists for a policy of appeasing Germany. As Director of Studies
at the Royal Institute of International Affairs (from 1925) Toynbee
worked for the formal readmission of German scholars to inter¬
national conferences and meetings. In the pursuit of this
objective he was joined by his father-in-law Gilbert Murray, after
the death of Bryce, perhaps the academic best-known to the general
4
public. Murray as a member of the executive of the Committee on
(footnote continued from previous page)
dedication page.
3. Ibid.p.v.Cf.Bryce. "The Future of Armenia", Contemporary
Rev.,CXIV, 6 (Dec.1918),604-11.
4. Rothwell,pp.25-30,117-8.
1. On Seton-Watson, see "tributes to R.W.Seton-Watson: A Symposium",
Slavonic & East European Rev..XXX.75(June 1952),331-63. On
Burrows, see G.Glasgow, Ronald Burrows. 1924.
2. Although, to be fair, Bryce*s position as principal advocate of
Armenian independence (founder and first president of the Anglo-
Armenian Society) from 1876 meant that he was as much using the
report for his own purposes, as being used by the Government,
3. Toynbee, Experiences. 1969,p.72.
4. Murray seems to have been a forerunner of A.N.L.Munby's non-
Bellocean don of the 1960s: "Don back from Russia, off to Rome,
Don on the Third, the Light, the Home".
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Intellectual Cooperation, a League of Nations organisation based
in Geneva, was intimately involved in the machinations of insti¬
tutionalised international scholarship,1 a subject to which we
now turn.
1. See Times, 5 Mar.1924,p.10c
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XIV, POSTWAR RECONCILIATION
"Before 1914, if any of us had been questioned
as to the position of scholars in the event of a
war between nations, I think our answer would in
substance have been that scholars, as men, would
take such part in the defence and assistance of
their country, as circumstances qualified them to
take, but that as scholars they would have no
share in the hostilities and would be ready, when
the war was over, if not before, to take up in
common that pursuit of truth which is the scholar*s
function. It has been recalled that at the height
of the Napoleonic Wars Sir Humphrey Davy was invited
to Paris and received with great honour; and I think
most of us would have felt that on sdholars, more
perhaps than on any other class of men the duty would
lie of keeping alive the spirit of sane human
relationships, which war tends to interrupt so for¬
cibly. The facts have turned out otherwise."
- Sir Frederic Kenyon, International
Scholarship (1920)
Early in 1915 Bertrand Russell had described Europe as "a
house on fire, where the inmates instead of trying to extinguish
the flames" were "engaged in accusing each other of having caused
the conflagration".1 When peace came at least half of the house
was in ruins and the inmates were no longer on speaking terms.
Russell was anxious that there should be no condemnation of intel¬
lectuals for their "wartime transgressions" so that reconciliation
2
could proceed smoothly. But although individual British scholars
got in touch again with German colleagues as soon as peace was
3
declared, the institutional framework of international scholarship
1. War The Offspring Of Fear. 1915, p.3.
2. Mayer, p.888.
3. Eg. J.B.Bury & B.G.Browne. See N.H.A.B&ynes, A bibliography of
the Works of J,B.Bury. Cambridge, 1929, p.39 & E.D.Ross,p.xv.
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seemed - as Russell had predicted - to have been fragmented
permanently. This can be clearly seen in the controversy which
surrounded the question of Germany's participation in postwar
scholarly congresses and conferences. Before the outbreak of the
war these had been increasing in scale and number.1 The war had
put a virtual end to them. Now with peace came the question of
whether the wartime activities of German professors had put them
quite outside the international community of scholars.
Bernard Bosanquet, who had been elected president of the
projected Fifth International Congress of Philosophy to be held
in London in 1915, hoped to be able to offer "cordiality to all
philosophers after peace". However, this aroused opposition
amongst other members of the General Organising Committee and he
had to be content with the more cautious statement expressing "an
earnest hope that the confederacy of the entire philosophical
world" would "not be set aside for a longer time" than "outward
circumstances" rendered "absolutely imperative". "We are confi¬
dent", the philosophers wrote, "that the common interest in philo¬
sophy which has expressed itself so effectively in the past meet-
2
ings of the Congress will prove to be an enduring bond." But
German and Austrian philosophers were not invited to the
Philosophical Congress An Oxford in 1920, nor to the Fifth Inter¬
national Congress which was held, not in London, but in Naples
in 1924. Only in 1926 at the Sixth Congress held at Harvard
University were German and Austrian philosophers officially
1. F.S.Northedge estimates that 1062 congresses met in international
assembly in 1900-10. "International Intellectual Cooperation
Within The League of Nations", London Ph.D.thesis(1953),p.242.
See also F.S.L.Lyons.Internationalism in Europe 1815-1914.
Leyden,1963,pp.202-8,223-37.
2. Cit.H.Bosanquet,pp.131-3. Muirhead,Bernard Bosanquet...,p.l65.
Muirhead.Reflections....p.181
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represented.1 The story of the International Historical
Congress is very much the same. Last held in London in 1913,
planned for St. Petersburg in 1918, postponed by war, revolution
and civil war, and finally abandoned. Austrian scholars attended
the 1924 Brussels congress in an unoficial capacity, and not until
1926 were German, Austrian and Bulgarian delegates officially
invited to join the new Comit6 des Sciences Historiques.2
The war also put an end to plans for congresses of
Orientalists at Oxford in 1916, and of Anthropology and Prehistoric
Archaeology at Madrid in 1915. However, the International Con¬
gress of Americanists did go ahead as planned in Washington D.C.
in December 1915. The list of participants included two from
the Central Powers, and one German scholar gave a paper. But
even so neutral a gathering could not escape entirely from the pol¬
itics of European war and there were official representatives from
3
"Bohemia" and "Russian Poland". This must have been one of the
few important scholarly congresses held during wartime. Otherwise
the picture was bleak. Many years work was lost when the Inter¬
national Association of Universities (1901) and the International
Association of Universities (1899) broke up after the outbreak of
war. But of greater importance was the disruption of the inter¬
national cooperation of scholars on projects like the Anglo-German-
- — - 4
Austrian edition of the Mahabharata . Doubtless there were many
other lesser known examples.
1. PAS. NS, XX(1919-20),304-6.
2. T.P.Tout, "National & International Cooperation In Historical
Scholarship", TRHS, Ser.4,X(l927),l-20.
3. Proc. of the 19th International Congress of Americanists,
Washington, 1917.
4. F.Kenyan, British Academy.p.21.
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Yet, even during the war, some eminent British scholars
talked of the time when links with their German and Austrian
colleagues could be renewed. Considering the hysteria and hatreds
of the time, the few who did speak their minds deserve our admir¬
ation. That crusty individualist James Bryce was one such. In
1916 he informed members of the British Academy that it was for
"learned bodies to try to link up the bonds of personal regard
and intellectual cooperation" then "unhappily severed" - but after
"bitterness of feeling" had subsided.1 Obviously the Academy
would find it difficult to be too much out of step with public
opinion, but at a time when many people were calling for enemy
nationals to be struck off the rolls of learned societies both
the Academy and its sister institution the Royal Society success¬
fully resisted. The wartime behaviour of German professors
(especially the manifesto of "the 93") was difficult to explain
away and Bryce felt that the distinction between willing and
unwilling participation in expressions of anti-British feeling
was not always clear.
In May 1918 the British Academy heard an address on
"International Scholarship After The War" by the Oxford theologian
William Sanday. As the most prestigious body of British scholars
in the humanities the Academy was the natural place for discussion
of future relations with German and Austrian scholars. Even so,
Bryce*s successor as President Sir Frederick Kenyon was careful
to affirm the Academy's continued belief in the rightness of the
1. FBA,VII(1915-16),3-4
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war. As The Times reportedj
"The President...stated that the discussion
of the subject was not to be taken as a sign of
any weakening on the part of British scholars with
regard to the war. On behalf of the Academy he
could affirm that they believed as firmly as ever
in the righteousness of the war, and in the necessity
of fighting until an honourable peace was secured.
It would be impossible to resume intercourse with
German scholars until they had renounced the crimes
against civilisation which Germany had committed.
But if such a change of mind should take place when
Germans discover the truth, British scholars might
assist the process of conversion by which alone
Germany could win readmission to the fellowship of
civilised nations. This would be done, not by
condoning crimes, but by making the truth known,
without unnecessary acts of unfriendliness such as
the expulsion of enemy members of learned societies."
There was much talk from the assembled academicians of
Germany as a sinner in the world community - her "absolution"
2
would depend on "repentance"Sanday gravely asked his audience
+
just how "a gentleman" would behave after "a serious quarrel...
in which one of the disputants had right on his side and in which
he had great cause to be aggrieved". The revelations of Prince
Lichnowsky, the former German ambassador in London, should cause
"a complete revulsion and revolution in public feeling in Germany".
But would they? Here was a "great opportunity" for those
theologians, like Loofs, Troeltsch and Harnack, who had signed anti-
3
British manifestos, to assist in this process of "repentance".
1. 10 May 1918,p.9d. See also letter from E.A.Sonnenschein, ibid.,
29 Nov.l918,p.llf.
2. Bryce. Loc.cit.
3. "There was probably no country whose population was, on the whole
more chivalrous sportsmanlike and fair than our own, but the
provocation we had received was so deep and so deadly that it
was not surprising that Germany was regarded by many as having
made itself an outlaw among the nations." Loc.cit.
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Obviously for many British scholars Carman re-entry to the world
of international scholarship was conditional upon a renunciation
of statements made during wartime in the heat of the moment, just
as German participation in the League of Nations was seen as con¬
ditional upon far-reaching internal political changes. But even
this carefully qualified expectation of future normalisation of
relations between scholars was bitterly attacked by those whose
sole concern was to "get on with the war and win it".1 -There
Sanday and Bryce saw apostacy on the part of the German professors,
other British academics saw the professors as "agents of the
German Government" and the German universities as bastions of
2
"the political and military power of the German nation".
Even before the war had ended, however, there were signs
that some of the signatories of the manifesto of "the ninety-
three" were beginning have second thoughts. The great Lujo
Brentano, pioneer historian of British trade union and economic
history, claimed as early as 1916 that he had not read the raani-
3
festo before signing. This was reported in the British press in
November 1918, together with similar explanations by other German
4
scholars. Other equally eminent scholars, like the classicist
1. J.A.Stewart (Professor of Moral Philosophy,Oxford). Times. 13 May
1918,p.lid.
2. C.Bampier Whetham (Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge). Times.
24 Aug.1918,p.46. ffhetham called for a postwar struggle against
"the German academic offensive", by taking a leaf out of the
German book - "Subsidies to universities, careful study of the
needs of foreign students, help towards the expenses of research
cheap production of good literary and scientific books, especially
for export, immediate translation...of noteworthy treatises in
ether languages". German universities, he felt, had a predominance
"far beyond their intrinsic merits".
3. J.J.Sheehan, The Career of Lujo Brentano, Chicago,1966,pp.188-9.
but see p.189 n.49 for Sheehan*s doubts about Brentano's conversion.
4. 7 Nov.1918,p.5f.
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Ulrich von Wilamowitz-MBllendorff, never recanted their wartime
views,31 but they were in a minority. By 1919 over half of the
signatories who were still alive had publicly acknowledged that
they had been mistaken in accepting the assertions in the manifesto
or had not read it before signing. In November 1919 Brentano
was in London as a German delegate to a meeting of the "Fight the
Famine Council" in the Caxton Hall, London, where he met Keynes,
3
Hobhouse and Leonard WooIf. Brentano*s visit seems to ha*e gone
largely unnoticed, unlike the visit two years later of Albert
Einstein. Einstein had never signed the manifesto of "the ninety-
three"} in fact he had been one of the few German academics Who
4
had signed G.F.Nicolai's counter "Manifesto To Europeans". But
even so, Ernest Barker, who as Principal brought him to King • a
5
College, London, to lecture, feared that there might be an outcry.
Barker's fears proved groundless and Einstein was elected
a member of the Royal Society and went on to receive an honorary
D.Sc. from Manchester University. On his return to Berlin,
where he was Professor of Physics until 1933, Einstein spoke of
the desire "among English savants and statesmen" for a resumption
1. Sheehan,pp.188-9. He had not changed his mind when he published
his memoirs in 1926. See his My Recollections 1848-1914.
1930 (first English transl.),pp.382-3.
2. Bryce to J.F.Rhodes, 22 Aug.1919.cit.Fisher. Eryce. JL , 223-4.
E.A.Sonnenschein, "The German professors", 19th Century.LXXXVI
(Aug.1919),322. H.Wehburg, Wider den Anruf den 931 .Charlottenburg,
1920,pp.8-13. The latter shows that by 1919 of the 93 signatories,
18 were dead, 16 unchanged in their views, 42 claimed to have
been deceived (most had not seen the text) or mistaken, 17 had not
replied (from a sense of shame Wehburg surmised).
3. Times. 3 Nov.l919,p.l3« & 6 Nov.1919,pp.14d,18a/b.
4. See Nicolai, Biology Of War.pp.7-9.
Aoe & Youth.p.136
6. Times.IP June 1921,p.8c & 7 Junel921,p.lOf.
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of"friendly relations with Germany".1 It was, perhaps under¬
standably, from British scientists that the first moves for recon¬
ciliation were seen. Although scientists had placed their know¬
ledge at the disposal of the war-effort, they had on the whole not
been involved in the bitter war of words between Germany and
Britain. Possibly they could also claim in one sense to have a
less emotional attitude towards their work than, say, historians.
Could one talk of British physics in the same way as one could of
British history? Although there were some who called for a boycott
2
of German scientists and scientific publications, the debate among
scientists in the correspondence columns of Nature and The Times
generally proceeded on the assumption that reconciliation would
come about - the question was how? The learned societies of
formerly neutral states were calling for the inclusion of German
scholars in international meetings. In Nature one of the elder
statesmen of British science recommended his colleagues to oppose
3
this move, while Professor D'Arcy Thompson of St.Andrews
recommended that German overtures be "freely reciprocated". "I cannot
say that I have always been on the side of tolerance and reconcil¬
iation", he wrote, "but already we have had some little time
1. Times. 2 July 1921,p.12e. Ernst Troeltsch (one of "the 93") was
invited to give a series of lectures in Oxford and London in
March 1923 (Published as Christian Thought.1923) but died before
leaving Germany.
2. Eg. Sir George Hampson (Natural History Museum,London): "German
is, without doubt, a barbarous language only just emerging from
the stage of primitive Gothic character, and I venture to suggest
that it would be to the advantage of science to treat it as such."
Science. NS.XLIX (21 Feb.1919), 193.Cf.Lord Walsingham (Trinity
College,Cambridge) who proposed to ignore scientific papers in
German. Nature. CII (5 Sept.1918), 4 & H.H.Godwin-Austen, ibid.
(26 Sept.1918),64.
3. Sir E.Ray Lankester. Nature. CIV (30 Sept.1919),172. "...the less
our academies and societies move in this manner the better".
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to think".1
But it took another year before anyfcrmal overture was made
to German scientists. The lead was taken by Oxford scholars, many
of idiom had been in the forefront of the propaganda battle during
the war. According to the organiser Robert Bridges, the Poet
Laureate, the manifesto had been sent to 120 members of the Univer¬
sity "whose names were picked on the register solely for their
position and eminence". Significantly, slightly more than half
of those approached had refused to sign and the resulting list,
though impressive enough, was criticised as not really being rep-
2
resentative. The manifesto is worth quoting at length since it
made no demand for a public confession of national guilt from
German professors - a point commented on unfavourably in The Times
3
leader. The manifesto was addressed to "the Professors of the
Arts and Sciences and to members of the Universities and Learned
Societies in Germany and Austria":
"Since there will be many of you who fully
share our heartfelt sorrow and regret for the breach
that the war has occasioned in our friendly inter¬
course, and since you cannot doubt the sincerity of
the feeling which engendered and cherished that old
friendliness, you must we believe, be sharing our
hope for its speedy re-establishment.
1. Ibid.. (23 Oct 1919),154
2. Robert Bridges. Times. 27 Oct.1920,p.l3e. See also critical
letters from L.R.Parnell (30 Oct.1920,p.lie) & B.W.Henderson
(19 Oct.1920,p.13e), both of Exeter College. One of the sig¬
natories (D.G.Hogarth) pointed out that as late as Nov.1918
Bridges had put his poetic skills at the service of the "haters
of Germany". Ibid., 20 Oct.1920,p.l3e.
3. 18 Oct.1920, p,12b/c. "...Justice demands that there shall be
no pardon, to say nothing of •amicable reunion* and the restor¬
ation of former *friendliness• until the offenders publicly
confess their guilt, exhibit heartfelt sorrow for their crimes,
and make the utmost satisfaction in their power. Then, and only
then, will it be time to readmit them upon equal terras either
into the fellowship of learning or into *the honourable comity
of European states*."
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We, therefore, the undersigned doctors,
heads of houses, professors, and other teachers
and officers in the University of Oxford, now
personally approach you with the desire to dispel
the embittermerit of animosities that under the
impulse of loyal patriotism may have passed between
us.
In the field where our aims are one, our
enthusiasms, our rivalry and ambition generous, we
can surely look to be reconciled, and the fellow¬
ship of learning offers a road which may - and if
our spiritual ideals be alive, must - lead to wider
sympathy and better understanding between our
kindred nations.
While political dissensions are threatening to
extinguish the honourable comity of the great
European states, we pray that we may help to hasten
that amicable reunion which civilization demands.
Impetret ratio quod dies icipretratura est."
Some eminent scholars were uneasy "about the temper still
prevailing in German universities" or were doubtful whether this
2
was really the best way to go about normalising relations. The
case for greater caution had been put by Sir Frederick Kenyon as
President of the British Academy in July 1920. The "notorious"
manifesto of "the ninety-three" - "a gross crime against scholar¬
ship" and "an offence against good manners and the common decencies
of life" - still rankled. Even though "the pressure of official
authority" had been removed from German scholars, there was still
no official disavowal. British scholars had "legitimate grounds
for resentment", especially now that Germany and Austria were
appealing for help to maintain their "intellectual life". And
Kenyon contined: "We do not...ask for express withdrawal or
1. 18 Oct. 1920, p.8e. For a list of signatories see
appendix (o-
2. Sir Frederick Pollock. Tiraes, 26 Oct.1920,p.lie (see also
letter from A.Hassall).
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apology. We do riot want to make reconciliation difficult. But
I think English scholars are entitled to some indication that
German scholars desire the resumption of relations; that they
recognise that an obstacle stands in the way of any cordiality
in such relations; that they regret the obstacle, for the existence
of which there may be excuses, though not justification; that they
do not, in short, hold such opinions of England as must make
sincere and genuine relations impossible."1
In the end it seems that Kenyon's views prevailed over the
more open-handed Oxford approach. Although individual scholars
continued to extend the hands of friendship to German and Austrian
colleagues, there was a fairly effective boycott at the level of
organised international scholarship. There were serious differ-
2
ences of opinion, as in the Royal Asiatic Society, between those
who supported, and those who opposed, normalising relations. At
an international level, American and especially Scandinavian
scholars exerted pressure on their British and French colleagues
for the reinclusion of German and Austrian delegates in invitations
to congresses, like that of historians at Brussels in 1924 and
3
Oslo in 1928. By the end of the 1920s German and Austrian
1. International Scholarship .pp.5-7. "With our allies we can work
with fuller accord, with a more deeply based affection, than
ever; and we welcome the opportunity of renewing connexion with
the nations which perforce remain neutral during the war." But
restoration of links with Germany would "be a matter of years".
2. In 1921 the Society was preparing to celebrate its centenary and
the proposal to invite Germans to attend was defeated on the gov¬
erning Council. B.G.Browne who voted with the minority "came very
near to resigning from the Society". E.D.Ross,p.xv.
3. Successfully in the case of Oslo. Previously the Belgians had been
very reluctant to invite Germans & had extended invitations only
to nations which were members of the League. Henri Pirenne,who
had been imprisoned during the war by the Germans, "explained
that they did not want to exclude private German historians, only
they could not persuade themselves to address official invitations
(pto)
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scholars were again participating in international congresses
- sometimes in an unofficial capacity, it is true - but membership
of the Union Acadeaigue Internationale and the International
Council of Scientific Unions remained closed to them. These had
been established soon after the war to replace the old International
Association of Academies and their refusal to admit the former
Central Powers to membership through the 1920s aroused a certain
amount of hostile comment among British scholars.1
In one field there was a re-establishment of prewar ties.
In 1926 the formation of the Any1o-German Academic Board, acting
in association with the Akademischer Austauschdienst of Berlin,
helped to encourage more British students to travel to Germany for
2
study and research. But it is unlikely that the number of
British students attending German universities reached prewar
3
levels. Quite apart from the estrangement caused by the war,
German universities were in a difficult financial position after
(footnote 3 cont. frrara previous page)
to German universities and academies". Danish & Swedish historians
then refused to accept invitations, and the Norwegians (supported
by the Americans) moved "to assure a complete international organ¬
isation of the following congress by moving it over to neutral
ground". Thus Oslo, rather than Warsaw, was chosen for 1928. K.Koht,
The Origins & Beginnings Of The international Committee Of Historical
Sciences. Lausanne, 1962,pp.2-4.
1. Austria & Germany were invited to join the U.A.I, in 1935 by a
unanimous vote "though not without some lively previous discus¬
sions" Kenyon, British Academy.p.26. These countries, together
with Turkey, Bulgaria & Hungary were invited to join the I.C.S.U.
in 1926 on the proposal of Britain (with Sweden & Holland).
Several previous attempts had been defeated & by 1928 only Hungary
& Bulgaria had joiaed. A Description Of the I.C.S.U., Cambridge,
1930,pp.2,114-5. See also: Nature, CVII,17 Mar.1921(72) & 24
Mar.1921(108); Forster,pp.154-6.
2. Times. 28 Oct.1926,p.9b. The Board included Murray, Barker, Sir W.
Beveridge, C.G.Robertson (Principal of Birmingham University), Sir M.
Sadler, A.C.Seward(Master of Downing College),G.Foster (provost of
University College, London),P.Giles(Master of Emmanuel College),Sir
T.Morrison (Principal of Armstrong College, Newcastle),
3. There had been a fall-cff after 1900.Cf.Veysey,p.l3l for the American
situation in relation to Germany.
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the war and may thus have been less attractive centres for research.
The establishment of the doctorate as a research degree at Oxford
and Cambridge after the war (following the example of London and
the newer universities) had the effect of encouraging British
students to go onto further study in Britain. The spell of
German Wissensehaft had been broken, too, and the decline of German
universities after 1933 meant the end of any attempt to re¬
establish the close relations which had existed before 1914. The
invitation to British universities to participate in the 550th
anniversary celebrations of the University of Heidelberg in June
1936 was declined by Oxford and Birmingham, and then by all the
1
British universities. But that, together with the reception of
refugee academics in Britain during the 1930s is another story.
h.
1. See the correspondence repr. in Heidelberg and American
Universities. N.Y., 1936, which (despite its title) is concerned
with the response of British Universities to Nasism.
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BRITISH INTERNATIONAL LAWYERS & THE WAR
At the outbreak of war in 1914 international law as a
university discipline in Britain was still at a relatively undeve¬
loped stage - even, as one lawyer noted, in an "unsatisfactory
condition". With few teachers and poorly-endowed chairs (even in
the three great universities) there was little public interest in
the subject. One effect - and perhaps a contributory cause - of
this neglect was that there was no British journal devoted to the
study of international law. "Indeed", the same observer noted, "in
the scientific study of the subject less interest is shown in this
country than in almost any other leading State."1 Yet British
entry to the war was ostensibly, as Asquith put it, in "the first
place to fulfil a solemn international obligation". The German
invasion of Belgium was portrayed by British international lawyers
(and by historians) as a challenge to "the existence of any code
of law at all between nations". "Any system of international
law must be based on the equality of States", the Chichele Professor
of International Law at Oxford told the readers of the Italian
review Scientia. Every state had to have "the same rights and
the same duties irrespective of its power or of its resources naval
3
or military".
The German invasion of Belgium seemed to be a body blow to
international law, but to the question "Does international law
still exist?" the British answer was in most cases a confident
1. E.A.Whittuck, "International Law Teaching", Trans.Grotius Soc..
Ill (1917),55. In 1910 there were 10 professors, readers and
lecturers in international law in Britain, compared with 20
professors and several lecturers in France and one or two
professors in each German and Swiss university. A.P.Higgins, The
Binding Force Of International Law. Cambridge, 1910,p.48,n.12.
2. Cit. Holbraad,pp.37-8
3. H.E.Richards "The Issues At Stake In This War", 202-3.
affirmative. As Sir H. Erie Richards told a W.E.A. meeting in
Birmingham: "if you had asked me to address you on the growth of
International Law as late even as last July, I should have told you
that it was strengthening its hold on the world year by year, and
that law was gradually displacing force in the settlement, at least of
some classes, of international disputes." But now Britain was at
war because "her enemy...declined to be bound by International Law".
Even so, Ricards concluded, since public opinion was "some check
even in the darkest days", one could confidently assert that
International Law did still exist and that at the end of the war
would "stand on a more secure footing than before".3* This con¬
fidence was reflected in the decision to investigate the conduct
of the German army in occupied Belgium (although this was also
considered in terms of propaganda warfare) and in the plans (which
never came to anything) for a general commission to investigate
German violations of the laws of war.
Confidence in the future of international law was perhaps
reflected also in the establishment of the Grotius Society in 1915
to fill a gap caused by the cessation (for the war years) of the
activities of the International Law Association. Membership of the
new society was restricted to British subjects, although foreigners
(invariably of allied or neutral states) were allowed to become
honorary or corresponding members - this to avoid the embarrassing
2
situation of the I.L.A. on the outbreak of war. However, the
first President (Henry Goudy, Regius Professor of Civil Law at
Oxford) was at pains to disclaim any intention to "discuss inter¬
national questions from a purely British standpoint, or to support
1. Does International Law Still Exist?. Oxford, 1914, pp.8, 13-17.
c.f. C.Oppenheira, The League of Nations, 1919,p.v. (lectures
given in 1918). A.P.Higgins gave a less confident assessment in
1910: "Hague Conferences, Inter-Parliamentary Unions, Federations,
Unions of Workers, and such-like gatherings all conduce to a
growing feeling of solidarity among the nations of the world, and
tend to create an atmosphere in which the observance of Inter¬
national Law will be increasingly easy to be realised. But as yet
I see no prospect of perpetual peace. International Law is
developing, but has not yet reached the fulness of the development
of national laws." Biadinq Force...,p.22. For the optimistic
view of prewar international law, see above p.43.
2. See I.Abraras, "The Emergence Of The International Law Societies",
Rev, of Politics. XIX, 3 (July 1957),361-80.
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dogmas because they might be thought advantageous to the British
interest". Discussion was to be from a "cosmopolitan point of
view"; suggestions for the reform of international law were to be
"based on humanity and justice wherever possible". This was a brave
standard to nail to the mast in wartime, and a few sentences later
Goudy gave evidence of partiality in his interpretation of recent
1
events in the light of international larw. Nowhere was the
objectivity of British international lawyers put to greater test
than on the question of contraband.
As a maritime nation the law of the sea was of utmost
importance for Britain. Before the outbreak of war the whole
question of the rules of naval warfare had been raised at a con¬
ference in London, which had taken place as the result of an
initiative by the British Government in December 1908. The result¬
ing "Declaration of London" was accepted by the British Government
but not by influential sections of political and naval opinion. A
bill embodying the provisions of the Declaration was passed by the
House of Commons but thrown out by the Lords in December 1911. A
similar division of opinion existed among British international
lawyers, especially on the merits of the central proposal in the
Declaration - the immunity from capture of private property at sea
in time of war. The former Chichele Professor of International
Law at Oxford T.E.Holland was strongly opposed to this idea, and,
echoing what had been official government policy up until 1908,
he also argued against restraint on the British right of blockading
2
enemy ports and capturing enemy ships. However, his successor in
the Chichele chair Sir H.Erie Richards seems to have come down on
the other side. As late as 1915 he was arguing for some compro¬
mise on the question of contraband between complete abandonment of
the belligerent right of search, and including all conditional
1. "Introduction" to Trans.Grotius Soc..1(1915 ) .1-2. Goudy gave
as an example of dynastic autocracy the Greek monarchy (which
was then giving Britain trouble as a potential adherent of the
Central Powers) and made no mention of Tsarist Russia.
2. Holland, pp.87-92, 154.
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contraband in the category of absolute contraband.*"
Two other international lawyers, Sir John Macdonell and the
Rev. T.J.Lawrence, campaigned strongly for the inviolability of
private property in wartime. Both men were involved in attempts
to foster better Anglo-German relations before 1914, and Lawrence's
Principles of International Law (1895) was one of the major works
2
on the subject. In a letter to the "Anglo-German Understanding
Conference" held in London in 1912 Macdonell listed what he felt
were the real motives behind the opposition in Britain to the idea
of immunity from capture of private property in wartime. There was
the procedural objection that this issue was merely part of the
wider one of regulating contraband and commercial blockades, and
could not therefore be solved in isolation. Then there was the
argument that "liability to capture" was really a "deterrent from
war" since people who would otherwise be "untouched" by war felt
its effects. Macdonell disposed of these objections - both
really depended on how urgently one desired reform, and on whether
one really believed in the efficacy of "deterrents" to prevent war.
The other objections, being based on less rational arguments, were
more difficult to deal with."Mahanism", which Macdonell described
as the belief that "every concession to the cause of peace" was an
admission of weakness, a "slurring over of the moral issues and
aspects of war", could only lead to an end to all rules of war
(not merely those concerned with contraband). This was not much
better than the arguments of the Social Darwinists which Macdonell
saw as part of a general "upthrust of barbarism; a secret admiration
of force unrestricted; impatience at every limitation of the area of
warfare; an unavowed belief in war as something divine, or as the
3
true field for manly virtue."
1. Does International Law Still Exist?,pp.14-15. Richards did not
discuss blockade, but did propose the establishment of an
International Prize Court (a favourite idea of the "liberal"
international lawyers).
2. Macdonell in the Anglo-German Friendship Society and Lawrence
in the Church of England Peace League (see above p.44 n.2). On
Lawrence's reputation, see D.H.N.Johnson, The English Tradition
Of International Law, 1962,p.25.
3. Report Of Proceedings. 1912,pp.89-90.
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What Macdonell was approaching from the perspective of
international law, Maclver and Wallas had approached from the per¬
spective of the social sciences - namely, the persistence of
attitudes which could very well lead to war at a time when nations
were increasingly interdependent in economic and financial terms.
As T.J.Lawrence wrote in the Peace Yearbook for 1914: "The increas¬
ing community of interests among nations, the reciprocity of
services rendered by international commerce, becomes every year a
greater obstacle to the free use of the right of capture." The
inviolability of private property in wartime was an issue upon
which "the pacifist, the politician and the trader" could "heartily
2
agree". Agreement on this would also "limit the destructiveness
of war", and perhaps even the peacetime arms rivalry which so
exercised the minds of delegates at the Anglo-German Understanding
3
Conference. But Lawrence was more realistic than many peace
4
advocates in his assessment of what could be achieved, and when
war did break out and the Declaration of London came increasingly
1. For Maclver and Wallas, see above pp.42ff.
2. "Present Policy", p.15.
3. Lawrence, "The Inviolability Of Private Property At Sea In Time
Of War", Peace Yearbook 1913, pp.6-9. Cf. his The 3rd Hague
Conference and Innocent Commerce In Time Of War. 1912, and his
contribution to the Understanding Conference in Report Of
Proceedings. Macdonell even argued that capture and blockade
were no longer the potent weapons against an enemy they once
were: it was "highly probable" that their use would cause "much
trouble with neutral States", and it was "ridiculous to suppose"
that the "•bottling-up* to any extent of the German merchant
marine, could appreciably influence the issue of hostilities".
Some Plain Reasons For Immunity From Capture Of Private Property
At Sea. 1910,pp.9-10.
4. The claim that the abolition of the right to make war on
innocuous sea-borne commerce would enable "navies...to confirm
to the standard of humanity already reached in military oper¬
ations", shewed little knowledge of the barbarity (despite the
Geneva Convention) of war on land. One could not argue in moral
terras:" "The capture of an enemy*s merchantman is an operation
as regular as the levy of a requisition for beef on a country
village." Barbarous as war was, "it would be still more barbarous
if disciplined forces were deprived of the power of striking hard
blows at the warlike resources of their enemies. There would be in
it no more of mercy and humanity than at present, and it would last
longer." The formula of advance was thus to "protect scrupulously
(p.t.o.)
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to be ignored by the belligerent states, Lawrence*s reaction was
a level-headed one.* But the same could not be said of other
British international lawyers.
The most uncompromising statement of the British case came,
predictably enough, from J.H.Morgan of University College, London
- editor of the English translation of the Kriegsbrauch ira Land-
krieqe (The German War Book) and participant in Lord Bryce's
investigation of alleged German atrocities in Belgium. Throughout
his life Morgan never seems to have wavered in his bad opinion of
the Germans, but his Rhodes Lecture in November 1915 has more than
a whiff of Realpolitik in its defence of British policy on war at
sea:
"I believe our departures from the orthodoxy
of international law have been thoroughly justified.
If I have any criticism to make of them, it is not
that they were made too soon, but that they were not
made soon enough. But their justification is to be -
found less in law than in morality. If we have
•scrapped' the Declaration of London and laid a
profane hand on the Declaration of Paris, it is
because the Germans have broken nearly every one
of the Hague Regulations governing the conduct of
the war on land, and have sunk neutral merchant¬
men by way of vindicating what they are pleased
to call the freedom of the seas. We were justified
and more than fully justified. But let us realise
no less resolutely than sadly that international
conventions never counted for so little as they do
now. We must, I think, take a long farewell of
the American contention that peace, and with it
(footnote continued from previous page)
persons and things not immediately useful for warlike purposes,
and seize or destroy all who are". Lawrence, International
Problems & The Hague Conferences, 1908,pp.10o-7. In other
words, Lawrence did not feel that complete abandonment of
belligerent right of search desirable, and that advance in
international law had to be argued for in terms of practical
benefit rather than abstract moral principles.
1. "...the ill-starred Declaration of London, whose misfortune was
that it came either too late or too soon - too late for the
regulation of a sea-order about to perish owing to the advances
of science and retrogressions of morality, and too soon for the
regulation of a new order whose outlines are yet in the making."
The Society Of Nations, p.83.
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the commerce of neutrals, should govern the
rules of war. This is an age of iron, and it
has little room for such academic conceptions."
There was little to choose between this conception of war at sea
and German "frightfulness" on land. In his introduction to The
German War Book Morgan had written that its "peculiar logic" con¬
sisted "for the most part in ostentatiously laying down unimpeach¬
able rules and then quietly destroying them by debilitating
2
exceptions". Was not this distinction between Kriegsmanier
and Kr.iegsraison reflected in a similar distinction in British
rules of war at sea? Were not the departures from international
law justified on the grounds of necessity - the notorious Notwendiqkeit
which had been used to justify the German invasion of Belgium?
This was the question dealt with by J.E.G. de Montmorency,
Lecturer in International Law at Cambridge and later (1920)
Macdonell's successor as Quain Professor of Comparative Law at London.
Writing in February 1915, Montmorency noted that there were "two
points of view" on international law during wartime:
"There is the purely legal view, difficult and
complex, often involving the clash of nations,
statesmen and jurists, a legal view that is ultimately
based upon economic necessity, and one therefore that
varies as that necessity varies from nation to nation.
The other point of view, the non-juridicial and common-
sense point of view, is the view that is too little
considered, though it is the view that has ultimately
determined and must always ultimately determine the
minds of statesmen and the policy of nations. War is
a form of reality that will not have its dread purpose
thwarted by unrealities. If a legal doctrine has
1. "The War & The Empire", Law Quly. Rev,. XXXIII, 131 (July 1917),
215-6. on the outbreak of war the Central Powers promised to
observe the Declaration of London if the Allies did likewise.
The latter, however, only agreed to this "subject to certain
modifications and additions" they deexaed "indispensable to the
efficient conduct of naval operations". Such piecemeal rati¬
fication violated Article 65 of the Declaration (which Britain
had not ratified), and, more importantly, was a first step in
a retreat from the spirit as well as the letter of all rules
of naval warfare (including the Declaration of Paris on block¬
ade and capture). Both sides were to blame for the subsequent
measures and counter-measures (maritime war zones, mining, long¬
distance blockade, unrestricted submarine warfare, armed
merchantmen). See E.Castren, The Present Law Of War & Neutrality
Helsinki, 1954,pp.21-2, 358-9, 535 & J.W.Garner, International
Law & The World War. 1920,1,30.
2 . p. 1.
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ceased to be a reality, if it is a mere echo of
realities once all important under conditions
that have passed away, then such a doctrine, "though
it may persist on record in times of peace, is
necessarily swept away when a new economic position
is forced by war."*
If there was a hint of "blood and iron" in Morgan's ideas, was
there not a touch of Clausewitz in de Montmorency's words? This
he of course denied. He was not advocating:
w...the monstrous German doctrine of
Kriegsverrath. Necessity whether in war or peace,
has no claim to interfere with fundamental principles
of righteousness. Neither might nor necessity
justifies the overturning of right....But a legal
doctrine is not necessarily a principle of
righteousness, and, indeed, has often proved a
perverse and evil thing, that has been handed on
from one set of economic conditions that justified
it, to later sets of economic conditions that
abhorred it. The continual adjustment of the
doctrines and practices of law to changing economic
conditions is one of the explanations of the growth of
English Common Law...."2
A recent "neutral" international lawyer has criticised this
3
kind of justification of British policy during the First World War
and at the time Macdonell expressed misgivings along the same lines.
i.
He was especially worried by British departures from previously
accepted rules of blockade. An Order in Council of March 1915
1. "Contraband and Continuous Transport", Contemporary Rev., CVII,
2(Feb. 1915),177.
2* Loc.cit. "No doubt, from a juridicial point of view, it is
important to see if possible the processes of growth by which
legal doctrines are expanded to meet new conditions; but from
the point of view of the businessman and statesman the practical
question of the moment is the thing that must be faced, it is
the business of the jurist later to show that this new attitude
was in fact an inevitable growth."
3. "As the existing law must be observed until it is repealed or
amended in a regular manner, changed conditions may not be invoked
as a ground for establishing war zones....the British observed
that obsolete rules of warfare were simply being adapted to suit
new conditions better, and that there was no intention of deviating
from the general rules of international law concerning blockade.
But this explanation too is unsatisfactory." Castren,p.314.
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"empowering British cruisers to detain all vessels attempting to
enter or leave German ports" prompted his comment that international
law now consisted of little more than "polite fictions". It was
just "an imposing name for opportunism".1 And in a reference to
the kind of arguments put forward by Morgan and de Montmorency,
Macdonell attacked those people in positions to "influence our
actual policy" who suggested "either let there be no rules, or
rules drawn in terms so elastic and vague that they be interpreted
to meet any new or unexpected circumstances". Such talk of course
meant "the abrogation of all law"; it was "the familiar doctrine
of necessity, to be reprobated on land, but, it would seeiu, to be
approved at sea". The "actual working creed of some Governments"
- and here he meant his own in particular - could be summed up in
the following way: "By all means let there be rules and let them
be observed when they are not seriously inconvenient. But when they
prove to be very much in the way, let us be free to break them, pay¬
ing damages, to be awarded by an international tribunal. Compensation
to neutrals is, and must be, no small part of the normal cost of
2
a modern naval wax."
But with the advent of unrestricted submarine warfare by
the Germans in January 1917 Macdonell found it difficult to remain
so critical of British sea policy. The entry of America into the
war on the Allied side later in the year invited historical parallels
1. "The New Blockade", Nation. XVI, 25(20 Mar.1915), 793-4. Britain
made additions to contraband lists (conditional and absolute)
and from April 1916 intercepted "contraband" (now all considered
absolute) even if it were bound for neutral ports. The idea
of "continuous voyage" assumed that goods were eventually des¬
tined for official government use in Germany and
could be intercepted at any stage of the journey.
2. "Some Notes On the Blockade", Trans.Grotius Soc..I(1915).
108-9. For the same charge against German war on land, see
German War Book, pp.1-11.
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and the description of German policy as "barbaric".* It was
perhaps inevitable that international law would be influenced by
national considerations during war-time - neither philosophers
nor historians had proved able to resist. Unrestricted submarine
warfare effectively diverted attention - in Britain, if not in all
neutral states - from departures from the law of the sea by the
Allies. Whether sinking merchantmen by torpedo was more "barbaric"
than the long-range blockade of the Central Powers is difficult to
2
say. The newness and the spectacular nature of submarine warfare
meant that it tended to arouse repugnance sooner than blockade, a
weapon hallowed by long use (though not in its present all-encompassing
form) .3
1. "...three times have the United States interposed with armed
force in the affairs of the Old World....First in 1805; next in
1815; and lastly in 1917, and all three times with the like
object - in 1805 and 1815 to put down the unrestricted invasion
of the freedom of the seas by the Barbary pirates, and in 1917
to stop unrestricted U-boat warfare. The American troops and
sailors are now doing much the same work as did Admiral Decatur's
ships against the Dey of Algiers." Macdonell, "The True Freedom of
the Sea, 19th Century. CXXXII, 479(Nov. 1917), 1017. Cf. de
Montmorency, "The Barbary States In International Law". Trans.
Grotius Soc., IV(1918),87-94. " *
2. In 1908 Lawrence had called submarines a "monstrous race of maritime
hermaphrodites". International Problems....p.197. British
counter-policy of arming merchantmen was defended by A.P.Higgins
in Defensively-Armed Merchant Ships & Submarine Warfare,1917. See
also his essays in Studies In International Law & Relations.
Cambridge,1920.
3. One has only to compare Lawrence writing in 1908 where he critic¬
ises equally categorising food as absolute contraband and arming
merchantmen (the British side), and mining the high seas and using
submarines (the German), and his different tone in wartime, to see
the changes wrought by war. See International Problems..., pp.121-7,
155, 174-7, 190-1 & Society of Nations, pp.91-110.
359.
APPENDIX THREE: ACADEMIC MEMBERSHIP OF THE ANGLO (BRITISH) - GERMAN
FRIENDSHIP SOCIETY
W.R. Anson (Warden of All Souls)
Sir Thomas Barlow (Professor of Medicine, London)
C.R. Beazley (Professor of History, Birmingham)
K. Breul (Professor of German, Cambridge)
A.J. Butler (Professor of Italian, London)
E. Caird (Master of Balliol College, Oxford)
Sir William M. Conway (Professor of Art, Cambridge)
T.W. Rhys Davids (Professor of Comparative Religion, London)
Sir Herbert von Herkhomer (Professor of Art, Oxford)
Sir John Macdonell (Professor of Comparative Law, London)
Alfred Marshall (Professor of Economics, Cambridge)
J.H. Kuirhead (Professor of Philosophy, Manchester)
W.P. Paterson (Professor of Theology, Edinburgh)
Sir William M. Ramsay (Professor of Old Philology, Aberdeen)
J.G. Robe: tson (Professor of German, London)
M.E. Sadler (Vice-Charicellor, Leeds University)
A.W. Ward (Master of Peterhouse, Cambridge)
APPENDIX FOUR: ACADEMIC MEMBERSHIP OF THE RATIONAL PEACE CONGRESS
J. Bryce
E.G. Browne (Professor of Arabic, Cambridge)
J.E. Carpenter (Principal of Manchester College, Oxford)
T.J. Lawrence (Reader in International Law, Bristol)
Sir John Macdonell (Professor of Comparative Law, London)
W.J. Roberts (Professor of Economics, Cardiff)
A. Scnuster (Professor of Physics, Manchester)
F.E. Weiss (Vice-Chancellor Manchester University)
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APPENDIX FIVE: DONS IN WARTIME WHITEHALL
The involvement of British academics in Whitehall during the
Second World War—subject of many an autobiographical or fictional
account of the corridors of power—had been foreshadowed during the 191^-
1918 war. The Civil Service is an environment not unlike that which
academics normally inhabit, and, when war broke out in 191^, university
men too old for active service searched out old school or college friends
in the hope of finding anything which seemed to provide useful employ-
1
ment. Almost anything, it seemed, was better than lecturing to half-
empty college and university class-rooms. Some, like the Oxford philo¬
sopher and ancient historian R.G. Collingwood found jobs which required
certain of their professional skills. Collingwood found a job in Admiralty
Intelligence from 1915 onward, where he "employed" his knowledge of
French, German, Spanish and Italian as well as his skill in sifting evi-
2
dence which he had developed as an archaeologist." In his Autobiography
(1939) Collingwood tells how he worked on a philosophical treatise
Truth and Contradiction during this time, and Admiralty Intelligence seems
to have become rather a haven for philosophers. Beside the usual bevy of
classicists, Collingwood's colleagues included the Kantian scholar Norman
Kemp Smith and two Oxford moral philosophers (H.J. Paton and Hastings
1. Sir Charles Oman, Professor of History at Oxford, found a job on
the Neutral Press Committee through his old school friend, Sir John
Simon, the Home Secretary. Oman, Things I Have Seen, 1933, pp. 220-
k.
2. W.M. Johnston, The Formative Years of R.G. Collingwood, The Hague,
1967, p. 10. " """" "
Rashdall)Working closely with the Admiralty, as well as with the
Board of Trade, was a small group of academics who organised the trade
intelligence section of Postal Censorship. This "Trade Clearing House"
was formally recognised as a branch of the War Trade Department in
February 1915, with the job of licencing exports. A few months later
it was again transformed into the War Trade Intelligence Department with
two Oxford historians as chairman and vice-chairman—T.H. Penson (Pembroke
College) and H.W.C. Davis (Balliol).
So successful was Davis in his job of drafting daily minutes for
the Cabinet on the progress of the commercial blockade of the Central
Powers that he was chosen to represent the department on the British
delegation at Versailles in 1919. This in turn lead to a C.B.E. in the
New Year's Honours List and offers of Vice-Chancellorships from the
universities of Liverpool and Sheffield. The Chancellor of the Exchequer
was also considering Davis for an "important position", and all this made
Davis hesitate before returning to academic life. But apart from taking
over the direction of the Department of Overseas Trade for six weeks
(March-April 1919) while his superiors were absent, Davis did not rise
... 2 .
in the civil service. However, his wartime experience seems to have had
a profound effect on his scholarly activities. The editor of Stubb's
Select Charters and the author of England Under the Normans and Aagevins
now turned his attention to the antecedents of the war. Contributions to
1. Collingwooa, Autobiography, p. H2. For a fuller list of academics
employed in wartime Whitehall, see below,
2. J.R.H. Weaver, Honry William Carless Davis 187^-1928, 1933, pp.
36-U2. Obituary in The Times, 29 June 1928, p. lib. Headlam-
Morley, Memoir..., p. V. Letter of Lord Southborough (Chairman of
Restriction of Enemy Supplies Committee) to The Times, 30 June
1928, p. 10a.
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Temperley's History of the Peace Conference and articles on pre-war diplo¬
macy in the English Historical Review testify to his new concern with
contemporary history.1
Lloyd George did not have Asquith's intimate links with Oxford, and
he is better-known for recruiting businessmen than academics to
government service during wartime. However, he was not averse to recruit¬
ing advisors and even ministers (H.A.L. Fisher) from the universities.
One member of his secretariat—"the garden suburb"—was W.G.S. Adams,
Gladstone Professor of Political Theory and Institutions at Oxford
(1912-33) and founder of the Political Quarterly (191*0. Adams had
joined the Ministry of Munitions, which was well-stocked with Oxford dons,
in 1915, and a year later he joined Lloyd George's staff, a position which
he held until 1919, editing the War Cabinet Reports (1917-18) and working
on labour matters. Adams was also a member of the Commission which
examined the Civil Service (1918) and he acted as liaison officer between
Lloyd George and Sir Horace Plunkett, chairman of the Irish Convention.
2
However, he was probably closer to Lord Milner than to Lloyd George. The
other academic member of the secretariat was Arthur Greenwood, until
just before the war a Lecturer in Economics at the University of Leeds.
In 191^ he had been appointed General Secretary of the Council for the
Study of International Relations. In 1916 he became a member of Lloyd
1. See also his inaugural lecture as Regius Professor of History at
Oxford, "The Stu<3y of History" (ifov. 1925), in Weaver, esp. pp. 70-k.
2. Obituary in The Times, 1 Feb. (1966), p. 123. J.O. Stubbs, "Lord
Milner arid Patriotic Labour", EHR, LXXXVII (July 1972), 73**. T.
Jones, Whitehall Diary, 1969, T, 31. Beatrice Webb described Adams
as "a high-browed idealist" who wanted to "change the 'world
spirit' rather than alter social machinery", about which he xnew
little. Beatrice Webb's Diaries 1912-1924, 1952, p. 85 (3 June
1917). But two articles by Adams on the international control of
disputes show a real grasp of the difficulties. See his Inter¬
national Control (1915) and "The Basis of Constructive Inter¬
nationalism", Annals A.A.P.S.S, LXI (Sept. 1915), 217-29.
George's secretariat and. between 191? and 1919 worked in the Ministry
of Reconstruction under Christopher Addison. Later still he became
one of the leading members of the Labour Party until his death in 195^.1
Lloyd George's other notable academic appointee was II.A.L. Fisher,
who became President of the Board of Education in December 1916, with the
task of introducing major educational, reform. With the details of the
2
1918 Education Bill we cannot be concerned, but we can note that Fisher
was sensitive to criticism from other liberal academics, like Gilbert
Murray, because of his decision to work for the politician who had so
recently deposed Asquith. In their eyes Lloyd George seemed as danger¬
ous and ambitious as Gladstone had to an earlier generation of academic
liberals during the Home Rule controversy. "All my sympathies are with
Asquith and Grey. The Press Campaign against them has been hateful".
Fisher wrote to Murray. But his decision to accept Lloyd George's offer
3
of political office had not been "as a politician but as an educationist."
Fisher's doubts over Lloyd George were shared in more extreme form by
the leading academic liberal of the next generation, John Maynard Keynes
who from January 1915 worked full-time at the Treasury. With many of his
friends conscientious objectors, Keynes found the moves towards the
introduction of conscription made his position difficult. However, a
letter to his mother of January 1916 shows a genuine liking for life
in the corridors of power mixed in with a dislike of some of the men he
1. H.V. Wiseman in DNB 1951-60, pp. 1+29-31.
2. See: D.W. Dean, "H.A.L. Fisher, Reconstruction and Development
of the 1918 Education Act", British J. of Educational Studies, XVIII,
3 (Oct. 1970), 259-76; L.O. Ward, "H.A.L. Fisher and the Teachers",
ibid., XXII, 2 (June 197*0, 191-9; G.E. Sherrington, "The 1918
Act: Origins, Aims and Development", ibid., XXIV, 1 (Feb. 1976),
66-85 and "H.A.L. Fisher and the Teachers", ibid., XXIV, 2 (June
1976), 171-6.
3. 9 Dec. 1916, Fisher Mss. Box 7. In another letter to Murray Fisher
defended his decision as allowing him to do "a big piece of national
work." (12 Dec. 1916).
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found, there."'" In the event he did not break from Lloyd George until
the Peace Conference in 1919.
A fuller list of academics employed in government departments and
secretariats follows:
1. Admiralty Intelligence:
F.E. Adcock (King's College, Cambridge; later Professor of Ancient
History, Cambridge)
C. Bailey (Balliol College, Oxford; classics)
J. Baillie (Professor of Moral Philosophy, Aberdeen) O.B.E. 1918
W.M. Calder (Professor of Greek, Manchester)
R.G. Collingwood (Pembroke College, Oxford; classics and philosophy)
H.N. Dickson (Professor of Geography, Reading)
G.B. Grundy (Corpus Christi College, Oxford; ancient history)
L.G. Wickham Legg (Hew College, Oxford; history)
R.B. Mowat (Corpus Christi College, Oxford; later Professor of History,
Bristol)
J. Orr (Lecturer in French, Queen Mary College, London; from 1919
Professor of French at Manchester)
H.J. Paton (Queen's College, Oxford; philosophy)
H. Rashdall (New College, Oxford; philosophy)
N. Kemp Smith (Professor of Philosophy, Princeton; from 1919 Professor
of Philosophy, Edinburgh)
W.B. Stevenson (Professor of Hebrew, Glasgow)
1. "things drift on, and I shall stay now, I expect, until they begin
to torture one of my friends. I believe a real split now and a
taste of trouble would bring peace nearer, not postpone it, other¬
wise I'd swallow a great deal. I've been very busy and with occas¬
sional excursions into high life—met the P.M. at dinner on Saturday,
refused to dine with the old scoundrel on Sunday, banqueted with
the Lord Mayor yesterday." To F.A. Keynes, 13 Jan. 1916, cit.
Collected Writings, XVI, l6l-2. A year later he vented his feeling
about Lloyd George to Duncan Grant: "Did you read his last speech?'
The war is a road paved with gold and cemented with blood." God
curse him." (l4 Jan. 1917) "I work for a Government I despise for
ends I think horrid", Keynes wrote in another letter to Grant (15
Dec. 1917). Both letters in Keynes-Grant Correspondence.
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2. War Office Intelligence:
S. Alexander (Professor of Philosophy, Manchester)
C.F. Crutwell (Hertford College; history)
J.D. Denniston (Hertford College; classics)
G.B. Grundy
G. Gordon (Professor of English, Leeds and later Oxford)
R. Hackforth (Sidney Sussex College, Cambridge; classics)
R.G.D. Laffan (Queen's College, Cambridge; history)
K.W.M. Pickthorn (Corpus Christi College, Cambridge; history)
J.T. Sheppard (King's College, Cambridge; classics)
H. Sumner (All Souls College, Oxford, from 1919)
H. Temperley (Peterhouse, Cambridge, history tutor and later Regius
Professor)
C.K. Webster (Professor of Modern History, Liverpool and later Professor
of International History at Aberystwyth and London)
W. Lorimer (Lecturer in Greek, St. Andrews)
3. War Trade Intelligence Department
H.W.C. Davi3 (Balliol College, Oxford; history tutor
Professor)
T.H. Penson (Pembroke College, Oxford; economics)
F.M. Powicke (Professor of History Belfast and later
Oxford)
R.S. Rait (Professor of Scottish History, Glasgow)
C.E. Vaughan (Professor of English at Leeds up until
W.T. Waugh (Lecturer in History, Manchester)
U. Ministry of Munitions:
W.G.S. Adams (Professor of Political Theory and Institutions, Oxford)
J.B. Baillie
C. Bailey
F.M. Cornford (Trinity College, Cambridge; classics tutor and later
Professor of Ancient Philosophy)
H.W. Garrod (Merton College, Oxford; classics tutor and later Professor
of Poetry)
A.E.W. Hazel (Jesus College, Oxford; law)
A.J. Jenkinson (Brasenose College, Oxford; classics)





G.G.G. Butler (Corpus Christi College, Cambridge; history) Hews
Department of the Foreign Office
C.W.C. Oman (Chichele Professor of History, Oxford) Neutral Press
Committee of the Home Office and from 1916 attached to the
Foreign Office, C.B.E. 1913 and K.B.E. 1920
Z.N. Brooke (Gonville and Caius College, Cambridge; history) Ministry
of Food
A.D. Lindsay (Balliol College, Oxford; politics) Deputy Controller of
Labour in France
J.H. Clapham (King's College, Cambridge; economics tutor and later
Professor of Economic History) Board of Trade and Cabinet
Committee on Priorities.
A.C. Pigou (Professor of Economics, Cambridge) Board of Trade
J.M. Keynes (King's College, Cambridge; economics) Treasury
E. Barker (Hew College, Oxford; philosophy) Ministry of Labour
W.G.S. Adams: Lloyd George's Secretariat
A. Greenwood (former Lecturer in Economics, Leeds) Lloyd George's
Secretariat
H.S. Jones (Trinity College, Cambridge; classics) Foreign Office
R. McKenzie (St. John's College, Cambridge; classics) Foreign Office
L. Oppenheim (Professor of International Law, Cambridge) Foreign Office
A. P. Higgins (Lecturer and later Professor of International Law, Cam¬
bridge) Treasury and the Trade Division of the Admiralty
6• Paris Peace Conference 1918-1919:
W.M. Calder: Foreign Office advisor
H.W.C. Davis: Foreign Office "Intelligence Clearing House"
C. Guillebaud (St. John's College, Cambridge; economics) Supreme
Economic Council advisor
A.P. Higgins: Advisor to the Admiralty
J.M. Keynes: Treasury
R.B. Mowat: War Cabinet Secretariat under Smuts
H.J. Paton: Foreign Office advisor
T.H. Penson: Foreign Office "Intelligence Clearing House"
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H. Sumner: Military Intelligence Section (Assistant Secretary)
C.K. Webster: Military Intelligence Section (Secretary)
N.B. For academics working in propaganda agencies, see the chapter on
propaganda.
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APPENDIX SIX: LIST OF SIGNATORIES OF THE OCTOBER 1920 OXFORD MANIFESTO
W.G.S. Adams, E. Barker, A.D. Lindsay, G. Murray, R. Bridges,
H.W.C. Davis and: E. Armstrong (Pro-Provost Queen's)
J.D. Beazley (Christ Church)
H. Boyd (Principal of Hertford)
G.C. Bourne (Professor of Zoology)
J.E. Carpenter
E.F. Carritt (University, Hertford)
R.W. Chapman (Secretary to the Delegates of the University Press)
A.C. Clark (Professor of Latin)
G.A. Cooke (Professor of Hebrew)
Sir Arthur Evans (Professor of Prehistoric Archaeology)
P. Gardner (Professor of Classical Archaeology)
E.E. Genner (Jesus)
H. Goudy (Emeritus Professor of Civil Law)
B.P. Grenfell (Professor of Papyrology)
J.S. Haldane (New)
G.H. Hardy (Professor of Geometry)
A.C. Headlan (Professor of Divinity)
C.B. Heberden (former Principal of Brasenose)
D.G. Hogarth (Keeper of the Ashmolean Museum)
L.P. Jacks (Principal of Manchester)
H.A. James (President of St. John's)
H.H. Joachim (Professor of Logic)
H.W.B. Joseph (New)
S. Langdon (Professor of Assyriology)
T.E. Lawrence (All Souls)
W. Lock (Professor of Divinity)
F.J. Lys (Provost of Worcester)
J.C. Masterman (Christ Church)
J. Murray (Christ Church)
J.L. Myres (Professor of Ancient History)
C.S. Orwin (Research Officer in Agricultural Economics)
R.L. Ottley (Professor of Pastoral Theology)
L.R. Phelps (Provost of Oriel)
Judge Radcliffe (All Souls)
C.G. Robertson (All Souls)
W.R. Ross (Oriel)
A.S. Russell (Lee's Reader)
C.H. Sampson (Principal of Erasenose)
W. Sanday (Emeritus Professor of Divinity)
F.C.S. Schiller (Corpus Christi)
W.B. Selbie (Mansfield)
J.A. Smith (Professor of Moral and Metaphysical Philosophy)
W. A. Spooner (Hew College)
G.H. Stevenson (University, Balliol)
J.L. Stocks (St. John's)
T.B. Strong (former Dean of Christ Church)
T.H. lizard (Oriel)
M.K. Tod (Oriel)
J. Wells (Warden of Wadhum)
H.H. Williams
***
C.M.M. Adye (St. Hugh's)







A.M. Bruce (Vice-Principal Somerville)




T.W. Grundy (Christ Church)
M.V. Clarke (Somerville)
N. Cunliffe (Forestry School)















A.E. Levett (Vice-Principal St. Hilda's)
K.K.M. Leys (University)
E.C. Lodge (Vice-Principal Lady Margaret Hall)
H.L. Lorimer (Somerville)
E.W. Lumnis (Worcester)









H.J. Pybus (St. Hilda's)
H.R. Raikes (Exeter)
A.E.J. Rawlinson (Christ Church)
A.M.H. Rogers (St. Hugh's)
E.W. Rooke (St. Hilda's)
J.W. Russell (Balliol)
H.V. Sidgwick (Lincoln)
M.G. Skipworth (Lady Margaret Hall)
A.H. Smith (Hew)
E.M. Spearing (St. Hugh's)









(items of most value marked +)
C.R. Ashbee Journal (King's College, Cambridge) contains letters from
Dickinson.
W.J. Ashley (British Museum Add. Mss. 1+22^2-56) on war work for the
Government.
A.C. Benson (British Museum Add. Mss. 51290) correspondence with C.R.
Sayle.
J.Bryce (Bodleian Library) correspondence with Murray & Toyabee;
material relating to investigation of atrocities committed in
Belgium & Armenia.
Cambridge University Fabian Socialist & Socialist Societies (Cambridge
University Library Add. Mss. 7^51~3) various minute books 1911-20.
E. Canaan (British Library of Political & Economic Science) letters
from Dickinson & Morel.
F.C. Conybeare (New College, Oxford) comments by R.F. Carritt on
Conybeare.
W.I1. Dawson (Birmingham University Library) letters.
G.L. Dickinson (King's College, Cambridge) letters.
V?. McN.Dixon (Mitchell Library, Glasgow) letters from W. Raleigh.
H.A.L. Fisher (Bodleian Library) correspondence with Murray and con¬
cerning the Bryce Commission.
H.G. Fiedler-C. Harding (Birmingham University Library) letters.
H.W, Garrod (Merton College, Oxford) "Three Years in Whitehall"
(wartime experiences in the Ministry of Munitions).
D. Grant (British Museum Add. Mss.) Letters from J.M. Keynes
J.L. & B. Hammond (Bodleian Library) correspondence with Murray.
F.J♦C. Hearnshaw (Professor L.S. Hearnshaw) unpublished autobiography
(typescript), chapter XI (on the war).
F. von Hugel (St. Andrews University Library) letter from J. Ward
(Ms. 3126).
J.M. Keynes (King's College, Cambridge) correspondence with Pigou,
Fay, Dickinson; material relating to Russell.
J.N. Keynes (Cambridge University Library) diary for 191^-17.
P.Kerr (Lord Lothian) (Scottish Record Office) correspondence with
B. Pares & J.Y. Simpson (GD.1*0/17).
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E.D. Morel (British Library of Political & Economic Science) letter
from C.R. Beazley.
+ G.Murray (Bodleian Library) correspondence with A.C. Bradley, Cole,
Fisher, Rissell; material on conscientious objectors and the
League movement.
A.F. Pollard (institute of Historical Research, London) letters to
his father during the war.
R. Poole (Bodleian Library Ms. Top. Oxon. d. 563) "Oxford in Wartime"
(unpublished typescript).
G.W. Prothero (Royal Historical Society, London) correspondence with
W. Raleigh; material relating to wartime propaganda.
C.P. Scott (British Museum Add. Mss. 50908) letters from Dickinson
and A. Marshall.
+ A.L. Smith (Balliol College, Oxford) correspondence with Morel;
material on wartime propaganda through the W.E.A.
T.F. Tout (John Rylands University Library, Manchester) letters from
former students at the Front.
G. Wallas (British Library of Political & Economic Science) material
relating to neutrality manifestos July 191^.
C, Walston (Waldstein) (King's College, Cambridge).
B. Webb (Passfield) diary v. 33-3^.
C. Webster (British Library of Political Si Economic Science) material
on work for the Foreign Office during the war.
N. Wedd (King's College, Cambridge) memoir of Dickinson; correspondence
(typescript) with E.F. Bulmer.
L.S. Woolf (Sussex University Library) letters from Dickinson.
A. Zimmern (Bodleian Library) letters from various correspondents.
War Cabinet Minutes (Public Record Office CAB 2k/2U).
Letters from:
Mr. A. Allen (University of Liverpool Library), 2k May 1973
Mr. A.W. Chapman (former Registrar of the University of Sheffield)
25 July 1973
Sir Keith Feiling, 21 Mar. 1973
Professor L. S. Hearnshaw, 15 Dec. 1975
Mr. J.G. Thomas (Registrar of the University of Wales), 6 June 1976
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PUBLISHED SOURCE MATERIAL: PERIODICALS
(for 191^-19 period unless stated)
Anglo-German Courier (Jan.-Oct. 1906).
The Cambridge Daily News.
The Cambridge Magazine; Edited by Members of Cambridge University
(1912-23).
Hie Cambridge Review: A Journal of University Life & Thought (1899-).
The English Historical Review.
Goodwill: A Journal of International Friendship.
Hie Hibbert Journal: A Quarterly Review of Religion, Theology &
Philosophy.
History: The Quarterly Journal of the Historical Association.
Mind: A Quarterly Review of Psychology & Philosophy.
The Hation (1910-).
Nature: A Weekly Illustrated Journal of Science.
The Oxford Magazine (l899_).
The Peace Yearbook (1910-).
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society.
Proceedings of the British Academy.
Students' Handbook to the Universities & Colleges of Cambridge (1902-).
Hie Times (l899~).
The Times Educational Supplement.
The Times Literary Supplement.
Transactions of the Royal Historical Society.
The Varsity: A Social View of Oxford Life.
War & Peace: A Norman Angell Monthly (1913-).
The Yearbook of Universities of the British Empire.
Calendars for the following universities & university colleges:
Aberdeen, Belfast, Birmingham, Bristol, Cambridge, Dublin, Durham,
Edinburgh, Glasgow, National University of Ireland, Leeds, Liverpool,
London, Manchester, Oxford, St. Andrews, Sheffield, Wales, Nottingham,
Reading.
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PUBLISHED SOURCE MATERIAL: BOOKS & ARTICLES
(place of publication is London, unless stated)
Acton, J.E.E. Historical Essays & Studies, 1907.
Lectures on Modern History, 190o.
The War of 1870: A Lecture Delivered at the Bridgenorth Literary
& Scientific Institution on the 25th of April, 1871.
Adams, W.G.S., "The Basis of Constructive Internationalism", Annals
of The American Academy of Political & Social Science, LXI
(Sept. 1915), 217-29.
International Control (Papers for Wartime, Ser. 2/no.22), Oxford
1915.
The Responsibility for the War (Oxford Pamphlets no. 3), Oxford
1915".
Allen, J.W. The Danger of Peace Being the Substance of a Lecture
Delivered at King's College, London, on May 19, 1915. 1915.
Germany & Europe, 1915.
The Place of History in Education, Edinburgh, 1909.
Anglo-German Understanding Conference, British Joint Committee. Report
of the Proceedings of the Anglo-German Understanding Conference,
1912.
Aristotelian Society, "Symposium: Ethical Principles of Social
Reconstruction", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society
N.S. XVII (1916-17), 256-300.
"Symposium: The Nature of the State in View of its External
Relations", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society,
US. XVI (1915-16), 290-325.
Arnold, E.V. "The Ferment of Revolution", The Times, 25 Sept. -
28 Sept. 1917.
"Germany's Peace Offer", hew Age, XX,. 5 (23 Nov. 1916), 80-1.
"The New Orientation", Cambridge Magazine, VI, 25 (9 June 1917),
689-91.
"Reckless Propaganda", New Age, XX, 5 (30 Nov. 1916), 103-5.
War-Time Lectures, 1916.
Ashley, W.J., "The Present Position of Political Economy in England",
in Die Entwicklung der deutschen Volkswirtschaftslehre im
neunzehnten Jahrhundert: Gustav Schmoller sur siebenzigsten
Wiederlehr seines Geburtstages 25 Juni 1908, Bd. I, Leipzig, 1903.
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The War & Its Economic Aspects (Oxford Pamphlets no. *0)
Oxford, 191U.
Baillie, J.B. Studies in Human Nature, 1921.
Barker, E.A. Confederation of Nations Its Powers & Constitution,
Oxford 1913.
"The Constitution of a League of Nations", New Europe, X,
125 (6 Mar. 1919), 180-1*; 126 (13 Mar. 1919), 196-203;
127 (20 Mar. 1919), 220-6.
"The Discredited State: Thoughts 011 Politics Before the
War", Political Quarterly, 5 (Feb. 1915), 101-21.
Great Britain's Reasons for Going to War, 1915.
Ireland in the Last Fifty Years (1866-1916), 2nd rev. ed.,
Oxford, 1919.
Linguistic Oppression in the German umpire, 1913.
Mothers & Sons in War Time & Other Pieces (Reprinted from
The Times), rev.ed., 1918.
Nietzsche & Treitschke: The Worship of Power in Modern Germany
(Oxford Pamphlets no. 20), Oxford, 191*+.
Political Thought in England l8*+6-19lL, 2nd rev.ed., 19*+7.
The Relations of England J Holland, 1915.
The Submerged Nationalities of the German Empire, 1915.
"The Superstition of the State", Times Literary Supplement,
XVII, 861 (13 July 1918), 329-30.
Baynes, A.H. "German Student Life", Fraser's Magazine, N.S. XXIV
(Nov. 1881) 630-1+5. "
Beavan, M. Austrian Policy Since 1867 (Oxford Pamphlets no. 9), Oxford,
19lfc.
"The Pact of Bjorko", New Europe, IV, 52 (II Oxt. 1917), 389-99.
Beazley, R,N. Forbes & G.A. Birkett, Russia From the Varangians to
the Bolsheviks, Oxford, 1918.
Beesly, E.S. "The Russian Alliance", Positivist Review, XX, 26l
(1 Sept. 191*0, 198-9.
Belgium, Reports on the Violation of the Rights of Nations & Of the
Laws & Customs of War in Belgium, 2v., 1915.
Benians, E.A. The British Empire & The War, 1915.
Bennett, A. The Journals of Arnold Bennett, v.3 (1911-21), 1932.
The Letters of Arnold Bennett, v.2 & 3, 1967.
Benson, A.C. "An Impression of the War", Atlantic Monthly, CXVIII,
I (July 1916), 125-30. "
The Happy Warrior: A Sight of General Smuts at Cambridge,
May 1917, Cambridge, 1917.
Bosanquet, B. Bernard Bosanquet & His Friends: Letters Illustrating
the Sources & Development of his Philosophical Opinions, 1935.
"The History of Philosophy", in Germany in the Nineteenth
Century (ed. C.H. Herford), Ser. 2, Manchester, 1915.
"A Note on Mr. Cole's Paper", Proceedings of the Aristotelian
Society, US. XV (191U-15), 160-3.
"The Notion of a General Will", Mind, US. XXIX, 113 (Jan. 1920),
77-81.
The Philosophical Theory of the State, l*th ed. 1923.
Review of Russell's Principles of Social Reconstruction, Mind,
NS. XXVI, 102 (July 1917), 233-1*.
Review of Vaughan's Edition of The Political Writings of
Rousseau, Mind. NS. XXV, 99 (July 1916), 399-1*01*7
Social & International Ideals Being Studies in Patriotism, 1917.
Some Suggestions in Ethics, 1918.
"The State & The Individual", Mind, NS. XXVIII, 109 (Jan. 1919),
75-7.
Bosvell, A.B. Poland & The Poles, 1919.
"The Polish Question", Scientia, XXIII (Oct. 1917), 29^-302.
Bradley, F.H. "The Limits of Individual & National Self-Sacrifice",
in Collected Essays, Oxford, 1935.
Britain, Home Office, Report of the Committee on Alleged German
Outrages, 2 v., 1915.
British Universities & The War: A Record & Its Meaning, 1917.
Broaa, C.D. Ethics & The History of Philosophy, 1952.
"The Prevention of War", International Journal of Ethics, XXVI,
2 (Jan. 1916), 21*1-57.
"The Notion of a General Will", Mind, NS. XXVIII, 112 (Oct.
1919), 502-1*;
Review of Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (1916-17),
Mind, NS. XXVII, 107 (July 1918), 366-70.
"War Thoughts in Peace Time", in Religion, Philosophy $ Psychical
Research, 1953.
"The Broken Fellowship", Times Literary Supplement, 720 (h Nov. 1915),
385-6. " ~ ~ '
Brooke, R. The Letters of Rupert Brooke Chosen & Edited by Geoffrey
Keynes, 1968.
Brooke, T. & H.S. Canby, War Aims & Peace Ideal3: Selections in
Prose & Verae Illustrating the Aspirations of the Modern World,
N. Haven, 1919.
Browne, E.G. A Brief Narrative of Recent Events in Persia Followed By
An Appendix on the Persian Constitution, 1909.
The Persian Constitutionalists: An Address, 1909.
The Persian Crisis of December 1911: How it Arose & Whither
It May Lead Us Compiled for the Use of the Persia Committee,
Cambridge 1912.
The Persian Revolution of 1905-1909, Cambridge, 1910.
"The Persian Oil Concession", War & Peace, I, II (Aug. 191*0,
315-6.
The Reign of Terror at Tabriz: England's Responsibility...
Compiled for the Use of the Persia Committee, Manchester, 1912.
Bryce, J. The Attitude of Great Britain in the Present War, 1916.
Essays & Addresses in War Time, 1918.
"The Future of Armenia", Contemporary Review,CXIV, 6 (Dec. 1918),
60U-II.
The Last Phase in Belgium: Statement by Viscount Bryce on tne
Belgian Deportations Made in Reply to a Letter from the
Representative of the New York "Tribune", 1916.
Race Sentiment As a Factor in History; A Lecture Delivered Before
the University of London on February 22, 1915, 1915.
"War & Human Progress", Atlantic Monthly, CXVIII, 3 (Sept. 1916),
301-19.
University & Historical Addresses Delivered During a Residence
in the United States as Ambassador of Great Britain, 1913.
Burns, C."The Balance of Power", War & Peace, (Supplement to Nation),
51 (Dec. 1917), 1*17-9.
"Diplomatic Despotism", Cambridge Magazine, IV, II
(30 Jan. 1915), 221-2.
"The Idea of the State", Mind, NS. XXVII (1918), 188-97.
"The Ideal of Peace", Times Literary Supplement, 731 (20 Jan.
1916), 26.
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"Moral Effects of War St Peace", International Journal of
Ethics, XXV, 3 (April 1915), 317-27-
"When Peace Breaks Out", International Journal of Ethics, XXVI,
I (Oct. 1915), 82-91.
Burgh, W.G. de. "The Peril of Kubris", Edinburgh Review, CCV, L60
(April 1917), 2288-302
Burnet, J. Higher Education St The War, 1917-
Burrows, R.M. The Abdication of King Constantine Being a Reprint of
Articles (Anglo-Hellenic League Pamphlet no. 3Mi 1917.
"Albania & Greece", Hew Europe, IX, 105 (19 Dec. 1918), 227-31.
The Crisis in Greece (Anglo-Hellenic League Pamphlet no. 19), 1915
Greece in 1917 (Anglo-Hellenic League Pamphlet no. 33), 1917.
"Greece & the Balkan Settlement", Quarterly Review, CCIX, 1*55
(April 1918), 576-81*.
"The Greek White Book", Contemporary Review, CXIII, I (Jan. 1918),
129-31*.
"The Korakas Forgery", Hew Europe, V, 57 (15 Nov. 1917), 133-1*0.
"The Need for Self-Renunciation", New Europe, VI, 69 (7 Feb.
1918), 99-103.
"Philhellenisin in England & France", Contemporary Review, CIX,
(Feb. 1916), 161-1*.
The New Greece (Anglo-Hellenic League Pamphlet no. ll*), 1911*.
The Present Position in the Balkans (Anglo-Hellenic League
Pamphlet no. 27), 1916.
"Venizelos & the Greek Crisis", Contemporary Review, CVII, 5
(May 1916), 5^5-52.
Bury, J.B. "Freedom of Speech & The Censorship", R.P.A. Annual &
Ethical Review, 1919, 16-19.
Germany & Slavonic Civilisation, 191^.
Selected Essays, Cambridge, 1930.
Butler, G.G. International Law & Autocracy: A Public Lecture Delivered
Before the University of Pennsylvania, 1917.
Cairns, D.S. An Answer to Bernhardi (Papers for Wartime no. 12), Oxford
191^.
Carpenter, J.E. "The Development of Liberal Theology in England", in
Religion & the Future & Other Essays, 1911.
382.
The Promotion of International Peace through Universities.
(National Peace Council Pamphlet, Educational Series), 1912.
(ed.) Ethical & Religious Problems of the War Fourteen Addresses,
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